BERND PULCH, STASI LIST, KGB LIST, STASI LISTE, LIVE SEARCH, SECRET LIST OF ALL OFFSHORE COMPANIES, OFFSHORE INDONESIA, OFFSHORE, MALAYSIA, KGB PUTIN, BDVP, STASI IM WESTEN, STASI FUEHRUNGSOFFIZIERE, TOXDAT, GOMOPA, COMMUNIST DATABASE, DOWNLOAD, STASI-LISTE, KGB LISTE, STASI PUTIN, TOP SECRET – BERND PULCH – The Naked Truth
In einem Archiv wurde der Stasi-Ausweis des heutigen russischen Präsidenten Wladimir Putin gefunden. Mit dem Ausweis habe er in Stasi-Dienststellen ein- und ausgehen können. Damit zeigt sich, dass es noch etliche Stasi-Promis gibt, die bis jetzt noch nicht enttarnt wurden. Diese Stasi-“Stars” sind nicht auf der offiziellen Stasi-Liste verzeichnet, die im Hinblick auf Rentenforderungen vor dem Ende der DDR erstellt wurde.
Folgen jetzt noch mehr Enttarnungen ?
Russlands Präsident Wladimir Putin (66) hatte bis zum Mauerfall auch einen Ausweis der Staatssicherheit der DDR. Das Dokument habe jahrelang unbemerkt im Archiv gelegen, sagte der Dresdner Außenstellenleiter der Stasiunterlagenbehörde, Konrad Felber..
Der Ausweis war am 31. Dezember 1985 ausgestellt und bis Ende 1989 immer wieder verlängert worden. Putin war damals als Offizier des sowjetischen Geheimdienstes KGB in Dresden tätig.
Mit dem Dokument habe Putin ohne umfangreiche Kontrolle in den Dienststellen der Stasi ein- und ausgehen können, erläuterte Felber.
“Das heißt aber nicht automatisch, dass Putin für die Stasi gearbeitet hat.” Nein, denn die Stasi hat för Putins KGB gearbeitet und diverse Seilschaftenvor allem in Ostberlin tun dies heute noch – Mord und Cyberkrieg inklusive.
“Zu sowjetischen Zeiten waren der KGB und die Stasi befreundete Dienste. Deshalb ist nicht auszuschließen, dass es auch wechselseitige Ausweise gab”, sagte Putins Sprecher Dmitri Peskow der Agentur Tass zufolge.
Putin war Augenzeuge, als während der friedlichen Revolution am 5. Dezember 1989 rund 5.000 Demonstranten die hermetisch abgeschirmte Dresdner Bezirksverwaltung der Staatssicherheit besetzten. Als sich die Demonstranten der Dienststelle näherten, kam es fast zu gewalttätigen Auseinandersetzungen mit sowjetischen Militärs.
Aufgrund einer Medienanfrage seien Akten der Abteilung “Kader und Schulung” der ehemaligen Stasi-Bezirksverwaltung Dresden durchforstet worden, sagte Felber. Dabei sei man auf den Ausweis gestoßen.
“Es ist schon eine kleine Sensation. Putins Name war in den Akten, die die Ausgabe der Ausweise an sowjetische Militärangehörige nachweisen, nicht verzeichnet.”
Es zeigt sich wieder einmal, wie die Stasiunterlagenbehörde, die seit Beginn mit Stasi-Agenten durchsetzt war und ist, arbeitet.
Wann kommen endlich die längst überfälligen anderen Enttarnungen ?
Cyberspace operations (CO) is the employment of cyberspace capabilities where the primary purpose is to achieve objectives in or through cyberspace.
This publication focuses on military operations in and through cyberspace; explains the relationships and responsibilities of the Joint Staff (JS), combatant commands (CCMDs), United States Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM), the Service cyberspace component (SCC) commands, and combat support agencies; and establishes a framework for the employment of cyberspace forces and capabilities.
The Nature of Cyberspace Relationship with the Physical Domains.
Cyberspace, while part of the information environment, is dependent on the physical domains of air, land, maritime, and space.
CO use links and nodes located in the physical domains and perform logical functions to create effects first in cyberspace and then, as needed, in the physical domains. Actions in cyberspace, through carefully controlled cascading effects, can enable freedom of action for activities in the physical domains.
Cyberspace Layer Model. To assist in the planning and execution of CO, cyberspace can be described in terms of three interrelated layers: physical network, logical network, and cyberpersona. Department of Defense (DOD) Cyberspace. The Department of Defense information network (DODIN) is the set of information capabilities and associated processes for collecting, processing, storing, disseminating, and managing information on-demand to warfighters, policy makers, and support personnel, whether interconnected or stand-alone, including owned and leased communications and computing systems and services, software (including applications), data, security services, other associated services, and national security systems.
Connectivity and Access. Gaining access to operationally useful areas of cyberspace, including targets within them, is affected by legal, policy, or operational limitations. For all of these reasons, access is not guaranteed. Additionally, achieving a commander’s objectives can be significantly complicated by specific elements of cyberspace being used by enemies, adversaries, allies, neutral parties, and other United States Government (USG) departments and agencies, all at the same time.
The operational environment (OE) is a composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and impact the decisions of the commander assigned responsibility for it. The information environment permeates the physical domains and therefore exists in any OE. The information environment is the aggregate of individuals, organizations, and systems that collect, process, disseminate, or act on information.
Given that cyberspace is wholly contained within the information environment and the chief purpose of information operations (IO) is to create effects in the information environment, there is significant interdependency between IO and CO.
Integrating Cyberspace Operations with Other Operations
During joint planning, cyberspace capabilities are integrated into the joint force commander’s (JFC’s) plans and synchronized with other operations across the range of military operations. While not the norm, some military objectives can be achieved by CO alone. Commanders conduct CO to obtain or retain freedom of maneuver in cyberspace, accomplish JFC objectives, deny freedom of action to the threat, and enable other operational activities.
Cyberspace Operations Forces
Commander, United States Cyber Command (CDRUSCYBERCOM), commands a preponderance of the cyberspace forces that are not retained by the Services. USCYBERCOM accomplishes its missions within three primary lines of operation: secure, operate, and defend the DODIN; defend the nation from attack in cyberspace; and provide cyberspace support as required to combatant commanders (CCDRs). The Services man, train, and equip cyberspace units and provide them to USCYBERCOM through the SCCs.
Challenges to the Joint Force’s Use of Cyberspace
Threats. Cyberspace presents the JFC’s operations with many threats, from nation-states to individual actors to accidents and natural hazards. Anonymity and Difficulties with Attribution. To initiate an appropriate defensive response, attribution of threats in cyberspace is crucial for any actions external to the defended cyberspace beyond authorized self-defense.
Geography Challenges. In cyberspace, there is no stateless maneuver space. Therefore, when US military forces maneuver in foreign cyberspace, mission and policy requirements may require they maneuver clandestinely without the knowledge of the state where the infrastructure is located.
Technology Challenges. Using a cyberspace capability that relies on exploitation of technical vulnerabilities in the target may reveal its functionality and compromise the capability’s effectiveness for future missions.
Private Industry and Public Infrastructure. Many of DOD’s critical functions and operations rely on contracted commercial assets, including Internet service providers (ISPs) and global supply chains, over which DOD and its forces have no direct authority.
Globalization. The combination of DOD’s global operations with its reliance on cyberspace and associated technologies means DOD often procures mission-essential information technology products and services from foreign vendors.
Mitigations. DOD partners with the defense industrial base (DIB) to increase the security of information about DOD programs residing on or transiting DIB unclassified networks.
An unidentified cyber actor in mid-March 2018 used GrandCrab Version 2 ransomware to attack a State of Connecticut municipality network and a state judicial branch network, according to DHS reporting derived from a state law enforcement official with direct and indirect access. The municipality did not pay the ransom, resulting in the encryption of multiple servers that affected some data backups and the loss of tax payment information and assessor data. The attack against the state judicial branch resulted in the infection of numerous computers, but minimal content encryption, according to the same DHS report.
(U//FOUO) The unidentified cyber actor introduced the ransomware used against the judicial branch network through a vendor server/host; the ransomware then harvested cached credentials of high-level privileged accounts, according to the same DHS report. The actor then used the credentials to access two servers on the network and propagate the malware via server message block (SMB). Connecticut state cybersecurity officials were able to block the ransomware’s communication with external infrastructure, which prevented the encryption of additional hosts and data loss, according to the same DHS report.
(U) GandCrab Malware
(U) Released in late January 2018, GandCrab, also called “GrandCrab,” is a ransomware variant distributed by exploit kits that requires communication with the ransomware’s command-and-control (C2) server to encrypt files of an infected computer, according to an online technical support site. The developers of GandCrab recently upgraded the original version after Romanian police and BitDefender mitigated infections by recovering its decryption keys, according to a separate article from the same online technical support site. As of 6 March 2018, no free decryption key is available to victims of GandCrab version 2. GandCrab uses NameCoin’s .BIT as its top-level domain (TLD); therefore, variants of the ransomware using the .BIT TLD must also use a domain name server that supports .BIT, according to the same online technical support site. Upon infection, GandCrab will attempt to query the ransomware’s C2 servers on the .BIT domain to establish communication. GandCrab will not encrypt a host’s content with the .CRAB extension if communication is not established with the C2 server, according to the same online technical support site.
• Establish a shared ontology and enhance information-sharing since it is easier to maintain mapping of multiple models to a common reference than directly to each other
• Characterize and categorize threat activity in a straightforward way that can support missions ranging from strategic decision-making to analysis and cybersecurity measures and users from generalists to technical experts
• Support common situational awareness across organizations
Key Attributes and Goals in Building a Cyber Threat Framework
• Incorporate a hierarchical/layered perspective that allows a focus on a level detail appropriate to the audience while maintaining linkage and traceability of data
• Employ Structured and documented categories with explicitly defined terms and labels (lexicon)
• Focus on empirical/sensor-derived ‘objective’ data
• Accommodate a wide variety of data sources, threat actors and activity
• Provide as a foundation for analysis and decision-making
The Common Cyber Threat Framework
• Since 2012, the Office of the DNI has worked with interagency partners to build and refine The Common Cyber Threat Framework reflecting these key attributes and goals
• The Common Cyber Threat Framework is not intended to displace or replace an organization’s existing model which is tailored to its specific mission and requirements; rather, it is intended to:
Serve as a viable Universal Translator (a cyber Esperanto or Rosetta Stone) facilitating efficient and possibly automated exchange of data and insight across models once each has been mapped to it and the mappings shared
Provide a Starting Point featuring a simple threat model and value-neutral concepts. It can be customized for any organization as needed—and any deviations from the common approach are readily apparent, facilitating mapping and data exchange.
The Domestic Operational Law (DOPLAW) Handbook for judge advocates is a product of the Center for Law and Military Operations (CLAMO). The content is derived from statutes, Executive Orders and Directives, national policy, DoD Directives and Instructions, joint publications, service regulations, field manuals, as well as lessons learned by judge advocates and other practitioners throughout Federal and State government. This edition includes substantial revisions. It incorporates new guidance set forth in Department of Defense Directive 3025.18 (Defense Support of Civil Authorities), Department of Defense Instruction 3025.21 (Defense Support of Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies), numerous new National Planning Framework documents, and many other recently updated publications. It provides amplifying information on wildfire response, emergency mutual assistance compacts, the role of the National Guard and Army units in domestic response, and provides valuable lessons learned from major disasters such as Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria.
The Handbook is designed to serve as a working reference and training tool for judge advocates; however, it is not a substitute for independent research. With the exception of footnoted doctrinal material, the information contained in this Handbook is not doctrine. Judge advocates advising in this area of the law should monitor developments in domestic operations closely as the landscape continues to evolve. Further, the information and examples provided in this Handbook are advisory only. The term “State” is frequently used throughout this Handbook, and collectively refers to the 50 States, Guam, Puerto Rico, U.S. Virgin Islands, and the District of Columbia. The same is often referred to as “the 54 States and territories.” Finally, the content and opinions expressed in this Handbook do not represent the official position of the U.S. Army or the other services, the National Guard Bureau, the Office of The Judge Advocate General, The Judge Advocate General’s Legal Center and School, or any other government agency.
A Dual Status Commander maintains a commission in both a Title 10 and Title 32 capacity which helps to unify the effort of the Federal and National Guard personnel involved in the response to a major disaster or emergency. The National Defense Authorization Act for 201261 stated that when Federal forces and the National Guard are employed simultaneously in support of civil authorities,appointment of a Dual Status Commander should be the usual and customary command and control arrangement. This includes Stafford Act major disaster and emergency response missions. The use of Dual Status Commanders is becoming more common for incident response, and they have been used for planned and special events since 2004. Dual Status Commanders receive orders from both the State and Federal chains of command, and thus serve as a vital link between the two. Dual Status Commanders can be appointed in one of two ways. First, under 32 U.S.C. § 315, an active duty Army or Air Force officer may be detailed to the Army or Air National Guard of a State. Second, under 32 U.S.C. § 325, a member of a State’s Army or Air National Guard may be ordered to active duty. Regardless of method of appointment, the Secretary of Defense must authorize the dual status, and the Governor of the effected State must consent.
c. Participation of DoD Personnel in Civilian Law Enforcement Activities
The Federal courts have enunciated three tests to determine whether the use of military personnel violates the PCA. If any one of these three tests is met, the assistance may be considered a violation of the PCA.
The first test is whether the actions of military personnel are “active” or “passive.” Only the active, or direct, use of military personnel to enforce the laws is a violation of the PCA. The second test is whether the use of military personnel pervades the activities of civilian law enforcement officials. Under this test, military personnel must fully subsume the role of civilian law enforcement officials. The third test is whether the military personnel subjected citizens to the exercise of military power that was regulatory, proscriptive, or compulsory in nature. A power “regulatory in nature” is one which controls or directs. A power “proscriptive in nature” is one that prohibits or condemns. A power “compulsory in nature” is one that exerts some coercive force. Note that under DoDD 3025.21, Immediate Response Authority may not be used when it may subject civilians to military power that is “regulatory, prescriptive, proscriptive, or compulsory.” Thus, Immediate Response Authority may not be used to circumvent the PCA. …
(iii) Civil Disturbance Statutes
The third type of permitted direct assistance by military forces to civilian law enforcement is action taken pursuant to DoD responsibilities under the Insurrection Act, 10 U.S.C. §§ 251-255. This statute contains express exceptions to the Posse Comitatus Act that allow for the use of military forces to repel insurgency, domestic violence, or conspiracy that hinders the execution of State or Federal law in specified circumstances. Actions under this authority are governed by DoDD 3025.21. The Insurrection Act permits the President to use the armed forces to enforce the law when:
There is an insurrection within a State, and the State legislature (or Governor if the legislature cannot be convened) requests assistance from the President; A rebellion makes it impracticable to enforce the Federal law through ordinary judicial proceedings; An insurrection or domestic violence opposes or obstructs Federal law, or so hinders the enforcement of Federal or State laws that residents of that State are deprived of their constitutional rights and the State is unable or unwilling to protect these rights. 10 U.S.C. § 254 requires the President to issue a proclamation ordering the insurgents to disperse within a certain time before use of the military to enforce the laws. The President issued such a proclamation during the Los Angeles riots in 1992.
(iv) Other Authority
There are several statutes and authorities, other than the Insurrection Act, that allow for direct DoD participation in civil law enforcement.64 They permit direct military participation in civilian law enforcement, subject to the limitations within each respective statute. This section does not contain detailed guidance; therefore, specific statutes and other references must be consulted before determining whether military participation is permissible. A brief listing of these statutes includes:
Prohibited transactions involving nuclear material (18 U.S.C. § 831) Emergency situations involving chemical or biological weapons of mass destruction (10 U.S.C. § 282) (see also 10 U.S.C. §§ 175a, 229E and 233E which authorizes the Attorney General or other DOJ official to request SECDEF to provide assistance under 10 U.S.C. § 282) Assistance in the case of crimes against foreign officials, official guests of the United States, and other internationally protected persons (18 U.S.C. §§ 112, 1116) Protection of the President, Vice President, and other designated dignitaries (18 U.S.C. § 1751 and the Presidential Protection Assistance Act of 1976) Assistance in the case of crimes against members of Congress (18 U.S.C. § 351) Execution of quarantine and certain health laws (42 U.S.C. § 97) Protection of national parks and certain other Federal lands (16 U.S.C. §§ 23, 78, 593) Enforcement of the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery and Conservation Management Act (16 U.S.C. § 1861(a)) Actions taken in support of the neutrality laws (22 U.S.C. §§ 408, 461–462) Removal of persons unlawfully present on Indian lands (25 U.S.C. § 180) Execution of certain warrants relating to enforcement of specified civil rights laws (42 U.S.C. § 1989) Removal of unlawful enclosures from public lands (43 U.S.C. § 1065) Protection of the rights of a discoverer of a guano island (48 U.S.C. § 1418) Support of territorial Governors if a civil disorder occurs (48 U.S.C. §§ 1422, 1591) Actions in support of certain customs laws (50 U.S.C. § 220) Actions taken to provide search and rescue support domestically under the authorities provided in the National Search and Rescue Plan …
Cyber operations are not the future. They are now. The National Guard faces the same constraints in cyberspace as in the traditional kinetic realm. However, cyberspace presents some unique challenges. For instance, most military equipment is not governed by restrictive licensing agreements. However, software-licensing agreements may restrict who may use a cyber-tool kit and how that kit may be used. Additionally, cyberspace activities are generally not linear in nature. For example, one computer does not normally interact directly with another computer. Rather, the data is transferred through multiple routers and servers, all of which may not be in the same town, State or even country. As a result, actions intended to have a domestic effect in cyberspace could have international consequences. Additionally, attribution in cyberspace is not as clear as it is in the kinetic realm. What may appear to be an action taken by a local resident could very well be an action orchestrated by a foreign actor. This complex and evolving battle space requires legal practitioners to have both a basic understanding of how the cyberspace works as well as the laws and policies governing those actions.