“The Future of Warfare Is Warfare in Cyberspace,” NSA Declared

Washington, D.C., April 26, 2013 – Since at least 1997, the National Security Agency (NSA) has been responsible for developing ways to attack hostile computer networks as part of the growing field of Information Warfare (IW), according to a recently declassified internal NSA publication posted today by the non-governmental National Security Archive (“the Archive”) at The George Washington University. Declaring that “the future of warfare is warfare in cyberspace,” a former NSA official describes the new activity as “sure to be a catalyst for major change” at the super-secret agency.

The document is one of 98 items the Archive is posting today that provide wide-ranging background on the nature and scope of U.S. cyber activities.

Activities in cyberspace — both defensive and offensive — have become a subject of increasing media and government attention over the last decade, although usually the focus has been on foreign attacks against the United States, most notably the Chinese government’s reported exploitation of U.S. government, commercial and media computer networks. At the same time, the apparent U.S.-Israeli created Stuxnet worm, designed to damage Iranian centrifuges, has put the spotlight on the United States’ own clandestine cyber efforts.

The NSA’s new assignment as of 1997, known as Computer Network Attack (CNA), comprises “operations to disrupt, deny, degrade or destroy” information in target computers or networks, “or the computers and networks themselves,” according to the NSA document.

Today’s posting by the Archive highlights various aspects of U.S. cyberspace activities and concerns going back to the late 1970s. The documents — obtained from government and private websites as well as Freedom of Information Act requests — originate from a wide variety of organizations. These include the White House and National Security Council, the National Security Agency, the Departments of Defense, Energy, and Homeland Security, the military services, the General Accounting/ Government Accountability Office, and the Congressional Research Service — as well as three private organizations (Project 2049, Mandiant Corporation, and Symantec).

Source: Department of Homeland Security (see Document 52).

Among the highlights of the documents are:

The NSA’s earlier concerns about the vulnerability of sensitive computer systems to either viruses or compromise through foreign intelligence service recruitment of computer personnel (Document 1, Document 2, Document 3, Document 4, Document 9)
The Secretary of Defense’s March 1997 authorization of the National Security Agency to conduct computer network attack operations (Document 11)
Detailed discussions of Chinese computer network exploitation activities (Document 66, Document 79, Document 83)
Analyses of the Stuxnet worm (Document 40, Document 42, Document 44, Document 88)
Extensive treatments of intelligence collection concerning U.S. technologies through computer network exploitation (Document 18, Document 55, Document 63)

* * *
Cyberspace and U.S. National Security
By Jeffrey T. Richelson

In an October 2012 speech (Document 78), then-Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta told a group of business executives that “a cyber attack perpetrated by nation states [or] violent extremist groups could be as destructive as the terrorist attack on 9/11,” and raised the prospect of a “cyber Pearl Harbor.” In his February 2013 State of the Union address, President Barack Obama asserted that “our enemies are … seeking the ability to sabotage our power grid, our financial institutions, our air traffic control systems.” Later that month, Director of National Intelligence James R. Clapper led off his annual threat assessment (Document 90) appearance before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence with a discussion of the Intelligence Community’s assessment of the cyber threat.1

Stuxnet: “The world’s first precision cybermunition.” Source: Department of Homeland Security (see Document 52)

Concern about the potential damage of cyber attack did not originate in the current administration. Even before the establishment of the computer connectivity of the current Internet-era, there was concern, including in the National Security Agency, about the threat of computer viruses (Document 1, Document 2, Document 3, Document 4, Document 5, Document 6) or the vulnerability of computer systems due to recruitment efforts by hostile intelligence services (Document 9). More recently, the William J. Clinton and George W. Bush administrations focused on the connection between cyberspace and national security, issued policy directives, and considered and/or authorized both public and covert actions.

Occasionally, some of those concerns have been met with skepticism. Critiques have included the assertion that the very structure of the Internet means it is not subject to a ‘Pearl Harbor’ type attack — that is, an attack at single point. The association of power outages in the northeastern United States in 2003 and Brazil in 2007 with cyberattacks has been challenged by reviewers and experts — who point to studies that concluded there were other, more mundane, causes. One writer has asserted that cyberwar is not here, and that it is not coming. Additional issues that have been raised include the lack of disclosed evidence with regard to more extreme claims concerning the threat, the dangers of threat inflation (including facilitating the expenditure on ‘cyber pork’), and the extent to which the costs of other types of criminal activity (such as car theft) dwarf the cost of cyber crime.2 What is indisputable, however, is the dramatic increase in attention — both in the U.S. Government and private industry — to activities in cyberspace in the last decade — which has been reflected in both media coverage and the release of private and government documents.

Attacks & Exercises

Source: Defense Science Board. See Document 81.

Significant attention has been devoted, in both the classified and unclassified realms, to actual attacks as well as exercises that have sought to determine the vulnerability of key government and infrastructure systems to attack.

The Government Accounting Office (renamed the Government Accountability Office in 2004) reported (Document 6) that between April 1990 and May 1991, a period that encompassed Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, computer hackers from the Netherlands penetrated 34 Department of Defense sites. According to that report, the hackers were able to access “unclassified, sensitive information” concerning military personnel, logistics, and weapons systems development. The report also asserted that, particularly during times of international conflict, “such information … can be highly sensitive.”

In March and April 1994, according to GAO reports (Document 10a, Document 10b), the Air Force’s Rome Laboratory, in upstate New York, was targeted by a pair of hackers (a 16-year old British student and a 22-year old Israeli technician) who, using “Trojan Horse” and “sniffer” programs, managed to take control of the lab’s networks. In addition to taking all of the lab’s 33 subnetworks offline for several days, the hackers also stole air tasking order research data and gained access to systems at NASA’s Goddard Space Flight Center, Wright Patterson Air Force Base, and a variety of defense contractors.

Source: Defense Science Board. See Document 81.

In February 1998, several Department of Defense networks were attacked through a commonly understood vulnerability in the Solaris (UNIX-based) computer system — the investigation of which was designated SOLAR SUNRISE. The attack involved probing Defense Department servers to determine if the vulnerability existed, and then exploiting it — entering the system and planting a program to collect data. The hackers, ultimately discovered to be two California high school students, also mounted at least a second intrusion to extract data from the penetrated computers.3

In 2003, a series of computer intrusions were directed against the U.S. Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA), the U.S. Redstone Arsenal, the Army Space and Strategic Defense Command, and several DoD contractors – but they apparently went undetected for several months. That series of intrusions was labeled TITAN RAIN, and Defense Department investigators believed it to have originated in China. In June 2006, Department of Energy officials acknowledged that the names of and personal information of more than 1,500 National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) employees had been stolen due to network intrusion that apparently began in 2004.4

Another set of attacks that attracted attention (Document 27) was directed against former Soviet-controlled territories, and was widely believed to have been the work of the Russian government. On July 20, 2008, the Georgian president’s website was subjected to a denial-of-service attack. On August 8, a coordinated, distributed denial-of-service attack occurred on other Georgian government websites. At that time, Russian forces were engaged in combat with Georgian forces. Additional cyber attacks on Lithuanian and Kyrgzstan targets took place in June 2008 and January 2009, respectively. The attack on Lithuanian websites occurred three days after that country passed legislation outlawing the use of Soviet and communist symbols, while the January 2009 attack took place on the same day that Russia tried to pressure Kyrgyzstan to revoke U.S. access to the Bishkek airbase being used as a transit point for supplies to Afghanistan.5

Since that time there have been numerous reports of cyber incidents. Included have been a series of attacks on global energy targets, dubbed NIGHT DRAGON, a 2012 cyber attack on the Saudi Arabian state-owned Aramco oil company, and cyber attacks on U.S. banks and companies — attacks alleged to have been the responsibility of Iran.6

Along with the actual intrusions that have been taking place for over two decades, the United States has also conducted a number of exercises and studies in an attempt to assess the extent of computer network vulnerability. The first exercise, designated ELIGIBLE RECEIVER, was conducted over 90 days in 1997, and involved a Red Team consisting of 35 individuals. Simulated, and apparently successful, cyber attacks were made against government and private power and communications networks in Oahu, Los Angeles, Colorado Springs, St. Louis, Chicago, Detroit, Washington, D.C., Fayetteville, and Tampa. The head of the Pentagon’s Joint Task Force – Computer Network Defense, wrote that the exercise “clearly demonstrated our lack of preparation for a coordinated cyber and physical attack on our critical military and civilian infrastucture.”7

A subsequent exercise, designated LIVEWIRE, was conducted by the Department of Homeland Security. In 2005, the CIA’s Information Operations Center conducted a three-day exercise, codenamed SILENT HORIZON. The objective of the exercise was to practice defending against a cyber attack that would be on the same scale as the September 11, 2001, events, and would target both governmental and private sectors.8

Intelligence and Threat Assessments

Intelligence/threat assessments concerning cyberspace include estimates of the current and projected future cyber capabilities and activities of a variety of nations and groups. They can also include assessments of the specific threats faced by government and private organizations in relation to the current state of cyber security.

In late 2012 and early 2013, several press sources reported that a national intelligence estimate focused on worldwide cyber activities had either been completed or was in the process of completion. An earlier estimate was produced in February 2004: NIE-2004-01D/I, Cyber Threats to the Information Infrastructure. An additional national intelligence product was produced for the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) by the Intelligence Science Board – a January 2008 report titled Technical Challenges of the National Cyber Initiative. 9

None of those products has been released, even in redacted form. Estimates and assessments which have been released include those produced by the Congressional Research Service, the Defense Security Service, a ODNI component, and a contractor for the U.S.-China Security and Economic Review Commission. In 2007, the CRS examined (Document 24), inter alia, examples of vulnerabilities that terrorists might decide to exploit in attempting a coordinated cyberattack and ways that terrorists might be improving their cyber skills. The report, Terrorist Capabilities for Cyberattack: Overview and Policy Issues, noted different views concerning the ability of Al-Qaeda (or other terrorist groups) to launch a significant cyberattack and the related danger of a “Digital Pearl Harbor.” It also noted a CIA assessment, provided in April 2002 to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, that “cyberwarfare attacks against the U.S. critical infrastructure will become a viable option for terrorists as they become more familiar with the technology required for the attacks.”

A 2004 assessment of the intelligence threat (Document 18), particularly from nations or others seeking to conduct economic espionage was produced by the Interagency OPSEC Support Staff. One chapter focuses on ‘Computers and the Internet’. In addition to providing a history of Internet security and discussing the relationship between website content and operational security, it also explores the roots of network vulnerability and eight outsider attack techniques – including scanning, packet sniffing, and malware.

Several unclassified assessments (Document 26, Document 43, Document 63) by the Defense Security Service have focused on foreign attempts to acquire advanced U.S. technology. The most recent version (Document 63), as with previous versions, examines a variety of methods for acquiring information on U.S. technologies — including “suspicious network activity,” which was the most prevalent collection method for “entities originating from East Asia and the Pacific.”

A similar type of assessment (Document 55) was produced in October 2011 by the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive, a component of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. The report, Foreign Spies Stealing US Economic Secrets in Cyberspace, examines the vulnerability of US technologies and trade secrets to cyberspace operations, the threat from specific collectors (including Russia, China, and U.S. partners), and the outlook for the future (including both “near certainties” and “possible game changers”).

Key assessments of Chinese computer network exploitation that are in the public domain have been produced either by contractors in response to tasking from the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission or by private organizations. In October 2009, the review commission released Capability of the People’s Republic of China to Conduct Cyber Warfare and Computer Network Exploitation (Document 30). It examined Chinese computer network exploitation activities, strategy and operations during a military conflict, key entities in Chinese computer network operations, cyber-espionage, an operational profile of an advanced cyber intrusion and a chronology of alleged Chinese computer network exploitation activities.

A second report (Document 66), also produced for the U.S.-China review commission, and released in 2012, Occupying the High Ground, focused on Chinese capabilities for computer network exploitation. It included a look at the key entities and institutions supporting Chinese computer network operations, potential risks to the U.S. telecommunications supply chain, and the risks and reality of collaboration between U.S. and Chinese information security firms. Along with the reports for the review commission, two private organizations have produced detailed reports on PRC computer espionage activities. In 2012, a research group focused on China released a study (Document 79) based on open sources and computer-based investigations, examining the roles of several PLA organizations in cyber operations, including the Third Department of the PLA General Staff Department, its 2nd Bureau as well as its Beijing North Computer Center. Early the next year, the Mandiant computer security company released its study (Document 83) on the 2nd Bureau — which discussed the tasking of the unit, its past espionage operations, attack lifecycle, and the unit’s infrastructure and personnel.

In contrast to the extensive public documents concerning China’s computer attack and exploitation activities, far less has appeared concerning similar Iranian activities. In 2012, Director of National Intelligence James Clapper did characterize them as “dramatically increasing in recent years in depth and complexity.” 10 A hearing in 2012 featured statements on Iranian cyber activities from two members of Congress and two non-governmental experts. (Document 71a, Document 71b, Document 71c, Document 71d).

Directives, Strategies, Policies, and Plans

While a number of presidential directives in earlier years addressed subjects such as communications security and information security, Presidential Decision Directive 63 (Document 12), Critical Infrastructure Protection, signed by President William J. Clinton on May 22, 1998, focused on protecting both “physical and cyber-based systems essential to the minimum operations of the economy and government.” Among the steps Clinton directed was the establishment of a National Infrastructure Assurance Plan, increased intelligence collection and analysis devoted to the cyber threat, and creation of a National Infrastructure Protection Center.

The George W. Bush administration produced a number of classified as well as unclassified documents concerning cyberspace. The first, National Security Presidential Directive 16 (NSPD-16) was reported to have been issued in July 2002 and provide guidelines for the conduct of offensive cyber operations. A public document, The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace (Document 16), was released in February 2003 and was followed by the classified NSPD-38, with the same title, of July 7, 2004. A third classified directive, NSPD-54, Cyber Security and Monitoring, was issued on January 8, 2008. 11

President Obama has signed two Presidential Policy Directives concerning cybersecurity — the still classified PPD-20 (title unknown) and PPD-21, “Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience” (Document 86) — the latter following the failure of two proposed pieces of cybersecurity legislation to make it through Congress. Its key components are its delineation of roles and responsibilities, of officials and agencies, its identification of three strategic imperatives, and its direction to the Secretary of Homeland Security on steps to take to implement the directive. Issued the same day was an executive order (Document 87) that focused solely on critical infrastructure cybersecurity — including information sharing, reduction of cyber risk, and identification of critical infrastructure at greatest risk.

On May 8, 2009, the White House issued the results of its cyberspace policy review — Cyberspace Policy Review: Assuring a Trusted and Resilient Information and Communications Infrastructure (Document 28). It produced a plan that included establishing performance metrics, preparing a cybersecurity response plan, and instituting a national public awareness and education campaign to promote cybersecurity. In May 2011 the White House released its International Strategy for Cyberspace: Prosperity, Security, and Openness in a Networked World (Document 46), which discussed the building of U.S. cyberspace policy, the future of cyberspace, as well as U.S. policy priorities and concludes with the a discussion of the implementation of U.S. strategy. Then, in early 2013, along with PPD-21 and the related executive order, the administration released Administration Strategy on Mitigating the Theft of U.S. Trade Secrets (Document 82). Part of the strategy concerns mitigating cyber theft and describes four action items – diplomatic efforts, voluntary practices by industry, enhancing domestic law enforcement operations, improving domestic legislation, and promoting public awareness.

Numerous departments also have produced cyber strategy documents at various levels of classification. In 2006, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff produced the National Military Strategy for Cyberspace Operations (Document 23), which was classified Secret. Its introduction described it as the “comprehensive strategy of the U.S. Armed Forces to ensure U.S. military superiority in cyberspace.” Since released under the Freedom of Information Act, the document identified four strategic priorities in implementing the strategy – including gaining and maintaining the initiative to operate within adversary decision cycles and integrating cyber capabilities across the full range of military operations using cyberspace. In July 2011, that strategy was replaced by the unclassified Department of Defense Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace (Document 50) — which noted five strategic initiatives with regard to DoD operations in cyberspace. Those initiatives include treating cyberspace as an operational domain with regard to organization, training, and equipment as well as employing new concepts to protect DoD networks and systems.

The individual military services and their components have also produced their own policy and planning documents concerning cyberspace activities. In February 2010, the Army’s Training and Doctrine Command published an unclassified pamphlet (Document 33) on how cyber operations would be integrated into the full spectrum of Army operations. The next year, the Air Force produced Air Force Doctrine Document 3-12, Cyberspace Operations (Document 60), which included a discussion of the design, planning, execution, and assessment of cyberspace operations.

Civilian departments have also produced their own strategy documents — such as the Department of Homeland Security’s November 2011 Blueprint for a Secure Cyber Future (Document 58), which listed four cybersecurity goals (including reducing exposure to cyber risk and increasing resilience) and nine means for achieving those goals.

In addition to presidential directives, departmental directives also serve to state policies as well as assign responsibilities. Thus, the 2006 DoD Directive 3600.01 (Document 22), “Information Operations,” assigned the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information Integration responsibilities with regard to computer network defense — a responsibility since assumed by the department’s Chief Information Officer.. A January 2010 directive (Document 31) focuses on protection of unclassified Defense Department information that passes through or resides on Defense Industrial Base information systems and networks.

The Department of Energy has also issued its own directives concerning cybersecurity — including a September 2010 directive (Document 36) on the department’s cybersecurity management policy, including a statement of objectives, principles, responsibilities, and implementation, as well as a May 2011 directive (Document 48) which stipulates that the department’s cybersecurity policy be based on a risk management approach.

Organizations

U.S. government organizations involved in cyberspace activities (excluding those involved in evaluating programs) can be found in the Intelligence Community, Department of Defense, and several civilian departments or agencies – including the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Department of Homeland Security.

The most senior U.S. official concerned with the analysis of intelligence concerning foreign cyber capabilities and activities is a member of the DNI’s National Intelligence Council — the National Intelligence Officer for Cyber Issues — a position first established in May 2011. Sometime in the late 1990s, an Information Operations Center was established within the CIA’s Directorate of Operations (now the National Clandestine Service). It absorbed some of the functions of the Directorate of Science and Technology’s Clandestine Information Technology Office. The office was officially described as being responsible for addressing “collection capabilities within emerging information technologies.” The Center’s Analysis Group is located in the Directorate of Intelligence and evaluates foreign threats to U.S. computer systems, particularly those that support critical infrastructure. 1 2

The National Security Agency’s involvement in cyber security is a consequence of its long-time role in insuring first communications and then information security for various components of the government and private sector as well as its need to insure the security of the computers it has relied on heavily for decades (e.g. Document 2, Document 3, Document 4). Its role in computer network exploitation – of gathering electronic “data at rest” is a natural extension of its signals intelligence role of gathering “data in motion.” In March 1997, according to an article (Document 11) by a former deputy director, it was also assigned the mission of computer network attack.

A major step in the organization of U.S. cyberspace activities, indicative of an upgrade in attention, occurred in late June 2009, when Secretary of Defense Robert Gates ordered (Document 29) the establishment of a unified U.S. Cyber Command subordinate to the U.S. Strategic Command. In his memo Gates noted that he would recommend to the president that he appoint the director of the National Security Agency as commander of the Cyber Command, that the command would reach initial operating capability by October 2009 and full operating capability by October 2010. He also directed disestablishment of STRATCOM’s Joint Task Force — Global Network Operations (JTF-GNO) and Joint Functional Component Command — Network Warfare (JFCC-NW) prior to the new command reaching full capability. In addition, Gates wrote that his memorandum “reinforces, but does not expand, USSTRATCOM authorities and responsibilities for military cyberspace operations.”

According to a brief fact sheet (Document 38), the Cyber Command is responsible for planning, coordinating, and conducting the operations and defense of specified Department of Defense information networks.” It also, when directed, conducts “full-spectrum military cyberspace operations.” Its current headquarters organization, as depicted in an organization chart (Document 92), was released in April 2013.

Subordinate to the Cyber Command are its component commands — Army Forces Cyber Command; the 24th Air Force (a component of the Air Force Space Command); the U.S. Fleet Cyber Command (Document 69), which oversees the Navy Information Operations Command; the Navy Cyber Warfare Development Group; the Navy Cyber Defense Operations Command; and the Marine Forces Cyber Command.

In June 2002, the Director of the FBI established a Cyber Division. The division is responsible for coordinating and supervising the FBI’s investigation of federal violations “in which the Internet, computer systems, or networks are exploited as the principal instruments or targets of terrorist organizations, foreign government-sponsored intelligence operations, or criminal activity, and for which the use of such systems is essential to that activity.” 13

The Department of Homeland Security established the National Cyber Security Division (NCSD) in June 2003 “to serve as the national focal point for cybersecurity and to coordinate implementation of the February 2003 national cyberspace strategy (Document 16). Its mission (Document 52) is to “serve as the Federal Government’s lead in assessing, mitigating and responding to cyber risks in collaboration with Federal, State and local governments, the private sector, academia, and international partners.”

Cybersecurity White Papers

The most public aspect of U.S. activities in cyberspace centers around standard cybersecurity operations. In addition to documents such as presidential and departmental directives or strategy documents that stipulate cybersecurity goals, objectives or specific activities, there are a variety of other relevant documents.

Included are a number of “white papers” which described cybersecurity efforts. In March 2010, the White House released The Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative (Document 34), which described details of the initiative launched in the previous administration and provided details of a dozen different components of the effort. In February 2010, the Department of Homeland Security released a paper (Document 32) describing various cybersecurity activities — such as the operation of the EINSTEIN intrusion detection system. In July 2011 a DHS official briefed his audience (Document 52) on a variety of topics — including the department’s National Cyber Security Division, hacking activities directed at both government and private organizations, the Stuxnet worm, and the NIGHT DRAGON exploitation effort, and cybersecurity advisory activities.

Computer Network Exploitation

Computer network exploitation (CNE) has been defined (Document 22) as “enabling operations and intelligence collection to gather data from target or adversary automated information systems or networks.” Such exploitation operations can be intended to produce information about the computer systems and networks as a prelude to a network attack or as another method of gathering economic or military intelligence. 14

CNE operations are examined in a number of intelligence threat assessments, including the Defense Security Service (Document 26, Document 43, Document 63) assessments, as well as the report by the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive. (Document 55). As noted above, Chinese CNE operations are discussed in two reports (Document 30, Document 66) for the U.S-China review commission as well as the reports by Project 2049 (Document 79) and the Mandiant Corporation (Document 83). In addition, an Army War College paper (Document 72) also examines Chinese cyber, including CNE, capabilities.

Computer Network Attack

Computer Network Attack (CNA) has been defined (Document 22) as “operations to disrupt, deny, degrade or destroy information resident in computers and computer networks, or the computers and networks themselves. According to former NSA official William B Black Jr. (Document 11), on March 3, 1997, the Secretary of Defense officially delegated to the National Security Agency the authority to develop CNA techniques. Prior to U.S.-led airstrikes against the Qaddafi government in March 2011, the U.S. reportedly considered a cyber offensive designed to disrupt and even disable the Libyan government’s air-defense system.15

What is widely believed to be the product of a joint U.S-Israeli CNA operation was the worm Stuxnet — part of a U.S. CNA effort designated OLYMPIC GAMES.16 The worm was reported to have infected Iranian industrial control systems at the Natanz nuclear facility and damaged Iranian centrifuges. While there has been no official U.S. or Israeli confirmation of their involvement in the operation, it has been the subject of reports by the RAND Corporation (Document 42) and Congressional Research Service (Document 40) as well as the Symantec computer security corporation.

The CRS paper (Document 40), The Stuxnet Computer Worm: Harbinger of an Emerging Warfare Capability, provides an overview of the worm, an exploration of possible developers and future users, a discussion of whether Iran was the intended target, as well as coverage of industrial control systems vulnerabilities and critical infrastructure, national security implications, and issues for Congress. RAND’s study, A Cyberworm that Knows No Boundaries (Document 42), explores the issues raised by the Stuxnet case, the vulnerabilities exploited, the difficulties in defending against such malware, and the problems posed by organizational and legal restrictions. It also provides a short assessment of the status of U.S. defensive capabilities and efforts required to improve those capabilities.

Symantec’s initial analysis (Document 44) provided a technical analysis of the worm, exploring the attack scenario, timeline, Stuxnet architecture, installation, load point, command and control, propagation methods, payload exports, payload resources, and other topics. A subsequent Symantec report (Document 88) stated that the company had “discovered an older version of Stuxnet that can answer questions about its evolution.”

Computer Network Defense

See Document 23.

Computer network defense is defined in the DoD Information Operations directive (Document 22) as “actions taken to protect, monitor, analyze, detect, and respond to unauthorized activity within DoD information systems and computer networks.” Those actions can include counterintelligence, law enforcement, and other military capabilities. The first of these is the subject of one classified DoD directive (Document 41) — “Counterintelligence (CI) Activities in Cyberspace.” That directive makes clear that those activities include not only counterintelligence collection and support but offensive counterintelligence operations.

Techniques for computer network defense are also the subject of two Naval Postgraduate School theses. A 2003 thesis (Document 17) explores the feasibility of employing deception against cyberterrorists, where cyberterrorists are defined by two criteria – that the aim of launching unlawful attacks or threatening such attacks on computers, networks, and the information stored in them is to intimidate or coerce a government or its people in pursuit of political or social objectives, and that the activities result either in violence against persons or property or cause enough harm to generate fear.

A 2008 thesis (Document 25) examines what the author believes to be the key elements of deterrence in cyberspace – including denial, the development and demonstration of overt punishment techniques, the establishment of thresholds, and the development and articulation of national policy – and the prospects for cyber deterrence.

Audits and Evaluations

Audits and evaluations of cybersecurity and other cyberspace operations have been conducted by the GAO and the inspectors general of the Defense, Energy, Homeland Security, and Justice departments.

The inspector general of the Department of Homeland Security produced a classified report, released with redactions (Document 54), which examined the department’s capability to share cyber threat information with other federal agencies and the private sector. A subsequent classified report, also released with redactions in August 2012 (Document 75), addressed the department’s international cybersecurity program and noted areas that could be targeted for improvement — including developing a strategic implementation plan for foreign engagement and improving communications between the U.S. Computer Emergency Readiness Team and foreign entities.

The Department of Energy’s inspector general issued a report (Document 56) in October 2011 on the department’s unclassified cybersecurity program, which examined whether that program provided sufficient protection of its data and information systems. According to the report, corrective actions for only 11 of 35 cyber security weaknesses identified in the inspector general’s 2010 report had been completed. It also reported that there was a 60 percent growth in identified weaknesses over the 2010 report. In early 2013, the department’s inspector general issued a report (Document 84) on the cybersecurity program at the Los Alamos National Laboratory.

The Justice Department’s inspector general produced a 2011 audit report (Document 45) on the FBI’s ability to address the national security cyber intrusion threat. It reported on the FBI’s efforts in developing and operating the National Cyber Investigative Joint Task Force, and the ability of the FBI field offices to investigate national security cyber cases.

The GAO also produced a report (Document 47), released in May 2011, that evaluated the extent to which the Department of Defense and the U.S. Cyber Command had provided the military services with adequate guidance with respect to roles and responsibilities, command and control relationships, and mission requirements and capabilities with regard to cyberspace operations. Other GAO reports have examined continued challenges facing DoD (Document 49) and protection of critical infrastructure (Document 51, Document 62). A 2012 GAO report (Document 70) assessed the cyber threats to federal and other computer systems and vulnerabilities present in federal information systems and supporting critical infrastructure. A February 2013 report (Document 85) focused on the challenges facing the federal government in producing a strategic approach to cybersecurity.

Some GAO evaluations have focused on cybersecurity issues with respect to single components of critical U.S. infrastructure – including the electricity grid (Document 74), and pipelines (Document 76). The GAO’s report on securing the electricity grid examines cyber threats to the grid, actions taken to prevent attacks, and remaining challenges. The office’s pipeline study cybersecurity risks, U.S. pipeline security initiatives, and the adequacy of voluntary pipeline cybersecurity.

Legal Issues

The increasing attention to cyberspace issues has also been reflected in the examination of associated legal issues — both in law journals and government documents.17

In November 1999, the Office of the General Counsel of the Department of Defense issued a second edition of An Assessment of International Legal Issues in Information Operations (Document 13). The section “Application to Computer Network Attacks” (pp.16-23) concludes with a one-paragraph assessment which begins, “It is far from clear the extent to which the world community will regard computer network attacks as ‘armed attacks’ or ‘uses of force,’ and how the doctrines of self-defense and countermeasures will be applied to computer network attacks.” More recently, an Air Force instruction (Document 53) specifies the responsibilities of different Air Force components for legal reviews of weapons and cyber capabilities as well as the content of such reviews.

Legal issues have also been examined by the Congressional Research Service. In a March 2012 paper (Document 65), CRS explored Fourth Amendment, civil liberties, and privacy issues related to the protection of critical infrastructure and the sharing of cybersecurity information — as well as the possibility of conflicts between state and federal cybersecurity law. Another CRS study (Document 73) examines possible cyber-related changes to 28 different statutes.

The question of whether the U.S. Cyber Command had sufficient legal authority to carry out its mission was the catalyst for an exchange of letters (Document 68a, Document 68b, Document 68c), beginning in March 2012, between Senator John McCain (R-AZ) and General Keith B. Alexander, Director of the National Security Agency and the commander of the U.S. Cyber Command. In his initial letter McCain posed six questions, while in his second letter he notes a number of disagreements with the content of Alexander’s responses.

The Documents

Document 1: [Deleted], National Security Agency, “Computer Operating System Vulnerabilities,” Cryptolog, VI, 3 (March 1979). Unclassified.

Source: http://www.nsa.gov

This article, which appeared in a classified NSA journal, explores seven common computer operating system vulnerabilities, several penetration techniques, defensive measures, and future research areas.

Document 2: Robert J. Hanyok, National Security Agency, “Some Reflections on the Reality of Computer Security,” Cryptolog, IX, 6-7 (June-July 1982). Confidential.

Source: http://www.nsa.gov

The author of this article argues that while computer users at NSA have been confident that the security of their systems is “ironclad and invulnerable” the reality is quite different. He then notes a number of user practices and implementation problems that make those systems vulnerable.

Document 3: [Deleted], “Computer Virus Infections: Is NSA Vulnerable?,” Cryptologic Quarterly, 4, 3 (Fall 1985). Top Secret.

Source: http://www.nsa.gov

This paper examines the nature of computer viruses, whether there is an algorithm to determine whether a program is infected with a virus, different classes of attack (including compromise, spoofing, and denial of service), and solutions.

Document 4: [Deleted], “A First Generation Technical Viral Defense,” Cryptologic Quarterly, 7, 2 (Summer 1988). Secret.

Source: http://www.nsa.gov

This paper examines a defense, involving encryption, that can be used to respond to the detection of a computer virus — and means for checking the effectiveness of the response.

Document 5: General Accounting Office, GAO/IMTEC-89-57, Computer Security: Virus Highlights Need for Improved Internet Management, June 1989. Unclassified.

The catalyst for this report was a November 1988 computer virus that caused thousands of computers, in the United States and overseas, to shut down. The report provides details on some of the networks disrupted by the virus, the means of infection, and notes the vulnerabilities highlighted by the incident.

Document 6: General Accounting Office, GAO/T-IMTEC-92-5, Computer Security: Hackers Penetrate DOD Computer Systems, November 20, 1991. Unclassified.

Source: http://www.gao.gov

This testimony of a GAO official concerns his division’s investigation of the attacks by Dutch hackers on Army, Navy, and Air Force computer systems — which the official characterizes as containing unclassified but sensitive information — during Operation Desert Storm/Shield. It examines how the hackers penetrated the systems, agency responses, and the need for greater attention to computer security.

Document 7: Richard Sylvester, National Security Agency, “NSA and Computer Viruses,” Cryptolog, XIX, 3 (1992). Unclassified/For Official Use Only.

Source: http://www.nsa.gov

This one-page article reports NSA classification guidelines with respect to any discussion of computer viruses with regard to NSA systems. Classification of specific facts ranged from Unclassified to Top Secret/Handle Via Comint Channels Only.

Document 8: [Deleted], National Security Agency, “Global Network Intelligence and Information Warfare: SIGINT and INFOSEC in Cyberspace,” Cryptolog, XXI,1 (1995). Top Secret/Handle Via Comint Channels Only.

Source: http://www.nsa.gov

This heavily-redacted article extends beyond cyber issues, but does note that “sophisticated telecommunications and data networks … make it possible to deny and degrade a potential adversary’s command and control communications and sensitive commercial and diplomatic communications from great distances with little or no risk to life and limb.”

Document 9: [Deleted], “Out of Control,” Cryptologic Quarterly, Special Edition, 15, 1996. Secret.

Source: http://www.nsa.gov

This article, in another National Security Agency journal, discusses the threat to computer systems containing classified information via human intelligence operations directed at systems administrators. A largely redacted section is titled “”Foreign Intelligence Services Are Already Targeting Computer Personnel,” while the final section offers recommendations on how to address the problem.

Document 10a: Government Accounting Office, GAO/AIMD- 96-84, Information Security: Computer Attacks at Department of Defense Pose Increasing Risks, May 22, 1996. Unclassified.

Document 10b: Jack L. Brock, General Accounting Office, GAO/T-AIMD-96-92, Information Security: Computer Attacks at Department of Defense Pose Increasing Risks, May 22, 1996. Unclassified.

Source: http://www.gao.gov

This report and testimony by a GAO official reports on an examination of hacker attacks on Defense Department computer systems, including a 1994 episode that involved over 150 attempts to access the computer systems of Rome Laboratory — which resulted in the theft of air tasking research data and damage to the laboratory’s air tasking order research project “beyond repair,” according to lab officials. The report and testimony also discuss the challenges faced by DoD in securing its computer systems.

Document 11: William B. Black, National Security Agency, “Thinking Out Loud About Cyberspace,” Cryptolog, XXIII, 1 (Spring 1997). Secret.

Source: http://www.nsa.gov

This article, by a senior NSA official, notes that NSA was assigned the mission of computer network attack in March 1997, and argues that the world was on the verge of a new age — “the information age” — and that the future of war would be warfare in cyberspace.

Document 12: William J. Clinton, Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-63, Subject: Critical Infrastructure Protection, May 22, 1998. For Official Use Only/Unclassified.

Source: Federation of American Scientists (www.fas.org)

The introduction to this directive notes that the military and economy of the United States are “increasingly reliant upon certain critical infrastructures and upon cyber-based information systems.” The remainder of the 18-page directive specifies the President’s intent “to assure the continuity and validity of critical infrastructures” in the face of physical or cyber threats, states a national goal, delineates a public-private partnership to reduce vulnerability, states guidelines, specifies structure and organization, discusses protection of Federal government critical infrastructures, orders a NSC subgroup to produce a schedule for the completion of a variety of tasks, and directs that an annual implementation report be produced.

Document 13: Office of General Counsel, Department of Defense, An Assessment of International Legal Issues in Information Operations, Second Edition, November 1999. Unclassified.

Source: http://www.dod.gov

The introduction to this assessment notes that information operations includes information attack which, in turn, includes computer network attack. It goes on to consider the implications of a variety of domestic and international laws and treaties with regard to information operations.

Document 14: Steven A. Hildreth, Congressional Research Service, Cyberwarfare, June 19, 2001. Unclassified.

Source: http://www.fas.org

This report discusses the definition of cyberwarfare, and contains three case studies — including the Rome Laboratory incident (Document 8a, Document 8b) and two exercises — and, inter alia, reviews U.S policy and doctrine, organization, and legal issues. It also discusses selected foreign views and activities with regard to cyberwar.

Document 15: Michael Vatis, ESDP Discussion Paper-2002-04, Cyber Attacks: Protecting America’s Security Against Digital Threats, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, June 2002. Not classified.

Source: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University (www.beflercenter.hks.harvard.edu)

This paper, written by the first director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s National Infrastructure Protection Center, examines: the range of cyber attackers (including insiders, criminal groups, virus writers, foreign intelligence services, foreign military organizations, terrorists, “hacktivists,” and recreational hackers), types of cyber attacks, the international component of cyber attacks, the federal response to cyber attacks, Presidential Decision Directives 62 and 63, and the policy of the George H.W. Bush administration. Vatis also offers recommendations concerning cyber research and development, alert status during conflict, and identifying best practices related to cyber security.

Document 16: The White House, The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, February 2003. Unclassified.

Source: http://www.us-cert.gov

This 76-page document discusses the strategy’s strategic objectives (including preventing cyber attacks against critical U.S. infrastructures), the government’s role in cyber security, the anticipated role of the Department of Homeland Security in cyber security, and five critical priorities for cyberspace security (including a national cyberspace security response system and international cooperation). A classified National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD-38), with the identical title, was issued on July 7, 2004.

Document 17: Kheng Lee Gregory Tran, Naval Postgraduate School, Confronting Cyberterrorism with Cyber Deception, December 2003. Unclassified.

Source: Dudley Knox Library, Naval Postgraduate School (www.nps.edu/library)

This master’s thesis examines the possibility of using deception to defeat or mitigate the damage from cyberterrorism. It examines, inter alia, the cyberterrorism threat, the values and risks of deception, nine varieties of cyber deception (including concealment, camouflage, false and planted information, ruses, and feints) and cyber defense, and the pitfalls of cyber defense.

Document 18: Interagency OPSEC Support Staff, Intelligence Threat Handbook, June 2004. Unclassified.

Source: Author’s Collection

The scope of this handbook is broader than cybersecurity, but one section — Computers and the Internet — addresses the history of Internet security, threats to computer network security, roots of network vulnerability, outsider attack techniques, insider attack techniques, and countermeasures.

Document 19: Office of Inspector General, Department of Homeland Security, OIG-04-29, Progress and Challenges in Securing the Nation’s Cyberspace, July 2004. Unclassified.

Source: http://www.dhs.gov

This document reports on the inspector general’s evaluation of the Department of Homeland Security’s efforts to implement The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace (Document 14). It notes “major accomplishments” — including the creation of a Computer Emergency Readiness Team, creation of the National Cyber Alert System, and sponsorship of the National Cyber Security Summit. It also notes “a number of challenges to address long-term cyber threats and vulnerabilities” — including the DHS National Cybersecurity Division’s need to prioritize its initiatives, identify resources required to carry out its mission, and develop strategic implementation plans.

Document 20: President’s Information Technology Advisory Committee, Report to the President, Cyber Security: A Crisis of Prioritization, February 2005. Unclassified.

Source: http://www.nitrd.gov/pitac/reports

The two main chapters of this report, prior to the concluding chapter, address the importance of cyber security and examine federal cyber security research and development efforts. In its concluding chapter the committee states its findings and recommendations with regard to federal funding for fundamental research in civilian cyber security, the cyber security research community, technology transfer efforts, and the coordination and oversight of federal cyber security research and development.

Document 21: Donald Rumsfeld, to Steve Cambone, Subject: Cyber Attack Issue, November 04, 2005, Unclassified/FOUO .

Source: http://www.rumsfeld.com

In this “snowflake” directed to his under secretary for intelligence, Rumsfeld suggests that Cambone consider establishing a group to review organization, budgeting, and presentation issues with regard to cyber attacks.

Document 22: Department of Directive O-3600.01, Subject: Information Operations, August 14, 2006. Unclassified/For Official Use Only.

Source: Department of Defense Freedom of Information Act Release

This directive states Department of Defense policy and responsibilities with regard to information operations (defined as the integrated deployment of electronic warfare, computer network operations, psychological operations, military deception, and operations security). Among those whose responsibilities are identified is the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information Integration.

Document 23: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, The National Military Strategy for Cyberspace Operations, December 2006. Secret.

Source: Department of Defense Freedom of Information Act Release.

This strategy document was issued to provide guidelines to the Defense Department — including military service organizations, the unified commands, and DoD components (including agencies, field activities and other entities) — with regard to planning, executing, and allocating resources for cyberspace operations. Its main chapters focus on the strategic context, threats and vulnerabilities, strategic considerations, the military strategic framework, and implementation and assessment. Several enclosures address topics such as examples of threats and threat actors, examples of vulnerabilities, and strategic priorities and outcomes.

Document 24: John Rollins and Clay Wilson, Congressional Research Service, Terrorist Capabilities for Cyberattack: Overview and Policy Issues, January 22, 2007. Unclassified.

Source: http://www.fas.org

This study examines possible terrorists’ objectives in conducting cyberattacks, computer vulnerabilities that might make cyberattack against the U.S. homeland’s critical infrastructure viable, and emerging computer and technical skills of terrorists. It also examines the cybersecurity efforts of several government agencies, changing concerns about cyberattack, and a number of additional issues concerning terrorist or criminal cyber activities.

Document 25: Ryan J. Moore, Naval Postgraduate School, Prospects for Cyber Deterrence, December 2008. Unclassified.

Source: http://www.nps.edu/library

The author of this thesis argues that with “more sectors of critical national infrastructure [being] interconnected in cyberspace,” the risk to national security from cyberattack “has increased dramatically.” He explores the fundamentals of strategic deterrence, the evolving cyber threat, deterrence strategy in cyberspace, and the prospects for cyber deterrence.

Document 26: Defense Security Service, Targeting U.S. Technologies: A Trend Analysis of Reporting from Defense Industry, 2009. Unclassified.

Source: http://www.dss.mil

This assessment of foreign attempts to illicitly acquire U.S. technologies concerns a variety of techniques, including “suspicious internet activity” — which includes, but is not limited to “confirmed intrusion, attempted intrusion, [and] computer network attack.”

Document 27: Major William C. Ashmore, School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Army Command and General Staff, Impact of Alleged Russian Cyber Attacks, 2009. Unclassified.

Source: http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/fr/fulltext/u2/a504991.pdf

This monograph was written to examine the implications of alleged Russian cyber attacks against Estonia and Georgia for the Russian Federation, former Soviet satellites, and international organizations.

Document 28: The White House, Cyberspace Policy Review: Assuring a Trusted and Resilient Information and Communications Infrastructure, May 8, 2009. Unclassified.

Source: The White House (www.whitehouse.gov)

This paper reports the results of a presidentially-directed 60-day comprehensive review to evaluate U.S. policies and organizational structures related to cybersecurity. The review produced seven main conclusions which included: “The Nation is at a crossroads,” “The status quo is no longer acceptable,” “The United States cannot succeed in securing cyberspace if it works in isolation,” and “The Federal government cannot entirely delegate or abrogate its role in securing the Nation from a cyber incident or accident.”

Document 29: Robert M. Gates, Memorandum to Secretaries of the Military Departments, Subject: Establishment of a Subordinate Unified U.S. Cyber Command Under U.S. Strategic Command for Military Cyberspace Operations, June 23, 2009. Unclassified.

Source: http://www.dod.gov

This memo from the Secretary of Defense directs the commander of the U.S. Strategic Command to establish a U.S. Cyber Command and that the command reach an initial operating capability by October 2009 and a full operating capability by October 2010. It also informs the recipients of the Secretary’s plan to recommend to the president that the National Security Agency director also become commander of the Cyber Command.

Document 30: Bryan Krekel, Northrop Grumman, Capability of the People’s Republic of China to Conduct Cyber Warfare and Computer Network Exploitation, October 9, 2009. Unclassified .

Source: Air University (www.au.af.mil)

This study, prepared for the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, focuses largely on Chinese computer network exploitation (CNE) as a strategic intelligence collection tool. It examines Chinese CNE operations strategy and operations during conflict, key entities in Chinese computer network operations, cyber-espionage, an operational profile of an advanced cyber intrusion, and a chronology of alleged Chinese computer network exploitation events.

Document 31: Department of Defense, DoD Instruction 5205.13, Subject: Defense Industrial Base (DIB) Cyber Security/Information Assurance (CS/IA) Activities, January 29, 2010. Unclassified.

Source: http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/520513p.pdf

This Defense Department instruction states policy, establishes responsibilities, and delegates authority with regard to the protection of unclassified DoD information that passes through or resides on unclassified Defense Industrial Base information systems and networks.

Document 32: Department of Homeland Security, Computer Network Security & Privacy Protection, February 19, 2010. Unclassified.

Source: http://www.dhs.gov

This white paper describes the Department of Homeland Security’s computer network security activities, which includes the operation of the EINSTEIN intrusion detection systems — including the systems collection methods and the implications for privacy protection. It also discusses topics such as oversight and compliance, the role of the National Security Agency, and future program development.

Document 33: U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-7-8, The United States Army’s Cyberspace Operations Concept Capability Plan, 2016-2028, February 22, 2010. Unclassified.

Source: http://www.fas.org

This pamphlet explores how “the Army’s future force in 2016-2028 will leverage cyberspace and CyberOps” and how CyberOps (which is specified to consist of four components — cyberwarfare, cyber network operations, cyber support, and cyber situational awareness) will be integrated into full spectrum operations.

Document 34: The White House, The Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative, March 2, 2010. Unclassified.

Source: http://www.whitehouse.gov

The release of this document by the Obama White House revealed details of the cybersecurity initiative launched during the previous administration. It provides basic details of twelve different components of the initiative — which include intrusion detection and prevention systems across the federal government, coordination and redirection of research and development efforts, enhancing situational awareness, increasing the security of classified networks, developing enduring deterrence strategies, and defining the role of the federal government for extending cybersecurity into critical infrastructure domains.

Document 35: Keith Alexander, Director, National Security Agency, Advanced Questions for Lieutenant General Keith Alexander, USA Nominee for Commander, United States Cyber Command, April15, 2010. Unclassified.

Source: http://www.fas.org

This 32-page documents consists of 28 questions (some with multiple parts) posed to, and answered by, General Alexander in advance of his appearance before the Senate Armed Services Committee with respect to his nomination to head the newly formed U.S. Cyber Command.

Document 36: Department of Energy, DOE P 205.1, Subject: Departmental Cyber Security Management Policy, September 23, 2010. Unclassified.

Source: http://www.energy.gov

This Department of Energy policy directive covers the six components of the department’s cyber security management policy — its objectives, guiding principles, core functions, mechanisms, responsibilities, and implementation.

Document 37: Janet Napolitano and Robert Gates (signators), Memorandum of Agreement Between the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Defense Regarding Cybersecurity, September 27, 2010. Unclassified.

Source: http://www.dhs.gov

The purpose of the agreement, signed by the Secretaries of Homeland Security and Defense, is specified as establishing the terms by which the two departments “will provide personnel, equipment, and facilities” in order to increase interdepartmental collaboration in strategic planning as well as operational activities concerning cybersecurity.

Document 38: Department of Defense, Cyber Command Fact Sheet, October 13, 2010. Unclassified.

Source: http://www.dod.gov

This fact sheet provides basic information about the U.S. Cyber Command — including its mission, focus, and components.

Document 39: JASON, JSR-10-102, Science of Cyber-Security, November 2010. Unclassified.

Source: http://www.fas.org

This report, by the Defense Department’s JASON scientific advisory group, was a response to the department’s request that the group examine whether there were underlying fundamental principles that would make it possible to adopt a more scientific approach to the issue of cybersecurity. The sciences they examine for possible guidance are economics, meteorology, medicine, astronomy, and agriculture.

Document 40: Paul K. Kerr, John Rollins, and Catherine A. Theohary, Congressional Research Service, The Stuxnet Computer Worm: Harbringer of an Emerging Warfare Capability, December 9, 2010. Unclassified.

Source: http://www.fas.org

This short paper provides an overview of the Stuxnet worm, an exploration of possible developers and future users, a discussion of whether Iran was the intended target, as well as industrial control systems vulnerabilities and critical infrastructure, national security implications, and issues for Congress.

Document 41: Department of Defense, DoD Instruction S-5240.23, Subject: Counterintelligence (CI) Activities in Cyberspace, December 13, 2010. Secret.

Source: Department of Defense Freedom of Information Act Release.

According to this instruction, DoD counterintelligence activities in cyberspace are to be directed against foreign intelligence services and international terrorist organizations. The two key portions of the instruction define the responsibilities of DoD components and establish procedures for counterintelligence activities. While much of the segment concerning procedures is redacted in the declassified version, the table of contents indicates three different types of CI-related activities in cyberspace: counterintelligence support, counterintelligence collection, and offensive counterintelligence operations (OFCO).

Document 42: Isaac R. Porsche III, Jerry M. Sollinger, and Shawn McKay, RAND Corporation, A Cyberworm that Knows no Boundaries, 2011. Unclassified.

Source: http://www.rand.org

The catalyst for this paper were the reports of the Stuxnet worm (Document 40). It explores issues raised by “sophisticated yet virulent malware” — including the nature of the threats, the vulnerabilities exploited and the difficulties in defending against Stuxnet-type worms, and the problems posed by organizational and legal restrictions. It also provides a short assessment of the status of U.S. defensive capabilities and efforts required to improve those capabilities.

Document 43: Defense Security Service, Targeting U.S. Technologies: A Trend Analysis of Reporting from Defense Industry, 2011. Unclassified.

Source: http://www.dss.mil

This report updates the Defense Security Service’s 2009 assessment of foreign attempts to illicitly acquire U.S. technologies, and concerns a variety of techniques, including “suspicious internet activity.” It notes a high level of suspicious network activity “in the form of cyber intrusion attempts directed at cleared contractor networks.”

Document 44: Nicolas Falliere, Liam O. Murchu, and Eric Chien, Symantec, W 32. Stuxnet Dossier, Version 1.4, February 2011. Not classified.

Source: http://www.symantec.com

This study, prepared by the Symantec computer security firm, provides a technical analysis of the Stuxnet malware — exploring the attack scenario, timeline, Stuxnet architecture, installation, load point, command and control, propagation methods, payload exports, payload resources and other topics.

Document 45: Office of the Inspector General, Department of Justice, Audit Report 11-22, The Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Ability to Address the National Security Cyber Intrusion Threat , April 2011. Secret.

Source: http://www.justice.gov/oig/reports/FBI/a1122r.pdf

The audit which is the subject of this report was conducted to evaluate the FBI’s efforts in developing and operating the National Cyber Investigative Joint Task Force in response to the national security cyber threat, and assess the FBI field offices’ capabilities to investigate national security cyber cases.

Document 46: The White House, International Strategy for Cyberspace: Prosperity, Security, and Openness in a Networked World, May 2011. Unclassified.

Source: http://www.whitehouse.gov

This policy document discusses the process of building U.S. cyberspace policy, the future of cyberspace (including the preferences of the U.S. and its role in achieving its preferred outcomes), and U.S. policy priorities (with regard to economic issues, network protection, law enforcement, and several additional issues). It concludes with a discussion of U.S. implementation of its strategy.

Document 47: Government Accountability Office, GAO-11-421, Defense Department Cyber Efforts: More Detailed Guidance Needed to Ensure Military Services Develop Appropriate Cyberspace Capabilities, May 2011. Unclassified.

Source: http://www.gao.gov

This study was conducted to determine the extent to which the Defense Department and U.S. Cyber Command had provided the military services with adequate guidance with respect to roles and responsibilities, command and control relationships, and mission requirements and capabilities with regard to cyberspace operations.

Document 48: Department of Energy, DOE O 205.1B, Subject: Department of Energy Cyber Security Program, May 16, 2011. Unclassified .

Source: http://www.energy.gov

This Energy department order states requirements for the department’s Cyber Security Program, which requires a risk management approach. It also specifies the responsibilities of over a dozen department components or officers in formulating and implementing the program.

Document 49: Government Accountability Office, GAO-11-75, Department of Defense Cyber Efforts: DOD Faces Challenges In Its Cyber Activities, July 2011. Unclassified.

Source: http://www.gao.gov

This is an unclassified version of a previously classified report. It examines DoD’s organization for addressing cybersecurity threats as well as assessing the extent to which the Defense Department had developed a joint doctrine for cyberspace operations, assigned command and control responsibilities, and identified and addressed key capability gaps involving cyberspace operations.

Document 50: Department of Defense, Department of Defense Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace, July 2011. Unclassified .

Source: http://www.defense.gov

The core of this strategy document is the discussion of five strategic initiatives with regard to DoD operations in cyberspace — treating cyberspace as an operational domain with regard to organization, training, and equipment; employing new defense operations concepts to protect DoD networks and systems; collaboration with other U.S. government departments and the private sector; cooperation with U.S. allies and international partners; and leveraging “the nation’s ingenuity” through the cyber work force and technological innovation.

Document 51: Gregory C. Wilshusen, Government Accountability Office, GAO-11-865T, Cybersecurity: Continued Attention Needed to Protect Our Nation’s Critical Infrastructure, July 26, 2011. Unclassified.

Source: http://www.gao.gov

The focus of this study is the federal role in enhancing cybersecurity related to the private sector’s operation of critical infrastructure. It describes cyber threats facing cyber-reliant critical infrastructures; discusses recent federal government actions, taken in cooperation with the private sector, to identify and protect such infrastructures; and identifies challenges to the protection of those infrastructures.

Document 52: Bradford Willke, Department of Homeland Security, Moving Toward Cyber Resilience, July 27, 2011. Unclassified.

Source: Pubic Intelligence (http://info.publicintelligence.net/DHS-CyberResilience.pdf)

This briefing covers a number of topics, including the origins, organization, and mission of the DHS National Cyber Security Division, hacking activities directed at a number of government and private entities (the CIA, Booz Allen Hamilton, Lockheed Martin), the Stuxnet worm, an effort designated Night Dragon that involved cyber-theft of sensitive information from international oil and energy companies, and cyber security advisory activities.

Document 53: Department of the Air Force, Air Force Instruction 51-402, Legal Reviews of Weapons and Cyber Capabilities, July 27, 2011. Unclassified.

Source: http://www.fas.org

This instruction focuses on the responsibilities of different Air Force components for legal reviews of weapons and cyber capabilities, as well as the contents of such reviews.

Document 54: Office of Inspector General, Department of Homeland Security, Review of the Department of Homeland Security’s Capability to Share Cyber Threat Information (Redacted), September 2011, Unclassified.

Source: http://www.dhs.gov

The Fiscal Year 2010 Intelligence Authorization Act required the inspectors general of the Intelligence Community and DHS to provide Congress with an assessment of how cyber threat information is being shared among federal agencies and the private sector, the means used to share classified cyber threat information, and the effectiveness of the sharing and distribution of cyber threat information. In addition to providing such an assessment, the Inspector General made three recommendations to DHS.

Document 55: National Counterintelligence Executive, Foreign Spies Stealing US Economic Secrets in Cyberspace: Report to Congress on Foreign Economic Collection and Industrial Espionage, 2009-2011 , October 2011. Unclassified.

Source: http://www.ncix.gov

This report, produced by a component of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, consists of three major sections. One is the vulnerability of U.S. technologies and trade secrets to cyberspace operations and the appeal of cyberspace collection. Another examines the threat from specific collectors, including Russia, China, and U.S. partners. The third provides an outlook for the future, divided between sections on “near certainties” and “possible game changers.”

Document 56: Office of Inspector General, Department of Energy, DOE/IG-0856, Evaluation Report: The Department’s Unclassified Cyber Security Program – 2011, October 2011. Unclassified.

Source: http://www.dhs.gov

The Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002 required an independent evaluation to determine whether the Department of Energy’s unclassified cyber security program adequately protected its data and information systems. According to the report, corrective actions for only 11 of 35 cybersecurity weaknesses identified in the inspector general’s 2010 report had been completed. In addition, there was a 60 percent growth in identified weakness over the 2010 report.

Document 57: Department of Homeland Security, Preventing and Defending Against Cyber Attacks, October 2011. Unclassified.

Source: http://www.dhs.gov

This DHS paper focuses on the department’s efforts in assisting federal executive branch civilian departments with securing their unclassified computer networks. It reports on the department’s efforts with respect to cybersecurity coordination and research, cybersecurity initiatives and exercises, the promotion of public awareness of cybersecurity, cybersecurity workforce development, and privacy and civil liberties issues.

Document 58: Department of Homeland Security, Blueprint for a Secure Cyber Future: The Cybersecurity Strategy for the Homeland Security Enterprise, November 2011. Unclassified.

Source: http://www.dhs.gov

This blueprint contains two main components. It lists four cybersecurity goals (reducing exposure to cyber risk, ensuring priority response and recovery, maintaining shared situational awareness, and increasing resilience) — to be attained through nine objectives. Secondly, it specifies four goals for strengthening the cyber system (to be attained via eleven objectives).

Document 59: Department of Defense, Department of Defense Cyberspace Policy Report: A Report to Congress Pursuant to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011, Section 934 , November 2011. Unclassified.

Source: http://www.dod.gov

This 14-page document describes the legal and policy issues associated with cyberspace, reports on decisions of the secretary of defense, and notes that there are no plans to update the National Military Strategy for Cyberspace Operations (Document 23) but that the Department of Defense Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace (Document 50) would provide strategy guidance. In addition, it describes the use and application of cyber modeling and simulation.

Document 60: United States Air Force, Air Force Doctrine Document 3-12, Cyberspace Operations, November 30, 2011. Unclassified.

Source: http://www.e-publishing/af.mil

This document examines cyberspace fundamentals (including U.S. national policy and the challenges of cyberspace operations); command and organization (including a description of U.S. cyberspace organizations as well as command and control of cyberspace operations); and the design, planning, execution, and assessment of cyberspace operations.

Document 61: National Science and Technology Council, Executive Office of the President, Trustworthy Cyberspace: Strategic Plan for the Federal Cybersecurity Research and Development Program, December 2011. Unclassified .

Source: http://www.cyber.st.dhs.gov

This plan specifies four interconnected priorities for U.S. government agencies that conduct or sponsor research and development in cybersecurity. The priorities are organized along four lines: inducing change, developing scientific foundations, accelerating transition to practice, and maximizing research impact.

Document 62: Government Accountability Office, GAO-12-92, Critical Infrastructure Protection: Cybersecurity Guidance Is Available but More Can Be Done to Promote Its Use, December 2011. Unclassified.

Source: http://www.gao.gov

This GAO report examines the use of cybersecurity guidance in seven critical infrastructure sectors (including banking and finance, energy, and nuclear reactors) from national and international organizations. It reports that while such guidance is being employed, sector officials do not believe it is comprehensive, and DHS and other sector-specific agencies have not identified key cybersecurity guidance applicable to each of their critical infrastructure sectors.

Document 63: Defense Security Service, Targeting U.S. Technologies: A Trend Analysis of Reporting from Defense Industry, 2012. Unclassified.

Source: http://www.dss.mil

The main focus of this report, by the Pentagon’s Defense Security Service, is not cybersecurity but the attempts to gather information on U.S. technologies — by whatever method. However, as did previous DSS reports (Document 26, Document 43), it does discuss “suspicious network activity” (SNA) as one acquisition method. It notes that SNA is “the most prevalent collection method for entities originating from East Asia and the Pacific,” although it is no higher than fifth with regard to collection methods associated with other regions.

Document 64: 624th Operations Center, Intelligence Surveillance & Reconnaissance Division, Air Force Space Command, Cyber Threat Bulletin, 2012 Top Ten Cyber Threats, January 9, 2012. Unclassified/For Official Use Only.

Source: http://www.publicintelligence.net

This bulletin passes along the conclusions of the McAfee computer security firm concerning the top 10 cyber threats for the coming year. The top five are attacking mobile devices, embedded hardware, “legalized” spam, industrial attacks, and hacktivism.

Document 65: Mark Mateski, Cassandra M. Trevino, Cynthia K. Veitch, John Michalski, J. Mark Harris, Scott Maruoka, and Jason Frye, Sandia National Laboratories, SAND 2012-2427, Cyber Threat Metrics, March 2012. Unclassified.

Source: http://www.fas.org

This report was prepared in support of the DHS cyber-risk and vulnerability assessment program intended to aid federal civilian executive branch agencies. It reviews alternative cyber threat metrics and models that might be employed in any operational threat assessment.

Document 66: Bryan Krekel, Patton Adams, George Bakos, Northrup Grumman, Occupying the Information High Ground: Chinese Capabilities for Computer Network Espionage and Cyber Espionage, March 7, 2012. Unclassified.

Source: http://www.uscc.gov

This report, prepared for the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, focuses on six topics: information warfare strategy, Chinese use of network warfare against the United States, key entities and institutions supporting Chinese computer network operations (the Third and Fourth Departments of the Peoples Liberation Army’s General Staff Department), potential risks to the U.S. telecommunications supply chain, the comparison between criminal and state-sponsored network exploitation, and the risks and reality of collaboration between U.S. and Chinese information security firms.

Document 67: Edward C. Liu, Gina Stevens, Kathleen Ann Ruane, Alissa M. Dolan, and Richard M. Thompson II, Congressional Research Service, Cybersecurity: Selected Legal Issues, March 14, 2012. Unclassified.

Source: http://www.fas.org

The authors of this report address legal issues related to the protection of critical infrastructure, the protection of federal networks (including Fourth Amendment as well as civil liberties and privacy issues), and the sharing of cybersecurity information. In addition, the authors explore the possibility of federal cybersecurity law preempting state law.

Document 68a: John McCain to General Keith B. Alexander, Letter, March 29, 2012. Unclassified.

Document 68b: Keith B. Alexander, Commander, U.S. Cyber Command to The Honorable John McCain, May 3, 2012. Unclassified/For Official Use Only.

Document 68c: John McCain to General Keith B. Alexander, May 9, 2012. Unclassified.

Sources: http://www.washingtonpost.com, http://www.federalnewsradio.com, http://blog.zwillgencom

This series of letters begins with Senator John McCain (R-Az.) writing to Cyber Command chief Keith Alexander concerning the issue of whether the U.S. government needs additional authorities to deter and defend against cyber attacks. Alexander’s May 3 letter contains responses to the six questions posed by McCain in his March 29 letter. In turn, McCain’s May 9 letter notes a number of disagreements with the content of Alexander’s responses.

Document 69: Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, OPNAV Instruction 5450.345, Subj: Mission, Functions, and Tasks for Commander, U.S. Fleet Cyber Command and Commander, U.S. Tenth Fleet, April 4, 2012. Unclassified.

Source: http://doni.daps.dla.mil/Directives

This instruction specifies the authorities and missions of the U.S. Fleet Cyber Command, as well as the relationship between the commander, Fleet Cyber Command, and the commander, U.S. Tenth Fleet. It also specifies a number of Navy entities under the administrative control of the Fleet Cyber Command — including the Navy Information Operations Command (which conducts signals intelligence operations), the Navy Cyber Warfare Development Group, and the Navy Cyber Defense Operations Command.

Document 70: Gregory C. Wilshusen, Government Accountability Office, GAO-12-666T, Cybersecurity: Threats Impacting the Nation, April 24, 2012. Unclassified.

Source: http://www.gao.gov

This report describes GAO’s assessment of cyber threats posed to federal and other computer systems, and vulnerabilities present in federal information systems and supporting critical infrastructure. It also describes reported cyber incidents and their impacts. It characterizes the number of cybersecurity incidents reported by federal agencies as rising and that “recent incidents illustrate that these pose serious risk.”

Document 71a: Pat Meehan, Statement to Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence and Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection and Security Technologies, “Iranian Cyber Threat to the U.S. Homeland,” April 26, 2012. Unclassified.

Document 71b: Dan Lungren, Statement to Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence and Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection and Security Technologies, “Iranian Cyber Threat to the U.S. Homeland,” April 26, 2012. Unclassified.

Document 71c: Frank J. Cilluffo, Director, Homeland Security Policy Institute, George Washington University, Statement to Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence and Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection and Security Technologies, “The Iranian Cyber Threat to the United States,” April 26, 2012.

Document 71d: Ilan Berman, American Foreign Policy Council, Statement to Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence and Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection and Security Technologies, “The Iranian Cyber Threat to the U.S. Homeland,” April 26, 2012. Unclassified.

Source: http://homeland.house.gov

Substantial attention has been devoted to Chinese cyberwarfare activities in the reports of private and government organizations as well as in Congressional hearings. While Iranian cyber activities were noted in the 2012 testimony of Director of National Intelligence James Clapper, who characterized them as “dramatically increasing in recent years in depth and complexity,” they have received less attention that those of the People’s Republic of China. These hearings, before a subcommittee of the House Committee on Homeland Security, involve assessments of the Iranian cyber threat by two Congressmen and representatives of two private organizations.

Document 72: Colonel Jayson M. Spade, U.S. Army War College, Information as Power: China’s Cyber Power and America’s National Security, May 2012. Unclassified.

Source: U.S. Army War College (www.carlisle.army.mil)

This research paper examines the growth of Chinese cyber capabilities — including those for offensive, defensive, and computer network exploitation operations. It also compares China’s capacity and potential in cyberspace to United States efforts with regard to cybersecurity. In addition, the author suggests a number of steps to improve U.S. cybersecurity policy.

Document 73: Eric A. Fischer, Congressional Research Service, Federal Laws Relating to Cybersecurity: Discussion of Proposed Revisions, June 29, 2012. Unclassified.

Source: http://www.fas.org

This analysis contains an introduction reviewing the then-current legislative framework on cybersecurity, executive branch actions, and legislative proposals. It then discusses proposed cybersecurity-related revisions to 28 different statutes — from the Posse Comitatus Act of 1879 to the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004.

Document 74: Gregory C. Wilshusen, Government Accountability Office, GAO-12-962T, Cybersecurity: Challenges in Securing the Electricity Grid, July 17, 2012. Unclassified.

Source: http://www.gao.gov

This testimony, by a GAO official, concerns cyber threats to critical infrastructure — including the electricity grid — as well as actions taken to prevent cyber attacks on the grid and challenges that remain. Mr. Wilshusen notes the actions taken by a number of entities (including the North American Electric Reliability Corporation, the National Institute of Standards and Technology, and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission), and identifies challenges such as a focus by utilities on regulatory compliance instead of comprehensive security and the lack of electricity metrics for evaluating cybersecurity.

Document 75: Office of Inspector General, Department of Homeland Security, OIG-12-112, DHS Can Strengthen Its International Cybersecurity Program (Redacted) , August 2012. Unclassified.

Source: http://www.dhs.gov

This is an unclassified version of a DHS inspector general report. In addition to reviewing actions taken to establish relationships with international cybersecurity entities, the report notes four areas that could be targeted for improvement — developing a strategic implementation plan for foreign engagement, streamlining the National Programs and Protection Directorate’s (NPPD) international affairs program and processes, improving communication between the U.S. Computer Emergency Readiness Team and foreign entities, and strengthening NPPD information sharing capabilities.

Document 76: Paul W. Parfomak, Congressional Research Service, Pipeline Cybersecurity: Federal Policy, August 16, 2012. Unclassified.

Source: http://www.fas.org

As a means of aiding Congressional consideration of possible measures to enhance pipeline security, this report examines pipeline security risks (including general security threats, supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) security risks, and cyber threats to U.S. pipelines), U.S. pipeline security initiatives, and the adequacy of voluntary pipeline cybersecurity.

Document 77: Brian McKeon, Executive Secretary, National Security Staff, The White House, Memorandum, Subject: Papers Deputies Committee Meeting on Executive Order on Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity Practices, September 28, 2012 w/atts: Discussion Paper for Deputies Committee Meeting on Executive Order on Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity Practices; Draft Executive Order on Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity Practices. Unclassified.

Source: http://www.lawfareblog.com

In the face of Congressional rejection of the Administration’s proposed cybersecurity legislation, work began on producing an executive order intended to accomplish the desired objectives. The first attachment (Tab A) to the covering memo discusses the key components of the cybersecurity legislation as well as how the executive order relies on current agency authorities to accomplish those objectives. The second attachment is a draft of the executive order.

Document 78: Leon E. Panetta, Secretary of Defense, “Defending the Nation from Cyber Attack,” Speech to Business Executives for National Security, October 11, 2012. Unclassified.

Source: http://www.defense.gov

In this speech, Secretary Panetta warns of the possibility of a “cyber Pearl Harbor” — which could involve the derailing of passenger trains, contamination of the water supply in major cities, or the shutdown of the power grid across large parts of the country.

Document 79: Mark A. Stokes and L.C. Russell Hsiao, Project 2049 Institute, Countering Chinese Cyber Operations: Opportunities and Challenges for U.S. Interests, October 29, 2012. Not classified.

Source: http://project2049.net

This report, by a private organization, examines the role of several Chinese organizations — including the Third Department of the PLA General Staff Department, its Second Bureau, and its Beijing North Computing Center — in cyber operations. It also explores a number of possible reactions — including deception, an international code of conduct, an Asian cyber defense alliance, and what the report terms a “forceful response.”

Document 80: Richard Colbaugh and Kristin Glass, Sandia National Laboratories, SAND2012-10177, Proactive Defense for Evolving Cyber Threats, November 2012. Unclassified.

Source: http://www.fas.org

This technical/mathematical analysis seeks to characterize “the predictability of attack/defender coevolution” — which is then used to create a framework for designing proactive defenses for large networks.

Document 81: Defense Science Board, Resilient Military Systems and the Advanced Cyber Threat, January 2013. Unclassified.

Source: http://www.acq.osd.mil/reports

This report (consisting of eleven chapters and six appendices) examines and evaluates the Defense Department’s defensive and offensive cyber operations. It concludes that DoD cyber security practices “have not kept up” with the tactics of cyber adversaries. It characterizes the threat as “serious” and “insidious” and objects that current Defense Department actions are “fragmented,” intelligence against targeting of DoD systems is “inadequate,” and that “with present capabilities and technology it is not possible to defend with confidence against the most sophisticated cyber attacks.”

Document 82: The White House, Administration Strategy on Mitigating the Theft of U.S. Trade Secrets, February 2013. Unclassified.

Source: http://www.publicintelligence.net

This document describes the administration strategy on mitigating the theft of U.S. trade secrets — including those stolen through cyber operations. It describes four action items — involving diplomatic efforts, promoting voluntary practices by private industry, enhancing domestic law enforcement operations, improving domestic legislation, and promoting public awareness.

Document 83: Mandiant, APT 1: Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage Units, February 2013. Not classified.

Source: http://www.mandiant.com

As a result of its investigation into computer security breaches around the world, Mandiant identified 20 groups designated Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) groups. The focus of this report is APT 1 — which the report concludes is the People Liberation Army’s Unit 61398 — the military unit cover designator for the 2nd Bureau of the Third Department of the PLA General Staff Department (also discussed in Document 79). The key elements of the report are the discussions of tasking to the unit, its past espionage operations, attack lifecycle, and the unit’s infrastructure and personnel.

Document 84: Office of Inspector General, Department of Energy, DOE/IG-0880, Audit Report, Management of Los Alamos National Laboratory’s Cyber Security Program, February 2013. Unclassified.

Source: http://www.energy.gov

Based on its audit of the Los Alamos National Laboratory’s (LANL) cyber security practices, the DoE inspector general observes that “LANL had made significant improvements to its cybersecurity program in recent years,” but that there were continuing concerns for several reasons – including a failure to address the full set of “critical and high-risk vulnerabilities.” The inspector general also makes three recommendations to improve LANL cybersecurity.

Document 85: Government Accountability Office, GAO-13-187, Cybersecurity: National Strategy, Roles, and Responsibilities Need to Be Better Defined and More Effectively Implemented, February 2013. Unclassified.

Source: http://www.gao.gov

This study reports a 782-percent increase in cybersecurity incidents between 2006 and 2012. It examines the challenges facing the federal government in producing a strategic approach to cybersecurity and the degree to which the “national cybersecurity strategy adheres to desirable characteristics for such a strategy.”

Document 86: The White House, Presidential Policy Directive/PPD-21, Subject: Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience, February 12, 2013. Unclassified.

Source: http://www.whitehouse.gov

This directive states basic U.S. policy with regard to the protection and recovery of critical infrastructure from both physical and cyber attacks. The key components are its delineation of roles and responsibilities of officials and agencies, its identification of three strategic imperatives, and its direction to the Secretary of Homeland Security on steps to implement the directive.

Document 87: The White House, Executive Order – Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity, February 12, 2013. Unclassified.

Source: Federal Register, 78, 33 (February 19, 2013)

In contrast to PPD-21 (Document 86) this executive order focuses solely on critical infrastructure cybersecurity. It address cybersecurity information sharing, a framework to reduce cyber risk to critical infrastructure, and the identification of critical infrastructure at greatest risk.

Document 88: Geoff McDonald, Liam O. Murchu, Stephen Doherty, and Eric Chien, Symantec Corporation, Stuxnet 0.5: The Missing Link, February 26, 2013. Not classified.

Source: http://www.symantec.com

This analysis follows up on Symantec’s earlier examination of the Stuxnet worm (Document 44, also see Document 40). It reports that Symantec “discovered an older version of Stuxent that can answer the questions about [its] evolution.”

Document 89: Eric A. Fischer, Edward C. Liu, John Rollins, and Catherine A. Theohary, Congressional Research Service, The 2013 Cybersecurity Executive Order: Overview and Considerations for Congress, March 1, 2013. Unclassified.

Source: http://www.fas.org

This paper identifies a number of types of individuals or groups that are considered threats to cybersecurity. It also provides an overview of President Obama’s executive order (Document 87), considers the question of the scope of presidential authority, and examines the relationship between the executive order and legislative proposals.

Document 90: James R. Clapper, Director of National Intelligence, Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community, Statement for the Record to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, March 12, 2013. Unclassified.

Source: http://www.dni.gov

In his annual worldwide threat assessment, Director of National Intelligence James Clapper begins with a discussion of global threats, and his discussion of global threat with an examination of the cyber threat. Specific topics addressed include the risk to U.S. critical infrastructure, the impact on U.S. economic and national security, information control and internet governance, and the activities of hacktivists and cybercrimnals.

Document 91: General Keith Alexander, Commander, United States Cyber Command, Statement before the Senate Committee on Armed Services, March 12, 2013. Unclassified.

Source: http://www.armed-services-senate.gov

In this statement, Alexander describes the organization and personnel strength of the Cyber Command, the strategic landscape, the command’s priorities, and plans for the future.

Document 92: U.S. Cyber Command, U.S. Cyber Command Organization Chart, n.d., Unclassified.

Source: U.S. Strategic Command Freedom of Information Act Release

This chart depicts the headquarters organizational structure of U.S. Cyber Command as of April 2013.

NOTES

1. Leon Panetta, Address to Business Executives for National Security, “Defending the Nation from Cyber Attack,” October 11, 2012, http://www.defense.gov; Barack Obama, “Remarks by the President in the State of the Union Address,” February 12, 2013, http://www.whitehouse.gov; James R. Clapper, Statement for the Record, Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community, March 12, 2013, pp. 1-3, http://www.dni.gov; “Senate Armed Services Committee Gets Grim Briefing on Cyber Threats,” March 20, 2013, http://www.matthewaid.com.

2. See Ted Lewis, “Cyber Insecurity: Black Swan or Headline?,” Homeland Security Watch (www.hlswatch.com), February 8, 2013; Ryan Singel, “Richard Clarke’s Cyberware: File Under Fiction, http://www.wired.com, April 22, 2010; John Arquilla, “Panetta’s Wrong About a Cyber ‘Pearl Harbor’, http://www.foreignpolicy.com, November 19, 2012; Jerry Brito and Tate Watkins, “Loving the Cyber Bomb?: The Dangers of Threat Inflation in Cybersecurity Policy,” Homeland National Security Journal, Vol. 3, 2011, pp. 39-83; Thomas Rid, “Cyber War Will Not Take Place,” Journal of Strategic Studies, 35, 1 (February 2012), pp. 5-32; Ronald Bailey, “Cyberwar Is Harder Than It Looks,” Reason, May 2011, pp. 50-51.

3. Steven A. Hildreth, Congressional Research Service, Cyberwarfare , June 19, 2001, p. CRS-4

4. John Rollins and Clay Wilson, Congressional Research Service, Terrorist Capabilities for Cyberattack: Overview and Policy Issues , January 22, 2007,pp. CRS-16-17.

5. Major William C. Ashmore, United States Army Command and General Staff College, Impact of Alleged Russian Cyber Attacks , 2009, pp. 11-14.

6. McAfee, Global Energy Cyberattacks: “Night Dragon”, February 10, 2011; “Three Saudis Sent to Prison for Stealing Info From Aramco Computer Systems,” http://www.matthewaid.com,March 19, 2013; Ellen Nakashima, “Iran blamed for cyberattacks on U.S. banks and companies,”www.washingtonpost.com, September 21, 2012.

7. Michael Vatis, Cyber Atttacks: Protecting America’s Security against Digital Threats,” ESDP Discussion Paper ESDP-2002-04, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, June 2002, p. 15, n.42.

8. Ted Bridis, “‘Silent Horizon’ war games wrap up for the CI A,” http://www.usatoday.com,May 26,2005

9. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, The National Military Strategy for Cyberspace Operations , December 2006, p. C-2.

10. James R. Clapper, Director of National Intelligence, Unclassified Statement for the Record on the Worldwide Threat Assessment for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence , January 31, 2012, p. 8.

11. “National Security Presidential Directives [NSPD] George W. Bush Administration,”www.fas.org, accessed March 30, 2013.

12. “Sean Kanuck – National Intelligence Officer for Cyber Issues, Office of the Director of National Intelligence,” http://www.security-innovation.org/bios, accessed April 5, 2013; Jeffrey T. Richelson, The U.S. Intelligence Community (Boulder, Co.: Westview, 2011), pp. 23, 29;”The Information Operations Center Analysis Group (IOC/AG),” http://www.cia.gov, accessed April7, 2013; John Rollins and Clay Wilson, Congressional Research Service, Terrorist Capabilities for Cyberattack: Overview and Policy Issues, January 22, 2007, p. CRS-8.

13. Jana D. Monroe, Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Testimony before House Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet and Intellectual Property,” June 17, 2002,www.fbi.gov/news/testimony/the-fbis-cyber-division; “Cyber Division,” http://www.fbigovs.gov/311132.asp, accessed March 31, 2013.

14. A computer virus designated FLAME has been reported to have been designed to gather information needed for the U.S. and Israel to employ the Stuxnet worm. See Ellen Nakishima, Greg Miller, and Julie Tate, “U.S., Israel developed Flame computer virus to slow Iranian nuclear efforts, officials say,” http://www.washingtonpostcom, June 19, 2012; Kim Zetter, “Meet ‘Flame,’ The Massive Spy Malware Infiltrating Iranian Computers,” http://www.wired.com, May 28, 2012.

15. Eric Schmitt and Thom Shanker, “U.S. Weighed Use of Cyberattacks To Weaken Libya,” New York Times, October 18, 2011, pp. A1, A7.

16. David E. Sanger, Confront and Conceal: Obama’s Secret Wars and Surprising Use of American Power (New York: Crown, 2012), pp. 188-225; Marc Ambinder and D.B. Grady, Deep State: Inside the Government Secrecy Industry (New York: Wiley, 2013), pp. 261-279.

17. Some law review articles include David E. Graham, “Cyber Threats and the Law of War,” Journal of National Security Law and Policy , 4, 2010, pp. 87-102; Matthew C. Waxman, “Cyber-Attack and the Use of Force: Back to the Future, Article 2(4),” Yale Journal of International Law, 36, 2011, pp. 421-459; Eric Talbot Jensen, “Computer Attacks on Critical National Infrastructure,” Stanford Journal of International Law, 38, 2002, pp. 207-240.

Declassified – China May Have Helped Pakistan Nuclear Weapons Design

CIA in 1977 Correctly Estimated South Africa Could Produce Enough Weapons-Grade Uranium “to Make Several Nuclear Devices Per Year”

Report on the Libyan Nuclear Program Found that “Serious Deficiencies,” “Poor Leadership” and Lack of “Coherent Planning” Made it “Highly Unlikely to Achieve a Nuclear Weapons Capability “Within the Next 10 years”

Intelligence Estimates on Argentina and Brazil Raised Questions About Their Nuclear Programs and Whether they Sought a Weapons Capability

National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 423

Khushab plutonium production reactor, Pakistan, 1998 (Photo from spaceimaging.com, courtesy of Institute for Science and International Security)

Washington, D.C., May 2, 2013 – China was exporting nuclear materials to Third World countries without safeguards beginning in the early 1980s, and may have given Pakistan weapons design information in the early years of its clandestine program, according to recently declassified CIA records. The formerly Top Secret reports, published today by the National Security Archive and the Nuclear Proliferation International History Project, are the CIA’s first-ever declassifications of allegations that Beijing supported Islamabad’s nuclear ambitions.

The newly released records, obtained under the Freedom of Information Act and Mandatory Declassification Review process, indicate growing U.S. concern from the 1960s to the early 1990s about the intentions of other embryonic or potential nuclear states, including Brazil, Argentina, South Africa and Libya. Among the disclosures in these reports:

  • A 1966 estimate discussed what would become an important problem: the possibility of “covert” nuclear programs and the prospect that a “country could go far toward a weapons program” under the disguise of a “peaceful program.”
  • On South Africa, a 1977 CIA analysis of the uranium enrichment plant at Valindaba included the estimate that South Africa would be able to produce enough weapons-grade uranium “to make several nuclear devices per year.”
  • According to a 1982 estimate, nuclear proliferation could become a “greater threat to US interests over the next five years.” Nuclear R&D alone, without producing any weapons, could contribute to regional instability and the “disruptive aspect of the proliferation phenomenon will constitute the greater threat to the United States.”
  • In 1981, U.S. intelligence became aware of a “secret nuclear facility” at Pilcaniyeu that the Argentines later announced was a uranium enrichment (gaseous diffusion) pilot plant.
  • A Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE) prepared after the 1982 Argentine-British conflict over the Falkland Islands professed “great uncertainty” over Argentina’s nuclear intentions: “emotionally” the Argentine military leadership was interested in a weapons option, but it had “reduced capability to fulfill this desire.” By 1985, uncertainty had passed: U.S. intelligence believed that Argentina had no program to develop nuclear weapons.
  • According to the estimates on Brazil, the leaders of the nuclear establishment sought to “keep … options open to develop a nuclear weapons capability.” The 1985 estimate asserted that the prominent role of the Brazilian military in nuclear activities, “the direction of Brazil’s nuclear r&d,” and the “reputation” of the National Nuclear Energy Commission’s president for “favoring a nuclear option” all posed a “danger to US interests.”
  • A report on Indian efforts to purchase nuclear-related supplies in world markets described it as a “direct challenge to longstanding US efforts to work with other supplier nations … for tighter export controls” over sensitive technologies. Japan and Western Europe resisted U.S. pressure by arguing that “they will be replaced by the Soviets in the Indian market if they are curtailed.”
  • The analysis of the Libyan nuclear program was severe: the program’s “serious deficiencies,” including “poor leadership” and the lack of both “coherent planning” and trained personnel made it “highly unlikely the Libyans will achieve a nuclear weapons capability within the next 10 years.”
Image of South African nuclear facilities near Pretoria in 1991. The uranium enrichment plant at Valindiba is indicated as the Y-Plant. (Courtesy of Institute for Science and International Security and http://www.terraform.com)

Since its inception, the U.S. intelligence community has been investigating and analyzing overseas nuclear activities, whether explicitly weapons-oriented or simply suspicious.[1] At the heart of the earliest effort was the monitoring of the former Soviet Union and its European allies for signs of a weapons program. Beginning in the late 1950s, however with concern about France, China, Israel, and other countries mounting, the Central Intelligence Agency began to focus on global trends. While the CIA has declassified dozens of National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) on the former Soviet Union and its nuclear forces, NIEs and other detailed reports on proliferation issues have been relatively scarce, especially for the 1970s and 1980s, and often heavily excised. Nevertheless, the Agency has been taking a more forthcoming approach to nuclear proliferation intelligence and the releases are significant. NIEs have had the reputation, sometimes disputed, of being the most authoritative intelligence product on a given topic and their declassification is important for understanding how the intelligence establishment understood this problem during various time periods. [2]

These intelligence estimates alert us to the challenge of interpreting the motives of other countries. Some of the estimates present a rather pessimistic view of the future of the nuclear nonproliferation system, raising questions about the intentions of countries that did not actually seek a nuclear weapons option. With more information available from overseas archives and other sources it is becoming possible to evaluate the acuity of U.S. intelligence analysis for understanding nuclear motivations. For example, new sources in Brazil indicate that the country’s leadership did not want a weapons capability but aimed instead for major accomplishments in advanced technology. Like Iran today, Brazil had initiated a gas centrifuge program (although without the international opprobrium). Nevertheless, the NIEs pointed to a “determination” to have a weapons option, although it also more accurately cited the quest for technological progress. Indeed, Brazil and Argentina, another suspect country, eventually signed off on the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty despite longstanding objections (which persist in Brazil). Determining the intentions of the leadership in such countries as Iran and North Korea remains a continuing and important challenge because the outcome will have profound implications for the future of the nonproliferation system. Declassified NIEs can serve as a primary source data set for illuminating contemporary proliferation controversies and for drawing lessons from earlier ones.

Except for a few items, the CIA released these documents as a result of Freedom of Information and mandatory declassification review requests by the National Security Archive. Some of the estimates appear on the CIA FOIA Web site and the editor of this posting requested a new review to see if more information would be declassified. In some cases, that happened: the CIA released more details, for example, on Argentina and Brazil. In some instances, as in Pakistan, the CIA released no new information and the estimates are under appeal. Other pending requests and appeals, if successful, will illuminate CIA and intelligence community perspectives on the problem of nuclear proliferation.


THE DOCUMENTS

Document 1: “Covert Programs”

National Intelligence Estimate, “The Likelihood of Further Nuclear Proliferation,” NIE 4-66, 20 January 1966, Secret, Excised copy, released on appeal by Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel

This estimate, previously released in massively excised form, updated an estimate (NIE-4-2-64) published in 1964 of the nuclear proliferation problem. That estimate, like this one, overestimated the likelihood of an Indian bomb, while somewhat underestimating Israel’s program. This assessment followed the same pattern-predicting India would produce a weapon within a “few years” and also putting Israel in the “might” category, although treating it as a “serious contender” nonetheless. Sweden was also in the “might” category, although the estimators acknowledged the strong opposition of public opinion to a weapons program. Why Israel was in the “might” category, even though it would have weapons by mid-1967, must have reflected debate among U.S. government experts as to the purposes of the Dimona reactor.

The estimate ruled out nuclear programs by a number of countries (Belgium, Denmark, Italy, etc.) for the “foreseeable future,” while it found that other countries “warranted more detailed discussion” because their “incentives” could be strong enough to acquire nuclear weapons in the next 10 years. In addition to India, Israel, and Sweden, these included Japan and South Africa, among others. For plausible reasons (lack of incentive and ample disincentives) the estimate ruled out Italy from the second list, but it is worth noting that in early 1967 its top officials were so angry about the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty that they briefly debated whether to initiate a national nuclear weapons program. [3]

A short discussion of the “snowball effect” (later known as “proliferation cascades” or “chains”) suggested that the United Arab Republic (Egypt-Syria) and Pakistan were likely to take the nuclear option should India or Israel go nuclear. The snowball effect could be limited by various considerations; for example, if close allies such as Japan or West Germany felt the pressure, they were less likely to go nuclear if the United States “strongly opposed” it. An interesting but heavily excised section on “The Detection of Covert Programs” is the first time that an NIE on nuclear proliferation addressed this problem at length, although the possibility had long been known. This section includes deletions on intelligence capabilities and U.S. efforts to inspect Israel’s Dimona reactor. In this connection, the estimate treated the “ultracentrifuge process” as a “feasible” source of weapons-grade uranium where an enrichment plant could be “built and operated without attracting attention.” Unlike some of the earlier estimates, there is little discussion of adverse consequences of nuclear proliferation; no doubt by 1966, the drafters of this estimate assumed that its readers recognized that the implications were harmful to U.S. interests and there was no need to belabor the point.

Document 2: National Intelligence Estimate, “French Nuclear Weapons and Delivery Capabilities,” NIE 22-68, 31 December 1968, Secret, excised copy, released under appeal

The French nuclear program had been of great concern to U.S. presidents during the 1960s because Paris had defied U.S. pressure and was also suspected of supporting proliferation by aiding the Israeli nuclear program. This recently declassified estimate, prepared at the close of the Johnson administration, gives a picture of a program that was slowing down because of internal financial and economic problems, in part by the impact of the May 1968 student and worker uprising. While President Charles de Gaulle saw a nuclear arsenal as indispensable for “great-power status,” the plans for bomber, missile, and submarine-launched delivery systems were difficult to realize. Even the bomber force that was in place could only undertake one-way missions to Soviet targets. Despite the heavy excisions in the section on nuclear weapons, it comes across that the French had not yet produced a deliverable thermonuclear weapon. Although the French had provided Israel with a small nuclear reactor in the 1950s, the estimators did not believe that they would take further action to abet nuclear weapons proliferation, yet the sale of advanced delivery capabilities was not ruled out “if the price was right.”

The document hinted at the possibility of special arrangements with the United States to get “US nuclear know-how,” but De Gaulle would reject any quid pro quo that involved external control of French forces. The same would be true of any continental nuclear arrangements, for example, special cooperation with West Germany; DeGaulle would insist on “French control” of the weapons. Within a few years, the Nixon administration would begin to provide secret aid to the French nuclear weapons program, beginning first with assistance to missile systems, but no information on a quid pro quo has surfaced.

Documents 3A-B: China and Nuclear Proliferation

A: Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment, Central Intelligence Agency, to Christine Dodson, National Security Council, 7 December 1979, enclosing report, “A Review of the Evidence of Chinese Involvement in Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons Program,” 7 December 1979, Top Secret, Excised Copy

B: Special National Intelligence Estimate, “Chinese Policy and Practices Regarding Sensitive Nuclear Transfers,” SNIE 13/32-83, 20 January 1983, Top Secret, Excised Copy

Nuclear proliferation issues posed a sensitive problem in the early development of U.S.-China relations. With nuclear proliferation a policy priority for the Jimmy Carter administration, and Pakistan already a special concern, the possibility that China and Pakistan were sharing nuclear weapons-related information began worry U.S. government officials. They had no hard evidence–and the soft evidence that concerned them is massively excised in the December 1979 report just as Beijing and Washington were normalizing relations-so the “precise nature and extent of this cooperation is uncertain.” These concerns did not go away during the Reagan administration. While nuclear proliferation was not a top priority, the administration was apprehensive about the implications of the spread of nuclear capabilities and that China may have been aiding and abetting some potential proliferators by selling unsafeguarded nuclear materials. That China was selling nuclear materials to meet national objectives (hard currency earnings, etc.) and flouting international standards, however, did not mean that it was intent upon supporting further nuclear proliferation.

On Pakistan specifically, the CIA had evidence suggesting close Chinese nuclear cooperation, to the point of facilitating a nuclear weapons capability, although the intelligence community saw this as possibly a special case based on an alliance that had existed since 1963. This allegation has come up before, for example in a State Department document and in major news stories but this is the first time the CIA has released some of its own information. [4] The estimate highlights some of the main developments, including “verbal consent [in 1974] to help Pakistan develop a ‘nuclear blast’ capability”, “hedged and conditional commitment” in 1976 to provide nuclear weapons technology, and unspecified excised information that raised the “possibility that China has provided a fairly comprehensive package of proven nuclear weapon design information.” The exchanges may not have been one-way and the reference to Chinese “involvement” in Pakistan’s uranium enrichment program probably refers to gas centrifuge technology, which Pakistan shared with the Chinese. [5] Significant portions of the document covering technology sharing are excised, but more may be learned if additional details are released under appeal.

Document 4: A “Greater Threat to US Interests”

National Intelligence Estimate, “Nuclear Proliferation Trends Through 1987,” NIE-4-82, July 1982, Secret, Excised copy, under appeal

This pessimistic appraisal portrayed a deeply troubled nonproliferation regime, with “the development of small nuclear forces … increasingly feasible,” declining confidence in International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards, and research and development programs exacerbating regional tensions. With proliferation becoming a “greater threat to US interests over the next five years,” intelligence analysts believed that the “disruptive aspect of the proliferation phenomenon will constitute the greater threat to the United States.” While the estimators saw “low potential” for terrorist acquisition of nuclear weapons, the likelihood of terrorist/extortionist hoaxes was on the upswing.

Significant portions of the NIE are excised, especially the estimate of Israel’s nuclear arsenal and its impact in the Middle East. Nevertheless, much information remains on the countries of greatest concern: Iraq and Libya in the Near East, India and Pakistan in South Asia, Brazil and Argentina in Latin America, and the Republic of South Africa, as well as those of lesser concern: Iran, Egypt, Taiwan and the two Koreas. The title of the last section, “Implications for U.S.-Soviet relations” suggests that the analysts saw the nuclear proliferation problem in largely cold war terms.

While describing suspect nuclear activity in a number of countries, the estimate provided little evidence of intentions. For example, Argentina was “unlikely” to try to test a device in the next five years and the incentives to do so were weak, but beginning in 1984 it could potentially produce one to four weapons a year using safeguarded plutonium. But whether Argentina was likely to make a decision to build weapons is not discussed (but see documents 5A-B).

On Pakistan, a state where evidence of intentions was strong, the estimate found that by the end of 1986 it “could accumulate five to ten enriched uranium implosion weapons” and five to ten plutonium weapons. Yet this projection was highly exaggerated because Pakistan would barely have one weapon in 1987 and did not have a truly deliverable weapon (by fighter jet) until 1995. Plainly the Pakistani nuclear effort was less efficient than the estimators recognized but this report does not get into the nuts and bolts of program efficiency. [6]

On one crucial point there may have been a misunderstanding. The estimate identified the Iraqi nuclear reactor project destroyed by an Israeli attack in 1981 as having a “plutonium production capability.” Yet recent research indicates that the French had taken action to ensure that the reactor had low value as a plutonium producer; that the reactor would have been under IAEA safeguards; and that French technicians were staffing the project to prevent untoward uses. Nevertheless, the estimate correctly suggests that the Israeli attack had been a counter-proliferation failure by raising Iraq’s determination: it “[increased the] desire for secrecy in attempting to acquire nuclear-related assistance from foreign sources.” [7]

Documents 5A-C: Argentina

A: Special National Intelligence Estimate, “Argentina’s Nuclear Policies in Light of the Falkland’s Defeat,” SNIE 91-2-82, 1 September 1982, Secret, Excised copy, under appeal

B: Special National Intelligence Estimate, “Argentina’s Nuclear Policies Under Alfonsin,” SNIE 91/3-84, 31 July 1984, Secret, Excised copy, under appeal

C: Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, “Argentina: Seeking Nuclear Independence: An Intelligence Assessment,” September 1985, Secret, excised copy

Source: CIA CREST Database, National Archives II, College Park, MD

Argentina, like its neighbor, Brazil, was determined to develop an “independent nuclear fuel cycle,” with the capacity to reprocess plutonium and enrich uranium. Also like Brazil, Argentina was one of the few Latin American countries to refuse to sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Thus, Argentina’s nuclear activities were under routine scrutiny to see if they involved anything that suggested an interest in a weapons capability. U.S. intelligence agencies continued to monitor developments but perspectives shifted as Argentina’s domestic politics evolved. Prepared after the Argentine-British conflict over the Falklands Islands, in which Washington helped London, this special estimate professed “great uncertainty” over Argentina’s nuclear intentions. While “emotionally” the Argentine military leadership was interested in a weapons option, it had “reduced capability to fulfill this desire.” Nevertheless, rightly or wrongly, the intelligence establishment assumed that the leadership had “carefully reserved an option to develop nuclear weapons.” [8] Therefore, if the National Atomic Energy Commission (CNEA) decided to implement the option, it had two “plausible” routes for securing plutonium: 1) diverting spent fuel from a safeguarded reactor, or 2) diverting spent fuel from an unsafeguarded reactor that was in the works.

The 1982 estimate does not mention the gaseous diffusion uranium enrichment project at Pilcaniyeu, which the Argentines began in 1978 when the Carter administration cut off sales of enriched uranium to countries refusing to sign the NPT. Nevertheless, according to the 1985 report (Document 5C), in 1981 U.S. intelligence became aware of a “secret nuclear facility.” As military rule was collapsing in November 1983, the outgoing head of the Atomic Energy Commission, Vice Admiral Carlos Castro Madero, announced the achievement of an enrichment capability and the Pilcaniyeu plant became known to the world.

Almost two years later military rule had collapsed and a democratically-elected government led by Raul Alfonsin was taking an unambiguous stand on nuclear weapons. In its 1984 assessment, the intelligence community was more certain about Argentina’s nuclear policies: “on the basis of discernible evidence … Argentina does not have a program to develop or test nuclear explosives.” Nevertheless, Alfonsin was unlikely to change “Argentina’s long-term efforts to achieve its goal of acquiring a full range of nuclear-fuel-cycle facilities.” Consistent with this, the military–which still played a central role in the nuclear energy program–was “likely to continue its involvement in some of the most sensitive nuclear programs, including uranium enrichment and reprocessing.” Despite the CNEA claim that it had developed a capability to enrich uranium, the estimate could not confirm that “indigenous equipment has functioned successfully.

A year later, the CIA was still more definite about Argentine capabilities. According to the 1985 report, the Argentines “have achieved at least a proof of principle of uranium enrichment via gaseous diffusion.” In other words, they had a workable system. Nevertheless, the enrichment plant would not be “fully operational until 1987-1988.” While the assessment of Argentine interest in nuclear weapons did not change, CIA analysts asserted that “Argentina continues to develop the necessary facilities and capabilities that could support a nuclear weapons development effort.”

Documents 6A-C: Brazil

A: Special National Intelligence Estimate, “Brazil’s Changing Nuclear Goals: Motives and Constraints,” SNIE 93-83, 21 October 1983, Secret, excised copy[9]

B: Special National Intelligence Estimate, Memorandum to Holders, “Brazil’s Changing Nuclear Goals: Motives and Constraints,” SNIE 93-83, December 1985, Secret, excised copy

C: Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, “President Sarney and Brazil’s Nuclear Policy,” 8 September 1986, Secret, Excised copy.

Source: CREST, National Archives

Brazilian nationalism has often posed a challenge to U.S. official precepts on the way the world should work and these estimates convey the deep Brasilia-Washington gap over nuclear policy during the 1980s. SNIEs from 1983 and the 1985 update emphasize Brazil’s quest for technological-industrial autonomy which in nuclear terms meant developing an indigenous program to master the fuel cycle, including uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing capabilities. In seeking those objectives, Brazil did not want to face any constraints, and its leaders were unresponsive to U.S. or other pressures for safeguards on nuclear facilities.

Even though Brazil had cut back its civilian nuclear program and had virtually withdrawn from the controversial agreement with West Germany, the military services were going ahead with a variety of secret nuclear R&D projects which are described but excised in the two reports. For example, the Nuclear Energy Research Institute [Portuguese acronym, IPEN] role in developing gas centrifuge technology is spelled out, but any information on its purposes is excised. While it sought to produce nuclear submarine reactor fuel, it will not be clear whether the CIA knew until more information is declassified. Less than a year after the 1985 SNIE, the IPEN centrifuges had successfully enriched uranium, but whether the CIA was aware how close it was to success remains to be learned. The 1985 SNIE predicted the requisite capabilities for developing nuclear weapons by 1990. [10]

On the key issues of nuclear weapons and capabilities, both reports assume that a decision had not been made. Nevertheless, the estimates portray leaders of the nuclear establishment as wishing to “keep … options open to develop a nuclear weapons capability.” Indeed, Brazil’s refusal to sign the NPT and the insistence that the Treaty of Tlalelolco permitted PNEs [peaceful nuclear explosives] “demonstrates a determination … to preserve a nuclear weapons option.” U.S. intelligence analysts saw this as worrisome: according to the 1985 report the prominent role of the military in nuclear activities, “the direction of Brazil’s nuclear r&d,” and the CNEN president’s “reputation of favoring a nuclear option” posed a “danger to US interests in Brazil.” But the alleged interest in a nuclear weapons option was probably overstated in light of recent research that indicates that Brazilian leaders were not thinking in those terms.[11]

A Directorate of Intelligence analysis, prepared later the following year, provides an interesting contrast with excisions in the NIEs on the indigenous program; it includes details on the major Navy, Air Force, and Army components of the indigenous program, including the nuclear submarine objective. As with the NIEs, the authors of this report saw no “political decision” on nuclear weapons and further noted President Sarney’s public statements against a weapons program. But a piece of political intelligence initially excised from this report suggested, rightly or wrongly, that Sarney may have been personally ambivalent.

Documents 7A-B: India

A: Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, Intelligence Assessment, “India’s Nuclear Program: Energy and Weapons,” July 1982, Top Secret, excised copy, under appeal

B: Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, “India’s Nuclear Procurement Strategy: Implications for the United States,” December 1982, Secret, excised copy

Source: CREST, National Archives

This massively excised report indicates the Agency’s strong views about releasing its knowledge of India’s nuclear weapons activities, even when the information is decades old. That many of the pages are classified “Top Secret Umbra” suggests that some of the information draws on communications intelligence intercepts, another highly sensitive matter. A CIA report on India produced a few months later, “India’s Nuclear Procurement Strategy: Implications for the United States,” has comparatively fewer excisions. It discusses in some detail Indian efforts to support its nuclear power and nuclear weapons development program by circumventing international controls through purchases of sensitive technology on “gray markets.” The report depicts a “growing crisis in the Indian civil nuclear program,” which combined with meeting nuclear weapons development goals, was forcing India to expand imports of nuclear-related supplies. The purchasing activities posed a “direct challenge to longstanding US efforts to work with other supplier nations … for tighter export controls.”

Document 8: Pakistan

Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, Research Paper, “Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons Program: Personnel and Organizations,” November 1985, Top Secret, Excised copy, under appeal

This heavily excised report on the “well-educated committed cadre” that managed the Pakistani nuclear program demonstrates how the CIA protects its intelligence on Pakistani nuclear activities. This is the same version of the report that can be found on the Agency’s FOIA Web page; the recent version includes no new information. Details on Khan Research Laboratories and the gas centrifuge program are entirely withheld, but some information is made available on the Pakistani Atomic Energy Commission and the Directorate of Nuclear Fuels and Materials. The latter includes details on the status and purpose of major projects, for example, the Kundian Nuclear Complex, also known as the Chasma Reprocessing Plant, which was not completed until 1990. For the purposes of producing plutonium for weapons, the Pakistanis were interested in a heavy water moderated reactor of the NRX (National Research Experimental) type that Canada built at Chalk River. In 1985, the Pakistanis started that project in earnest, with construction beginning in 1987 of what became known as Khushab Chemical Plant II.[12]

Documents 9A-B: South Africa

A: Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, Office of Scientific Intelligence, “South African Uranium Enrichment Program,” August 1977, Secret, excised copy, under appeal

B: National Intelligence Estimate, “Trends in South Africa’s Nuclear Security Policies and Programs,” NIE 73/5-84, 5 October 1984, Top Secret, excised copy, under appeal

These reports remain heavily excised even though the institutions and activities that they describe have not existed for years (although perhaps some details have been withheld on nonproliferation grounds. With South Africa’s status as a pariah state, its nuclear program was a thorny problem for a series of U.S. presidents. In August 1977, the Carter administration, working with the Soviet Union, lodged protests against South Africa’s apparent preparations for a nuclear test, forcing a shut-down of the Kalahari test site if not the entire nuclear program itself. Indeed the CIA’s analysis of South Africa’s innovative “aerodynamic” uranium enrichment plant at Valindaba brought it to the conclusion that South Africa would be able to produce enough weapons-grade uranium “to make several nuclear devices per year.”

Seeking “constructive engagement” with the apartheid regime, the Reagan administration wanted the South Africans to keep a lid on their nuclear weapons program. The NIE’s top-secret status was compatible with one of the elements of the 1984 estimate: that any revelations that broke the regime’s “calculated ambiguity” about its nuclear status would put Washington in an “awkward position” by “fir[ing] the drive” for the sanctions and disinvestment campaigns which the administration was trying to avoid. Analyzing the motives for the nuclear program, the CIA found it “irrelevant” to any threat that the regime was likely to face.

A key issue was whether South Africa had a nuclear arsenal. On that problem, the NIE dovetailed with the view taken by NIE-4-82: South Africa “probably has the capability to produce nuclear weapons on short notice.” That was accurate, but U.S. intelligence may not have known that the regime’s leaders had already decided to build a stockpile of 7 weapons, with six weapons assembled during the 1980s. [13] A lengthy annex detailed South Africa’s nuclear test capabilities, with some coverage of the mysterious South Atlantic flash of September 1979. This portion is significantly excised so the event remains a puzzle, with debate continuing over whether South Africa tested the weapon, whether it even had a suitable device for atmospheric testing in September 1979, or whether another country, possibly Israel, was the guilty party.

Document 10: Libya – “Serious Deficiencies”

Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, “The Libyan Nuclear Program: A Technical Perspective,” February 1985, Top Secret, excised copy

For years, U.S. intelligence agencies did not take seriously Muammar Gaddafi’s efforts to develop a Libyan nuclear capability and this report provides early evidence of the perspective that the Libyan program “did not know what it was doing.” [14] According to the CIA, the program’s “serious deficiencies,” including “poor leadership” and lack of both “coherent planning” and trained personnel made it “highly unlikely the Libyans will achieve a nuclear weapons capability within the next 10 years.” The Libyan effort was in such a “rudimentary stage” that they were trying to acquire any technology that would be relevant to producing plutonium or enriched uranium. While the Soviets had provided some nuclear assistance, that relationship was stagnating and the Libyans were trying to acquire enrichment-related technology from Belgium, but even if that happened it was likely to be provided under safeguards narrowing Gaddafi’s freedom of action. The denouement of Gaddafi’s failed quest for the bomb was the discovery in 2003 of a shipment of material en route from the A.Q. Khan network. While the Pakistanis had provided centrifuge equipment it was not working or had not been installed, remaining in packing crates – more evidence of the “rudimentary” nature of Libya’s nuclear efforts.

Document 11: “Special Weapons” Proliferation

Director of Central Intelligence, National Intelligence Estimate, “Prospects for Special Weapons Proliferation and Control,” NIE 5-91C, Volume I: The Estimate, and Volume II: Annexes A (“Country Studies), B (Weapons and Technologies) and C (Control Regimes), July 1991, Top Secret, excised copy, under appeal

With the term “weapons of mass destruction” having not yet fully come into general usage, this NIE used the term “special weapons” to describe nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons (formerly the term “special weapons” was sometimes used to describe nuclear weapons only). With numerous excisions, including the names of some countries in the sections on “East Asia and the Pacific” and “Central America,” this wide-ranging estimate provides broad-brushed, sometimes superficial, pictures of the situations in numerous countries along with coverage of international controls to halt sensitive technology exports to suspect countries. The estimate presents a fairly bleak picture of continuing proliferation “despite efforts by the United States and others to arrest the spread.” Iraq’s nuclear ambitions, even with the recent war, remained a concern and so did Iran’s, although it was deemed unlikely to achieve a nuclear capability “over the next decade.” North Korea was likely to have a nuclear device in 2 to 5 years (surely an overestimate) while India and Pakistan were estimated to have the ability to “assemble nuclear weapons quickly.” Also troubling was the ability of would-be nuclear proliferators to acquire sensitive technologies. Sometimes that was done through “dummy corporations” and other such devices, but “West European reluctance or inability to enforce controls” did not help, nor did China’s role as a supplier of nuclear technology.

The picture was not entirely bleak. Brazil had “halt[ed] the development of nuclear weapons” and the current Argentine government “will not attempt to develop nuclear weapons,” although no evidence is provided that either country had been trying. With the downfall of apartheid, South Africa’s nuclear weapons were “less troublesome,” although it is not clear whether the analysts were aware that country had already dismantled its nuclear arsenal.


NOTES

[1] See Jeffrey Richelson, Spying on the Bomb: American Nuclear Intelligence from Nazi Germany to Iran and North Korea (New York, 2006), for the most comprehensive survey.

[2] Controversies over NIEs, in and outside the U.S. government, have been a running theme in the history of U.S. intelligence. See, for example, Harold R. Ford, CIA and Vietnam Policymakers: Three Episodes, 1962-1968 (Washington, D.C. 1998), 1-24, Thomas Powers, The Man Who Kept the Secrets: Richard Helms and the CIA (New York, 1979), 204-207, and Anne Hessing Cahn, Killing Détente: The Right Attacks the CIA (University Park, 1998).

[3] Leopoldo Nuti, “Italy’s Nuclear Choices,” UNISCI Discussion Papers, No. 25, January 2011 (on-line).

[4] R. Jeffrey Smith and Joby Warrick, “A Nuclear Power’s Act of Proliferation,” The Washington Post, 13 November 2009.

[5] For more detail on China-Pakistan nuclear cooperation, see Feroz Khan, Eating Grass, (Stanford CA, 2012) 188, among other references.

[6] Khan, Eating Grass, 186, 189-190

[7] Jacques Hymans, Achieving Nuclear Ambitions: Scientists, Politicians, and Proliferation (New York, 2012), 96-97

[8] For an argument that the Argentine program had non-weapons motivations, see Jacques Hymans, The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation: Identify, Emotions, and Foreign Policy (New York, 2006), 141-170.

[9] CIA reviewed the SNIEs on Brazilian nuclear activities in 2011 for another requester and under the two-year limitations of Executive Order 13526 they cannot be re-requested until later in 2013.

[10] For background on the military programs, see Michael Barletta, “The Military Nuclear Program in Brazil,” (Stanford University, Center for International Security and Arms Control, 1997), and John R. Reddick, Nuclear Illusions: Argentina and Brazil. Henry L. Stimson Center Occasional Paper No. 25, December 1995. For recently available documents on Brazilian nuclear activities, see the Web site of the Nuclear Proliferation International History Project.

[11] Presentation by Matias Spektor, Getulio Vargas Foundation, Nuclear Proliferation International History Project workshop, Vienna, 1 February 2013.

[12] Khan, Eating Grass, 196-197.

[14] Hymans, Achieving Nuclear Ambitions, 242.

Unveiled – NARA Leaks WikiLeaks Citations – Block Lifted

National Archives fixes search but bans WikiLeaks documents:http://cryptome.org/2012/11/nara-bans-wikileaks.htm

6 November 2012.

Griffin Boyce sends 6 November 2012:

After hearing that the national archives was blocking wikileaks-related searches, I decided to try it out myself. I was able to search for WikiLeaks uninhibited on the public site [1][2]. Though if blocked in the future, a search for *ikileaks (with the asterisk) will bring them up as well [3].[1] http://search.archives.gov/query.html?col=1arch&qt=wikileaks

[2] http://research.archives.gov/search?expression=WikiLeaks

[3] http://search.archives.gov/query.html?qt=*ikileaks

@USNatArchives tweeted yesterday that it would look into the block, and it has been lifted although the hits are fewer than the 30 by Google:

US National Archives @USNatArchivesWe’re looking into this, and we’ll update soon. MT @public_archive: The banning of @wikileaks from @USNatArchives: http://bit.ly/SmVQfQ

4 November 2012. About 30 Google hits for “WikiLeaks” on the National Archives website via search of “site:archives.gov wikileaks

3 November 2012. NARA online produces one hit for “Assange:”

http://research.archives.gov/search?expression=assange&pg_src=group&data-source=all

Did you mean passage?AOTUS: Collector in Chief | What I’m Reading

http://blogs.archives.gov/aotus/?page_id=314

Google hits for Assange “About 55,500,000.”

2 November 2012. @AlecMuffett notes that wildcards such as “?ikileaks” and “wiki?eaks” retrieve a few more documents with the word “WikiLeaks” in them.

2 November 2012

NARA Leaks WikiLeaks Citations


Access to documents containing the word “WikiLeaks” are blocked at the US National Archives website:

http://research.archives.gov/search?v%3Aproject=opa&query=WikiLeaks

The URL you requested has been blockedThe page you have requested has been blocked, because the URL is banned.

URL = research.archives.gov/search?v%3Aproject=opa&query=WikiLeaks

However documents with the words “Wiki” and “Leak,” separated by a space, are not. Six documents with “Wiki” and “Leak” may be retrieved:

http://research.archives.gov/search?expression=wiki+leak&pg_src=brief&data-source=archives-gov

1. June 2011 NISPPAChttp://www.archives.gov/isoo/oversight-groups/nisppac/meeting-june-2011.pdf

2. meeting march 2011

http://www.archives.gov/isoo/oversight-groups/nisppac/meeting-march-2011.pdf

3. meeting jun 2011

http://www.archives.gov/isoo/oversight-groups/nisppac/meeting-jun-2011.pdf

4. Microsoft Word – Advisory Committee Minutes_June 2011

http://www.archives.gov/presidential-libraries/committees/pdfs/2011-06-minutes.pdf

5. Press Release Archive by Date

http://www.archives.gov/press/press-releases/date-archive.html

6. meeting nov 2011

http://www.archives.gov/isoo/oversight-groups/nisppac/meeting-nov-2011.pdf



 

The NSA – The Alexeyeva File


Sergei Kovalev with Alexeyeva, 2011.
Arsenii Roginsky of the Memorial Society with Alexeyeva.


Kovalev and Alexeyeva.


Roginsky toasting Alexeyeva.


Alexeyeva with colleagues of the Helsinki Group.


Alexeyeva discussing the Helsinki Final Act with Ambassador Kashlev, one of the Soviet negotiators, at an Archive summer school in Gelendzhik.

Photos by Svetlana Savranskaya.


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The Moscow Helsinki Group 30th Anniversary
From the Secret Files


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Moscow, Russian Federation, October 17, 2012 – Marking the 85thbirthday of Russian human rights legend Lyudmila Alexeyeva, the National Security Archive today published on the Web a digital collection of documents covering Alexeyeva’s brilliant career, from the mid-1970s founding of the Moscow Helsinki Group (which she now heads) to the current challenges posed by the Putin regime’s crackdown on civil society.Today’s posting includes declassified U.S. documents from the Carter Presidential Library on Soviet dissident movements of the 1970s including the Moscow Helsinki Group, and KGB and Soviet Communist Party Central Committee documents on the surveillance and repression of the Group.

With the generous cooperation of the Memorial Society’s invaluable Archive of the History of Dissent, the posting also features examples of Alexeyeva’s own letters to officials (on behalf of other dissidents) and to friends, her Congressional testimony and reports, scripts she produced for Radio Liberty, and numerous photographs. Also highlighted in today’s publication are multiple media articles by and about Alexeyeva including her analysis of the current attack on human righters in Russia.

As Alexeyeva’s colleagues, friends, and admirers gather today in Moscow to celebrate her 85th birthday, the illustrious history documented in today’s posting will gain a new chapter. The party-goers will not only toast Lyudmila Alexeyeva, but also debate the appropriate responses to the new Putin-inspired requirement that any civil society group receiving any international support should register as a “foreign agent” and undergo frequent “audits.” No doubt Alexeyeva will have something to say worth listening to. She has seen worse.

Biography

Lyudmila Mikhailovna Alexeyeva was born on July 20, 1927 in Yevpatoria, a Black Sea port town in the Crimea (now in Ukraine). Her parents came from modest backgrounds, but both received graduate degrees; her father was an economist and her mother a mathematician. She was a teenager in Moscow during the war, and she attributes her decision to come back and live in Russia after more than a decade of emigration to the attachment to her country and her city formed during those hungry and frozen war years. Alexeyeva originally studied to be an archaeologist, entering Moscow State University in 1945, and graduating with a degree in history in 1950. She received her graduate degree from the Moscow Institute of Economics and Statistics in 1956. She married Valentin Alexeyev in 1945 and had two sons, Sergei and Mikhail. Already in the university she began to question the policies of the regime, and decided not to go to graduate school in the history of the CPSU, which at the time would have guaranteed a successful career in politics.

She did join the Communist Party, hoping to reform it from the inside, but very soon she became involved in publishing, copying and disseminating samizdat with the very first human rights movements in the USSR. In 1959 through 1962 she worked as an editor in the academic publishing house Nauka of the USSR Academy of Sciences. In 1966, she joined friends and fellow samizdat publishers in protesting the imprisonment and unfair trial of two fellow writers, Andrei Sinyavsky and Yuli Daniel. For her involvement with the dissident movement, she lost her job as an editor and was expelled from the Party. Later, in 1970, she found an editorial position at the Institute of Information on Social Sciences, where she worked until her forced emigration in 1977. From 1968 to 1972, she worked as a typist for the first dissident periodical in the USSR, The Chronicle of Current Events.

As the 1960s progressed, Alexeyeva became more and more involved in the emerging human rights movement. Her apartment in Moscow became a meeting place and a storage site for samizdat materials. She built up a large network of friends involved in samizdat and other forms of dissent. Many of her friends were harassed by the police and later arrested. She and her close friends developed a tradition of celebrating incarcerated friends’ birthdays at their relatives’ houses, and they developed a tradition of “toast number two” dedicated to those who were far away. Her apartment was constantly bugged and surveilled by the KGB.

Founding the Moscow Helsinki Group

In the spring of 1976, the physicist Yuri Orlov – by then an experienced dissident surviving only by his connection to the Armenian Academy of Sciences– asked her to meet him in front of the Bolshoi Ballet. These benches infamously served as the primary trysting site in downtown Moscow, thus guaranteeing the two some privacy while they talked. Orlov shared his idea of creating a group that would focus on implementing the human rights protections in the Helsinki Accords – the 1975 Final Act was published in full in Pravda, and the brilliant idea was simply to hold the Soviet government to the promises it had signed and was blatantly violating.

Orlov had the idea, but he needed someone who could make it happen – a typist, an editor, a writer, a historian – Lyudmila Alexeyeva. In May 1976, she became one of the ten founding members of the Moscow Helsinki Group with the formal announcement reported by foreign journalists with some help from Andrei Sakharov, despite KGB disruption efforts. The government started harassment of the group even before it was formally announced, and very quickly, the group became a target for special attention by Yuri Andropov and his organization – the KGB.

Alexeyeva produced (typed, edited, wrote) many early MHG documents. One of her early – and characteristically remarkable – assignments was a fact-finding mission to investigate charges of sexual harassment against a fellow dissident in Lithuania. Several high school boys who would not testify against their teacher were expelled from school. She arranged a meeting with the Lithuanian Minister of Education, who did not know what the Moscow Helsinki Group was but anything from Moscow sounded prestigious enough to command his attention, and convinced him to return the boys to school. It was only when some higher-up called the Minister to explain what the Helsinki Group really was that he reconsidered his decision.

As one of ten original members of the Moscow Helsinki Group, Alexeyeva received even greater scrutiny from the Soviet government, including the KGB. Over the course of 1976, she was under constant surveillance, including phone taps and tails in public. She had her apartment searched by the KGB and many of her samizdat materials confiscated. In early February 1977, KGB agents burst into her apartment searching for Yuri Orlov, saying “We’re looking for someone who thinks like you do.” A few days later, she and her second husband, the mathematician Nikolai Williams, were forced to leave the Soviet Union under the threat of arrest. Her departure was very painful – she was convinced that she would never be able to return, and her youngest son had to stay behind.

Alexeyeva in Exile

Alexeyeva briefly stopped over in the UK, where she participated in human rights protests, before she eventually settled in northern Virginia, and became the Moscow Helsinki Group spokesperson in the United States. She testified before the U.S. Congressional Helsinki Commission, worked with NGOs such as the International Helsinki Federation, wrote reports on the CSCE conferences in Belgrade, Madrid and Vienna, which she attended, and became actively involved in the issue of political abuse of psychiatry in the USSR.

She soon met her best-friend-to-be, Larisa Silnicky of Radio Liberty (formerly from Odessa and Prague), who had founded the prominent dissident journal Problems of Eastern Europe, with her husband, Frantisek Silnicky. Alexeyeva started working for the journal as an editor in 1981 (initially an unpaid volunteer!). Meanwhile, she returned to her original calling as a historian and wrote the single most important volume on the movements of which she had been such a key participant. Her book, Soviet Dissent: Contemporary Movements for National, Religious and Human Rights, which was published in the United States in 1984 by Wesleyan University Press, remains the indispensable source on Soviet dissent.

The book was not the only evidence of the way Alexeyeva’s talents blossomed in an atmosphere where she could engage in serious research without constant fear of searches and arrest. She worked for Voice of America and for Radio Liberty during the 1980s covering a wide range of issues in her broadcasts, especially in the programs “Neformalam o Neformalakh” and “Novye dvizheniya, novye lyudi,” which she produced together with Larisa Silnicky. These and other programs that she produced for the RL were based mainly on samizdat materials that she was getting though dissident channels, and taken together they provide a real encyclopedia of developments in Soviet society in the 1980s. The depth and perceptiveness of her analysis are astounding, especially given the fact that she was writing her scripts from Washington. Other U.S. institutions ranging from the State Department to the AFL-CIO Free Trade Union Institute also asked her for analyses of the Gorbachev changes in the USSR, among other subjects. In the late 1980s-early 1990s, she was especially interested in new labor movements in the Soviet Union, hoping that a Solidarity-type organization could emerge to replace the old communist labor unions.

Back in the USSR

The Moscow Helsinki Group had to be disbanded in 1982 after a campaign of persecution that left only three members free within the Soviet Union. When the Group was finally reestablished in 1989 by Larisa Bogoraz, Alexeyeva was quick to rejoin it from afar, and she never stopped speaking out. She had longed to return to Russia, but thought it would never be possible. She first came back to the USSR in May 1990 (after being denied a visa six times previously by the Soviet authorities) with a group of the International Helsinki Federation members to investigate if conditions were appropriate for convening a conference on the “human dimension” of the Helsinki process. She also attended the subsequent November 1991 official CSCE human rights conference in Moscow, where the human righters could see the end of the Soviet Union just weeks away. She was an early supporter of the idea of convening the conference in Moscow – in order to use it as leverage to make the Soviet government fulfill its obligations – while many Western governments and Helsinki groups were skeptical about holding the conference in the Soviet capital.

In 1992-1993 she made numerous trips to Russia, spending more time there than in the United States. She and her husband Nikolai Williams returned to Russia to stay in 1993, where she resumed her constant activism despite having reached retirement age. She became chair of the new Moscow Helsinki Group in 1996, only 20 years after she and Yuri Orlov discussed the idea and first made it happen; and in that spirit, in the 1990s, she facilitated several new human rights groups throughout Russia.

When Vladimir Putin became president in 2000, Lyudmila Alexeyeva agreed to become part of a formal committee that would advise him on the state of human rights in Russia, while continuing her protest activities. The two did not go well together in Putin’s mind, and soon she was under as much suspicion as ever. By this time, though, her legacy as a lifelong dissident was so outsized that it was harder to persecute her. Even state-controlled television felt compelled to give her air-time on occasion, and she used her standing as a human rights legend to bring public attention to abuses ranging from the mass atrocities in the Chechen wars to the abominable conditions in Russian prisons.

When the Moscow Helsinki Group celebrated its 30th anniversary in 2006, with Lyudmila Alexeyeva presiding, Yuri Orlov came back from his physics professorship at Cornell University to join her on stage. Also paying tribute were dozens of present and former public officials from the rank of ex-Prime Minister on down, as well the whole range of opposition politicians and non-governmental activists, for whom she served as the unique convenor and den mother.

The Challenge in Russia Today

In 2009, Alexeyeva became an organizer of Strategy 31, the campaign to hold peaceful protests on the 31st of every month that has a 31st, in support of Article 31 of the Russian constitution, which guarantees freedom of assembly. Everyone remembers the protest on December 31, 2009, when Lyudmila Alexeyeva went dressed as the Snow Maiden (Snegurochka in the fairy tales) where dozens of other people were also arrested. But when officials realized they had the Lyudmila Alexeyeva in custody, they returned to the bus where she was being held, personally apologized for the inconvenience and offered her immediate release from custody. She refused until all were released. The video and photographs of the authorities arresting the Snow Maiden and then apologizing went viral on the Internet and made broadcast news all over the world. The “31st” protests have ended in arrests multiple times, but that has yet to deter the protesters, who provided a key spark for the mass protests in December 2011.

The darker side of the authorities’ attitude was evident in March 2010, when she was assaulted at the Park Kultury metro station where she was paying her respects to the victims of the subway bombings a few days earlier. She had been vilified by the state media so often that the attacker called himself a “Russian patriot” and asserted (correctly, so far) that he would not be charged for his actions.

In 2012, the chauvinistic assault became institutional and government-wide, with a new law proposed by the Putin regime and approved by the Duma, requiring any organization that received support from abroad to register as a “foreign agent” and submit to multiple audits by the authorities. The intent was clearly to stigmatize NGOs like the Moscow Helsinki Group that have international standing and raise money from around the world. Earlier this month, Lyudmila Alexeyeva announced that the Group would not register as a foreign agent and would no longer accept foreign support once the law goes into effect in November 2012.

Other Russian human righters say they are used to being tagged as foreign agents. In fact, humorous signs appeared at the mass protests in late 2011 asking the U.S. Secretary of State, Hillary Rodham Clinton, “Hillary! Where’s my check? I never got my money!” So the debate over strategy, over how best to deal with and to push back against the new repression, will likely dominate the conversation at Lyudmila Mikhailovna’s 85th birthday party today (July 20). Yet again, when she is one of the few original Soviet dissidents still alive, she is at the center of the storm, committed to freedom in Russia today, and leading the discussion about how to achieve human rights for all.


Documents

Document 1: Lyudmila Alexeyeva, “Biography,” November 1977.

This modest biographical note presents Alexeyeva’s own summary of her life as of the year she went into exile. She prepared this note as part of her presentation to the International Sakharov Hearing in Rome, Italy, on 26 November 1977, which was the second in a series named after the distinguished Soviet physicist and activist (the first was in Copenhagen in 1975) that brought together scholars, analysts and dissidents in exile to discuss human rights in the Soviet bloc.

[Source: Memorial Society, Moscow, Archive of History of Dissent, Fond 101, opis 1, Box 2-3-6]

Document 2: Lyudmila Alexeyeva to Senator Jacob K. Javits, 4 July, 1975.

Even before she co-founded the Moscow Helsinki Group, Lyudmila Alexeyeva actively worked to defend dissidents and political prisoners in the USSR. In this 1975 letter preserved in the Archive of the History of Dissent, the irreplaceable collections of the Memorial Society in Moscow, she is writing from Moscow to a prominent U.S. Senator, Jacob Javits, a Republican from New York and himself Jewish, who was outspoken in supporting not only the right of Jews to emigrate from the USSR to Israel, but also the Soviet dissident cause in general. The case she presents to Javits is that of Anatoly Marchenko, who asked for political emigration (not to Israel) and as punishment was sent to Siberia for four years’ exile – on top of the 11 years he had already spent as a political prisoner on trumped-up charges. Tragically, Marchenko would die in prison in the fall of 1986, just as Gorbachev began releasing the political prisoners.

[Source: Memorial Society, Moscow, Archive of History of Dissent, Fond 101, opis 1, Box 2-3-6]

Document 3: Yuri Andropov, Chairman of the KGB, Memorandum to the Politburo, 29 December, 1975.

Yuri Andropov gives the Politburo an alarming report on dissent in the USSR in connection with criticism of Soviet human rights abuses by the French and Italian Communist parties. The main thrust of Andropov’ report is how to keep the internal opposition in check in the aftermath of the signing of the Helsinki agreement and the following increase of international pressure on the USSR. He gives the number of political prisoners as 860, people who received the “prophylactic treatment” in 1971-74 as 63,108 and states that there are many more “hostile elements” in the country, and that “these people number in the hundreds of thousands.” Andropov concluded that the authorities would have to continue to persecute and jail the dissidents notwithstanding the foreign attention. This document sets the stage and gives a good preview of what would happen after the Moscow Helsinki Group was founded in May 1976.

[Source: U.S. Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Dmitrii A. Volkogonov Papers, Reel 18, Container 28]

Document 4: Moscow Helsinki Monitoring Group, “Evaluation of the Influence of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe on the Quality of Human Rights in the U.S.S.R.,” 1 August 1975-1 August 1976. (Summary of the document)

This document was written during a time of relative calm, when surprisingly, for the first six months of the existence of the MHG, the authorities did not undertake any repressions against members of the group, and allowed it to function. The document sounds more positive and optimistic than the group’s subsequent assessments of the effect of the Helsinki Accords. The report points out that the Soviet government was sensitive to pressure from foreign governments and groups and that several other objective factors such as the end of the war in Vietnam and increasing Soviet grain purchases made the USSR more open to external influences. Under such pressure, the Soviet government released the mathematician Leonid Plyusch, allowed some refuseniks to emigrate and generally relaxed the restrictions somewhat. The report also lists continuing violations of human rights but concludes that the Helskinki Accords did and probably would play a positive role. [See the Russian page for the original]

[Source: Memorial Society, Moscow, Archive of History of Dissent, Fond 101, opis 1, Box 2-3-6]

Document 5: KGB Memorandum to the CC CPSU, “About the Hostile Actions of the So-called Group for Assistance of Implementation of the Helsinki Agreements in the USSR,” 15 November 1976.

The KGB informed the Politburo about the activities of the MHG for the first time six months after its founding. The report gives a brief history of the human rights movement in the USSR as seen from the KGB. Andropov names each founding member of the group and charges the group with efforts to put the Soviet sincerity in implementing the Helsinki Accords in doubt. The document also alleges MHG efforts to receive official recognition from the United States and reports on its connections with the American embassy.

[Source: U.S. Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Dmitrii A. Volkogonov Papers, Reel 18, Container 28]

Document 6: Helsinki Monitoring Group, “Special Notice,” 2 December, 1976.

This notice, one of a series by the MHG publicizing official misconduct, testifies to the increasing harassment of members of the group by the KGB. This time it is the son of Malva Landa who has been warned that he might lose his job.   The document is signed by Alexeyeva, Orlov and other leading MHG members.

[Source: Memorial Society, Moscow, Archive of History of Dissent, Fond 101, opis 1, Box 2-3-6]

Document 7: KGB Memorandum to the CC CPSU, “On the Provocative Demonstration by Antisocial Elements on Pushkin Square in Moscow and at the Pushkin Monument in Leningrad,” 6 December, 1976.

This KGB report informs the Politburo about silent rallies in Moscow and Leningrad to celebrate Constitution Day by dissidents including members of the MHG. Nobody was arrested.

[Source: U.S. Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Dmitrii A. Volkogonov Papers, Reel 16, Container 24]

Document 8: Moscow Helsinki Monitoring Group, “On the Exclusion of Seven Students From the Vienuolis Middle School (Vilnius),” 8 December, 1976.

This is a report of the first fact-finding mission undertaken by Lyudmila Alexeyeva with Lithuanian human rights activist and member of the Helsinki Group Thomas Ventslov to investigate charges of sexual harassment against a member of the Lithuanian Helsinki Group Viktoras Petkus. Seven boys were expelled from the school and pressured by the KGB to say that they had spent time at Petkus’ apartment, where he engaged in illegal activities with them. The boys’ families were told that they were expelled on the basis of a school board decision that the parents were not allowed to see. The report concludes that the KGB was behind the charges and that the only reason for the expulsions was the refusal of the boys to give false testimony against their teacher. Alexeyeva met with the Lithuanian Minister of Education to discuss the situation, and he initially agreed to remedy it but then changed his mind upon finding out who his visitor was.

[Source: Memorial Society, Moscow, Archive of History of Dissent, Fond 101, opis 1, Box 2-3-6]

Document 9: Memo from Andropov to CC CPSU, “About Measures to End the Hostile Activity of Members of the So-called “Group for Assistance in the Implementation of the Helsinki Agreements in the USSR,” 5 January, 1977.

After the two informational reports above, the KGB started to get serious about terminating the activities of the MHG. This report charges that the group was capable of inflicting serious damage to Soviet interests, that in recent months group members have stepped up their subversive activities, especially through the dissemination of samizdat documents (and particularly the MHG reports), undermining Soviet claims to be implementing the Helsinki Final Act. The Procuracy would later develop measures to put an end to these activities.

[Source: U.S. Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Dmitrii A. Volkogonov Papers, Reel 18, Container 28]

Document 10: Resolution of Secretariat of CC of CPSU, “On Measures for the Curtailment of the Criminal Activities of Orlov, Ginsburg, Rudenko and Ventslova,” 20 January, 1977.

Following the recommendations of the KGB report above, and another report submitted by Andropov on January 20, the CC CPSU Secretariat decides to “intercept and curtail the activities” of Orlov, Ginzburg, Rudenko and Ventslov of the MHG, Ukrainian and Lithuanian Helsinki groups. All four would be arrested soon after the resolution.

[Source: The Bukovsky Archive, Soviet Archives at INFO-RUSS http://psi.ece.jhu.edu/~kaplan/IRUSS/BUK/GBARC/buk.html, Folder 3.2]

Document 11: Extract from CC CPSU Politburo Meeting, “About the Instructions to the Soviet Ambassador in Washington for His Conversation with Vance on the Question of “Human Rights,” 18 February, 1977.

After Orlov and Ginzburg are arrested and Lyudmila Alexeyeva goes into exile, and anticipating the visit of U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance to Moscow in March, the Politburo discusses a rebuff to the Carter administration on human rights issues. Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin is instructed to meet with Vance and inform him of Soviet “bewilderment” regarding Carter administration attempts to raise the issue of Ginsburg’s arrest. Dobrynin should explain to administration officials that human rights is not an issue of inter-state relations but an internal matter in which the United States should not interfere.

[Source: TsKhSD (Central Archive of Contemporary Documents) Fond 89, Opis list 25, Document 44]

Document 12: “Dignity or Death: How they Plant Dirty Pictures and Dollars on Men Who Fight for Freedom,” The Daily Mail, London, 21 March, 1977, by Lyudmila Alexeyeva and Nicholas Bethell.

Documents 12-16 comprise a series of articles in the Western media printed soon after Lyudmila Alexeyeva’s emigration from the USSR. In interviews she described the deteriorating human rights situation in the Soviet Union, including the increased repression and arrests of Helsinki groups members in Russia, Ukraine, Lithuania and Georgia, and calls on the West to put pressure on the Soviet government to comply with the Helsinki Accords.

Document 13: “Dignity or Death: My Phone was Dead and All Night the KGB Waited Silently at My Door,” The Daily Mail, London, 22 March, 1977, by Lyudmila Alexeyeva and Nicholas Bethell.

Document 14: “Why Brezhnev Must Never be Believed,” The Daily Mail, London, 23 March, 1977, by Lyudmila Alexeyeva and Nicholas Bethell.

Document 15: “Soviet Human Rights from Mrs. Lyudmila Alexeyeva and others,” The Times, London, 26 April, 1977, by Lyudmila Alexeyeva, Andrey Amalrik, Vadimir Bukovsky.

Document 16: “Soviet Dissidents on the Run,” The Washington Post, 2 June, 1977, by Joseph Kraft.

Document 17: “Basket III: Implementation of the Helsinki Accords,” Hearings before the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe; Ninety-Fifth Congress, First Session; on the Implementation of the Helsinki Accords; Volume IV: Soviet Helsinki Watch Reports on Repression June 3, 1977; U.S. Policy and the Belgrade Conference, 6 June, 1977.

Document 18: National Security Council, Global Issues [staff], to Zbigniew Brzezinski, U.S. National Security Advisor, “Evening Report,” June 7, 1977.

This report to their boss by the staff of the Global Issues directorate of the National Security Council on their daily activities includes a remarkable initial paragraph describing internal U.S. government discussions of the Moscow Helsinki Group (called here “the Orlov Committee”). Staffer Jessica Tuchman says a State Department-hosted group of experts all agreed that “the hidden bombshell in the whole human rights debate with the USSR” was the fact that the nationalist movements in the Soviet Union all saw human rights activism as just the “first step” to autonomy – thus the real threat to the Soviet government.

[Source: Carter Presidential Library, FOIA case NLC 10-3-2-7-8, 2008]

Document 19: Central Intelligence Agency, “The Evolution of Soviet Reaction to Dissent,” 15 July, 1977.

This document traces the Soviet government’s response to dissident activity especially in light of their agreement to the human rights provisions outlined in Basket III of the Helsinki Accords. The CIA notes that the Soviet Union signed the accords assuming it would not result in an increase in internal opposition, but that instead the Basket III provisions have provided a rallying point for dissent. It also suggests that internal protests sparked by food shortages and open criticism of the Eurocommunists, including the French and Spanish communist parties, are further causes for the current Soviet crackdown on the opposition. It also mentions political unrest in Eastern Europe and the Unites States new human rights campaign, which has prompted dissidents to make their appeals directly to the U.S. government as reasons for Soviet anxiety. Next, it outlines the Soviet government’s much harsher measures against dissidents in the wake of the Helsinki Accords. These include arrests of members of the Helsinki group, cutting off Western access, and accusing dissidents of espionage. Further, it concludes that the Soviet government’s increased apparent anxiety over dissent is the result of a variety of factors, including the approach of the Belgrade conference and their general fears of increased Western contact leading to discontent and a variety of social vices.

[Source: The Carter Presidential Library]

Document 20: American Embassy Belgrade to Cyrus Vance, Secretary of State, Text of Speech Given by Ambassador Arthur Goldberg at the Belgrade Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe Meeting, November 1977 (excerpt).

This text, the second half of the U.S. Embassy Belgrade cable reporting the speech made by U.S. ambassador Arthur Goldberg to the Belgrade review conference, specifically raises the cases of Orlov, Scharansky and Ginsberg – three of the founding members, with Alexeyeva, of the Moscow Helsinki Group – in the face of major objections from the Soviet delegation, and no small amount of disquiet from other diplomats present. While considered “timid” by the outside human righters like Alexeyeva, this initiative by the U.S. delegation created a breakthrough of sorts that would heighten the human rights dialogue at upcoming Helsinki review conferences and in the media.

[Source: The Carter Presidential Library]

Document 21: Secretary of State, to American Embassy Moscow, “Statement on Orlov,” 18 May, 1978.

This public statement from the State Deparment’s noon press briefing, sent by cable to the U.S. Embassy Moscow and Consulate Leningrad, uses the strongest language to date on the Orlov case, no doubt informed by Alexeyeva and other Orlov colleagues in exile. Here, the U.S. “strongly deplores” Orlov’s conviction and calls it a “gross distortion of internationally accepted standards,” since the activities for which he was being punished were simply the monitoring of Soviet performance under the Helsinki Final Act.

[Source: The Carter Presidential Library]

Document 22: Joseph Aragon, to Hamilton Jordan, “Carter on Human Rights,” 7 July, 1978.

This memorandum from White House staff member Joe Aragon to the president’s chief of staff, Hamilton Jordan, discusses the Soviet Union’s treatment of dissidents, as monitored by another White House staffer, Joyce Starr. Aragon notes that the overall Soviet campaign against dissidents continues despite Carter’s forceful public stance on human rights. He notes that if anything dissidents have become further shut out of Soviet society since Carter came to office. He specifically mentions the Helsinki group, and Slepak, Orlov, Scharansky, Nadel and Ginzburg as dissidents in need of United States help. He goes in depth into the Slepak case and the state of his family, characterizing Slepak as the Soviet equivalent of a Martin Luther King Jr. However, he writes that the administration so far has made public statements in support of the dissidents, but failed to act on the diplomatic level. Aragon concludes that Carter cares deeply about human rights, but that his reputation is at risk due to the failure of low-level officials to follow through the initiatives outlined in the Helsinki Final Act. Aragon calls for a meeting in which he and other will discuss a course of action for the president.

[Source: The Carter Presidential Library]

Document 23: Central Intelligence Agency, “Human Rights Review,” 18-31 August, 1978.

This document contains a general overview of human rights throughout the world, but begins with a discussion of the condition of dissidents in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. It notes that the most recent dissident activity has been in their statements of support for the Czech Charter 77 dissident movement. It also discusses the Soviet Union’s fear of East European and Soviet dissidents forming a united front of opposition. It also mentions an incident in which dissident Aleksandr Lyapin attempted to commit suicide by self-immolation in protest of Helsinki group leader Yuri Orlov’s court sentence, and that he has since been confined to a mental institution.

[Source: The Carter Presidential Library]

Document 24: Senator Henry M. Jackson, Remarks at the Coalition for a Democratic Majority Human Rights Dinner, September 30, 1978.

Document 25: “Basket III: Implementation of the Helsinki Accords,” Hearings before the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe; Ninety-Fifth Congress, First Session; on the Implementation of the Helsinki Accords; Volume X: Aleksandr Ginzburg on the Human Rights Situation in the U.S.S.R., 11 May, 1979.

Document 26: “A Helsinki Clue to Moscow’s Salt II Intentions,” The New York Times, June 18, 1979, by Lyudmila Alexeyeva, Aleksandr Ginzberg, Petr Grigorenko, Yuri Mnyukh, and Valentin Turchin.

Document 27: Jimmy Carter and Cyrus Vance, “Major Executive Statements on Behalf of Anatoliy Scharanskiy,” 16 July, 1979.

Document 28: Peter Tarnoff, Department of State, to Zbigniew Brzezinski, “U.S. Government Initiatives on Behalf of Human Rights in the U.S.S.R.” 17 April, 1980.

This memorandum from State Department Executive Secretary Peter Tarnoff to Zbigniew Brzezinski contains a list of actions and statements by the U.S. government on human rights and protection of dissidents in the USSR. The list covers the years 1977 through 1980. The actions include reports on the Soviet Union’s implementation of the human rights provisions of the Helsinki Final Act, as well as discussions of these matters at international conferences. Another area of action has to do with investigating denials of exit visas to Jews and prisoners of conscience attempting to leave the Soviet Union. It also comprises various efforts to help imprisoned dissidents by sending observers to attend their trials and providing special aid to some families, including the Ginzburg/Shibayev and Sakharov/Yankelevich families. The document also includes a list of Carter’s addresses in which he voices concerns over human rights or the treatment of Soviet dissidents.

Document 29: Helsinki Monitoring Group [members of the Moscow Helsinki group in exile], “On the Madrid Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe,” c. summer 1980.

These recommendations were prepared by members of Helsinki groups in exile before the Madrid review conference of November 1980. The dissidents call the efforts of Western delegations at the earlier Belgrade conference “timid” and chide the lack of pressure on Moscow to observe the human rights provisions of the Helsinki Accords. The report describes the worsening human rights situation in the USSR after the Belgrade conference of 1977-78, arrests of the Helsinki Group members, persecution of religious believers, and restrictions on emigration. Recommendations include that the Madrid conference delegates demand that political prisoners, including Helsinki group members, be released, and that an international commission be created consisting of representatives of member-states to keep the pressure on the Soviets between the review conferences. Similar concerns, the report indicates, were raised by the MHG in its recommendations for the Belgrade conference in 1977.

Document 30: Lyudmila Alexeyeva, letter to friends in Moscow, undated, circa summer 1984.

This extraordinary personal letter provides a unique vista of Alexeyeva’s life in exile and her thinking about dissent. Here she describes how she found her calling as a historian (a “personal harbor” which is essential for enduring exile), came to write the book on Soviet dissent, and struggled to reform the radios (Liberty, Free Europe, Voice of America) against the nationalist-authoritarian messages provided from “Vermont and Paris” – meaning Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn and Vladimir Bukovsky, respectively – or, the Bolsheviks versus her own Mensheviks within the dissident movement, in her striking analogy. Also here are the personal details, the open window in the woods for the cats, the ruminations on the very process of writing letters (like cleaning house, do it regularly and it comes easily, otherwise it’s never done or only with great difficulty). Here she pleads for activation as opposed to liquidation of the Helsinki Groups, because “we have nothing else to replace them.”

[Source: Memorial Society, Moscow, Archive of History of Dissent, Fond 101, opis 1, Box 2-3-6]

Document 31: Liudmila Alexeyeva, edited by Yuri Orlov, Documents and People, “What Gorbachev took from samizdat.”

In this draft script prepared for a Radio Liberty show in 1987 together with Yuri Orlov, Alexeyeva traces the roots of Gorbachev’s new thinking to samizdat materials as far back as the 1960s. She finds an amazing continuity in terms of ideals and goals, especially in foreign policy-thinking about the primacy of human rights and an interdependent world.

[Source: Memorial Society, Moscow, Archive of History of Dissent, Fond 101, opis 1, Box 2-3-2]

Document 32: Lyudmila Alexeyeva’s handwritten draft paper on informal associations in the USSR.

This unique handwritten draft written for Alexeyeva on the emergence of informal organizations – the first NGOs – in the Soviet Union. The draft is undated but was most likely written in 1990 or early 1991. The main question is whether Gorbachev will stay in power and therefore whether the changes he brought about will stick. She sees the importance of informal organizations in reviving civil society in the Soviet Union and creating conditions for democratization.

[Source: Memorial Society, Moscow, Archive of History of Dissent, Fond 101, opis 1, Box 2-3-2]

Document 33: Lyudmila Alexeyeva, Trip to Nizhny Novgorod, 9 November, 1992.

Lyudmila Alexeyeva visited Nizhny Novgorod on August 29, 1992, and met with members of Dialogue Club and the independent trade union at the ship-building plant Krasnoe Sormovo. Semen Bulatkin, her main contact, talked to her about the political club they founded at the plant, whose outside member was governor Boris Nemtsov, and the difficulties of organizing a free trade union there. The independent trade union was founded in February 1992, with an initial membership of about 250-300 people. Two weeks later, threatened by the plant’s administration with the loss of jobs or social benefits, membership declined to 157. Alexeyeva also met with Governor Nemtsov – a radical reformer and close supporter of President Boris Yeltsin – who told her he had read her book on Soviet dissent and was an active listener of Radio Liberty.

[Source: Memorial Society, Moscow, Archive of History of Dissent, Fond 101, opis 1, Box 2-3-2]

Document 34: Lyudmila Alexeyeva, Trip to Moscow Report, 10-20 December, 1992.

Alexeyeva visited Russia in December 1992, just a year after the Soviet collapse, at the behest of the AFL-CIO Free Trade Union Institute, which had been a key international backer of Solidarity in Poland and sought to support similar independent union development in post-Soviet Russia. Alexeyeva’s trip report does not provide much cause for optimism. In it, she describes democratic reformers’ complaints about President Yeltsin and the lack of alternative progressive leadership; the resistance to change by older Party-dominated union structures; the lack of access to television by new, more democratic unions to make their case; and the effective transformation of Communist Party elites into quasi-capitalist owners and managers of the means of production – not because they are true reformers or effective producers, but because they know how to boss. Dozens of intriguing details and provocative conversation summaries fill the report, including a newspaper story alleging that Yeltsin was now privatizing his own appointment schedule with an outside company, selling access at $30,000 per meeting.

[Source: Memorial Society, Moscow, Archive of History of Dissent, Fond 101, opis 1, Box 2-3-2]

The NSA-Declassified Documents Provide New Detail on Confronting the Terrorist Threat

Washington, D.C., October 8, 2012 – A new Web resource posted by the National Security Archive offers a wide-ranging compilation of declassified records detailing the operations of a key component of U.S. national security. Among the new documents are internal reports on domestic terrorism that expand on what previously public intelligence assessments have revealed.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has been one of the best known and most scrutinized components of the U.S. government for well over seventy years. As a result it has been the subject of non-fiction books, novels, a multitude of articles, films and television shows, and congressional hearings. In addition to its criminal investigative effort and pursuit of bank-robbers that propelled it into the news, the Bureau has also been heavily involved in counterintelligence, counterterrorism, foreign intelligence, and counter-subversion work. FBI successes, failures, and abuses have helped produce attention and controversy for the Bureau.

Today’s National Security Archive posting of 38 documents – drawn from a variety of sources – provides a window into the Bureau’s activities in those areas since, with one exception, 1970. The collection’s aim is to present a foundation for understanding the scope and history of the organization, and in some instances to offer correctives to popular accounts. Freedom of Information Act requests yielded a number of the documents included in the briefing book, which are being posted here for the first time. Included are two intelligence assessments of the domestic terrorist threat – The Terrorist Threat to the U.S. Homeland: An FBI Assessment (2004) and A Threat Assessment for Domestic Terrorism, 2005-2006 (2007) – which examine the threat from al-Qaeda and its supporters as well as from assorted home-grown terrorist groups.

The latter assessments offer a broader and more detailed view of the terrorist issue, including on al-Qaeda, than the key judgments of the 2007 National Intelligence Estimate released by the Director of National Intelligence. The 2004 assessment stated that FBI investigations revealed “extensive support for terrorist causes in the US,” although they also found little evidence of sympathizers being actively engaged in planning or carrying out terrorist attacks.

Additional details on some of the domestic threats mentioned in the 2004 and 2007 estimates can be found in other newly released assessments – such as those on white supremacist groups. Those assessments discuss the threats from ‘stealth’ fascists, white supremacist infiltration of law enforcement, and the possibility of white supremacists employing suicide terrorism to further their cause.

Also, included are detailed inspector general reports concerning the FBI’s performance in the case of Robert Hanssen, the FBI official who spied for the Soviet Union and Russia, its handling of information related to the September 11 terrorist attacks, and its employment of national security letters. Finally, included are a number of Congressional Research Service studies on the Bureau’s history and current activities, including its terrorism investigations.

* * *

Documenting the FBI

By Jeffrey T. Richelson

Federal Bureau of Investigation, The Terrorist Threat to the U.S. Homeland: An FBI Assessment, April 15, 2004. Secret/NOFORN. Source: FBI Freedom of Information Act Release.

For almost eight decades the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has been one the best known components of the federal government. The organization, or its long-time director, J. Edgar Hoover, have been the subject of a number of non-fiction books – ranging from the adulatory to the intensely critical. 1 There have also been assorted novels, films, and television shows in which the Bureau or Hoover were central elements. 2

Created in 1908, as an untitled Justice Department bureau, it became the Bureau of Investigation in 1909, the Division of Investigation in 1933, and the FBI in 1935. Today, the FBI consists of its headquarters in Washington, D.C., its training academy in Quantico, Virginia, other elements in Virginia, 56 domestic field offices, 380 resident agencies, and more than 60 legal attaché offices outside the United States. As of April 30, 2012, it had 35,850 employees (13, 851 special agents, and 21, 989 support personnel) and a budget of $8.1 billion. 3

It became best known, at least initially, for its operations directed against high-profile gangsters, such as the fatal shooting of John Dillinger on July 22, 1934, in front of Chicago’s Biograph Theater by two of the Bureau’s special agents. 4 Subsequently, the Bureau’s prominence grew as a result of its national security activities. Over the years, those operations have included the gathering of foreign intelligence, counterintelligence, counter-terrorism, and combating, what were in the view of the Bureau (and others), subversive elements. 5

The documents posted today by the National Security Archive range from unclassified records to redacted versions of Secret or “Law Enforcement Sensitive” documents that were obtained under the Freedom of Information Act as well as from a variety of government web pages (including the Department of Justice and General Accountability Office) and private organization sites (including the Federation of American Scientists and Government Attic). The records focus on the Bureau’s foreign intelligence, counterintelligence, and counterterrorism activities since (with one exception) 1970.

Thus, several documents focus on the FBI’s foreign intelligence activities. One examines its operation of the Special Intelligence Service, which was active in Latin America during World War II (Document 9). Another discusses how the Joint Chiefs of Staff requested the FBI employ its “internal information program” to gather intelligence that would be useful in planning and executing a second attempt to rescue the American hostages seized in Iran in November 1979 (Document 2). Today, the FBI’s extensive presence overseas, via its legal attaché program, the subject of a Justice Department inspector general report (Document 17), allows it to produce information relevant both to criminal investigations and U.S. foreign intelligence requirements.

The counterintelligence component of the organization’s mission involves the related activities of investigating foreign intelligence services and their employees, both those employing diplomatic cover and those operating as illegals, and detecting Americans – including members of the FBI and CIA – who are providing classified information to those services. Thus, documents in the posting include the executive summary of an inspector general report on the activities and detection of FBI agent Robert Hanssen, who provided extraordinarily sensitive intelligence to the Soviet Committee of State Security (KGB) and the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) over two decades (Document 12).

The posting also includes an examination of the FBI’s successes and failures. One involved the case of the CIA’s Aldrich Ames, arrested in 1994, but not after he disclosed the identities of a number of CIA sources to the Soviet Union. (Document 6). In addition, there is the case of Katrina Leung (Document 25), who had sexual relationships with at least two FBI agents while appearing to provide information on developments within the government of the People’s Republic of China – but actually serving as a PRC agent. Further, the posting includes the reports produced by several security reviews under taken by RAND and an outside commission in the wake of the Hanssen fiasco (Document 7, Document 10).

Also represented in the briefing book are a number of FBI intelligence assessments concerning terrorism. A 1970 analysis focuses on the Fedayeen terrorist group (Document 1) while a 1984 study (Document 3) describes Iranian and Iranian-linked institutions in the United States – including both official institutions and educational foundations – that had (or could have) served as covers for clandestine intelligence collection and support to terrorist activities.

Other more recent assessments have focused on both the international and domestic terrorist threats. Thus, a Secret/Noforn assessment from April 2004 (Document 19) focuses on the threats from al-Qaeda as well as from U.S.-based groups. It reported that the “motivation and commitment to lethality remains as strong as ever” among al-Qaeda’s members, that the group continued to be interested in targeting international flights, and that few entities or individuals in the United States had direct connections to senior al-Qaeda leaders.

But while al-Qaeda was the greatest concern, the FBI also devoted analytical resources to evaluating the threat from a variety of domestic groups. A 2007 assessment (Document 30) noted the threat from animal rights extremists who “committed the overwhelming majority of criminal incidents during 2005 and 2006.” Several reports concerned white supremacist groups – including their possible use of suicide terrorism (Document 28), their infiltration of law enforcement (Document 26), and the phenomenon of “ghost skins,” (Document 27) who “strive to blend into society.” According to the reports, suicide terrorism was seen “primarily as a means of uniting a fractured movement,” while infiltration of law enforcement threatened the success of investigations and could “jeopardize the safety of law enforcement sources and personnel.”

Beyond estimates of the terrorist threat, the documents posted today illuminate various aspects of FBI counter-terrorist operations and organization prior to 9/11 or in its aftermath. Thus, the Department of Justice’s inspector general produced a lengthy report (Document 22) on the Bureau’s performance with respect to the Phoenix memo (warning in 2001 about Osama bin Laden’s possible plan to send operatives to the U.S. to train in civil aviation), the investigation of two hijackers, Khalid al-Mindhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi, and of Zacarias Moussaoui. Another inspector general report (Document 32) focuses on the FBI’s involvement in and observations of interrogations at Guantanamo Bay. In addition, the FBI’s controversial, and at times inappropriate, use of National Security Letters is explored in a 2008 inspector general report (Document 31).

Other documents, produced by the Congressional Research Service as well as the Justice Department’s Inspector General, explore FBI practices subsequent to 9/11 and, particularly, attempts to improve the Bureau’s ability to perform its counterterrorist mission. Among the topics examined are the FBI’s efforts to improve the sharing of intelligence (Document 15); to develop a highly trained, stable corps of intelligence analysts (Document 23); to better integrate headquarters and field office intelligence operations (Document 35); and to assess the impact of revised attorney general guidelines for domestic intelligence operations (Document 38).


Documents

Document 1: Federal Bureau of Investigation, The Fedayeen Terrorist – A Profile, June 1970. Secret.
Source: www.governmentattic.org

This monograph was prepared “to furnish Field Agents a profile of the fedayeen terrorist,” a focus of major concern early in the modern era of international – and especially Middle East-based – terrorism. The study is based on the analysis of ten fedayeen terrorist attacks in Europe and other information available to the FBI. One motivation for its production was “persistent reports” that terrorist attacks in Europe would be followed by attacks in the United States.
Document 2: Joint Chiefs of Staff, Memorandum for the Record, Subject: Briefing of FBI Representatives, September 25, 1980. Top Secret.
Source: Digital National Security Archive

This memo discusses the briefing of FBI representatives by a member of the Joint Staff with regard to intelligence needs in support of operations against Iran – specifically with regard to plans to rescue American hostages.
Document 3: Federal Bureau of Investigation, Threat Assessment of Pro-Khomeini Shiite Activities in the U.S., February 24, 1984. Secret.
Source: www.governmentattic.org

This analysis consists of four key parts – an examination of the Shiite religion, a survey of official Iranian diplomatic establishments in the United States (including the Iranian mission to the United Nations, the Iranian interests section, the Islamic Education Center, and the Mostazafin Foundation), main Iranian Shiite organizations in the United States, and Iranian Shiite threats.
Document 4: General Accounting Office, International Terrorism: FBI Investigates Domestic Activities to Identify Terrorists, September 1990. Unclassified
Source: Government Accountability Office

This GAO study was conducted in response to a request by the chairman of the House Judiciary Committee’s subcommittee on civil and constitutional rights. The chairman was responding to information contained in documents released under the Freedom of Information Act that concerned FBI monitoring of the Committee in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador (CISPES). The study focused on the basis on which the FBI was opening investigations, the scope and results of the investigations, possible FBI monitoring of First Amendment activities, and the reasons for closure of the investigations.

Document 5: Office of the Attorney General, Attorney General Guidelines for FBI Foreign Intelligence Collection and Foreign Counterintelligence Investigations, May 25, 1995. Secret.
Source: Federation of American Scientists

The guidelines in the document govern all foreign intelligence and foreign counterintelligence, foreign intelligence support activities, and intelligence investigations of international terrorism conducted by the FBI as well as FBI investigations of violations of the espionage statutes and certain FBI investigations requested by foreign governments. It also provides guidance to the FBI with respect to coordination with CIA or Defense Department activities within the United States.

Document 6: Office of the Inspector General (OIG), Department of Justice, A Review of the FBI’s Performance in Uncovering the Espionage Activities of Aldrich Hazen Ames, Executive Summary, April 1997. Unclassified.
Source: Department of Justice

This document is the unclassified version of the executive summary of a more extensive, and more highly classified report on the FBI’s role in the Aldrich Ames investigation. While the investigation “found that the lack of knowledge and experience in counterintelligence work” among some FBI managers seriously hampered the FBI’s effort in detecting Ames’ espionage, it also found that once the investigation of Ames was initiated the FBI “allocated enormous resources” and pursued the investigation “efficiently and professionally.”

Document 7: Commission for Review of FBI Security Programs, A Review of FBI Security Programs, March 2002. Unclassified.
Source: Federation of American Scientists

In its report, the commission, which was established in response to the discovery of FBI agent Robert Hanssen’s delivery of “vast quantities of documents and computer diskettes” filled with national security information to the Soviet Union and Russia, identified “significant deficiencies” in FBI security policy practice — noting that “security is often viewed as an impediment to operations.” The report also contains a number of recommendations to improve Bureau security – including establishing an independent Office of Security.

Document 8: David Walker, Comptroller General of the United States, FBI Reorganization: Initial Steps Encouraging but Broad Transformation Needed, June 21, 2002. Unclassified.
Source: Government Accountability Office

In testimony before a subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee, the head of the General Accounting Office discusses several aspects of the FBI’s proposed reorganization and realignment efforts — including the broader issue of federal government transformation, the realignment of FBI resources, the elements of a successful transformation, and the importance of Congressional oversight.

Document 9: G. Gregg Webb, “New Insights into J. Edgar Hoover’s Role,” Studies in Intelligence, 48, 1 (2003). Unclassified.
Source: www.cia.gov

This article focuses on the FBI’s operation of a foreign intelligence organization during World War II – the Special Intelligence Service – which focused on Latin America.

Document 10: Gregory T. Treverton, Richard Davidek, Mark Gabriele, Martin Libicki, and William (Skip) Williams, RAND Corporation, Reinforcing Security at the FBI, February 2003. Unclassified.
Source: FBI Freedom of Information Act Release

This RAND study was undertaken at the request of the FBI’s Security Division and reports the results of RAND’s assessment of the FBI’s efforts to establish a security program that would dramatically reduce the risk of another security compromise similar to that involving Robert Hanssen.

Document 11: Todd Masse, Congressional Research Service, Domestic Intelligence in the United Kingdom: Applicability of the MI5 Model to the United States, May 2003. Unclassified.
Source: Federation of American Scientists

In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, attacks one suggestion for a possible change in the U.S. approach to domestic counter-terrorist intelligence was to remove such responsibilities (along with counterintelligence) from the FBI and create a separate organization along the lines of the British Security Service (better known as MI-5). This paper examines both political and organizational considerations relevant to the applicability of the British model as well as summarizing pending legislation.

Document 12: Office of the Inspector General, Department of Justice,A Review of the FBI’s Performance in Deterring, Detecting, and Investigating the Espionage Activities of Robert Philip Hanssen, Executive Summary, August 14, 2003. Unclassified.
Source: Department of Justice

This review is the unclassified version of two classified reports on the same subject – a 674-page Top Secret/Codeword level report and a 383-page report. This version consists of five chapters, which examine Hanssen’s activities before joining the FBI and between 1976 and 1985; his career between 1985 (when he became supervisor of a technical surveillance squad in New York and offered his services to the KGB) and 1992; and deficiencies in the FBI’s internal security revealed during the OIG investigation. It also offers recommendations for changes in the FBI’s counterintelligence and security programs.

Document 13: Todd Masse and William Krouse, Congressional Research Service, The FBI: Past, Present, and Future, October 2, 2003. Unclassified.
Source: Federation of American Scientists

One part of this study is a review of the FBI’s history, its current status, and its future. In addition, it examines four issues facing Congress with regard to the Bureau – whether the FBI can adapt to a terrorist prevention role; some of the FBI’s criminal investigative work should be transferred to state and local law enforcement organizations; a statutory charter should be developed for the Bureau; and whether the planned collocation of the FBI’s Counterterrorism Division and the Terrorist Threat Integration Center risks allowing U.S. foreign intelligence entities to engage in domestic intelligence activities.

Document 14: Office of the Attorney General, The Attorney General’s Guidelines for FBI National Security Investigations and Foreign Intelligence Collection , October 31, 2003. Secret/Noforn.
Source: Federation of American Scientists

This document is the result of a review of existing guidelines for national security and criminal investigations that was carried out after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. The new guidelines authorize FBI investigations of threats to national security; assistance to state, local, and foreign governments in relation to national security matters; foreign intelligence collection by the FBI; the production of strategic analysis by the FBI; and the retention and dissemination of information from those activities.

Document 15: Office of the Inspector General,Department of Justice, FBI’s Efforts to Improve Sharing of Intelligence and Other Information, December 2003. Redacted/Unclassified.
Source: Department of Justice

This audit focused on the FBI’s identification of impediments to its sharing of counter-terrorism related intelligence; improvements in its ability to share intelligence and other information not only within the FBI but with the Intelligence Community as well as state and local law enforcement agencies; and the dissemination of useful threat and intelligence information to other intelligence and law enforcement organizations.

Document 16: National Commission on Terrorist Attack Upon the United States, Memorandum for the Record, “Interview of [Deleted],” December 29, 2003. Secret.
Source: www.cryptome.org

This memo reports on an interview with a FBI reports officer (whose identity has been deleted) by members of the 9/11 Commission staff. It provides background on the interviewee, while the subjects of the remainder of the memo include, but are not limited to, the Terrorism Reports and Requirements Section, terrorism reporting, general impressions of the FBI, as well as the role of the Office of Intelligence and of reports officers and their products.

Document 17: Office of the Inspector General,Department of Justice, FBI Legal Attaché Program, March 2004. Redacted/Unclassified.
Source: Federation of American Scientists

This audit examines the type of activities performed by the FBI’s Legal Attaché offices; the effectiveness of the offices in establishing liaison relationships with other U.S. law enforcement and intelligence organizations overseas; the criteria and process used by the FBI to locate offices; and the oversight and management of existing offices. The auditors reviewed operations at FBI headquarters and four of the Bureau’s 46 attaché offices.

Document 18: Federal Bureau of Investigation, Tactics Used by Eco-Terrorists to Detect and Thwart Law Enforcement Operations, April 15, 2004. Unclassified/Law Enforcement Sensitive.
Source: www.wikileaks.org

This assessment report focuses on sections of Earth First founder David Foreman’s Eco-Defense; A Field Guide to Monkeywrenching – which discuss some of the covers Foreman believes are used by law enforcement to infiltrate radical environmental groups and the means of identifying undercover law enforcement personnel.

Document 19: Federal Bureau of Investigation, The Terrorist Threat to the U.S. Homeland: An FBI Assessment, April 15, 2004. Secret/NOFORN.
Source: FBI Freedom of Information Act Release

This secret assessment concerns the threat from Al-Qaeda as well as domestic terrorists (including terrorists from the white supremacist, animal rights, and hacker communities). It includes an examination of “Islamic Extremist Terrorism Trends.”

Document 20: Alfred Cumming and Todd Masse, Congressional Research Service, FBI Intelligence Reform Since September 11, 2001: Issues and Options for Congress, August 4, 2004. Unclassified.
Source: http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organizations/39334.pdf

In the aftermath of the September 11 attacks there were numerous proposals for reform of FBI intelligence operations. This study examines five options for Congress to consider – including creation of a domestic organization similar to the United Kindgom’s Security Service (MI-5), transferring domestic intelligence responsibilities to the Department of Homeland Security, and creating a national security intelligence service within the FBI.

Document 21: Office of the Inspector General,Department of Justice, Internal Effects of the FBI’s Reprioritization, September 2004. Redacted/Unclassified.
Source: Department of Justice

This Inspector General report lays out the FBI’s new priorities announced by the Bureau’s director in May 2002: protecting the United States from terrorist attack, foreign intelligence operations, and cyber-based attacks. The report examines FBI changes in resource utilization from the 2000 and 2003 fiscal years to determine if the new priorities were reflected in FBI resource allocations.

Document 22: Office of the Inspector General, Department of Justice, A Review of the FBI’s Handling of Intelligence Information Related to the September 11 Attacks, November 2004. Unclassified.
Source: Department of Justice

This 449-page report provides background concerning the FBI’s counterterrorism effort, and examines three key aspects of the FBI’s pre-9/11 work – its handling of the Phoenix communication and the Bureau’s attention to the possible use of airplanes in terrorist attacks, its handling of the Zacarias Moussaoui case, and its performance with respect to two of the 9/11 hijackers (Khalid al-Mihhar and Nawaf Al-Hazmi). It also provides several recommendations with regard to the FBI’s analytical program, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act process, and interactions with the Intelligence Community.

Document 23: Office of the Inspector General,Department of Justice, FBI Efforts to Hire, Train, and Retain Intelligence Analysts, May 2005. Unclassified.
Source: Department of Justice

This Inspector General audit examines the FBI’s progress in meeting analyst hiring goals, analyst hiring requirements, establishing a comprehensive training program and reaching the training goals, analyst staffing and utilization in support of FBI activities, and retaining analysts. The auditors concluded that the FBI “made significant progress in hiring and training quality analysts, although significant issues remain[ed].”

Document 24: Alfred Cumming and Todd Masse, Congressional Research Service, Intelligence Reform Implementation at the Federal Bureau of Investigation: Issues and Options for Congress, August 16, 2005. Unclassified.
Source: Federation of American Scientists

This study attempts to assess the state of intelligence reform in the FBI, subsequent to the announcement that the Bureau would establish a National Security Service (which was ultimately known as the National Security Branch). It also discusses some of Congress’ options and areas for oversight.

Document 25: Office of the Inspector General,Department of Justice, A Review of the FBI’s Handling and Oversight of FBI Asset Katrina Leung, Unclassified Executive Summary, May 2006. Unclassified.
Source: Department of Justice

In May 2000, the FBI received information that Katrina Leung, one of the Bureau’s most highly paid assets who was actively spying for the People’s Republic of China against the United States. The Secret 236-page report that was the product of the resulting investigation is summarized in this executive summary, which reports on the FBI’s Chinese counterintelligence program, the 18-year period in which Leung was operated by James J. Smith (who was also involved in “an intimate romantic relationship” with her), and the FBI’s investigation of Smith and Leung. It also reports the OIG’s conclusions and recommendations.

Document 26: Federal Bureau of Investigation, White Supremacist Infiltration of Law Enforcement, October 17, 2006. Unclassified/Law Enforcement Sensitive.
Source: FBI Freedom of Information Act Release

This assessment, drawn from open sources and FBI investigations, provides an overview of white supremacist infiltration of law enforcement. It reports the threats posed to intelligence collection and exploitation, as well as to elected officials and other protected persons. It also explains why different supremacist groups can benefit from a single penetration.

Document 27: Federal Bureau of Investigation, Ghost Skins: The Fascist Path of Stealth, October 17, 2006. Unclassified/Law Enforcement Sensitive.
Source: FBI Freedom of Information Act Release

This intelligence bulletin focuses on ‘ghost skins’ – white supremacists who avoid giving any indication of their sympathy with Nazi beliefs and “strive to blend into society to be unrecognizable to the Jewish enemy.”

Document 28: Federal Bureau of Investigation, White Supremacy: Contexts and Constraints for Suicide Terrorism, April 20, 2007. Unclassified/For Official Use Only/Law Enforcement Sensitive.
Source: FBI Freedom of Information Act Release

Suicide terrorism is defined in this study as instances in which a terrorist intentionally kills himself or herself while attempting to kill others or operations in which the terrorist expects to be killed by police or other defenders. It examines the prospects for organized suicide campaigns as well as for the white supremacist movement to generate lone offenders.

Document 29: Office of the Inspector General,Department of Justice,FBI’s Progress in Responding to the Recommendations in the OIG Report on Robert Hanssen, Executive Summary, September 2007. Unclassified.
Source: Department of Justice

In the wake of the discovery that Robert Hanssen had provided the KGB and then the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) with extremely sensitive information about U.S. intelligence and counterintelligence activities, the Department of Justice’s Office of the Inspector General examined FBI security practices and 21 recommendations to improve the Bureau’s internal security and its ability to deter and detect espionage by its own employees. This report assesses the FBI’s response to some of those recommendations.

Document 30: Federal Bureau of Investigation, A Threat Assessment for Domestic Terrorism, 2005 – 2006, September 18, 2007. Unclassified/For Official Use Only/Law Enforcement Sensitive.
Source: FBI Freedom of Information Act Release

This study examines the activities, capabilities, opportunities, intent, and potential targets of a variety of domestic terrorist groups – including anarchist, animal rights, anti-abortion, Puerto Rican, and white supremacist extremists.

Document 31: Office of the Inspector General,Department of Justice, A Review of the FBI’s Use of National Security Letters: Assessment of Corrective Actions and Examination of NSL Usage in 2006, March 2008. Unclassified.
Source: Department of Justice

This extensive review covers several aspects of the FBI’s controversial use of National Security Letters: corrective actions taken by the FBI and Department of Justice in response to an earlier Inspector General report on the use of NSLs; the FBI review of the earlier NSL report; NSL requests by the FBI in 2006; the effectiveness of national security letters as an investigative tool; Inspector General findings on the FBI’s compliance with non-disclosure and confidentiality requirements; and the improper or illegal use of NSLs reported by FBI personnel in 2006. It concluded that the FBI and Justice Department had made “significant progress” in implementing the recommendations from the earlier report but also offered 17 additional recommendations.

Document 32: Office of Inspector General, Department of Justice, A Review of the FBI’s Involvement in and Observations of Detainee Interrogations in Guantanamo Bay, Afghanistan, and Iraq, May 2008. Unclassified.
Source: Department of Justice

This 438-page study consists of twelve chapters. Between the introductory and concluding chapters, it provides background on the FBI’s post-9/11 role and interrogation policies, early development of FBI policies regarding detainee interviews and interrogations, the concerns of Bureau agents about military interrogation activities at Guantanamo Bay, the Bureau’s response to the disclosures concerning Abu Ghraib, training for FBI agents in military zones, FBI observations regarding specific techniques used in Guantanamo, Afghanistan, and Iraq, and the Office of Inspector General’s review of alleged misconduct by FBI employees in military zones.

Document 33: Federal Bureau of Investigation, White Supremacist Recruitment of Military Personnel since 9/11, July 7, 2008. Unclassified/For Offical Use Only/Law Enforcement Sensitive.
Source: www.cryptome.org

This assessment, based on FBI case files from October 2001 to May 2008, examines why white supremacist extremist groups sought to increase their recruitment of current and former U.S. military personnel, the extent of their success, and the impact of recruitment on the white supremacist movement.

Document 34: Office of the Attorney General, The Attorney General’s Guidelines for Domestic FBI Operations, September 29, 2008. Unclassified.
Source: Department of Justice

These guidelines, according to the introduction, were designed to allow full utilization of “all authorities and investigative methods, consistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States,” to shield the United States from threats to national security (including terrorism) and the victimization of individuals by federal crimes.

Document 35: Strategic Execution Team, FBI, The New Field Intelligence, March 2008-March 2009, 2009. Unclassified.
Source: FBI Freedom of Information Act Release

This study explores domestic intelligence collection, in 2008-2009, by FBI field offices. It focuses on organization, roles and responsibilities, collection management, HUMINT collection, tactical intelligence, production and dissemination, measuring and tracking performance, and implementation.

Document 36: Vivian S. Chu and Henry B. Hogue, Congressional Research Service, FBI Directorship: History and Congressional Action, July 25, 2011. Unclassified.
Source: Federation of American Scientists

This report examines the history of the 1968 and 1976 legislation that is the basis for the current nomination and confirmation process for FBI directors. It also discusses the precedent for lengthening the tenure of an office and the constitutionality of extending Robert Mueller’s tenure as director.

Document 37: Federal Bureau of Investigation, Anonymous’ Participation in “Day of Rage” Protest May Coincide with Cyber Attack, September 14, 2011. Unclassified/Law Enforcement Sensitive.
Source: www.publicintelligence.net

This intelligence bulletin reports the FBI’s assessment that the group of activist hackers known as Anonymous was likely to participate in the ‘Days of Rage’ protest in New York scheduled for September 17, 2011. The bulletin also notes past Anonymous activities that involved cyber attacks.

Document 38: Jerome P. Bjelopera, Congressional Research Service, The Federal Bureau of Investigation and Terrorism Investigations, December 28, 2011. Unclassified.
Source: Federation of American Scientists

This study focuses on key components of FBI terrorism investigations. It reports on enhanced investigative tools and capabilities, the revision of Attorney General guidelines for domestic FBI operations, intelligence reform within the FBI, and the implications for privacy and civil liberties inherent in the use of preventive techniques to combat terrorism.


Notes

[1] Don Whitehead, The FBI Story (New York: Pocket Books, 1959); Fred J. Cook, The FBI Nobody Knows (New York: Pyramid, 1972); Sanford J. Ungar, The FBI: An Uncensored Look Behind the Walls (Boston: Little, Brown, 1976); William C. Sullivan with Bill Brown,The Bureau: My Thirty Years in Hoover’s FBI (New York: W.W. Norton, 1979); David J. Garrow, The FBI and Martin Luther King, Jr: From “Solo” to Memphis (New York: W.W. Norton, 1981); Richard Gid Powers, Secrecy and Power: The Life of J. Edgar Hoover (New York: Free Press, 1988); Ronald Kessler, The Secrets of the FBI (New York: Crown, 2011), and Tim Weiner, Enemies: A History of the FBI (New York: Random House, 2012).

[2] Novels involving the FBI include those in the Ana Grey series, by April Smith, including White Shotgun (New York: Knopf, 2011) and Rex Stout’s The Doorbell Rang (New York: Viking, 1965). Films include The FBI Story (1959), Manhunter (1986), Mississippi Burning (1988), and J. Edgar (2011). Television shows featuring the FBI include I Led Three Lives (1953-56), The F.B.I. (1965-74), The X Files (1993-2002), and Fringe (2008- ).

[3] “Quick Facts,” http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/quick-facts, accessed May 27, 2012.

[4] Kessler, The Secrets of the FBI, pp. 194-195.

[5] The Bureau’s COINTELPRO efforts are covered in Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, Final Report, Book II: Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976).

The NSA – STOLEN BABIES: Argentina Convicts Two Military Dictators

STOLEN BABIES: Argentina Convicts Two Military Dictators

In Unprecedented Testimony, Former US Assistant Secretary of State Confirmed Military Kidnappings of Children of Disappeared Political Prisoners in the 1970′s

Washington, D.C., July 10, 2012 –An Argentine tribunal today convicted two former military leaders for their roles in the kidnapping and theft of dozens of babies of executed and disappeared political prisoners during the dictatorship. Drawing on critical evidence provided from the United States, the court sentenced General Rafael Videla to 50 years and General Reynaldo Bignone to 15 years in prison for crimes that epitomized the vicious human rights abuses during the military regime that governed Argentina between 1976 and 1983.

The “Tribunal Oral Federal N° 6″ handed down the verdict after a review of documentation that included a memorandum of conversation, written by former Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights Elliott Abrams, that proved the clandestine program to steal the babies of political prisoners was known at the highest levels of the regime. In his memo, dated December 3, 1982, Abrams recounted a meeting with the military’s ambassador to Washington: “I raised with the Ambassador the question of children… born to prisoners or children taken from their families during the dirty war… The Ambassador agreed completely and had already made this point to his [Argentine] foreign minister and president…”

The trial, pursued by the Association of the Grandmothers of the Plaza de Mayo, was based on the cases of 35 children, now adults, who have been identified through DNA testing as sons and daughters of disappeared victims of the dirty war. The Grandmothers estimate that more than 500 children were captured along with their parents or born in captivity; after their parents were executed, many were raised by security officers’ families who hid their true identities. More than 100 of the children have been identified.

This is not the first time that Videla and Bignone have been put on trial for crimes committed during the dictatorship. Both are currently serving life sentences for human rights abuses. Argentina’s National Commission on the Disappeared (CONADEP) originally documented 9,089 cases of people disappeared by the regime. Subsequent research using reports from the secret police battalion 601 raises the total of the dead and disappeared to about 22,000. Human rights organizations estimate that this number is closer to 30,000.

The Abrams memorandum of conversation was among thousands of records on human rights in Argentina declassified by the Department of State in 2002, but it had significant sections redacted [See the redacted memo here]. With the National Security Archive’s encouragement, the Grandmothers formally petitioned the U.S. Embassy in Buenos Aires to declassify a full version of the memcon. In “a remarkable move,” according to Carlos Osorio who directs the Archive’s Southern Cone Documentation project, the Department of State released an un-censored version of the memorandum of conversation last December.

“This is a wonderful example of how declassification serves the purposes of justice,” Osorio said. “We welcome and congratulate the initiative of the U.S. ambassador and Department of State to support the Abuelas de la Plaza De Mayo and provide evidence for this trial.”

The document proved critical in the trial, according to Alan Iud, lead lawyer for the Grandmothers. “The document is key for it demonstrates that the last President  of the military dictatorship General Bignone knew of the military policy to snatch the children and knew of their fate ” he said. “The release of the full document prevented the defense from arguing that the redacted sections of the document may have contained information that diminished the significance of the essence of declassified parts,” he added.

In a virtually unprecedented move, on January 26, 2012, Elliott Abrams provided formal testimony to the court on his meeting with the Argentine ambassador in 1982. He confirmed the authenticity of the document and offered further details about the Argentine military’s policy on the kidnapped children.

Abrams testified that the Department of State was aware that “we were not talking about one or two children, or one or two officers who had taken children. We thought there was a pattern or plan.”

He later went on to say that the kidnapped children were “in one way, the most significant human rights problem, because these children were alive. This was an ongoing problem.” [See clips from his testimony here. Find the transcript here]

As the trial concluded, Osorio called on the CIA, the Defense Department and the FBI to search their secret files for additional documentation related to the disappeared, and their children, in Argentina. The National Security Archive, he said, would press the Obama Administration to declassify such records, to advance the cause of human rights and “the right of the Abuelas to finally know the fates of their children and of their grandchildren.”


DOCUMENTS

Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation, December 2, 1982 [redacted version]
By the time Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights Elliott Abrams met with Argentina’s ambassador to Washington, Lucio Alberto Garcia del Solar, in late 1982, the military regime was completely discredited. Gen. Videla’s successor, Leopoldo Fortunato Galtieri, had led Argentina into the debacle of the Falklands war—the U.S. had secretly sided with the British. The defeat cost the regime whatever remaining domestic support it had. The call for an accounting of the disappeared was broadly debated among the media, and society at large.  General Reynaldo Bignone had replaced Galtieri as a transitional figure to hand power to civilians. The Department of State had recently received a delegation of the Grandmothers of the Plaza de Mayo who presented their case about the hundreds of children stolen from the disappeared and secretly transferred to security officers to raise as their own, “adopted,” children.

This redacted version of the memo of the conversation between Abrams and Garcia del Solar was declassified in 2002 as part of a special declassification of human rights documents on Argentina initiated by the State Department during the Clinton administration. It reveals that Abrams had been briefed on the issue of the disappeared children and explicitly addressed the issue.  ”I raised with the Ambassador the question of children… born to prisoners or children taken from their families during the dirty war. While the disappeared were dead, these children were still alive and this was in a sense the gravest humanitarian problem.” According to the memcon, “The Ambassador agreed completely and had already made this point to his foreign minister and president…” but del Solar also stated that the problem is “taking these children from adoptive parents.”

Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation, December 2, 1982 [unredacted version]
In preparation for the trial of General Videla and General Bignone as accessories to the kidnapping and theft of the missing children of political prisoners, the Grandmothers of the Plaza de Mayo asked the U.S. ambassador in Buenos Aires, Vilma Socorro Martínez, to obtain the full declassification of the document, in hopes that it would provide further evidence for the prosecution. On December 22, 2011, the State Department released the entire document. The redacted sections turned out not to provide additional information on the disappeared children, but having the full document facilitated its introduction as evidence in the trial.

Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), “Forwarding of Spanish Documents,” March 25, 1976.
The day after the Argentine military coup, the U.S. defense attaché in Buenos Aires forwarded to Washington two Spanish language documents entitled “Philosophy” and “Bio of Lieutenant General  Jorge Rafael Videla. ” A leader of the coup, Videla described “The historical justification of the Armed Forces intervention in the national process…” and “[T]he guiding ideas – the Philosophy -  that support this intervention and its operational modalities.…”

In a revealing section, Videla stated that “the current situation in the country is mismanagement, administrative chaos, venality, but also the existence of currents of public opinion or political beliefs which are deeply rooted, with a working class outside the mainstream… with a church alarmed by the process but still willing to report any excess against human dignity…”

Department of State – President Videla: An Alternative View,” November 19, 1977
Although the Carter Administration raised the profile of human rights violations in Latin America, by the end of 1977 U.S. officials decided to  engage General Videla as the “Moderate” within the military dictatorship with whom they could work. In this briefing paper drafted two days before Secretary of State Cyrus Vance’s visit to Buenos Aires, however, the Department of State makes the following assessment of the leader the U.S. has engaged: “A common view has been that President Videla would gradually but effectively move to improve the human rights situation in Argentina… If these views appeared probable when general Videla assumed the presidency in March, 1976, a year and a half later, they are increasingly difficult to support.” The assessment continued:

“Videla probably has good instincts on human rights, but several fundamental factors are preventing him from taking effective action:

  • He adheres to the ‘clandestine war’ doctrine, which argues that subversion must be countered with illegal measures. He also agrees that this illegal war be waged in a decentralized manner, with local captains and commanders acting largely on their own. This makes it impossible for the top generals, including the junta, to effectively control the security forces – but does provide the junta members with plausible deniability.
  • Videla fails to make a sharp distinction between terrorism and dissent. The loose application of the term ‘subversive’ to the government’s enemies has encouraged the security forces to strike not just at terrorists but a wide range of civilian opinion. Certainly less than half of the prisoners and disappeared persons (estimated by human rights groups at 15,000) were active terrorists; some estimates place the figure at under 15%.”

The NSA – Great Power Politics and the Korean Security Dilemma during and after the Cold War

Washington, D.C., July 11, 2012 – A new book and newly-released documents illuminate the history of U.S. efforts to deal with the Korean security dilemma during and since the Cold War. Among the key “lessons learned” are the limits to the ability of Beijing or Moscow to influence North Korea and persuade it to adopt less provocative and destabilizing behavior and policies, and the challenges facing efforts by the United States, South Korea and Japan to work together to address this critical unresolved legacy of the Cold War.

These and related issues are the focus of the new book edited by National Security Archive Senior Fellow Robert A. Wampler, Trilateralism and Beyond: Great Power Politics and the Korean Security Dilemma During and After the Cold War (Kent State University Press), which will be the subject of a panel discussion at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars on July 10, 2012.

The entwined political and security issues confronting Washington and its allies are also underscored in new documents, obtained by the Archive’s Korea Project and posted today. These documents include records of high-level meetings between President George H.W. Bush and Chinese and South Korean leaders, Department of Defense memoranda from the Carter years regarding the contentious issue of North Korea’s military capabilities, and a cable reporting on Secretary of Defense William Perry’s meeting with the South Korean Defense Minister during the 1994 nuclear crisis with North Korea.

Trilateralism and Beyond: Great Power Politics and the Korean Security Dilemma during and after the Cold War

Edited by Robert A. Wampler

Kent State University Press

July 6, 2012

The National Security Archive is pleased to announce the publication of a new study that sheds light on the history of a critical Cold War flashpoint.

“A groundbreaking book on a vital and timely topic, one that gives a valuable historical perspective on the recurrent crisis on the Korean peninsula.” – Charles K. Armstrong, Director, Center for Korean Research, Columbia University


President George H.W. Bush and President Roh Tae Woo of South Korea shake hands across the table during an expanded bilateral meeting in the Jiphyon Room of the Blue House, Seoul, Korea, January 6, 1992. This meeting took place against the backdrop of encouraging advances on the Korean Peninsula, marked by a more cooperative stance by Pyongyang on relations with South Korea and on opening up its nuclear facilities to International Atomic Energy Agency inspection. (Courtesy George Bush Presidential Library and Museum)

The fall of the Berlin Wall more than two decades ago brought an end to the Cold War for most of the world. But the legacy of that era remains unresolved on the divided Korean peninsula, which still presents a clear danger for the United States and its allies. Two triangular alliances-one comprised of the United States, South Korea, and Japan, and the other of Russia, China, and North Korea-lie at the heart of the security challenge and all efforts to pursue a final peace treaty.

Trilateralism and Beyond brings together a collection of essays by leading American, South Korean, and Japanese scholars that probe the historical dynamics formed and driven by the Korean security dilemma. Drawing on newly declassified documents secured by the National Security Archive’s Korea Project, along with new archival resources in China and former Warsaw Pact countries, the contributors examine the critical relationships between the two triangular security relationships that pivot on the Korean peninsula. As Editor Robert A. Wampler says in his introduction:

“Taken together, these chapters provide a multifaceted analysis of the complex historical dynamics at the heart of the Korean security dilemma. The picture they draw is of broadening circles of relationships, starting at the central U.S.-South Korea security relationship and widening out to include Japan, then China and Russia and the perpetually enigmatic and maddening North Korea, whose actions have added several layers of complexity to Churchill’s famous description of Russia as “a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma.” With their multiple perspectives on the common history of Korean peninsula diplomacy, the chapters provide what can be seen as a series of overlay maps that, when placed together, illuminate the linkages, goals, and assumptions regarding the two Koreas driving policy in the United States, South Korea, Japan, China, and Russia. While there can be no real map to the future, a better understanding of the route by which the Korean security dilemma has reached its current state and an appreciation of the lessons to be learned from this history would seem critical, if not essential, for addressing this challenge in the years to come.”

Dr Wampler will host a panel discussion on the book with several of the contributors at the Woodrow Wilson Center International Center for Scholars (see information in “Event” tab).

Below is the Preface to Trilateralism and Beyond by Professor Akira Iriye of Harvard University. A selection of declassified documents that illustrate a number of the themes addressed by the authors in this book can be found at the “Documents” tab.

= = = = = = = = =

Foreword by Akira Iriye

 

[Copyright 2012 The National Security Archive Fund, Inc.]


President Clinton and President Kim Dae Jung, the White House, July 2, 1999. Kim, who owed his life to U.S. intervention with the South Korean government on two occasions, pursued his ‘Sunshine Policy’ of expanded engagement with North Korea while the U.S. sought to build on the 1994 Framework Agreement to end Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons program, linking the promise of diplomatic and trade relations to North Korea’s commitment to accelerate the dismantling of its nuclear program and to halt its missile program. (Courtesy William J. Clinton Presidential Library)

The National Security Archive has been a pioneer among scholarly communities in its persistent and successful efforts to gain access to governmental documents and its sponsorship of international research projects in which declassified material forms the basis of historical inquiry. The present volume is a product of such a project, this time focusing on U.S. relations with the two Koreas. The Archive’s Korea Project brought together some of the world’s leading specialists, and their papers have been revised for publication. It is easy to see from the six essays included in this volume how important it is to have access to as much public record-of all countries-as possible and also why a historical perspective is a prerequisite to understanding contemporary issues.

The essays examine how the two Koreas, Japan, the United States, the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and the Soviet Union (Russia) dealt with one another in the last decades of the twentieth century and at the beginning of the twenty-first. Of these six countries, North Korea is perhaps unique in that, as Sergey Radchenko notes in his essay, its “policies, grievances, and demands . . . change very little” from decade to decade. This in sharp contrast to the other five countries where constant change would seem to have been their main characteristic, as clearly documented in the essays. What is equally important is that the world itself was significantly transformed in the last three decades of the twentieth century so that the old-fashioned game of geopolitics-the story of “the rise and fall of the great powers”-became less and less relevant. Instead, regional communities, transnational movements, and global networks of goods, capital, labor, and ideas came to provide the context in which nations sought to define, protect, and promote their interests. All countries with strong interests in, or concerns about, North Korea were aware of such changes, while the latter alone seemed to hold to its old ways. While most of the contributions in this volume focus on the security question, in particular the implications of North Korean’s nuclear armament for regional stability, they also touch on many other issues that always complicated the formulation of an appropriate response to that challenge.

In the first chapter, William Stueck traces the development of U.S. policy in the Korean peninsula in the framework of a six-party relationship, including Japan, China, and the Soviet Union. It is a complex story, but the author’s research finds that while most administrations in Washington have been eager to reduce U.S. commitments in Korea, this has proved very difficult because of North Korean’s unwillingness to cooperate. Although examined in the framework of regional security affairs, Stueck also mentions that from around 1989 the United States began to emphasize “the promotion of human rights and democratic values” among its objectives in the Pacific. This is not surprising in view of what appeared to be global democratization at that time, including the Chinese demonstrations at Tiananmen Square; but we can put it in an even larger framework, that of the growing importance of transnational, as against international, issues in the world at the end of the twentieth century, issues such as human rights, refugees, and global warming.

In that context, Seung-young Kim’s chapter on human rights makes a superb addition to the literature, showing that the promotion of democracy became a fundamental aspect of U.S. relations with South Korea during the 1970s and beyond. Particularly revealing is Kim’s discussion of the protest movement in South Korea against President Chun Doo-hwan that persisted throughout the 1980s, in which U.S. officials kept in close touch not only with the Korean military as well as opposition leaders but also with Chinese leaders. There were clearly global political developments in which all these countries became enveloped.

While the third essay in this book, Yasuyo Sakata’s study of the U.S.-Japan-South Korea security cooperation, focuses on geopolitical issues, it also touches on such topics as international aid to North Korea during its periods of food shortage and the alleged abduction of Japanese by North Korean agents, a human rights violation. Perhaps “human security,” the term that the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) began to use in the 1970s, might best describe the trilateral relationship. The next chapter, by Michael Chinworth, Narushige Michshita, and Taeyoung Yoon, brings the story of the sexangular relationship to the present and offers measured optimism about the possibility of renewed cooperation among South Korea, Japan, and the United States. Even so, the authors stress that “communication . . . remains a problem” among Seoul, Tokyo, and Washington.

The final two chapters expand the focus to examine Chinese and Russian diplomacy on the peninsula. Gregg Brazinsky examines China’s approach to North Korea, which, the author shows, became inseparable from the PRC’s overall relationship with the United States. The leadership in Beijing was determined to pursue its policy of modernization and globalization, which any crisis in the Korean peninsula would be sure to frustrate. In South Korea, too, China wanted to encourage political stability and “the country’s evolution toward democracy.” It may seem strange that a dictatorial regime in Beijing should encourage democratic government in South Korea, but it all fits into the theme of economic connections with the outside world. Here again, one sees the intrusion of larger forces on more traditional geopolitical strategies.

Given PRC’s growing involvement with South Korea, Pyongyang’s leaders not surprisingly turned to Moscow for assistance, a story that is presented in Radchenko’s chapter. He notes how isolated politically and intellectually North Korean leaders appeared to be when they visited the Soviet Union during the 1960s and the 1970s. They seemed to follow where their dogmatic ideology took them, and it was up to Soviet and Eastern European officials to disabuse them of some of their excessive ideas. They did succeed to some extent, but, as the essay suggests, the two countries’ paths diverged further in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Communication is a critical component of diplomatic efforts to address the security dilemmas on the Korean peninsula. If security were susceptible to “realistic” solutions, lack of communication would not matter. But in today’s interconnected world, mutual understanding is more than ever crucial, and one cannot enhance understanding by merely focusing on national security. We have to think in terms of the hundreds of thousands of Koreans, Japanese, Americans, Chinese, Russians, and many others who come into daily contact with one another all over the globe. It is ultimately they who must build the world of tomorrow.

My Special Day – Happy 46th Birthday, Freedom of Information!


Lyndon Johnson usually signed bills into law this way, with a crowd — but not the Freedom of Information Act, which he signed at the last minute, grudgingly, alone, at the ranch in Texas. (Credit: Wikimedia Commons).

Happy 46th Birthday, Freedom of Information!

National Security Archive Compilation of 46 News Stories

Shows Impact of FOIA for Public Health and Government Accountability

LBJ signed FOIA into law July 4, 1966 “kicking and screaming”

For more information contact:
Nate Jones/Tom Blanton – 202/994-7000

 

 

Washington, DC, July 4, 2012 – Marking the 46th anniversary of President Johnson’s signing the Freedom of Information Act, the National Security Archive today posted a compilation of 46 news headlines from the past year made possible by active and creative use of the FOIA. This representative sample, drawn from hundreds of FOIA stories reported by newspapers, blogs, broadcasters, and researchers, describe FOIA requests that revealed the theft of Jack Daniels whiskey by airport security screeners, the keywords used by homeland security officials to monitor social networking sites, the soil contamination endangering Marines and their families at Camp Lejeune, pre-9/11 attempts to whack Osama bin Laden, and $1.2 trillion of secret Federal Reserve loans to banks, among dozens of other topics that the public has a right and a need to know.

“These freedom of information stories show the paradox of FOIA,” remarked Tom Blanton, director of the Archive, which has made tens of thousands of successful FOIA requests since its founding in 1985. “We requesters always complain about the constant delays, the bureaucratic obstacles, the processing fee harassment, and the excessive government secrecy; yet the FOIA actually produces front-page results every year that make a real difference to citizens and to better government.”

“Agencies are still dragging their heels on fulfilling President Obama’s transparency promises,” said Nate Jones, the Archive’s Freedom of Information Coordinator, citing the Archive’s government-wide audits of FOIA performance. “But persistence and focus and pressure pay off, as these headlines show; and the core principle of FOIA – that government information belongs to the people – is worth fighting for.”

The Archive’s detailed 122-page guide, “Effective FOIA Requesting for Everyone,” is available online at the Archive’s FOIA page, here.

The Archive’s previous postings of documentation from the Johnson, Nixon and Ford presidential libraries show that President Johnson grudgingly signed the FOIA into law 46 years ago today, at the last possible minute, only after pressure from newspaper editors and his own press secretary Bill Moyers, who later said LBJ was “dragged kicking and screaming” into signing the bill. Moyers credited the persistence of longtime California congressman John Moss, lead author of the FOIA bill, for making the law happen.


46 FOIA News Stories for FOIA’s 46th Birthday

“FBI admits noted Memphis civil rights photographer Ernest Withers was informant,” The Commercial Appeal, Memphis, Tennessee, July 3, 2012, By Marc Perrusquia.
Documents released under FOIA to the Commercial Appeal confirm that Ernest Withers, who photographed the Civil Rights Movement and Martin Luther King, Jr., worked as an FBI informant for 14 years. U.S. District Judge Amy Berman Jackson ruled that the FBI must release portions of its file on Withers; the US government rarely releases the files of its informants.

“Army ‘investigating’ Bradley Manning Support Network; Admits to ‘Active Investigation,’” Antiwar.com, July 2, 2012, by Jason Ditz.
A U.S. Army response to a FOIA request confirms that The Bradley Manning Support Network is part of “an active investigation.” The group maintains the website of Bradley Manning, who is being charged under the Espionage Act for “aiding the enemy” by improperly disseminating classified information.

“Probe into soil contamination closes scrap metal lot at Camp Lejeune,” The Daily News, Jacksonville, North Carolina, June 29, 2012, By Lindell Kay.
A scrap metal yard at Camp Lejeune Marine Corps Base may be exposing workers to potentially carcinogenic chemicals. A Freedom of Information Act request shows that the Environmental Protection Agency and state regulators have been attempting to move the scrap yard for years, without avail.

“Group: Gas industry got inside information in N.Y.,” Associated Press, June 29, 2012, By Mary Esch.
Email exchanges obtained through New York’s Freedom of Information Law show that a natural gas industry lawyers repeatedly requested New York environmental regulators to weaken drilling and fracking regulations in their state.

“Declassified documents shed light on scramble to ‘hit’ bin Laden before 9/11,” CNN, June 21, 2012, By Tim Lister.
Documents released to the National Security Archive in response to a FOIA request show that the US government considered attacks on bin Laden several times before September 11, 2001. The documents also show that CIA and US Air Force drones “observed an individual most likely to be bin Laden” twice in the fall of 2000, but “had no way at the time to react to this information.”

“US Reveals Years of Accusations against Secret Service: Claims Include Involvement with Prostitutes, Leaks of Sensitive Information, Illegal Wiretaps,” MSNBC, June 15, 2012, By Alicia A. Caldwell.
Documents released by a Freedom of Information Act request reveal an extensive list of allegations filed against Secret Service agents and officers since 2004. The complaints include allegations of publishing pornography, illegal wiretaps, drunken behavior, and sexual assault.

“Steve Jobs’s Pentagon File: Blackmail Fears, Youthful Arrest and LSD Cubes,” Wired, June 11, 2012, By Kim Zetter.
Documents obtained through FOIA by Wired Magazine provide insight into Steve Jobs’s personal life after he founded Apple. In a 1988 security clearance interview with the Department of Defense, Jobs revealed that he was concerned about his daughter’s safety, disclosed his past altercations with the law, and chronicled his drug use.

“NOAA Cuts May Weaken Tsunami Mitigation Programs,” Oregon Public Broadcasting News, June 11, 2012, By Kristian Foden-Vencil.
Documents obtained through the Freedom of Information Act show that proposed federal cuts to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s Tsunami Hazard Mitigation Program in 2013 would leave hundreds of coastal communities vulnerable to tsunamis.

“The Department of Energy is Under Attack. Cyber Attack,” CNBC, June 8, 2012, By Eamon Javers.
Documents obtained by CNBC through FOIA show that the DOE is frequently under what it believes to be an aggressive attack by private sector firms to access its website at times when it releases “market-moving” economic data to the public.

“DHS social media monitoring practices revealed under FOIA,” Government Security News, May 29, 2012, By Mark Rockwell.
Documents attained through FOIA reveal a long, sometimes bizarre, list of trigger words that the Department of Homeland Security monitors social networking sites for, including: “Amtrak,” “swine,” “BART,” and “cops.” The document also advises analysts which news organizations it deems the most credible, including Fox News.

“Secret Service Releases Identity of ‘Spy’ Printer Manufacturers,” The FOIA blog, May 24, 2012, By Scott Hodes.
Documents obtained through a Freedom of Information Act request reveal the names of 10 printer manufacturers that released their machine identification codes to the Secret Service, thereby allowing the Secret Service to trace printed materials back to their origin.

“ACLU raises issue with single-sex education programs,” Augusta Free Press, May 21, 2012.
Documents acquired through the Freedom of Information Act by the ACLU show an alarming trend of unlawful sex-segregation through single-sex programs in Virginia’s public schools.

“DHS Considers Collecting DNA From Kids; DEA and US Marshals Already Do,” The Electronic Freedom Foundation, May 14, 2012, By Jennifer Lynch.
Documents obtained through FOIA by the EFF show that the Department of Homeland Security is contemplating collecting DNA from children over the age of 14, and is exploring how to collect DNA from children even younger than that. ICE is the first component of DHS to collect DNA in such cases; the DEA and U.S. Marshals already do.

“National Security Letter Gag Order FOIA,” ACLU, May 9, 2012.
A FOIA lawsuit by the ACLU has led to the release of the National Security Letter template used by the FBI. National Security Letters force internet service providers, credit card companies, cell phone providers, and others, to hand over information about their customers. It is illegal to inform customers that their information has been turned over to the government.

“TSA Reveals Passenger Complaints … Four Years Later,” ProPublica, May 4, 2012, Friday, by Michael Grabell.
Documents obtained through the Freedom of Information Act reveal – albeit after a four year wait – the litany of complaints travelers filed with the Transportation Security Administration in 2008. Grievances ranged from a complaint of wheelchair-bound passenger being forced to walk through security, to an allegation that a passenger’s bottle of Jack Daniels was surreptitiously emptied by TSA screeners.

“Govt Appeals Court-Ordered Release of Classified Document,” Secrecy News, April 27, 2012, By Steven Aftergood.
A U.S. District Court ruled that the U.S. Trade Representative must release documents concerning the U.S. negotiating position in free trade negotiations that were the subject of a Freedom of Information Act Request. Judge Roberts concluded that the continued classification of the document was not “logical;” the U.S. Department of Justice has decided to appeal the decision.

“Stonington attorney a no-show at Freedom of Information training,” The Day, New London, Conn, April 25, 2012, by Joe Wojtas.
After the Connecticut Freedom of Information Commission ruled that the town of New London had violated state FOIA law in 2011, it ordered town officials to undergo FOI training. A dozen town officials took the two hour training. However, attorney Michael Satti -who mishandled the FOIA cases- did not attend despite the Commission encouraging him, “in the strongest possible terms” to do so.

“City admits to violating Freedom of Information Act,” The Stamford Advocate, Conn, April 22, 2012, By Kate King.
The Stamford Office of Legal Affairs was forced to pay a $300 fine because it improperly withheld public documents requested under the act. The city wrongly denied a request by state Rep. Sal Gabriele, for documents about theft of scrap metal by city workers and a credit account opened by public workers to fund an annual golf tournament. “Substantially all” of the documents were eventually released to Rep. Gabriele.

“ICE confirms inquiry into freedom of information denial in Dallas case,” The Dallas Morning News, April 17, 2012, By Dianne Solis.
According to a reply to a FOIA request, the Dallas branch of Immigration and Customs Enforcement confirmed that it was investigating its office’s improper “pawning of personal property of immigration detainees.” Several individuals within the senor leadership of the office have been reassigned and an investigation is ongoing.

“Memo shows US official disagreed with Bush administration’s view on torture; Previously-unreleased document shows state department official thought techniques were ‘cruel’ and ‘degrading’ punishment,” Associated Press, April 2, 2012, By Pete Yost.
In response to a FOIA request by the National Security Archive, the Department of State released a 2006 internal memo written by the State Department’s legal counselor Philip Zelikow that warned that he believed the Bush administration’s “enhanced interrogation” practices were in fact illegal. Zelikow recounted that the White House “attempted to collect and destroy all copies of my memo.”

“US feared Falklands war would be ‘close-run thing,’ documents reveal; Declassified cables show US felt Thatcher had not considered diplomatic options, and feared Soviet Union could be drawn in,” The Guardian, April 1, 2012, By Julian Borger.
U.S. diplomatic cables, released to the National Security Archive under FOIA, show that during the Falklands War, the United States provided the United Kingdom with substantial covert support. As U.S. Secretary of State Alexander Haig explained to Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, “We are not impartial.”

“Documents show NYPD infiltrated liberal groups,” The Associated Press, March 23, 2012, By Matt Apuzzo and Adam Goldman.
Documents attained by a FOIA request show that from at least 2004-2008, undercover NYPD officers infiltrated liberal political organizations’ meetings and kept files on activists planning protests around the country. The use of these counterterrorism tactics likely violated the First Amendment.

“The State Department Tells Us How They Really Felt,” Huffington Post, February 17, 2012, By David Isenberg.
Documents obtained through a FOIA request shed light on how the Department of State rates, grades, and oversees the work assigned to its contractors. One assessment reported that Blackwater’s poor performance in Iraq caused the Department of State, “to lose confidence in their credibility and management ability.”

“Justices: Release Little Rock police officer’s use-of-force reports,” Arkansas Democrat-Gazette, February 17, 2012, By Alison Sider.
The Arkansas State Supreme Court ruled that a police officer’s “use of force reports” were not exempt under the state FOI law’s protection of employee privacy. The” use of force report” at issue recounts an incident where an officer struck a man “several times in the facial area” for refusing to leave a bar.

“Pentagon Discloses Military Intelligence Budget Request,” Secrecy News, February 14, 2012, By Steven Aftergood.
After refusing to disclose its Military Intelligence Program budget proposal request in response to a 2011 Freedom of Information Act request, the Department of Defense disclosed the amount of its FY2013 budget proposal request for its Military Intelligence Program in 2012. It requested 19.2 billion dollars.

“Congress Left in Dark on DOJ Wiretaps,” Wired Magazine, February 13, 2012, By David Kravetz.
Documents obtained via the Freedom of Information Act prove that the Department of Justice was illegally withholding material from Congress between 2004 and 2008. Specifically, the DOJ was refusing to turn over documentation on the number of times they used surveillance tools called “pen register” and “trap-and-trace capturing,” which are covert mobile telephone surveillance methods.

“No Conviction, No Freedom: Immigration Authorities Locked 13,000 In Limbo,” Huffington Post, January 27, 2012, By Elise Foley.
Documents obtained through the FOIA by the Huffington Post reveal that an alarming 40% of people in immigration detentions are held without being convicted of a crime.

“Federal Immigration Enforcement is Mandatory, Memo Says,” Los Angeles Times, January 8, 2012, By Paloma Esquivel.
Documents released through a FOIA request reveals that Secure Communities, the DHS’ controversial immigration enforcement program, will become mandatory by 2012, though states and some counties had initially been told they could opt out.

“FOIA Documents Show FBI Illegally Collecting Intelligence Under Guise of ‘Community Outreach,’” ACLU, December 1, 2011.
Documents obtained through FOIA reveal that the FBI has been using community outreach programs to spy on religious and community organizations. These actions have raised concerns that the Bureau may be violating various constitutional protections.

“Secret Fed Loans Gave Banks $13 Billion Undisclosed to Congress,” Bloomberg, November 27, 2011, By Bob Ivry, Bradley Keoun and Phil Kuntz.
29,000 pages of documents acquired by Bloomberg News FOIA requests reveal that the Federal Reserve loaned major banking institutions more than 1.2 trillion dollars on December 5, 2008, at the crux of the financial crisis. By taking advantage of the Fed’s below market rates, banks were able to make an estimated combined $13 billion in profits, according to Bloomberg’s calculation of data released to it under FOIA.

“Obama Intelligence Panel Identified after Suit,” Security Law Brief, November 12, 2011.
Documents obtained through a FOIA request provide the names of the members of the panel that oversees reports of illegal and improper spying by the intelligence community, the Intelligence Oversight Board.

“An FBI director with a grudge,” Los Angeles Times, November 6, 2011, By Richard A. Serrano.
Documents obtained by a FOIA request to the FBI reveal that long-time Bureau director J. Edgar Hoover had L.A. Times journalist Jack Nelson kept under close surveillance, as Hoover was concerned that Nelson could out Hoover as a homosexual.

“FBI releases Russian spy trove,” CNN, October 31, 2011, By Suzanne Kelly.
Documents attained by a FOIA request shed light on “Operation Ghost Stories,” an investigation into the “Anna Chapman” Russian spy ring. The documents reveal information about Russian Foreign Intelligence operatives in the U.S. who were thought to be attempting to access classified documents from undercover FBI agents; they include videos of Russian operatives conducting “brush passes” and other operational espionage.

“What If We Paid Off The Debt? The Secret Government Report,” NPR, October 20, 2011, By David Kestenbaum.
A document obtained through a FOIA request by NPR provides insight on how the government viewed a potential crisis in the year 2000. What was the crisis? How the global financial would suffer if the U.S. government entirely paid off its debt.

“FOIA request elicits declassification processing for NGA budget documents,” Progressive Technology Federal Systems, October 19, 2011.
Documents acquired by a Freedom of Information Act request by the Federation of American Scientists expose the budget considerations of the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency (NGA). The documents reveal the NGA’s concern about an upcoming wave of retirements, and the possible loss of valuable institutional knowledge and critical skills that could follow.

Enviros: TransCanada, State emails ‘cozy,’” PoliticoPro, October 3, 2011, By Bob King.
Documents obtained through the Freedom of Information Act illuminate a startling familiarity between State Department employees and lobbyists for the Canadian oil giant TransCanada, regarding approval for a North American oil pipeline.

“Don’t call us, we’ll call you: Tales of a DHS FOIA,” Federal Times, September 30, 2011, by Andy Medici.
Documents attained through FOIA a reporter for Federal Times show that the Department of Homeland Security redacts the contact information of their public relations employees – in order to prevent “an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.”

“Even Those Cleared of Crimes Can Stay on F.B.I.’s Watch List,” The New York Times, September 27, 2011, By Charlie Savage.
Documents obtained through a Freedom of Information Act request reveal that the Federal Bureau of Investigation is allowed to keep people on the government’s terrorist watch list – even if they have been acquitted of terrorism-related offenses, or if the charges have been dropped. This revelation brings the FBI’s practices under greater scrutiny.

“Declassified US spy satellites reveal rare look at Cold War space program,” MSNBC, September 18, 2011, by Roger Guillemette.
For its 50th anniversary, the National Reconnaissance Office declassified and released thousands of pages of documents about its GAMBIT and HEXAGON satellite programs which were active from 1963 until 1986.

“FOIA Victory Will Shed More Light on Warrantless Tracking of Cell Phones,” The Electronic Frontier Foundation, September 10, 2011.
A U.S. District Court ruled in favor of FOIA requesters seeking information on the warrantless tracking of cell phones. The Court case forces the government to turn over information about the cases that federal law enforcement agencies obtained information by tracking cell phones without a warrant.

“Details released on probe of Manchin administration; Subpoena included request for records relating to private airplane, campaign finance, email accounts,” Daily Mail Capitol Reporter, August 25, 2011, By Ry Rivard.
Subpoenas released in response to a Freedom of Information request show that federal investigators sought flight records, emails, and bids for roads contracts from the administration of former West Virginia governor Joe Manchin, now a U.S. senator. No one was charged as a result of the probe.

“History Held Hostage; A group’s legal effort to dislodge the CIA’s official history of the Bay of Pigs fiasco shows that prying secrets from the spy agency remains far too difficult,” The Daily Beast, August 13, 2011, By Peter Kornbluh.
In response to a FOIA lawsuit by the National Security Archive, the Central Intelligence Agency released over 1200 pages of its internal history of the Bay of Pigs invasion. The history includes accounts of CIA personnel shooting at their own aircraft, and new revelations about assassination plots and the use of Americans in combat.

“Energy Friendships Spur Conflicts of Interest,” Associated Press, July 27, 2011, By Dina Cappiello.
Documents acquired through the Freedom of Information Act reveal that relations between offshore oil and gas companies and the federal agency in charge of regulating them – the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management and Regulation – were so intertwined that, a year after new ethics rules were enforced, nearly a third of inspectors located in the Gulf of Mexico region have been disqualified.

“Defense Contractors Block Auditor Access to Records, Insiders Say,” TIME Magazine, July 22, 2011, By Nick Schwellenbach.
Documents obtained through the FOIA reveal that the Pentagon frequently disregards requests for access to contractor records. Specifically, documents acquired by the Project on Government Oversight (POGO) show that the Pentagon ignored proposals from the Defense Contracting Audit Agency for greater access to contractor information.

“Court Rules TSA Adopted Body Scanners Improperly: Agency did not Solicit Public Comment before Installing Whole-Body Scanners,” Consumer Affairs, July 16, 2011, By James R. Hood.
Documents obtained via a FOIA request prove that DHS required body scanners used by TSA to be capable of recording and storing “images of unclothed passengers.”

“Final Space Shuttle Launch Threatened by Bad Weather,” Techland, July 6, 2011, By Matt Peckham.
Documents obtained via the Freedom of Information Act show that NASA’s space shuttle launches are “100 times more dangerous” to launch-site spectators than other types of U.S. rockets, though odds of a spectator actually being killed are “extremely remote.”

Rela

Revealed – NSA Tells Former ISOO Director to File a FOIA Request

William Leonard, the former director of the Information Security Oversight Office, served as an expert witness for the defense in the misconceived prosecution of Thomas Drake, in which all felony charges against Mr. Drake were dismissed.  (Mr. Drake pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor count.)

Now Mr. Leonard is seeking permission from the trial judge in the Drake case to publicly disclose and discuss certain National Security Agency documents cited in the charges against Mr. Drake that he says were classified in violation of national policy.

“I believe the Government’s actions in the Drake case served to undermine the integrity of the classification system and as such, have placed information that genuinely requires protection in the interest of national security at increased risk,” Mr. Leonard wrote in a May affidavit seeking permission from Judge Richard D. Bennett to reveal the now-declassified (but still undisclosed) documents. Attorneys for Mr. Drake asked the court to release Mr. Leonard from the protective order that restricts disclosure of the documents, so that he could publicly pursue his criticism of their original classification by NSA.  See “Former Secrecy Czar Asks Court to Release NSA Document,” Secrecy News, May 23, 2012.

But government attorneys said that Mr. Leonard has no standing to request relief from the protective order that was imposed on the NSA documents.  They added that if he wants the documents to be publicly disclosed he should request them under the Freedom of Information Act.

“The problem with Leonard’s claim is that it relies not on injury to him, but instead on a general desire to complain to the press and the public,” the government said in a June 22 response to Mr. Leonard.  Instead of court-ordered release, “the proper alternative… is for Leonard to file a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request with the National Security Agency (NSA), which is prepared to act expeditiously upon the request.”

As it happens, I requested one of those documents under FOIA last year, and NSA has not acted on it expeditiously, or at all.

But the government said “The NSA has already prepared FOIA-approved versions of the documents at issue” which involve only minimal redactions.

“The government has no animus toward Leonard or his desire to express his opinion about the documents in question — only an interest in appropriately protecting the sensitive nature of the material and to prevent a flood of similar claims by non-parties in other completed cases,” the government response said.

See also “Complaint Seeks Punishment for Classification of Documents” by Scott Shane, New York Times, August 1, 2011.

Anatoly S. Chernyaev Diary, 1972 – TOP-SECRET from the NSA


click for full sizeFirst trip with Gorbachev. Chernyaev in Belgium, October 1972.

Anatoly S. Chernyaev Diary, 1972

Soviet government official Anatoly Chernyaev records an insider’s view of the Brezhnev era

National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 379

Translated and edited by Anna Melyakova and Svetlana Savranskaya “Anatoly Chernyaev’s diary is one of the great internal records of the Gorbachev years, a trove of irreplaceable observations about a turning point in history. There is nothing else quite like it, allowing the reader to sit at Gorbachev’s elbow at the time of perestroika and glasnost, experiencing the breakthroughs and setbacks. It is a major contribution to our understanding of this momentous period.”
— David E. Hoffman, Pulitzer Prize-winning author of The Dead Hand

“Remarkable diary …”
— Historian Amy Knight, New York Review of Books, April 6, 2012


click for full sizeChernyaev, Anatoly Kovalev and Alexander Bovin in Zavidovo.

click for full sizeChernyaev and Georgy Arbatov in Zavidovo.

Washington, D.C., May 25, 2012 – Today the National Security Archive publishes excerpts from Anatoly S. Chernyaev’s diary of 1972 for the first time in English translation with edits and postscript by the author. While the diary for the Gorbachev years, 1985-1991, published before and widely used in scholarly work on the end of the Cold War provided a major source on the Gorbachev reforms, the earlier years of the diary give the reader a very rare window into the workings of the Brezhnev inner circle in the 1970s.

The portrait of the Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev, whom most Americans remember from his later years as frail and incomprehensible, emerges very differently from the earliest in the series of diaries donated by Anatoly Sergeyevich Chernyaev to the National Security Archive. In 1972, Chernyaev, deputy head of the International Department of the Central Committee, started keeping a systematic diary, recording his attendance at Politburo meetings, his participation in meetings at the state dacha in Zavidovo (where the experts and speechwriters met to draft speeches and reports for the General Secretary), visits abroad, and the daily life of a high-level Soviet apparatchik.

In 1972, Brezhnev is a skillful negotiator, who prepares seriously for Richard Nixon’s first visit to Moscow, who discusses texts of his speeches with leading Moscow intellectuals whom he brought into his inner circle as speechwriters and consultants, who is essentially non-ideological in his dealings with foreign leaders-negotiating arms control and economic agreements with Nixon while the U.S. forces are bombing the Soviet communist ally Vietnam, preferring Georges Pompidou to the leader of French communists Georges Marchais, and”brainwashing” Pakistani leader Bhutto. The two most striking differences between the aging Brezhnev of the late 1970s-early 1980s and the Brezhnev of this diary are that the General Secretary is clearly in charge of the Politburo sessions and that he actively consults with leading experts and intellectuals, such as Georgy Arbatov, Nikolai Inozemtsev, Alexander Bovin and Chernyaev himself.

Chernyaev’s daily duties are centered around the international communist movement, interactions with representatives from European communist parties. The reader sees Chernyaev’s emerging disillusionment with his work, which in comparison to real foreign policy, like preparation for Nixon’s visit, feels meaningless. Chernyaev comes to believe that “the Communist Movement right now is nothing more than an ideological addendum to our foreign policy,” and that the Soviet authority in the progressive movements in the world is shrinking: “nobody believes us anymore, no matter how we portray the Chinese and try to explain our Marxist-Leninist purity.”

He sees the future in a different direction. After Nixon’s visit, Chernyaev is asked to draft Brezhnev’s speech on Soviet-American relations and thus is allowed to see all the materials from the meeting, including all transcripts of conversation. Impressed with the quality of interaction and the non-ideological spirit of it, Chernyaev anticipates a new era: “Be that as it may, but we’ve crossed the Rubicon. The great Rubicon of world history. These weeks of May 1972 will go down in history as the beginning of an era of convergence.”

But the new era will only come thirteen years later. In 1972, he sees the first almost imperceptible sign from the future. In October 1972, he is asked to accompany first secretary of the Stavropol region on a trip to Belgium. This is where Chernyaev meets and spends time with Mikhail Gorbachev for the first time. Astonishingly, as Chernyaev later admits, he did not record this meeting in the diary at the time. Only photographs documented this auspicious meeting where Chernyaev sits on the left hand of the future Soviet leader, whose right hand he was destined to become in the late 1980s.