|8 December 2014
4 December 2014. Add 63 pages to The Intercept. Tally now *2,627 pages of The Guardian first reported 58,000 files; caveat: Janine Gibson, The Guardian NY, said on 30 January 2014 “much more than 58,000 files in first part, two more parts” (no numbers) (tally now less than ~4.3%). DoD claims 1,700,000 files (~.015% of that released). ACLU lists 525 pages released by the press. However, if as The Washington Post reported, a minimum of 250,000 pages are in the Snowden files, then less than 1% have been released. Note Greenwald claim on 13 September 2014 of having “hundreds of thousands” of documents.
25 November 2014. Add 72 pages to Süddeutsche Zeitung.
17 November 2014, charts by Cryptome:
6 November 2014. At current rate of release it will take 31 to 908 years for full disclosure.
10 October 2014. Add 69 pages to The Intercept.
17 September 2014. Add 2 pages to The Intercept.
14 September 2014. Add 68 pages to Der Spiegel.
13 September 2014. In video Glenn Greenwald claims to have “hundreds of thousands” of documents (at 9:06 min)
Audio excerpt: http://youtu.be/xnfIp38AAhM
5 September 2014. Add 32 pages to The Intercept. Tally now *2,293 pages of The Guardian first reported 58,000 files; caveat: Janine Gibson, The Guardian NY, said on 30 January 2014 “much more than 58,000 files in first part, two more parts” (no numbers) (tally now less than ~3.5%). DoD claims 1,700,000 files (~.012% of that released). ACLU lists 525 pages released by the press. However, if as The Washington Post reported, a minimum of 250,000 pages are in the Snowden files, then less than 1% have been released.
31 August 2014. Add 34 pages to Der Spiegel.
25 August 2014. Add 55 pages to The Intercept.
16 August 2014. Add 26 pages to Heise.
12 August 2014. Add 6 pages to The Intercept.
5 August 2014. Add 12 pages to The Intercept.
4 August 2014. Add 23 pages to The Intercept.
25 July 2014. Add 4 pages to The Intercept.
14 July 2014. Add 8 pages to The Intercept.
14 July 2014. “I’m as mad as hell and I’m not going to take this anymore!”
Cryptome has sent a demand for accounting and public release specifics to holders of the Snowden documents: New York Times, Washington Post, The Guardian, Barton Gellman, Laura Poitrias, Glenn Greenwald, ACLU, EFF and John and Jane Does, US Citizens:
11 July 2014. See related essay, Open the Snowden Files, Krystian Woznicki, 11July 2014:
If a minimum of 250,000 pages are in the Snowden files, then less than 1% have been released.
9 July 2014. Add 8 pages to The Intercept.
9 July 2014. Add 1 page to Washington Post.
23 June 2014. Add 9 pages to Der Spiegel.
22 June 2014. Add 41 pages to Information-The Intercept.
Revised. This is included in entry above. 18 June 2014. Add 20 pages to The Intercept.
18 June 2014. Add 200 pages to Der Spiegel.
16 June 2014. Add 4 pages to Der Spiegel.
1 June 2014. Add 4 pages to New York Times.
23 May 2014. Cryptome placed online No Place to Hide, 310 pages, to compensate for failure to release Snowden documents:
19 May 2014. The Intercept released 12 pages.
13 May 2014. Glenn Greenwald released 107 pages, some new, some previously published, some full pages, some page fragments.
5 May 2014. Related tally of redactions of Snowden releases:
30 April 2014. Add 19 pages to The Intercept.
30 April 2014. Add 2 pages to Dagbladet belatedly.
5 April 2014. Add 21 pages to The Intercept.
4 April 2014. ACLU offers NSA documents search: https://www.aclu.org/nsa-documents-search
If more lists please send: cryptome[at]earthlink.net
2 April 2014.
29 March 2014. Add 1 page to Der Spiegel.
22 March 2014. Add 3 pages to Der Spiegel.
22 March 2014. Add 2 pages to New York Times.
21 March 2014. Add 7 pages to Le Monde.
20 March 2014. Add 6 pages to The Intercept.
18 March 2014. Add 4 pages to Washington Post.
13 March 2014. Add 1 page to The Intercept.
12 March 2014. Add 35 pages to The Intercept.
12 March 2014. Add 62 pages to New York Times. Add 2 pages to NRC Handelsblad.
7 March 2014. Add 8 pages to The Intercept.
27 February 2014. Add 3 pages to Guardian.
25 February 2014. Add 11 pages to NBC News.
24 February 2014. Add 4 pages to The Intercept.
24 February 2014. Add *50 pages to The Intercept (7 pages are duplicates of GCHQ Psychology).
18 February 2014. Add *45 pages to The Intercept (37 pages are duplicates of release by NBC News).
Note: Between 10-17 February 2014, The Intercept disclosed fragments of Snowden pages and the New York Times referenced some but as far as known did not release them in full. If available please send link.
10 February 2014. Add 1 page to NRC Handelsblad (via Electrospaces.blogspot.com).
7 February 2014. Add 15 pages NBC News.
5 February 2014. Add 14 pages NBC News.
31 January 2014. Add 27 pages to CBC News.
27 January 2014. Add 47 pages to NBC News.
27 January 2014. Add 18 pages to Anonymous via New York Times.
16 January 2014. Add 8 pages to The Guardian.
* 14 January 2014. Add 21 pages to Information.dk (duplicate).
* 13 January 2014. Add 4 pages to Information.dk (duplicate).
Related Snowden Document and Page Count Assessment:
* 5 January 2014. Add 16 pages to Der Spiegel (30 December 2013. No source given for NSA docs). Tally now *962 pages (~1.7%) of reported 58,000. NSA head claims 200,000 (~.50% of that released).
4 January 2014. The source was not identified for *133 pages published by Der Spiegel and Jacob Appelbaum in late December 2013. They are included here but have not been confirmed as provided by Edward Snowden. Thanks to post by Techdirt.
Glenn Greenwald tweeted:
Matt Blaze tweeted, 11:24 AM – 2 Jan 14
3 January 2014. Add 13 pages to Washington Post.
3 January 2014. See also EFF, ACLU and LeakSource accounts:
2 January 2014. Add 1 page to Washington Post published 10 July 2013.
* 31 December 2013. Add 16 pages to Der Spiegel.
* 30 December 2013. Add 50 pages of NSA ANT Catalog by Jacob Appelbaum (no source given for NSA docs).
* 30 December 2013. Add 21 pages from 30C3 video by Jacob Appelbaum (no source given for NSA docs).
* 30 December 2013. Add 42 pages (8 duplicates) to Der Spiegel (no source given for NSA docs).
* 29 December 2013. Add 4 pages to Der Spiegel (no source given for NSA docs).
24 December 2013. Add 2 pages to Washington Post.
23 December 2013
We’ve yet to see the full impact of former National Security Agency contractor Edward Snowden’s unauthorized downloading of highly classified intelligence documents.
Among the roughly 1.7 million documents he walked away with — the vast majority of which have not been made public — are highly sensitive, specific intelligence reports, as well as current and historic requirements the White House has given the agency to guide its collection activities, according to a senior government official with knowledge of the situation.
The latter category involves about 2,000 unique taskings that can run to 20 pages each and give reasons for selective targeting to NSA collectors and analysts. These orders alone may run 31,500 pages.
13 December 2013. Add 26 pages to Trojkan (SVT). Tally now 797 pages (~1.4%) of reported 58,000. NSA head claims 200,000 (~.40% of that released). Australia press reports “up to 20,000 Aussie files.”
Rate of release over 6 months, 132.8 pages per month, equals 436 months to release 58,000, or 36.3 years. Thus the period of release has decreased in the past month from 42 years.
12 December 2013. Belatedly add 27 pages to Guardian and 18 pages to Washington Post.
21 November 2013. See also EFF and ACLU accounts:
3 November 2013
47 42 Years to Release Snowden Documents
Out of reported 50,000 pages (or files, not clear which), about 446 514 pages (>1% 1%) have been released over 5 months beginning June 5, 2012. At this rate, 89 100 pages per month, it will take 47 42 years for full release. Snowden will be 77 72 years old, his reporters hoarding secrets all dead.
NY Times, 3 November 2013:
Whatever reforms may come, Bobby R. Inman, who weathered his own turbulent period as N.S.A. director from 1977 to 1981, offers his hyper-secret former agency a radical suggestion for right now. “My advice would be to take everything you think Snowden has and get it out yourself,” he said. “It would certainly be a shock to the agency. But bad news doesn’t get better with age. The sooner they get it out and put it behind them, the faster they can begin to rebuild.”
Timeline of releases:
[See tabulation below for full timeline.]
5 October 2013
26 Years to Release Snowden Docs by The Guardian
Out of reported 15,000 pages, The Guardian has published 192 pages in fourteen releases over four months, an average of 48 pages per month, or 1.28% of the total. At this rate it will take 26 years for full release.
Edward Snowden will be 56 years old.
|Compiled and edited by Svetlana Savranskaya and Thomas Blanton
For more information contact:
Eduard Shevardnadze, Foreign Minister Under Gorbachev, Dies at 86
Eduard Shevardnadze (seated second from right, next to George Shultz) listens to conversation between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev at Geneva, November 20, 1985. (Source: Ronald Reagan Presidential Library)
Washington, DC, July 24, 2014 – Former Soviet foreign minister Eduard Shevardnadze, who passed away on July 7, brought a new diplomatic style and candor to bear in changing U.S.-Soviet relations in the late 1980s and ending the Cold War, according to Soviet and U.S. declassified documents posted today by the National Security Archive at George Washington University (www.nsarchive.org).
The posting includes the 1985 Politburo minutes of Shevardnadze’s surprise selection as foreign minister, contrasted with the behind-the-scenes account from senior Central Committee official Anatoly Chernyaev in his diary. The e-book also includes the transcripts of Shevardnadze’s remarkable first conversations with his American counterparts, George Shultz (in the Reagan administration) and James Baker (in the George H.W. Bush administration); other memcons featuring Shevardnadze’s leading role in summit meetings between Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev and American presidents Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush, and Shevardnadze’s last conversation with Bush before the end of the Soviet Union in 1991.
President Ronald Reagan and Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze in the Oval Office, September 23, 1988. (photographer unknown)
Shevardnadze’s rise to leadership of the Foreign Ministry in 1985, only months after Gorbachev became general secretary, was a “bolt from the blue,” in Chernyaev’s words. Shevardnadze’s talks with Shultz brought a whole new tone to U.S.-Soviet discourse, while the Soviet minister’s growing friendship with Baker, including 1989’s fly-fishing outing in Wyoming, led to actual partnership between the former Cold War adversaries by the time of Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990. But the memcons also reflect Shevardnadze’s frustration with American “pauses” and missed opportunities for dramatic arms reductions across the board, and for earlier domestic political transformation in the Soviet Union.
The National Security Archive obtained the Shevardnadze documents through Freedom of Information Act requests to the Reagan and Bush presidential libraries and to the U.S. State Department, and through generous donations from Anatoly Chernyaev. Additional material comes from the files of the Gorbachev Foundation, the Russian State Archive of Contemporary History, and the former Communist Party (SED) archives in Germany.
General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev and Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze at a meeting of European leaders, November 21, 1990. (photographer unknown)
Two key aides to Shevardnadze played leading roles in developing the new Soviet foreign policy during the 1980s, and deserve mention for helping scholars afterwards understand the end of the Cold War. Experienced diplomat Sergei Tarasenko had already served in the Soviet embassy in Washington and provided Shevardnadze with expert advice on relations with the U.S., including in most of the U.S.-Soviet meetings transcribed here. Tarasenko also participated in the seminal 1998 Musgrove discussion published in the award-winning book, Masterpieces of History: The Peaceful End of the Cold War in Europe, 1989 (Budapest/New York: Central European University Press, 2010). Teimuraz Stepanov-Mamaladze served as Shevardnadze’s chief of staff, having come with him from Georgia to the Foreign Ministry, and subsequently donated his invaluable diaries and notes of the period to the Hoover Institution Archives at Stanford University.
DOCUMENT 1: Excerpt of Official Minutes of the Politburo CC CPSU Session, June 29, 1985
Source: Russian State Archive of Contemporary History (RGANI), Fond 89. Translated by Svetlana Savranskaya.
Perhaps the most audacious personnel change made by Gorbachev came very early, only four months into his leadership, when longtime Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko (known to the Americans as “Mr. Nyet”) retired upwards to the job of chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet — the titular head of state— as part of the deal that earlier had featured Gromyko advocating for Gorbachev’s election as general secretary. Gromyko understood that his successor would be his carefully-groomed deputy, Georgi Kornienko — so there was shock-and-awe throughout the Central Committee and the Foreign Ministry when Gorbachev instead proposed as foreign minister the ambitious first secretary of the Georgian Communist Party, Eduard Shevardnadze. During the Politburo session on June 29, 1985, Gorbachev stepped down from his position as chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, which he held together with his position as general secretary (Leonid Brezhnev had merged the two jobs in 1977). By kicking Gromyko upstairs, Gorbachev opened a key position-Minister of Foreign Affairs — where he wanted to place his close ally, whom he already knew shared his reformist thinking on both international and domestic policy. This official record of the Politburo session shows Gorbachev nominating Shevardnadze, ostensibly after discussing several alternative candidates with Gromyko and jointly coming to the conclusion that Shevardnadze was the best choice. All Politburo members express their full support for Gorbachev’s candidate— testament to the power of the general secretary.
Secretary of State James Baker and Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze fly-fishing in Wyoming, September 24, 1989. (photographer unknown)
DOCUMENT 2: Diary of Anatoly Chernyaev, July 1, 1985
Source: Diary of Anatoly S Chernyaev, donated to the National Security Archive.
Translated by Anna Melyakova.
Anatoly Chernyaev, who at the time was first deputy head of the International Department of the Central Committee (CC CPSU), describes in his diary the nominations of Gromyko and Shevardnadze as they were announced at the CC CPSU Plenum. The Plenum had to approve the nominations that the Supreme Soviet would confirm the next day. Shevardnadze’s nomination was like a “bolt from the blue,” Chernyaev writes. The diary relates how Boris Ponomarev, head of the International Department, told Chernyaev what had actually happened at the Politburo, an account that differs substantially from the official minutes (see Document 1). According to Ponomarev, the Shevardnadze nomination was a total surprise to other Politburo members, and Gromyko and Ponomarev tried to protest by suggesting career diplomat Yuli Vorontsov as a candidate, but Gorbachev disregarded their protest completely. Chernyaev concludes that Gorbachev’s nomination of Shevardnadze is “very indicative of the end of Gromyko’s monopoly and the power of the MFA’s staff over foreign policy.”
DOCUMENT 3: Record of Conversation between George Shultz and Eduard Shevardnadze in Helsinki, July 31, 1985
Source: Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request to the Department of State.
This U.S. State Department memcon records the meeting with the U.S. secretary of state during Shevardnadze’s first foreign trip in office — to Helsinki for a meeting of CSCE foreign ministers on the tenth anniversary of the Helsinki Final Act. In this first meeting with George Shultz, the Soviet foreign minister mainly reads from his notes, giving the American a tour d’horizon of the Soviet positions on arms control. However, his tone is strikingly different from previous meetings when Andrei Gromyko had represented the Soviet side. Even on questions of human rights, Shevardnadze reacts not with “indignation or rage” (as Shultz comments in his memoirs) but asks Shultz jokingly, “When I come to the United States, should I talk about unemployment and blacks?” In the second part of the conversation, where Shultz and Shevardnadze are accompanied only by translators, Shevardnadze urges his counterpart to move fast on arms control, indicating that the Soviets are willing to reassess their positions — “there is no time now to postpone solutions.” He ends the conversation with the statement: “you have experience but we have the truth,” a remark that would win him some positive points from the Politburo.
DOCUMENT 4: Minutes of Politburo discussion of Shultz-Shevardnadze talks in Vienna, November 13, 1986
Source: Archive of the Gorbachev Foundation. Translated by Svetlana Savranskaya.
Shevardnadze was an active participant at the historic summit between Gorbachev and Reagan in Reykjavik in October 1986, where the two leaders almost agreed to abolish nuclear weapons. Just after the summit, the Soviets, trying to build on the momentum of Reykjavik, tried to offer the U.S. side concessions on laboratory testing for the missile defense program so close to Reagan’s heart – a change in position that might have made a difference at Reykjavik. But it was too late. Enmeshed in the growing Iran-contra scandal and under attack from allies like Margaret Thatcher for nuclear heresy, the Reagan administration had already retreated from the Reykjavik positions. Here the Politburo reviews the results of the November Shevardnadze-Shultz talks in Geneva, where Shultz refused even to discuss Shevardnadze’s new proposals concerning what testing would be allowed and not allowed under the ABM treaty. Shultz’s position notwithstanding, Gorbachev emphasizes the need to press the U.S. to move forward on the basis of Reykjavik. He stresses that “we have not yet truly understood what Reykjavik means,” referring to its significance as a new level of disarmament dialogue and reduction of the sense of nuclear threat.
DOCUMENT 5: Record of Shultz-Shevardnadze Conversation in Moscow, April 21, 1988
Source: FOIA request to the Department of State.
This State Department memorandum of conversation records the third set of negotiations between the U.S. secretary of state and the Soviet foreign minister leading up to the 1988 Moscow summit (February in Moscow, March in Washington, now April back in Moscow). Shevardnadze presses for progress on the START treaty aimed at reducing nuclear weapons, but Shultz responds that still-unresolved issues like sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) would not “reach full closure during the next month,” so agreement would be unlikely for the summit. Arguments over these nuclear-armed cruise missiles would hold up START negotiations for years, pushed by the parochial interests of the U.S. Navy rather than a consideration of the national interest, but by 1991 their lack of strategic value would lead to President George H. W. Bush’s unilateral decision to withdraw all tactical nuclear weapons from U.S. ships.
The bulk of the discussion here concerns human rights issues, including an interesting exchange about the Vienna follow-up meeting on the Helsinki Final Act. Shultz raises his “disappointment with the performance of the Soviet delegation” at Vienna, which “was not prepared to go as far in its statements as what the Soviet leadership was saying in Moscow.” Shevardnadze responds, “We have a hard delegation” in Vienna; we tell them one thing, “They do something different.”
DOCUMENT 6: Minutes of the Politburo discussion of Mikhail Gorbachev’s United Nations speech, December 27-28, 1988
Source: RGANI. Published in “Istochnik” 5-6, 1993. Translated by Vladislav Zubok.
The December 27-28 Politburo meeting was the first following Gorbachev’s return from the United States after his historic announcement at the United Nations of massive unilateral Soviet withdrawals of forces from Eastern Europe. Observers in the United States ranging from Sen. Daniel Moynihan to Gen. Andrew Goodpaster hailed the speech as marking the end of the Cold War; but incoming Bush administration “hawks” such as Brent Scowcroft did not agree (as Gorbachev would only find out later, with the 1989 “pause”). Part of the context here in the Politburo for Gorbachev’s lengthy monologues and Shevardnadze’s proposals for a “businesslike” withdrawal of Soviet troops from Eastern Europe is the growing bewilderment of certain military and KGB leaders who were not fully informed in advance about the scale and tempo of Gorbachev’s announced unilateral arms cuts.
Still, there is no trace of real opposition to the new course. The Soviet party leader has learned a lesson from the military’s lack of a strong reaction to previous discussions of “sufficiency” as a national security strategy, and he is now ramming change down their throats. Ever obedient, Defense Minister Dmitri Yazov states, “everyone reacted with understanding,” even after Shevardnadze’s aggressive attacks against the military for retrograde thinking, for directly contradicting the U.N. speech, and for proposing only “admissible” openness rather than true glasnost. Ironically, however, when Shevardnadze and Ligachev suggest announcing the size of Soviet reductions “publicly,” it is Gorbachev who objects: if the Soviet people and party learn how huge Soviet defense expenditures really are, it will undermine the propaganda effect of his U.N. speech.
DOCUMENT 7: Record of Conversation between Erich Honecker and Eduard Shevardnadze, June 9, 1989
Source: Stiftung Archiv der Parteien und Massenorganisationen der DDR-Bundesarchiv, SED, ZK, JIV2/2A/3225. Translated by Christiaan Hetzner.
This is one of many documents that became available in the Communist party archives of the former East Germany (GDR) after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the unification of Germany. Less than a week after Solidarity had swept the Polish elections, to the dismay of the Polish Communists, the hard-line GDR leader Erick Honecker is rapidly becoming a dinosaur on the verge of extinction. At this moment in mid-1989, only Nicolae Ceausescu of Romania surpasses Honecker in his resistance to Gorbachev’s perestroika and the new thinking in Moscow represented in this meeting by Shevardnadze. Honecker has even banned some of the new Soviet publications from distribution in the GDR. The conversation reveals Honecker’s deep ideological concerns, and his understanding of the geostrategic realities in Central Europe. He reminds Shevardnadze that “socialism cannot be lost in Poland” because through Poland run the communications lines between the Soviet Union and the Soviet troops in the GDR facing NATO’s divisions.
This same consideration led Honecker and his predecessor, Walter Ulbricht, to urge Soviet military intervention to suppress previous East European uprisings such as the Prague Spring in 1968 or the strikes in Poland in 1980-1981. But here Honecker is most dismayed by Gorbachev’s upcoming trip to West Germany (FRG), which threatens Honecker’s own political “balancing act,” which in turn depends on poor relations between the Soviets and the West Germans. Shevardnadze has an impossible mission here, to assuage the East German leader’s concerns about all the changes taking place in Poland, Hungary and inside the Soviet Union. Shevardnadze’s opening words — “our friends in the GDR need not worry” — sound more than ironic today. In fact, Shevardnadze does not believe in Honecker’s concept of East German “socialism,” and in only a few months, the Moscow leadership would signal to Honecker’s colleagues it was time for him to go.
DOCUMENT 8: Memorandum of Conversation between George Bush and Eduard Shevardnadze in Washington, September 21, 1989
Source: FOIA request to the George H.W. Bush presidential library.
This meeting in Washington marks the start of Shevardnadze’s trip to the United States that will culminate with his fly-fishing expeditions with James Baker in Wyoming, where the two men established a close personal connection. This was also Shevardnadze’s first meeting with George H.W. Bush as president of the United States. He tells Bush about the progress of domestic perestroika and democratization in the Soviet Union, the work on economic reform, and the new tenor of U.S.-Soviet relations. However, Shevardnadze laments that the desired progress toward a 50% reduction in strategic nuclear weapons is not on the horizon, and he urges his U.S. counterparts to pick up the pace. He also enumerates other Soviet arms control proposals, including banning fissionable materials and eliminating short-range nuclear weapons.
DOCUMENT 9: Memorandum of Conversation between George Bush and Eduard Shevardnadze in Washington, April 6, 1990
Source: FOIA request to the George H.W. Bush presidential library.
Shevardnadze is in Washington for this meeting, working out arrangements for the long-planned summit meeting between Bush and Gorbachev that will take place at the end of May. The Lithuania crisis has created a rift in U.S.-Soviet relations, “lost momentum” in Bush’s phrase, as the independence demands of Lithuanian nationalists build on the long-standing American position of non-recognition of Soviet incorporation of the Baltics, as well as domestic U.S. political pressures from émigré groups. Gorbachev’s own lack of understanding for Baltic nationalism has produced an inconsistent Soviet policy alternating between crackdowns, threats of an embargo, and attempts at dialogue. Shevardnadze tries to explain to the Americans why the Soviets needed “Presidential authority” to deal with the problems between ethnic groups in Lithuania, not to mention Soviet claims to ownership of the factories there. But when Bush says the Soviets have backtracked on arms control agreements (such as how to count air-launched cruise missiles, or ACLMs), Shevardnadze is quick to point out how the Americans have reneged on their on-site inspection pledges.
Perhaps most remarkably, Shevardnadze describes the Soviet argument for a nuclear test ban as based on domestic political pressures from mass demonstrations (such as in Kazakhstan against the Semipalatinsk test range). The Soviet foreign minister also makes a plea for partnership in international financial institutions such as the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, saying the Soviets are “not looking for your help.” This would change within a year. On the American side, the conversation reveals a clear expression of Bush’s vision when he reports he is often asked, “Who is the enemy?” Bush’s answer: “unpredictability.” And perhaps it is just diplo-speak, but it is all the same music to Shevardnadze’s ears, when the American president combines his own “Europe whole and free” phrase with Gorbachev’s “common European home” and remarks that the latter idea is “very close to our own.”
DOCUMENT 10: Memorandum of Conversation between George Bush and Eduard Shevardnadze in Washington, May 6, 1991
Source: FOIA request to the George H.W. Bush presidential library.
This is Shevardnadze’s last meeting with President Bush, and he appears only in his unofficial capacity as president of the Moscow-based Foreign Policy Association. Shevardnadze resigned as foreign minister in December 1990, warning against the coming dictatorship, and protesting Gorbachev’s turn toward the hard-liners. But here Shevardnadze comes to Washington asking for support for the embattled reform still underway in the Soviet Union. He describes the dismal situation in his country, pointing specifically to economic instability, the nationalities crisis, and the rising conservative opposition. He regrets delays on every important issue, especially the Union treaty that would precipitate the hard-line coup in August 1991: “if we had offered this treaty in 1987 or even 1988, all would have signed it.” But most of all, the former foreign minister is “concerned, indeed frightened, by the pause in our relations.” He urges Bush not to delay the planned Moscow summit (it would ultimately happen at the very end of July) and to keep engaging with Gorbachev. In effect, progress in U.S.-Soviet relations has become the only strong card Gorbachev has left to play in the context of his domestic crises.
Bush and Shevardnadze talk about Gorbachev’s relationship with Russian leader Boris Yeltsin and wonder why they cannot find a way to work together. Shevardnadze appeals to Bush to move fast on reductions in conventional forces (CFE) and in nuclear weapons (START) because “demilitarization is the best way to help the Soviet Union.” For Bush, however, completing these two treaties remains a precondition for even holding the 1991 summit. Shevardnadze’s plea for farm credits is especially poignant; a year earlier, he sought economic partnership, but now he says, “We must let people [in the Soviet Union] feel something tangible. I know it is hard, but if it is possible, give the credits.” Prophetically, Shevardnadze remarks, “Even if we can’t maintain a single Soviet Union, reform will continue.”
From: John Young <jya[at]pipeline.com>
Date: 7/23/2014, 09:08 ET
Subject: FOIA Request
Jennifer L. Hudson
Director, Information Management Division
Office of the Director of National Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20511
Dear Ms. Hudson,
I request any and all information and records on documents reportedly taken by Edward Snowden from the National Security Agency, in particular:
1. An accounting of the documents by type, digital or non-digital, by number of files and pages.
2. To whom Edward Snowden transmitted the documents by name, occupation, nationality, and home address.
3. What documents were transmitted to each of the parties in Item 2, by type, number of files and pages.
4. Descriptions of consultation with the US government by those who received documents from Edward Snowden.
5. Descriptions of requests by the US government to redact or eliminate portions of the documents, to whom requests were made and date.
6. Assessments by the US government of the impact of the public release of the documents, by assessing agency with scope and date.
7. Agreements reached between the US government and the parties releasing and/or holding the documents for future release, by scope and schedule.
I am an individual seeking information for personal use and not for commercial use.
I am willing to pay $500 for my request.
I request a waiver of all fees for this request. Reason: This information will be published on the free public education website, Cryptome.org, to inform the public on the documents provided by Edward Snowden to commercial media.
251 West 89th Street
New York, New York 10024
Ordinary internet activity accounts for the overwhelming majority of communications collected and maintained by the National Security Agency (NSA). A recent report by The Washington Post, based on communications leaked by former contractor Edward Snowden, revealed that nine out of 10 communications collected belonged to average American and non-American internet users who were not the targets of investigations. Much of the highly personal communications –including baby pictures and revealing webcam photos– provide little intelligence value and are described as useless, yet are retained under Section 702 of the FISA Amendments. The Post’s findings clearly contradict former NSA head Keith Alexander’s assertions that there was no way Snowden could “touch the FISA data,” and give credence to the argument that “the NSA has been proven incapable of safeguarding” the intelligence it collects, irrespective of its value.
Glenn Greenwald and Murtaza Hussain’s latest Intercept expose reveals that the NSA, along with the FBI, covertly monitors the communications of prominent, upstanding Muslim-Americans under provisions of the FISA intended to target terrorists and foreign spies, ostensibly solely because of their religion. The FISA provision that seemingly codifies the surveillance requires that “the Justice Department must convince a judge with the top-secret Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court that there is probable cause to believe that American targets are not only agents of an international terrorist organization or other foreign power, but also ‘are or may be’ engaged in or abetting espionage, sabotage, or terrorism.” In practice, however, the agencies monitored the emails of Nihad Awad, the executive director of the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), the largest Muslim civil rights organization in the country, Asim Ghafoor, a prominent attorney who has represented clients in terrorism-related cases, and other civically inclined American Muslims.
White House officials are questioning why President Obama was left in the dark about the CIA’s German intelligence informant and his recent arrest, a somewhat baffling omission in the wake of revelations the NSA monitored the private communications of Chancellor Merkel and the resulting state of US-German relations. “A central question, one American official said, is how high the information about the agent went in the C.I.A.’s command — whether it was bottled up at the level of the station chief in Berlin or transmitted to senior officials, including the director, John O. Brennan, who is responsible for briefing the White House.” Of further interest is why the CIA made use of the German intelligence official in the first place, who not only walked into the agency’s Berlin office in 2012 and offered to spy, but also volunteered his spying services to Russia via email.
The internal affairs division of Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) is being investigated again, this time for mishandling the personal information of the agency’s 60,000 employees. Under investigation are defunct CBP programs that shared employees’ Social Security numbers with the FBI and that “automatically scanned the Social Security numbers of all the agency’s employees in a Treasury Department financial records database.” Both programs were part of the agency’s response to the Obama administration’s Insider Threat initiative.
Cause of Action’s latest “FOIA Follies” provides some insight on what qualifies for a (b)(5) “withhold because you want to” FOIA exemption at the IRS, and reinforces Archive FOIA Coordinator Nate Jones’ arguments of how the FOIA Improvement Act of 2014 would address this overused exemption and help ordinary requesters. Cause of Action submitted a FOIA request to the IRS seeking records related to any requests from the President for individual or business tax returns in 2012, after which the IRS released 790 heavily redacted pages. Cause of Action filed suit in 2013 challenging the IRS’ use of exemption (b)(5) to withhold large portions of the records, prompting the IRS to “reconsider” some of its withholdings. The newly-released portions of documents reveal the agency was using the (b)(5) exemption to withhold mundane information contrary to Attorney General Holder’s 2009 guidance that “an agency should not withhold information simply because it may do so legally.”
The Brazilian military regime employed a “sophisticated and elaborate psychophysical duress system” to “intimidate and terrify” suspected leftist militants in the early 1970s, according to a State Department report dated in April 1973 and made public last week. Peter Kornbluh, who directs the National Security Archive’s Brazil Documentation Project, called the document “one of the most detailed reports on torture techniques ever declassified by the U.S. government.” This document, and 42 others, were given to Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff by Vice President Joe Biden and were made available for use by the Brazilian Truth Commission, which is in the final phase of a two-year investigation of human rights atrocities during the military dictatorship which lasted from 1964 to 1985.
The Pentagon and the Justice Department are going after the money made by former Navy Seal Matt Bissonnette from his book on the raid to capture Osama bin Laden, No Easy Day, for failing to submit the book for pre-publication review to avoid disclosing any top secret information about the raid. It’s worth noting that while the government goes after Bissonnette for releasing his book without pre-publication review, both the CIA and DOD provided unprecedented access to Hollywood filmmakers Kathryn Bigelow and Mark Boal for their bin Laden raid blockbuster, Zero Dark Thirty, while simultaneously refusing to release the same information to FOIA requesters
A partially redacted 29-page report recently found low morale at the US government’s Office of Cuba Broadcasting, which is responsible for Radio and TV Marti. “Some of the reasons cited for low morale included the lack of transparency in decision-making, the inability to offer suggestions, and the lack of effective communication. Others were concerned about raising any issues to the inspection team because of fear of retaliation by management.”
Finally this week, our #tbt document picks concern Eduard Shevardnadze, the ex-Georgian president and Soviet foreign minster who recently died at the age of 86. The documents themselves comes from a 2010 Archive posting on high-level Soviet officials debates during the final years of the Cold War about covering-up the illicit Soviet biological weapons program in the face of protests from the United States and Great Britain. The documents show that Eduard Shevardnadze, along with defense minister Dmitri Yazov, and the Politburo member overseeing the military-industrial complex, Lev Zaikov, were aware of the concealment and were actively involved in discussing it in the years when Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev was advancing his glasnost reforms and attempting to slow the nuclear arms race. Check out the documents here.
Die STASI wusste scheinbar Bescheid, dass die NSA die deutsche Telekommunikation ausspäht. Diese Ansicht vertrat Klaus Eichner bei einer Podiumsdiskussion mit dem ehemaligen NSA-Technikchef William Binney. Eichner war in Zeiten der DDR Chefanalytiker beim Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (MfS). Eine “Quelle“ übergab ihm damals im Jahr 1985/1986 eine sogenannte NSAR-Liste, bei dem das Treiben der NSA dokumentiert wurde.
Der ehemalige Stasi-Abteilungsleiter erzählte, dass es “NSA Requirements“ gab, in denen geschrieben war, welche Personen und Institute für die US-Behörde interessant sind. Die Liste umfasste insgesamt 4000 Seiten und 30.000 “Einzelposten“. Eichners promotet sein Buch, welches den Namen “Imperium ohne Rätsel. Was bereits die DDR-Aufklärung über die NSA wusste“ trägt.
Kritik gab es von Eichner für die Politik, diese würde den Fall falsch behandeln. Das von der deutschen Bundesregierung vorgeschlagene “No-Spy-Abkommen“ sei ihm nach ein “schlechter Witz“. Die Überraschung der Regierung über die Snowden-Enthüllungen rund um die NSA sei außerdem nur “gespielt“.