Leaks Unlimited – With NSA contractor Martin arrested, other leakers may still be at large

Earlier this month we learned the name of a second person who stole top secret documents from the US National Security Agency (NSA). After Edward Snowden admitted doing so publicly in June 2013, the FBI has now arrested the 51-year old Harold T. Martin III at his home in Maryland.

Martin hoarded lots of classified documents, not only from NSA but also from a number of other military and intelligence agencies. The FBI is still comparing them with those from the recent Shadow Brokers leak and a range of other NSA leaks from the past few years, but given what’s known now, it seems likely that at least one other leaker is still at large.

The house of Harold T. Martin III in Glen Burnie, Maryland
(photo: Jose Luis Magana/The Associated Press)

The New York Times reported that when the FBI raided Martin’s house on August 27, they found paper documents and many terabytes of highly classified information, even going back the 1990s. At least six documents were from 2014. It was reported that Martin first took the classified documents on paper, later on CDs and more recently on thumb drives.

The reason why Harold Martin brought home and stored such large numbers of top secret documents isn’t yet clarified. One suggestion is that he may have used them forresearch for his dissertation about “new methods for remote analysis of heterogeneous & cloud computing architectures”, which he was working on at the University of Maryland.

Documents from multiple agencies

It should be noted that not everything Martin stole comes from NSA. In the official charges there are no names of the agencies where the documents come from, they are only described as highly classified, including ones that are marked as Top Secret and Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI).

With the documents going back to the 1990s, he may well have started hoarding them from the places where he worked in those days. From 1987 to 2000, Martin served at the US Navy, achieving the rank of lieutenant, but he left active duty in 1992.

As the Washington Post found out, he then took a variety of tech jobs with government contractors, like at Computer Sciences Corp. (CSC) somewhere in the 1990s and later, until 2009, at Tenacity Solutions, for which he worked at the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI).

In 2009, Harold Martin started to work for Booz Allen Hamilton, for which he was a contractor at NSA from 2012 to 2015, when Booz transferred him to the Pentagon’s Office of Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (AT&L), which is responsible for often highly sensitive and classified procurement programs. There he stayed until the moment of his arrest last August.

Officials have meanwhile said that Martin took classified documents not only from NSA, but also from his other workplaces, including ODNI and AT&L.

It’s interesting as well that in the charges against Martin, a whole paragraph is dedicated to the at least six documents from 2014, which are described as being produced “through sensitive government sources, methods, and capabilities”. As signals intelligence is traditionally seen as the most sensitive capability, maybe just these six documents are from NSA.

The building of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI)
where Harold Martin worked as a contractor before 2009
(photo: Microsoft, via – click to enlarge)

Shadow Brokers investigation

After the “Shadow Brokers” disclosed a large set of secret NSA hacking tools last August, the FBI began investigating this leak. At the same time there was a lot of speculation: was NSA hacked from the outside? Had an NSA hacker been sloppy? Were the tools leaked by an insider? Maybe the same insider responsible for earlier leaks that hadn’t been attributed to Snowden?

On September 22, it was reported that during the FBI investigation, NSA officials had said that a former agency operative had carelessly left the hacking tool files available on a remote computer, where Russian hackers found them. If that’s correct, then it seems likely that the FBI traced Harold Martin when they were looking for that careless NSA hacker. It has not yet been confirmed that Martin was that person though.

Harold Martin was working at NSA’s hacking division TAO around the time when the tools were considered to be left exposed, somewhere after October 18, 2013, but a former TAO hacker told the Washington Post that Martin “worked in the unit’s front office carrying out support roles such as setting up accounts, not conducting actual operations.”

Even if Martin was the man who left the hacking tools exposed, then we still don’t know who found them and published them under the name Shadow Brokers. It’s not very likely that this was done by Martin himself, as Shadow Brokers published additional messages on August 28, October 1 and October 15, when he was already in custody. The actual publication can therefore be the work of for example Russian, Iranian or North Korean hackers or even independent hacktivists.

Other sources?

Could Harold Martin also be the source of earlier leaks, that were not attributed to Edward Snowden? In theory he could have been that “second source” next to Snowden: none of these other leaked documents (like the TAO catalog, XKEYSCORE code, tasking lists and end reports) are newer than 2015, when Martin left NSA. Contrary to this Martin is described as very patriotic, which doesn’t fit the fact that these particular leaks were clearly meant to harm and embarrass the US and NSA.

Also, Martin hasn’t (yet) been charged with espionage or the attempt to provide classified information to a third party or a foreign government – which doesn’t seem something the US government would leave out or keep secret after the recent and unprecedented statement in which the Office of the Director of National Intelligence accused Russia of hacking the Democratic National Committee (DNC) and other political organizations.

Should the FBI investigation confirm that Harold Martin was only responsible for leaking the NSA hacking tools (after which unknown others published them) and that none of his documents were provided to foreign intelligence agencies or showed up in the earlier revelations, then there’s most likely yet another leaker from inside NSA.

The Shadow Brokers leak standing alone and not related to the earlier non-Snowden leaks is of some importance, because only among the stuff published by the Shadow Brokers there are files with a date (October 18, 2013) after the day that Snowden left NSA (May 20, 2013).

This means that when Harold Martin is the initial source of the Shadow Brokers files, we can no longer exclude the possibility that the earlier leaks do come from the Snowden trove. If that would be the case, then someone with access to them went rogue and had them published on his own account. But it should also be noted that both Glenn Greenwald and Bruce Schneier explicitly said that some of these leaked documents did not come from Snowden.

The more likely option is therefore that there’s still another leaker at large, someone with a more evil intent than Harold Martin and Edward Snowden – a conclusion which is not very comforting and which also raises questions about NSA’s internal security…

Some NSA buildings at the Friendship Annex (FANX) complex near Baltimore
(photo:, via – click to enlarge)

NSA’s internal security measures

The NSA’s hacking division TAO, where Harold Martin worked for some time, isapparently not located in the well-known NSA headquarters building at Fort Meade, but in one or more leased office buildings outside, one of them at an office complex calledFriendship Annex (FANX) near Baltimore. TAO also has units at NSA’s four Cryptologic Centers across the US.

Entrance to the highly secured TAO headquarters building is strictly controlled: one has to go through an imposing steel door, protected by armed guards, and entrance is only possible after entering a six-digit code and passing a retinal scanner to ensure that only specially cleared individuals are allowed in.

Such security measures are more aimed at keeping outsiders out, than at insiders in. And when it comes to finding inside moles of hostile foreign intelligence agencies, the NSA is also said to have a rather bad track record. The Manning and Snowden leaks made NSA painfully aware of this and so preventive insider-threat detection programs were put in place.

It’s not clear whether these new systems failed in the case of Harold Martin, or that they simply weren’t yet implemented at the TAO location where he worked – anti-leak software that was designed by Raytheon to “spot attempts by unauthorized people to access or download data” was also not yet installed at the NSA facility in Hawaii when Snowden was working there.

Tracking what employees are doing inside is one thing, checking what they take out is another. But according to The Washington Post, the NSA (like other agencies) does notimpose universal checks of personnel and their belongings as they enter and leave agency buildings. Security guards only conduct random checks and use their discretion in order to keep en build the trust of the employees.

“If you have a bag full of stuff, you’re probably going to get stopped” said a former TAO operator to the Post, but, in general, “Disneyland has more physical security checks than we had”. Additionally, NSA facilities will have detection gates, but it seems that it was easier for Snowden to walk out with his thousands of documents than many would have thought.

As former NSA general counsel Rajesh De explained, it is unlikely “you’re going to be able to stop every incident of somebody taking documents if they’re determined to do so. But the real question is how quickly can you detect it, how quickly can you mitigate the harm of any such incident.”

An old sign inside the NSA headquarters building
showing what kind of items are not allowed in.
(screenshot from a documentary about NSA)


Harold Martin stole a lot of classified documents from multiple military and intelligence agencies where he worked over the past 20 years, with maybe just a small number from NSA. The still ongoing FBI investigation has to make clear whether Martin was responsible for exposing the TAO hacking tools.

If not, then there has to be yet another careless NSA employee, but then it’s also still possible that the hacking tools came from a source responsible for a range of earlier leaks. So far it seems that Martin isn’t the source of those earlier leaks, which means that the so-called “second source” is still at large.

The case of Harold Martin also made clear that security measures at NSA, and other US agencies, were not as strict and tight as outsiders would have expected: even for someone without a strong ideological or financial drive like Martin it was apparently not that difficult to regularly walk out with top secret documents.

Many things have not yet been confirmed or clarified, but at least the Shadow Brokers leak and the subsquent arrest of Harold Martin created more awareness among the American public of the fact that there have been more leaks than just those from Snowden.

In August 2014, Bruce Schneier was probably one of the first who identified a second and a third leaker besides Snowden. Many more similar leaks followed and a full listof them was compiled on this weblog in December 2015 (still being updated). As an excerpt of this listing, a short overview of the most important non-Snowden leaks was published in The New York Times last week.

Shortly after this blog posting was published, The New York Times came with a new report saying that the volume of classified documents Harold Martin had in his possesion is larger than those stolen by Edward Snowden and even than those of the Panama Papers from 2015.
FBI investigators apparently also found that the TAO hacking tools were among Martin’s documents, but because he is not very cooperative, it is still not clear how they came in the hands of the mysterious Shadow Brokers, who subsequently published them. So far there’s no evidence that Martin was hacked or that he sold information.
He seems to have hoarded all these documents in order to get better at his job, as he is described as someone who imagined himself a top spy and an important player in the world of digital espionage.

On Thursday, October 20, government lawyers said they would prosecute Harold Martin under the Espionage Act because of stealing classified information. The FBI found the huge amount of 50 terabytes of data at his home, but it is not yet clear how much of that is classified. Also foundwere “hard-copy documents that were seized from various locations during the search that comprise six full bankers’ boxes worth of documents” with “Many of the documents marked ‘Secret’ and ‘Top Secret,’ also bear special handling caveats. The information stolen by the Defendant also appears to include the personal information of government employees”.

Links and Sources

– John Schindler: It’s Time to Rename NSA the National INsecurity Agency
– The Washington Post: NSA contractor thought to have taken classified material the old-fashioned way
– Daily Beast: Democrats Say WikiLeaks Is a Russian Front, U.S. Intelligence Isn’t So Sure
– Defense One: Data-Theft Arrest Shows that Insider Threat Remains Despite Post-Snowden Security Improvements
– John Schindler: Has the Russian Mole inside NSA finally been arrested?
– New York Times: N.S.A. Suspect Is a Hoarder. But a Leaker? Investigators Aren’t Sure.
– The Cipher Brief: First on The Cipher Brief: Snowden’s Boss Shares Lessons Learned


The Shadow Brokers leak – part of a series

Earlier this week, a group or an individual called the Shadow Brokers published a large set of files containing the computer code for hacking tools. They were said to be from the Equation Group, which is considered part of the NSA’s hacking division TAO.

The leak got quite some media attention, but so far it was not related to some earlier leaks of highly sensitive NSA documents. These show interesting similarities with the Shadow Brokers files, which were also not attributed to Edward Snowden, but seem to come from an unknown second source.

Screenshot of some computer code with instructions
from the Shadow Brokers archive
(click to enlarge)

The Shadow Brokers files

Since August 13, Shadow Brokers posted a manifesto and two large encrypted files onPastebin, on GitHub, on Tumblr and on DropBox (all of them closed or deleted meanwhile).

One of the encrypted files could be decrypted into a 301 MB archive containing a large number of computer codes for server side utility scripts and exploits for a variety of targets like firewalls from Cisco, Juniper, Fortinet and TOPSEC. The files also include different versions of several implants and instructions on how to use them, so they’re not just the malware that could have been found on the internet, but also files that were only used internally.

A full and detailed list of the exploits in this archive can be found here.

Security experts as well as former NSA employees considered the files to be authentic, and earlier today the website The Intercept came with some unpublished Snowden documents that confirm the Shadow Brokers files are real.

Besides the accessible archive, Shadow Brokers also posted a file that is still encrypted, and for which the key would only be provided to the highest bidder in an auction. Would the auction raise 1 million bitcoins (more than 500 million US dollars), then Shadow Brokers said they would release more files to the public. This auction however is likely just meant to attract attention.

Update: Shadow Brokers, or people posing like them, posted an short announcement on Pastebin on August 28, and a third, long message including a “self-interview” on on October 1. On October 15, a fourth message was published on Medium, saying that the auction was cancelled.


Screenshot of a file tree from the Shadow Brokers archive
(click to enlarge)

From the Snowden documents?

According to security experts Bruce Schneier and Nicholas Weaver the new files aren’t from the Snowden trove. Like most people, they apparently assume that Snowden took mostly powerpoint presentations and internal reports and newsletters, but that’s not the whole picture. The Snowden documents also include various kinds of operational data, but this rarely became public.

Most notable was a large set of raw communications content collected by NSA under FISA and FAA authority, which also included incidentally collected data from Americans, as was reported by The Washington Post on July 5, 2014. The Snowden documents also include technical reports, which are often very difficult to understand and rarely provide a newsworthy story on their own.

Someone reminded me as well that in January 2015, the German magazine Der Spiegel published the full computer code of a keylogger implant codenamed QWERTY, which was a component of the NSA’s WARRIORPRIDE malware framework. So with the Snowden trove containing this one piece of computer code, there’s no reason why it should not contain more.

Contradicting the option that the Shadow Brokers files could come from Snowden is the fact that some of the files have timestamps as late as October 18, 2013, which is five months after Snowden left NSA. Timestamps are easy to modify, but if they are authentic, then these files have to be from another source.

A second source?

This brings us to a number of leaks that occured in recent years and which were also not attributed to Snowden. These leaks involved highly sensitive NSA files and were often more embarrassing than stuff from the Snowden documents – for example the catalog of hacking tools and techniques, the fact that chancellor Merkel was targetedand intelligence reports proving that NSA was actually successful at that.

It is assumed that these and some other documents came from at least one other leaker, a “second source” besides Snowden, which is something that still not many people are aware of. The files that can be attributed to this second source have some interesting similarities with the Shadow Brokers leak. Like the ANT catalog published in December 2013, they are about hacking tools and like the XKEYSCORE rulespublished in 2014 and 2015 they are internal NSA computer code.

This alone doesn’t say much, but it’s the choice of the kind of files that makes these leaks look very similar: no fancy presentations, but plain technical data sets that make it possible to identify specific operations and individual targets – the kind of documents many people are most eager to see, but which were rarely provided through the Snowden reporting.

As mainstream media became more cautious in publishing such files, it is possible that someone who also had access to the Snowden cache went rogue and started leaking documents just for harming NSA and the US – without attributing these leaks to Snowden because he would probably not approve them, and also to suggest that more people followed Snowden’s example.

Of course the Shadow Brokers leak can still be unrelated to the earlier ones. In that case it could have been that an NSA hacker mistakenly uploaded his whole toolkit to a server outside the NSA’s secure networks (also called a “staging server” or “redirector” to mask his true location) and that someone was able to grab the files from there – an option favored by for example Edward Snowden and security researcher the grugq.

Diagram showing the various stages and networks involved
in botnet hacking operations by NSA’s TAO division
(source – click to enlarge)

An insider?

Meanwhile, several former NSA employees have said that the current Shadow Brokers leak might not be the result of a hack from the outside, but that it’s more likely that the files come from an insider, who stole them like Snowden did earlier.

Of course it’s easier for an insider to grab these files than for a foreign intelligence agency, let alone an ordinary hacker, to steal them from the outside. But if that’s the case, it would mean that this insider would still be able to exfiltrate files from NSA premises (something that shouldn’t be possible anymore after Snowden), and that this insider has the intent to embarrass and harm the NSA (Snowden at least said he just wanted to expose serious wrongdoings).

Here we should keep in mind that such an insider is not necessarily just a frustrated individual, but can also be a mole from a hostile foreign intelligence agency.

On August 21, NSA expert James Bamford also confirmed that TAO’s ANT catalog wasn’t included in the Snowden documents (Snowden didn’t want to talk about it publicly though). Bamford favors the option of a second insider, who may have leaked the documents through Jacob Appelbaum and Julian Assange.

Russian intelligence?

On Twitter, Edward Snowden said that “Circumstantial evidence and conventional wisdom indicates Russian responsibility”, but it’s not clear what that evidence should be. It seems he sees this leak as a kind of warning from the Russians not to take revenge for the hack of the Democratic National Committee (DNC) e-mails, which was attributed to Russian intelligence.

This was also what led Bruce Schneier to think it might be the Russians, because who other than a state actor would steal so much data and wait three years before publishing? Not mentioned by Schneier is that this also applies to the documents that can be attributed to the second source: they also pre-date June 2013.

A related point of speculation is the text that accompanied the Shadow Brokers files, which is in bad English, as if it was written by a Russian or some other non-western individual. This is probably distraction, as it looks much more like a fluent American/English speaker who tried to imitate unexperienced English.

The text also holds accusations against “Elites”, in a style which very much resembles the language used by anarchist hacker groups, but that can also be faked to distract from the real source (it was also noticed that the e-mail address used by Shadow Brokers ( seems to refer to the manga Code Geass in which an exiled prince takes revenge against the “Britannian Empire”).

Screenshot of some file folders from the Shadow Brokers archive
(click to enlarge)


With the authenticity of the Shadow Brokers files being confirmed, the biggest question is: who leaked them? There’s a small chance that it was a stupid accident in which an NSA hacker uploaded his whole toolkit to a non-secure server and someone (Russians?) found it there.

Somewhat more likely seems the option that they came from an insider, and in that case, this leak doesn’t stand alone, but fits into a series of leaks in which, since October 2013, highly sensitive NSA data sets were published.

So almost unnoticed by the mainstream media and the general public, someone was piggybacking on the Snowden-revelations with leaks that were often more embarrassing for NSA than many reportings based upon the documents from Snowden.

Again, obtaining such documents through hacking into highly secured NSA servers seems less likely than the chance that someone from inside the agency took them. If that person was Edward Snowden, then probably someone with access to his documents could have started his own crusade against NSA.

If that person wasn’t Snowden, then it’s either another NSA employee who was disgruntled and frustrated, or a mole for a hostile foreign intelligence agency. But for an individual without the protection of the public opinion like Snowden, it must be much harder and riskier to conduct these leaks than for a foreign state actor.

Former NSA counterintelligence officer John Schindler also thinks there could have been a (Russian) mole, as the agency has a rather bad track record in finding such spies. If this scenario is true, then it would be almost an even bigger scandal than that of the Snowden-leaks.

Update #1:
During an FBI-led investigation of the ShadowBrokers leak, NSA officialsreportedly said that a former agency operative carelessly left the hacking tool files available on a remote computer, where Russian hackers found them. After this was discovered, NSA tuned its sensors to detect use of any of the tools by other parties, like China and Russia. But as that wasn’t the case, NSA did not feel obligated to warn the US manufacturers.

Update #2:
On October 6, 2016, The New York Times reported that on August 27, 2016, the FBI arrested 51-year old Harold T. Martin III, who worked at NSA as a contractor for Booz Allen Hamilton. In his home in Glen Burnie, Maryland, “many terabytes” of highly classified information was found, from the 1990s until 2014. Hal Martin was described as a hoarder, but so far, investigators are not sure he was also responsible for the various leaks that could not be attributed to Snowden.

Links and Sources
– How the NSA got hacked
– Where Are NSA’s Overseers on the Shadow Brokers Release?
– NSA ‘Shadow Brokers’ Hack Shows SpyWar With Kremlin Is Turning Hot
– Everything you need to know about the NSA hack (but were afraid to Google)
– Powerful NSA hacking tools have been revealed online
– ‘Shadow Brokers’ Leak Raises Alarming Question: Was the N.S.A. Hacked?
– NSA and the No Good, Very Bad Monday

Unveiled – U.S. Government Debated Secret Nuclear Deployments in Iceland

During the Cold War the United States never deployed nuclear weapons in Iceland but a recently declassified State Department record shows that U.S. government officials debated whether they should do so, including through secret deployments. A letter from a U.S. ambassador to Iceland in August 1960, published today by the National Security Archive, rejected such proposals, but the revelation of internal discussions on the subject ties in to the broader issue of the practice of U.S. nuclear deployments overseas during the Cold War.

The author of the recently released letter, U.S. Ambassador Tyler Thompson, was aware that Icelandic authorities wondered whether Washington had ever deployed nuclear weapons there. Recognizing that Iceland’s ties to NATO and the Western security system were fragile, he argued that if Reykjavik learned about a secret deployment, it could leave NATO. Furthermore, a “dramatic row” could “be expected to have an unfortunate effect on our friends and allies, to affect adversely our interests as far as neutrals are concerned, and to provide a propaganda field day for our enemies.”

U.S. Ambassador to Iceland Tyler Thompson, whose long letter to the State Department raised critical questions about the possibility of secret nuclear deployments in Iceland (National Archives, Still Pictures Branch, RG 59-SO, box 17).

All references to Iceland were deleted from the archival release of Thompson’s letter but his signature and other evidence confirms that the subject matter was Iceland. Further research indicated that nuclear weapons had been an issue in U.S. relations with Iceland since the Korean War when Icelandic officials asked whether the U.S. had deployment plans. Washington did not, but at the time Thompson wrote the letter U.S. officials were exploring nuclear storage options and secret deployments. Moreover, archival documents discovered by an Icelandic historian and published here today demonstrate that the United States had plans for at least one nuclear weapons storage site in the event World War III broke out.

Included in today’s posting are:

▪ A request for assurance in November 1951 by Foreign Minister Bjarni Benediktsson that the United States was not planning an “atomic base” in Iceland

▪ A State Department telegram from December 1951 authorizing the U.S. minister to assure Benediktsson that the United States “has no (rpt no) intention [of] going beyond letter or spirit of [the] defense agreement” which had been negotiated earlier in the year.

▪ A question posed by Foreign Minister Guðmundur Í. Guðmundsson to ambassador Thompson in June 1960: was the United States keeping atomic bombs at Keflavik air base or carrying them through the base in transit?

▪ A draft reply to Guðmundsson’s question indicating that nuclear weapons had not been deployed in Iceland but noting that CINCLANT [Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Command] had a “requirement” for a nuclear weapons storage site.

That the United States never deployed nuclear weapons to Iceland is a settled issue. In 1998, Robert S. Norris, William Arkin, and this writer published an article in The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists in which they analyzed a recently declassified Defense Department history of U.S. nuclear deployments from 1945 to 1978. The study included several alphabetically arranged lists of nuclear weapons deployments in various parts of the world, including Western European members of NATO. Because many country and place names were excised the writers made educated guesses about some of them. One guess was Iceland. Certain details, such as Strategic Air Command activities during the 1950s, appeared to support the conclusion. The report in The Bulletin was widely publicized and when the news reached Iceland it created a political furor; the Icelandic government quickly denied the premise and the Clinton administration immediately supported the denial. In a significant departure from the usual “neither confirm nor deny” approach to nuclear weapons locations, the U.S. deputy chief of mission in Reykjavik declared that putting Iceland on the list of Cold War nuclear deployment sites was “incorrect.” Further research led to the identification of Iwo Jima as the deployment site.[1]

The fact that the U.S. government never deployed nuclear weapons in Iceland does not mean, however, that it had no nuclear plans for Iceland. Previous research by Valur Ingimundarson and William Arkin demonstrates that during the Cold War Iceland was considered a potential storage site. As Ingimundarson discovered, at the end of the 1950s the U.S. Navy ordered the construction of a facility for storing nuclear depth bombs, an Advanced Underseas Weapons (AUW) Shop at the outskirts of Keflavik airport. The AUW facility was built by local Icelandic workers who thought its purpose was to store torpedoes. Whether Ambassador Thompson knew about it remains to be learned. During the 1980s Arkin reported that a presidential directive from the Nixon period treated Iceland as one of several “Conditional Deployment” locations, where nuclear weapons could be stored in the event of war. An AUW storage facility would make sense in that context. Nevertheless, all such arrangements were kept deeply secret because of the political sensitivity of the U.S. military presence in Iceland.[2]

The heavily excised release of the Thompson letter suggests that the U.S. national security bureaucracy does not presently acknowledge that Iceland figured in American nuclear weapons planning during the Cold War. This is not surprising because the U.S. government has not acknowledged the names of a number of other countries which directly participated in the NATO nuclear weapons stockpile program during the Cold War (and later): Belgium, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey (only West Germany and the United Kingdom have been officially disclosed). As for Iceland’s status as a “conditional” deployment site, even though the horse left the barn years ago in terms of the previous archival releases, time will tell whether declassifiers take that into account when making future decisions on classified historical documents concerning Iceland and nuclear weapons.


Pictured here is a MK-101 “Lulu” nuclear depth bomb. which the U.S. Navy could have deployed to a storage site at Kefllavik airport, Iceland, in the event of World War III.  Weighing 1,200 pounds, with an explosive yield of between 10 and 15 kilotons, the Lulu was in service from the late 1950s to 1971.  An air-dropped weapon designed for use by all Navy aircraft, Lulu would have been available to British, Canadian, and Dutch naval forces under NATO nuclear sharing arrangements.  (Source: photograph by Mike Fazarckly at Nuclear Weapons: A Guide to British Nuclear Weapons. Thanks to Stephen Schwartz for pointing out these photos.)


Document 1: U.S. Legation Reykjavik telegram number 82 to State Department, 18 November 1951, Secret

Source: U.S. National Archives, Record Group 59, Department of State records [RG 59], Central Decimal Files 1950-1954 [CDF], 711.56340B/11-1851

On 5 May 1951, Iceland and the United States secretly signed a defense agreement which became public just two days later. Under the agreement, the United States took over the defense of Iceland, a decision which local elites believed was necessary in light of the Korean War and Iceland’s historically disarmed status. The arrangement was nonetheless contentious for many citizens and by some accounts bordered on illegal; the three major non-Communist parties therefore agreed to keep parliament in recess to minimize controversy (when Iceland joined NATO in 1949, riots had broken out). Two days later, on 7 May, 300 U.S. troops arrived, the first of a contingent which the Icelandic government limited to a tightly sequestered 3,900 troops out of fear of adverse public reaction (to the point that Reykjavik successfully insisted on the exclusion of African-American soldiers).

While the fine print of the defense agreement was still being negotiated, in November 1951 Foreign Minister Benediktsson showed U.S. Chargé d’Affaires Morris N. Hughes a London Times article quoting Senator Edwin Johnson (D-CO) that Iceland, North Africa, and Turkey were better deployment sites for atomic weapons than the United Kingdom. To assuage the foreign minister’s concern that Communist Party members and other critics would exploit Johnson’s statement, Hughes recommended “official reassurance” that the United States had no plans to deploy atomic weapons in Iceland.

Document 2: U.S. Legation Reykjavik telegram number 85 to State Department, 24 November 1951, Secret

Source: RG 59, CDF, 711.56340B/11-2451

A few days after the above exchange, Benediktsonn told Hughes that he had showed him the Times article so he could tell “critics and worried colleagues” that he had immediately sought U.S. reassurances about U.S. atomic plans. When the foreign minister wondered whether an “appropriate quarter” could provide “some reassurance,” Hughes agreed to inform the State Department “of his anxiety.” The reference to McGaw is to General Edward John McGaw, the first commander of the Iceland Defense Force, the U.S. unified command which provided for Iceland’s military security from 1951 to 2006.

Document 3: U.S. Legation Reykjavik Despatch 198 to State Department, ““First Icelandic Reaction to Senator Johnson’s Statement on Atomic Bases,” 27 November 1951, Secret

Source: RG 59, CDF, 711.56340B/11-2751

Chargé Hughes reported that the Communist newspaper, Thjodviljinn [Will of the Nation] had commented on Senator Johnson’s statement, noting that the “Americans feel that it does not matter if Iceland should be subjected to the attack and horrors such bases would bring

upon the nation.”

Document 4: U.S. Legation Reykjavik telegram number 97 to State Department, 20 December 1951, Secret

Source: RG 59, CDF, 711.56340B/12-1951

With no answer to his question about atomic bases, Benediktsonn asked Hughes again about the problem, noting that Communist opponents could “embarrass” him.

Document 5: State Department telegram 98 to U.S. Legation Reykjavik, 21 December 1951, Top Secret

Source: RG 59, CDF, box 3180, 711.56340B/11-2451

Benediktsonn’s second query was the charm. Responding to Hughes’ message, a State Department telegram sent under the name of Secretary of State Dean Acheson warned that any public statements would violate the policy to “not deny or affirm rumors” about the locations of atomic weapons. That was a military necessity to prevent the Soviet Union from determining the “pattern” of U.S. defenses. Nevertheless, the Department authorized Hughes to inform Benediktsonn confidentially that the United States would “make no move without [the] full consultation and agreement” of Iceland’s government.

Document 6: U.S. Legation Reykjavik Despatch 238 to State Department, “Further Reaction to Threatened Use of Iceland as Atomic Base,” 29 December 1951, Secret

Source: RG 59, CDF, box 3180, 711.56340B/12-2951

Hughes provided a fuller account of his meeting with Benediktsonn on 20 December and of his efforts during the holidays to pass on the gist of the State Department message to the permanent undersecretary and then to the foreign minister himself at a dinner. Whether there were any follow-up discussions remains unclear because the records covering the 1952-1954 period in the 711.56340B decimal file series are missing from box 3181.[3]

Document 7: U.S. Department of State Executive Secretariat, “Top Secret Daily Staff Summary,” 22 June 1960, top secret, excerpt

Source: RG 59, Executive Secretariat, Daily Staff Summary, 1944-1971, box 45, Daily Staff Summary, Top Secret, June 1960

According to the State Department summary of telegram 367 from the U.S. Embassy in Iceland, in light of the recent U-2 crisis, Foreign Minister Guðmundur Í. Guðmundsson asked Ambassador Thompson whether the United States had used Keflavik air base for U-2 flights, had stored nuclear weapons there or had moved them through Keflavik. While the Foreign Minister had not asked for assurances about advance agreement, according to the summary Thompson “feels that the storage of atomic warheads in Iceland without the latter’s prior agreement would be a mistake and suggests that, if we have no intention to do this, we so inform the Icelandic Government without awaiting its request to this effect.” This conversation is cited on the bottom of page 2 of the Tyler Thompson letter (Document 8) with the references to Iceland excised.

From the original Air Force caption: “A view of the famous Terminal Hotel at Keflavik Airport, Iceland, is pictured here. In the foreground are two MATS [Military Air Transport Service] aircraft parked out front of the hotel.” Ambassador Thompson’s letter captured the problems raised by the air base’s wide open status for proposals for secret nuclear weapons storage: the base’s “security problem” was “complicated by the small size of the secure areas, accessibility of the base to the public, the small community atmosphere there with everyone knowing to a large extent what is going on, and the speculation which new, and stricter security regulations might arouse.” (National Archives, Still Pictures Branch, RG 342-B, box 1458, Foreign Locations—Iceland)

Documents 8A-B: Answer to Gudmundsson’s Questions

A: Draft telegram to U.S. Embassy Iceland, 24 June 1960, Top Secret

B: Draft telegram to U.S. Embassy Iceland, circa 1 July 1960, Top Secret

Source: RG 59, Bureau of European Affairs, Office of Atlantic Political and Military Affairs, Subject Files, 1953-1962, box 11, Iceland Keflavick [sic] Air Base

In response to Guðmundsson’s questions about U-2 flights and nuclear weapons, State Department officials prepared a response; the finished, delivered version remains classified in State Department decimal files, but drafts of the response are available, of which the one dated 1 July 1960 is probably close to what was sent. The ambassador could assure the foreign minister that the U.S. had not stored nuclear weapons in Iceland or shipped them through Keflavik airbase. But this information was not for public consumption because of the U.S. government’s “neither confirm nor deny” policy. In response to Thompson’s suggestion that the U.S. pledge that it would consult the Icelandic government in advance about nuclear weapons deployments, the State Department believed this would “not [be] desirable.” Before any assurances could be given the subject would need careful study in Washington; if asked for such assurances, Thompson was to tell Guðmundsson that he needed to seek instructions. Thompson’s letter (below) does not indicate that a follow-up conversation with Guðmundsson had occurred, only the possibility that he might ask the question about nuclear deployments again.

The 24 June draft telegram mentions the CINCLANT requirement for a nuclear weapons storage site and its ongoing construction but that item was dropped from the 1 July draft, perhaps because of its sensitivity. The final version of the telegram remains classified but has been requested.

Document 9: Ambassador Tyler Thompson to Ivan White, 5 August 1960, top secret, excised copy

Source: RG 59, DF 1960-1963, 711.5611-8560

Probably to respond to the issues raised by Guðmundsson’s questions, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Ivan White sent Thompson a letter on 21 July 1960. It was one of those “official informal” communications then used by State Department officials to communicate with its embassies on matters that were too complex and sensitive to handle by telegram. White’s letter has not surfaced and is not indexed in the State Department decimal files. But judging from the tenor of Thompson’s reply, White may have asserted that the U.S. government was free to deploy nuclear weapons in Iceland without securing the agreement of Reykjavik. If that was the case, the Eisenhower administration had departed from the Acheson policy of assuring “full consultation and agreement.” It is possible that the previous ambassador, John Muccio, was the individual whom Thompson described as “recommending against prior consultation” out of fear that information about the deployment would leak to the Soviets.

If war was imminent or had broken out, Thompson believed that a secret emergency deployment would be permissible, but under peacetime circumstances he recommended seeking Iceland’s consent. Given that the Soviets probably suspected that Iceland was already a storage site, Thompson believed that it would be worse if the government of Iceland discovered a secret deployment; that would produce a diplomatic crisis, including Iceland’s possible withdrawal from NATO under protest. Moreover, “from the point of view of respect for the rights and sovereignty of [Iceland], the fact that it might not agree to the storage of nuclear weapons here could be considered as making prior consultations all the more necessary.”

To make deployments technically possible, Thompson suggested the construction of storage areas, but consulting the government if Washington ever wanted to use them. If war was approaching it would be possible to deploy weapons under emergency conditions because the possibility of objections would be “minimized.” If, however, the United States wanted to use the storage areas for actual deployments it should consult the Icelandic government. Thompson may not have been aware of the SACLANT storage site mentioned in the draft telegram cited above.

Thompson’s letter met with some internal criticism, mainly on the first page: a handwritten “no” next to his observation that U.S. nuclear weapons storage in NATO countries depends on the agreement of the country concerned; a question mark next to the comment about Canadian consent for storage of nuclear weapons in Canada; a comment “No! Canada on record,” suggesting that Ottawa would accept clandestine U.S. storage; and another comment which is harder to decipher: “tech … doesn’t get UK OK.”

For the archival release of this letter the State Department and the Defense Department justified the excision on two grounds. The State Department cited Section 3.3 (b) (6) of Executive Order 13526 – that declassification would “reveal information, including foreign government information, that would cause serious harm to relations between the United States and a foreign government, or to ongoing diplomatic activities of the United States.” The Defense Department cited exemption (b) (6), ruling that declassification would “reveal formally named or numbered U.S. military war plans that remain in effect, or reveal operational or tactical elements of prior plans that are contained in such active plans.” Whether the declassification of a document which is well over half a century old could have such impacts on U.S. diplomacy or military planning appears highly doubtful.



[1]. William Arkin, Robert S. Norris, and William Burr, “They Were,” The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November –December 1999, pp. 25-35; Arkin, Norris, and Burr, “How Much Did Japan Know,” The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, January-February 2000, pp. 11-13, 78-79.

[2] . Valur Ingimundarson, The Rebellious Ally: Iceland, the United States, and the Politics of Empire, 1945-2006(Dordrech, The Netherlands, 2011), 86; William Arkin, “Iceland Melts,” The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (50) January-February 2000, p. 80.

[3]. One relevant item that could show up in box 3181 was published in the Foreign Relations of the United States: a memorandum to the Deputy Under Secretary of State on “Additional Military Operating Requirements in Iceland,” dated 12 June 1952. It briefly recounts the discussions with the Icelandic foreign minister and mentions a NATO request to the U.S. and the Government of Iceland for a strategic air base in Iceland, but any further discussion of nuclear weapons was excised in the FRUS volume.

Unveiled – National Intelligence University Campus

Intelligence community unveils state-of-the-art campus

“World-class facility…is physical manifestation of ‘intelligence integration’”

James R. Clapper, director of national intelligence, participated in a ribbon-cutting ceremony today to celebrate the opening of the Intelligence Community Campus-Bethesda.

The purpose of the state-of-the-art facility, which is located at 4600 Sangamore Road in Bethesda, Maryland, is to develop a collaborative IC campus for the relocation of up to 3,000 intelligence professionals in the Washington National Capital area.

The campus, which is conveniently located in the heart of the intelligence community, will host employees from ODNI’s National Counterintelligence and Security Center, the National Intelligence University, and DIA.


Central Intelligence Agency University (much bigger 3-building campus)

38.9503729,-77.120482214 April 2016



The U.S. Discovery of Israel’s Secret Nuclear Project

Israeli Cover Stories about the Dimona Reactor Dismayed Top Level Officials Who Saw a “Clearly Apparent Lack of Candor

U.S. Embassy Telegram Quotes Ben-Gurion Aide That It Was a “Stupid Mistake” by Israel to Cloak the Nuclear Project in Secrecy

To Prevent Military Uses of the Facility, U.S. Officials Believed the International Atomic Energy Agency Should Monitor Dimona (It Never Has)

Today’s Posting Inaugurates the National Security Archive’s Special Web Site on Israeli Nuclear History

National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 510


Avner Cohen and William Burr, editors

For more information contact:
Avner Cohen at 202-489-6282 (mobile) or 831-647-6437 (office)
William Burr at 202/994-7000 or

Interview with Addy Cohen

An interview with Mr. Addy Cohen, a retired official from Israel’s Treasury Ministry, conducted by Ori Rabinowitz, a post-doctoral fellow at Tel Aviv University.

Part of the puzzle about the textile plant cover story is how it came about. While we know that Addy Cohen, the director of the Foreign Aid Office at the Treasury Ministry, used that description when guiding U.S. Ambassador Ogden Reid and some of his staff on a helicopter tour of the Negev in September 1960, the documentary trail has it limits. Cohen, who has just turned 87, and is living outside Tel Aviv, recalls the episode vividly. In a series of written and oral exchanges with the editors of this e-book in recent weeks, he has clarified further what happened.

As a senior official, Cohen was aware of the Dimona project and of its utmost secrecy. The issue of Dimona “was discussed in one of the Treasury Ministry executive meetings under [Minister Levi] Eshkol,” he wrote us. The helicopter tour covered various development projects that the U.S. supported, and they were on their way from the Dead Sea. “I was not prepared to Ambassador Reid’s question [about the Dimona site] as we flew far north of the structure. I ad libbed by referring to Trostler, the Jerusalemite architect [a relative of Cohen’s wife], who actually designed a textile plants” at Dimona.

Surprised by Reid’s query, Cohen improvised an answer that was not completely false. In retrospect, as he wrote on March 5, 2015, “It may have transpired that I was the first one who referred to the project as a ‘textile plant’ but I can assure you that it was not planned.”

Washington, D.C., April 15, 2015 – The U.S. government first learned of Israel’s secret nuclear program at Dimona from an American corporate official talking to U.S. diplomats in Tel Aviv during mid-summer 1960, according to a declassified document published today for the first time by the National Security Archive, the Nuclear Proliferation International History Project, and the Center for Nonproliferation Studies of the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey. Other documents published today detail the discovery of the secret project that some in the U.S. government believed from the very start aimed at a weapons capability; the U.S. debates over Israel’s lack of candor; and U.S. government efforts to pressure the Israelis to answer key questions about the nature of the Dimona project.

This “discovery,” which came as the presidency of Dwight D. Eisenhower was drawing to a close, caused apprehension in Washington by raising concern about regional stability and nuclear proliferation, but it also produced annoyance because Israeli officials at all levels repeatedly provided less than credible answers to U.S. questions about Dimona. Thus, in September 1960, when embassy officials asked about a new construction site when they were on a helicopter ride nearby, an adroit Israeli official, Addy Cohen, improvised a story to keep the secret: it was the site of a textile factory, he said; a story that was not wholly false because there was a textile plant near Dimona. An interview with Addy Cohen detailing the episode appears in this posting for the first time.

Documents published in this collection shed light on a particularly notable intelligence failure: how Washington missed warning signs that the Israelis had a nuclear project underway, but also how the U.S. belatedly realized what the Israelis were doing, and how Eisenhower and his senior advisers reacted to this discovery. Among the documents are:

  • The June 1959 Israel-Norway secret agreement providing for the sale of Norwegian heavy water to Israel (through the United Kingdom), transmitted by Oslo Embassy political officer Richard Kerry (father of Secretary of State John Kerry).
  • Reports about information from a then-covert source — University of Michigan nuclear engineering professor Henry Gomberg — who learned that the Israelis had a secret nuclear reactor project that involved experiments with plutonium.
  • A telegram from the U.S. embassy in Tel Aviv reporting on Finance Ministry official Addy Cohen’s statement that “we’ve been misbehaving,” and one by an unidentified official close to Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion that the secrecy surrounding Dimona was unjustifiable and that it was “a stupid mistake on the part of Israel.”
  • Reports by U.S. Ambassador Ogden Reid on conversations with Ben-Gurion.
  • A State Department message to the embassy in Tel Aviv conveying irritation that the responses of the Israeli government showed a “lack of candor.”
  • Messages about a role for the International Atomic Energy Agency in inspecting and safeguarding Dimona.

* * * * *

The Eisenhower Administration and the Discovery of Dimona: March 1958-January 1961

By Avner Cohen and William Burr

In the last months of 1960 as the presidency of Dwight D. Eisenhower was coming to a close, the U.S. government discovered that Israel had been building, with French assistance, a secret nuclear reactor near Dimona in the Negev Desert that could give Israel a nuclear weapons potential. The discovery caused apprehension within the Eisenhower administration by invoking concerns about regional stability and nuclear proliferation, but it also produced annoyance because Israeli officials at all levels provided less than credible answers to U.S. questions about Dimona.

One episode that helped create a sense of deception was that, in response to initial U.S. official questions about the construction site, the Israelis said it would be a textile factory. Over the years the “textile factory” story has acquired legendary status, but exactly when the story came about has been a mystery. But recently unearthed U.S. government documents — an embassy telegram and a memorandum by the Deputy Chief of Mission — help solve this historical puzzle. They show that during a helicopter flight in September 1960, with American Ambassador Ogden Reid and others of his staff on board, not far from the reactor site, Ambassador Reid (or one of the travelers) asked what the big construction site was. Their host, Addy Cohen, a senior Treasury Ministry official, replied, “Why, that’s a textile plant.” In December 1960, when the Dimona issue was publicly exposed, Cohen was asked why he had said “textile factory.” He responded: “that was our story at the time.” Cohen acknowledged that “we have been misbehaving” by keeping Dimona secret, but justified the project as a “deterrent” against Arab neighbors.

Today the National Security Archive, the Nuclear Proliferation International History Project and the Center for Nonproliferation Studies of the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey publish for the first time these two items and other declassified documents on the “discovery” of Dimona. The documents provide new perspectives on how the Eisenhower administration learned about the secret reactor project, how it reacted to the discovery, and how the Israelis responded. Among the findings are these:

  • The initial “discovery” by the U.S. embassy in Tel Aviv of the French-Israeli reactor project was probably in late July 1960, when a U.S. corporate official learned about it from an Israeli oil executive and told U.S. diplomats that the site would be a power reactor. This is the earliest known reference to Dimona.
  • The admission by French Foreign Minister Maurice Couve de Murville on December 16 to Secretary of State Christian Herter that France had helped Israel build the reactor, a “replica of [the] Marcoule plant.” He also told Herter that under the bilateral agreement, France would supply Israel the raw materials and receive any plutonium produced by the plant. In reply to Herter’s question about the plant’s financing, Couve said that he “assumed the money came from [the United States]”
  • Former Treasury Ministry official Addy Cohen ad libbed the “textile plant” story in response to questions on a helicopter tour [See above and sidebar].
  • An unidentified official close to Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion, according to an Embassy telegram, told the Canadian ambassador that the secrecy surrounding Dimona was unjustifiable and that it was “a stupid mistake on the part of Israel.” Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern Affairs G. Lewis Jones agreed: It was “stupid of them” and an “unnecessary … Israeli caper.”
  • The financial aspects of the Dimona project, i.e., cost, financing, and the role of U.S. money — through both the diversion of U.S. government aid and the use of tax-deductible individual charities — played an important role in the Eisenhower administration’s internal deliberations on Dimona. Washington considered applying, but apparently did not use, the power to withhold economic assistance as pressure on Israel.
  • When the U.S. started asking questions about Dimona, and then when the issue was leaked to the press, an irritated Prime Minister Ben-Gurion asked Ambassador Ogden Reid: “Why in [the] States is everything being told [to] everybody?” Ben-Gurion stuck to the new Israeli cover story, namely, that the Dimona reactor was for peaceful purposes only, and for the economic development of the Negev in particular — no more than a step towards the building of nuclear power stations and the production of electric power, a badly needed resource.
  • A State Department message to the embassy in Tel Aviv conveyed a sense of irritation with the responses of the Israeli government: Ben-Gurion’s explanations “appear evasive” and the “clearly apparent lack of candor [is] difficult to reconcile with [the] confidence which had traditionally characterized U.S.-Israel relations.” The Department wanted more questions asked and more detailed and frank answers from Ben-Gurion.
  • In June 1959 Israel and Norway signed a secret agreement providing for Norway to sell heavy water to Israel (through the United Kingdom). According to the U.S. embassy first secretary in Oslo, Richard Kerry (father of Secretary of State John Kerry), disclosure of the agreement could be embarrassing to the Norwegian government in light of its efforts to play the role of an “honest broker” in international conflicts, including in the Middle East.

Also published in this collection are important documents that have been available in previous National Security Archive postings, but are a significant part of the record of the discovery of Dimona, including:

  • A Special National Intelligence Estimate — SNIE 100-8-60 from 8 December 1960 — that formally determined that “Israel is engaged in construction of a nuclear reactor complex in the Negev near Beersheba” and “plutonium production for weapons is at least one major purpose of this effort.” The SNIE estimated “that Israel will produce some weapons grade plutonium in 1963-64 and possibly as early as 1962.” A significant portion of the SNIE is still classified.
  • President Eisenhower’s meeting with top advisers on 19 December 1960 to discuss the Dimona problem, ponder the issues raised by Israeli fundraising in the United States, and discuss plans to encourage Israel to open up Dimona to visits by U.S. or reliable foreign scientists and to subject the reactor to International Atomic Energy Agency inspections. Some portions of this meeting record are also still classified.
  • The post-mortem on SNIE 100-8-60 ordered by the U.S. Intelligence Board whereby the intelligence community tried to determine what pieces of information it had missed and to learn lessons from the intelligence failure.

The Eisenhower administration’s “discovery” during the last months of 1960 that Israel was secretly building a large nuclear complex at Dimona was a belated one indeed. It occurred more than five years after Israel had made a secret national commitment to create a nuclear program aiming at providing an option to produce nuclear weapons; more than three years after Israel had signed its secret comprehensive nuclear bargain with France; and two years or more after Israel had begun the vast excavation and construction work at the Dimona site.

The tardiness of the discovery was a major blunder, what is called in our times an intelligence failure. In comparative terms, it was probably as severe as (or more so than) the failures to anticipate the Indian nuclear tests of in 1974 and 1998. Some of the documents included in this e-book provide clues as to why the discovery was delayed and the roots and causes of the intelligence failure.

What amounted to an intelligence breakdown by the United States was a tremendous counterintelligence success for Israel. The U.S. bungle enabled Israel to buy precious time for the highly vulnerable Dimona project. One could argue that had the United States discovered Dimona two years earlier, perhaps even a year earlier, that the young and fragile undertaking might not have survived. Early political pressure from the United States on the two foreign suppliers, France and Norway, might have terminated it at the very start.

The documents presented here reveal how surprised and angry the Eisenhower administration was when it learned about Dimona — and yet how circumspect Washington was in its reaction to the discovery. There was a huge gap between what senior U.S. officials said to each other about Dimona and what they said to the Israelis. On the one hand, the Americans were convinced that the evidence they had amassed indicated that it was plutonium production-oriented project with weapons potential that posed a significant proliferation risk. They were irritated that the Israelis were trying to pull the wool over their eyes with all manner of evasive answers and misleading stories. Apparently they had many doubts about Ben-Gurion’s new cover story as well. On the other hand, the administration masked its anger and suspicions; opting for a cautious approach, it chose not to be confrontational but to confine itself largely to: 1) seeking answers about Dimona and Israel’s intentions, and 2) encouraging Israel to accept visits by U.S. scientists and consent to applying International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards to Dimona, as a way to constrain Israeli freedom of action. There are hints that U.S. diplomats warned the Israelis that U.S. economic aid could be jeopardized, but with only weeks left in office the Eisenhower administration was in no position to coerce its ally over the issue.


This and the three other photographs of the construction site near Dinoma in the Negev desert for Israel’s then-secret nuclear reactor were taken during the last months of 1960. According to the U.S. Intelligence Board post-mortem (See Document 27A), the British and U.S. military attachés took photos and these could be from either source. The plainly visible reactor dome undermined Israeli claims that a textile factory was under construction. These images of the reactor site, some of them originally classified secret or confidential, are located in State Department records at the National Archives. (Record Group 59, Records of the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Atomic Energy and Outer Space, General Records Relating to Atomic Energy, 1948-62, box 501, Country File Z1.50 Israel f. Reactors 1960)

President Eisenhower and Israel Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion during the latter’s visit in March 1960 to the United States. (Source:
Henry Gomberg, Professor of Nuclear Engineering at the University of Michigan, shown at the laboratory during the 1950s, several years before his fall November 1960 trip to Israel where he made discoveries about the Dimona reactor (photo courtesy of Bentley Historical Library, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor).
Under Secretary of State Robert Murphy swearing in Ogden Reid, the newly-appointed U.S. ambassador to Israel, 7 June 1959 (photo from NARA Still Pictures Division, RG 59 SO).
Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs G. Lewis Jones, who wrote to Ambassador Reid that “it was stupid” of the Israelis to undertake the secret reactor project. (photo from NARA Still Pictures Division, RG 59 SO).
Addy Cohen (at the left) with Teddy Kollek, Director General of the Prime Minister’s Office and later, Mayor of Jerusalem.

To appreciate the full historical context of the American intelligence failure we need to say a little bit about the Dimona project itself. In 1955, soon after David Ben-Gurion came back to power as Israel’s prime minister and minister of defense, he launched a secret feasibility initiative to determine whether, and how, Israel could build a nuclear infrastructure to support a program aiming at producing nuclear explosives. Ben-Gurion delegated that difficult task to a young (32 years of age) and highly ambitious lieutenant, Shimon Peres, whose formal position was then the director general of the Ministry of Defense. Within three years, from 1955 to 1958, Peres did almost the impossible: he managed to transform the idea of a national nuclear program from a vague vision of the future into a real technological project in the making.

Unlike the chair of the Israeli Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC), Professor David Ernst Bergmann, who preached self-reliance, Peres’s overall philosophy was that Israel must not (and cannot) reinvent the wheel and therefore must find a foreign supplier who could provide the most comprehensive nuclear package possible, one suited for a weapons-oriented program.[1]

Those three years were filled with internal deliberations, debates and planning. Often different courses of action were examined simultaneously, on parallel or even conflicting tracks. At least three countries were considered at one time or another to be the foreign supplier: the United States, France, Norway and, to a limited extent, the United Kingdom. In historical perspective, it appears that by 1958, the project’s international master plan had become firmly drawn: France would be the foreign supplier, Norway would provide the heavy water and possibly the backup in case the French card went wrong, and the United States would provide a small peaceful package, under “Atoms of Peace,” that could serve as the camouflage for the whole project, mostly as a way to conceal Israel’s real achievement — Dimona — from the United States.

This raises the issue of secrecy. The story of Dimona is one of a huge secret. Secrecy was essential in order to shield and insulate the highly vulnerable, newly born, project from a hostile outside. At the very core, of course, it is an Israeli secret – the largest, most comprehensive and longest-held secret Israel has ever generated. However, it is more than an Israeli secret; Israel had partners in this venture. The prime partner was the chief foreign supplier, France; the second was Norway, in concert with the British.

And then there was the United States. In a sense, the secrecy surrounding Dimona was aimed primarily against the United States. After all, of all the nations involved, the U.S. posed the greatest threat to the Israeli program. Since the time of the Baruch Plan in 1946 the United States had been on the record opposing the spread of nuclear weapons. Washington helped to create the IAEA in 1957 — the very same year the Dimona deal was signed — and since then it had promoted the creation of an international safeguards system. Should the Dimona secret have been compromised, the United States would have likely exercised pressure on France either to terminate the project altogether or at least to submit it to international safeguards.

The documents in this e-book involve Israel’s nuclear relations with the United States, France and Norway. What follows is some brief background on Israel’s efforts with each of them:

  • The United States. On 12 July 1955, Israel was the second country to sign a general agreement with the United States for peaceful nuclear cooperation under “Atoms for Peace.” Initially, the leaders of the Israeli Atomic Energy Commission [IAEC] thought that American assistance could be the starting point for a largely indigenous Israeli nuclear program. Consistent with this vision, during 1955-56, IAEC Chairman Bergmann tried to find out whether the United States would provide assistance to build a “real reactor” — that is, a 10 MW natural uranium/heavy water reactor — but also to provide 10 tons of heavy water. Bergman made a formal request in July 1956 through a letter to AEC Chairman Lewis Strauss. In September the AEC notified Israel that it could be done but only under the aegis of a new bilateral nuclear power agreement which would require a more rigorous safeguards agreement than the original 1955 bilateral research accord. When Israel asked why, it was told that “plutonium production capabilities” necessitated stricter controls. When it became apparent the United States would insist on strict safeguards, Israel dropped its probe altogether.

    A year later, however, in 1957, Israel returned to the original U.S. “Atoms for Peace” offer to construct a small 1 MW swimming pool-type reactor, to be designed and installed by American Machines and Foundry (AMF) Atomics. The contract was signed on 20 March 1957 and in December of that year the long-awaited proposal was submitted to the USAEC by AMF on behalf of Israel for the Nachal Soreq (Rubin) site. Finally, on 19 March 1958, Israel signed a contract with AMF, expecting that the reactor startup date would be 15 months later. Construction on the Soreq site had begun in January 1958 and the small reactor reached criticality in a public ceremony in June 1960, six months prior to the discovery of Dimona.[2]Unlike Dimona, however, the Soreq (“Atoms for Peace”) reactor became subject to IAEA safeguards beginning in the mid-1960s.

  • France. By early 1956, as French-Israeli military relations intensified, Peres became convinced that France could evolve into Israel’s foreign nuclear supplier and acted accordingly. But it was the nationalization of the Suez Canal that summer which created the political opening for a French-Israeli nuclear deal. In September 1956 the French Atomic Energy Commission and the IAEC reached an agreement in principle for the sale of a small EL type research reactor to Israel. A month later, as a side issue at the end of the secret Sevres conference (October 22-24) (site of the “collusion” that led to the Suez campaign), the nuclear deal received top-level political approval. The 1956 deal, however, was quite limited in size and scope; it also did not include a chemical separation plant and related reprocessing technology.

    It was in the context of the Suez campaign itself, when all three participants were subject to Soviet nuclear threats, that France reinforced its own earlier (1954) decision to become a nuclear power and agreed to help Israel to do the same. With France making its own nuclear decisions it became easier for Peres to be more explicit about the package that Israel actually wanted. The small EL-102 reactor that the CEA had planned for Israel in the fall of 1956 — similar to the experimental EL3 18 MW in Sacly — was upgraded to a large plutonium-producing reactor of generally the same order as the G-1 reactor at Marcoule. Following a year of highly intense discussions and negotiations in France, on 30 October 1957 Peres finally signed the Dimona package, which included both hardware and technological aid. In the wake of widespread rumors of French-Israeli nuclear cooperation in early 1958, U.S. embassy officials reported that Israel had plans to build an “experimental” reactor but the State Department did not investigate this further (See Documents 1AB).[3]

  • Norway. Beginning in 1955, Israeli AEC Chair Bergmann pressed his government to obtain 20 tons of heavy water cheaply and, if possible, without safeguards. Outside the United States, the Norwegian company Norsk Hydro was the only available producer of heavy water. In early 1956, Israel made a request to the United States but also approached Norway, informally via political channels, as to whether and when it could supply Israel with 20 tons of heavy water. Norway’s initial reply was that, due to current orders, it would be impossible to do so before the end of 1960. When the approach to Washington became hopeless, Israel grew more interested in the Norwegian supply. In August 1956, Bergmann wrote his friend Gunnar Randers, the director of the Norwegian Institute of for Atomic Energy, with a formal request to purchase 10 tons of heavy water. Randers responded noncommittally: supply was short but there was a “good chance” for a deal later on.

    Negotiations between Israel and Norway intensified in 1957-58, at the time that the Dimona deal was negotiated and signed. In a letter Randers wrote in August 1957 to Fredrik Moller, the director of NORATOM, a newly established company aimed at promoting the Norwegian nuclear industry, he explained that Israel needed the heavy water for a 40 MW “production reactor” fueled by natural uranium. As there were political and logistic difficulties with the Israeli order, to make it more attractive Randers presented it in the context of a larger nuclear cooperation agreement between NORATOM and the IAEC. In addition, to expedite the deal it became a three-party transaction: Israel purchased heavy water from NORATOM that had been sold and transferred two years earlier to Britain, but became surplus for them. The heavy water was shipped directly from the UK to Israel, without safeguards, as the issue of safeguards was left to the Norwegians. The paper record indicates that Randers was willing to be “creative” on controls, but the Norwegian Foreign Ministry insisted on safeguards to ascertain “peaceful use.” After long discussions Israel gave up on the question of safeguards and on 25 February 1959 the two countries exchanged documents on the heavy water sale with provisions to ensure that the use was peaceful. A few months later the Norwegian Foreign Ministry informed a U.S. AEC representative about the bilateral agreement, assuring him that it included safeguards and inspection rights (See Documents 2, 20).[4]

The discoveries of the French and Norwegian roles in the Israeli nuclear project were a revelation to the Eisenhower administration but it was even more surprised to discover that it already had in its possession clues that had not been followed up until it was too late. The documents below demonstrate how, during the short time it had available, the Eisenhower administration scrambled to pull the threads together by conducting an intelligence “post-mortem.” (See Document 27A). The post-mortem treated the missed opportunities as unfortunate but innocent errors caused by the deficient sharing of information and poor follow-up of instructions. But there have been more conspiratorial explanations of the missed opportunities: for example, the view that pro-Israeli officials in the AEC, CIA, and other agencies stove-piped important reports and information, and the open question that President Eisenhower himself may have chosen to look the other way during 1958-1959.[5]

A more delicate and complex dilemma faced by the Eisenhower administration was how to respond both publicly and privately to the challenge to U.S.-Israeli and U.S.-French relations posed by Dimona. Specifically, the administration had to decide how tough it should be and how to balance the Israeli proliferation concern against the rest of the U.S.-Israeli relationship. It is important to keep in mind that the administration was becoming aware of two things: (a) that Israel had made deliberate efforts to keep Dimona secret for as long as possible; and (b) that Washington could hardly take on faith the new Israeli “cover story” about Dimona, including Ben-Gurion’s public and private assurances. The administration remained skeptical, if not suspicious.

The possible public disclosure of Dimona also placed Israel, and specifically Prime Minister Ben-Gurion, in a dilemma: How should it react to the disclosure? How much should Israel tell and how truthful should it be? Could Israel tell the U.S. government one thing in private and something else to the world? The question was whether Israel should choose the path of truth or the path of ambiguity and deception. Because the first public statement would have great impact, this was a truly fateful decision. The internal Israeli deliberations about what to say are still unavailable, but it is possible to reconstruct the underlying reasoning based on important public and private statements made by Israeli officials, including Ben-Gurion.

Ben-Gurion chose the path of ambiguity and concealment: he declared that Dimona was purely a civilian scientific project, for training in the use of nuclear power for economic development. It was “exclusively for peaceful purposes,” he declared in his Knesset statement on 21 December 1960. In his private assurances to the United States Ben-Gurion provided some new information, but it was entirely consistent with his public version.[6] He would not tell the whole truth because the fate of the project was at stake. For Ben-Gurion this ambiguous, if not entirely deceitful, strategy had obvious short-term benefits: lessening U.S. anger and resulting pressure, and thereby avoiding a public showdown with Washington, while also calming the situation at home and in the region generally.[7]

It is apparent that the Eisenhower administration had no appetite to call Ben-Gurion’s bluff (either in private or in public). Nor was the departing president interested in escalating the Dimona problem into a diplomatic confrontation, which would not have even been possible given , with all that was already on his agenda (the Laos and Berlin crises, for example). Because relations with Israel had been relatively good, Israel had significant domestic support within the United States, and, perhaps most significantly, the Eisenhower administration was in its last few days in office, the White House let the State Department deal with the issue, keeping it under diplomatic control until the new Kennedy administration took office.

A determination to avoid a crisis encouraged senior officials such as Assistant Secretary of State G. Lewis Jones [Document 19] to try to “calm down” the agencies, including CIA, which he believed had been reacting intemperately, and to ensure that no one tried to cut off aid to Israel. At the same time, “calm”, secrecy, and the avoidance of publicity might make it possible for Washington to get answers from the Israeli and put quiet pressure on them to open up Dimona to visits by U.S. scientists and to accept safeguards by the IAEA (in fact, the last thing Ben-Gurion and his associates were likely to accept).

The dilemma the Eisenhower administration faced after the discovery of Dimona in December 1960-January 1961 would endure for the entire decade. From then on, three successive U.S. administrations — under presidents Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon — would have to deal with it as well. President Kennedy chose the toughest path of struggle and confrontation in his effort to check the program; President Johnson realized that the U.S. had limited leverage on the issue and planted the seeds of compromise and looking the other way; finally, in a bargain with Prime Minister Golda Meir, President Nixon accepted the Israel’s de facto nuclear status as long as it stayed secret, and in doing so created the present dilemma.

The documents that follow are illuminating but more is to be learned. Many records remain classified in the National Archives, not only in State Department files but also those of the Atomic Energy Commission. The papers of AEC Chairman John McCone at the National Archives include a file on Israel which is the subject of an earlier declassification request along with related State Department files. Moreover, the National Security Archive has pending requests with the Department of Energy, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Dwight D. Eisenhower Library. In response to a request to re-review SNIE 100-8-60 (See Document 8), the CIA has held the line, refusing to release more information. The request is now under appeal.



Documents 1A-B: Unnoticed Intelligence

A: Department of State Instruction A-128 to U.S. Embassy Israel, “Atomic Energy Developments,” 7 March 1958, Confidential

B: U.S. Embassy Tel Aviv Despatch No. 652 to State Department, “Israeli Exchanges With Other Countries Relating to Atomic Energy,” 16 April 1958,

Source for both: National Archives (College Park), Record Group 59, Department of State Records (hereinafter RG 59), Central Decimal Files, 1955-1959, 984a.801/4-1658.

Some in the U.S. intelligence community[8] regarded these communications as an early missed opportunity to discover the Dimona project a year or two earlier. In March 1958, in light of growing concern about the possibility of surreptitious nuclear weapons programs, the State Department saw an “urgent” need for information on the Israeli atomic energy program and asked its Tel Aviv embassy to report on “all phases” of Israeli nuclear-related activities, research and development, including any exchanges with foreign governments and organizations. As an example, the instruction cited a recent press report in the Jerusalem Post on French-Israeli atomic cooperation. The report included statements by the French minister of foreign affairs, Francois Benard, that France was supplying Israel’s uranium needs in exchange for “Israeli discoveries in atomic research for peace.”

In response the embassy set up a meeting on 15 April 1958 between embassy Second Secretary Lewis Townsend and Professor David Ernest Bergmann, the chairman of Israel’s Atomic Energy Commission. With respect to cooperation with France, Bergmann asserted flatly that Minister Benard “did not know what he was talking about.” Bergmann acknowledged that Israel had a nuclear agreement with France but the exchanges under the agreement were informational only. Under the agreement Israel received from France “unpublished reports” and sent students to study at French nuclear centers. He noted that the agreement had no provision under which France was obligated to supply Israel uranium as had been reported; nor had Israel ever received such supply. The substance of Bergmann’s commentary was close to what a US AEC representative would hear in Paris more than two years later in a similar inquiry (see Document 4). The comments were quite accurate as far as that (unpublished) 1954 bi-lateral exchange agreement was concerned (Bergmann mentioned that there was also a tri-lateral agreement on atomic energy research between Israel, France and the UK). Israel did not advertise the existence of those agreements, but did not treat them as classified either.[9]

Not surprisingly, however, Bergmann made no reference to the extremely secret French-Israeli Dimona agreement which had been signed in Paris on 3 October 1957. One must assume that he must have known something about that deal but it is not clear how much knew given that the IAEC was hardly consulted, let alone involved, in the decisions and actions that led to Dimona.[10] Bergmann’s most intriguing comment came at the end when he said that the principal decision to build a “power reactor had already been taken.” He seems to suggest two stages: first, “plans” which are currently “contemplated” to construct an “experimental nuclear reactor” within two or two-and-a-half years, and then five to seven years later “a large economically feasible [power] reactor could be put into operation.”

Was the reference to that “experimental reactor” an oblique reference to Dimona — as indeed Israel initially presented it — or was it a deliberate effort to confuse his American interlocutor? Or perhaps it was a mix of both? It is worth noting that Bergmann was known among Israelis as being loose on secrecy and this was apparently one of the reasons why he was bypassed on the Dimona project.[11]

In retrospect, according to the post-mortem investigation (see Document 27A) on why the United States discovered Dimona two years late, Bergmann’s loose comment on the “experimental reactor” was one of those major missing hints. In April 1958 U.S. intelligence wrongly assumed that the reference to the “experimental reactor” was to the US small swimming pool reactor at Soreq whose construction started in January that year at Nachal Soreq (see Document 3). Moreover, U.S. intelligence took on faith Bergmann’s statement about the limited nature of French-Israeli nuclear cooperation, although there had already been some reports about possible French-Israeli secret nuclear cooperation, even the possibility of joint nuclear weapons research. One way or another, a chance to investigate Bergmann’s claims and to seek further information about the “experimental reactor” was lost.

The numbers on the right side of these documents indicate that they are from the State Department’s central decimal files (whereby documents were filed using numerical combinations denoting subjects and countries). The 900 category signifies communications, transportation, and science; 84A stands for Israel; and 801 indicates research and development. The filing of the document in the R&D category, instead of the usual 1901 category for nuclear energy matters, would have hindered any U.S. government official who was interested in tracing intelligence on the Israeli nuclear program.


Documents 2A-C: “Certain Highly Classified Transactions with Israel”

A: Memorandum of Conversation, Norwegian Foreign Ministry, 5 June 1959, Secret, with 30 December 1960 routing slip [transcript attached]

B: Richard Kerry to Philip Farley, 15 June 1959, Secret

C: Richard Kerry to Philip Farley, 7 August 1959, enclosing copy of letter to Robert Brandin, and “Memorandum of conversation of August 6, 1959, at the Atomic Energy Institute, Kjeller, Norway,” Secret

Sources: A: RG 59, Records of Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Atomic Energy and Outer Space, Records Relating to Atomic Energy Matters, 1948-1962 [SAE], box 305, File 12. Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy Safeguards Sept-Dec 1960 Part 1 of 3; B: RG 59, SAE, box 501, Z1.50 Country File Israel d. General 1953-1961 Part 2 of 2 C: RG 59, SAE, box 313, Country File Norway d. General 1957-1961 Part 2 of 2

A critical piece of information that was known to the State Department, but for obscure reasons remained unknown to the U.S. intelligence community for many months (see Document 22), was the 20 tons of heavy water that Norway had quietly sold to Israel upon an agreement signed in Oslo on 25 February 1959. The Norwegians claimed that they wanted to keep the transaction under wraps because disclosure could hurt their diplomatic standing and interfere with business prospects in the Middle East. Evidently, Israel had equally strong reasons of her own to keep the heavy water deal secret as well. For this reason, but also due to an availability issue, Norway used the U.K. as a key third party in the deal: NORATOM (the Norwegian state-sponsored company to promote Norwegian nuclear energy industry) had originally sold heavy water to the United Kingdom for its nuclear weapons program. Then, as part of the three-party arrangement, the Norwegians asked the British to resell their excess heavy water back to NORATOM; even though the product would be shipped directly from the United Kingdom to Israel, it was NORATOM that was selling it. This also enabled NORATOM to avoid the political difficulty of having to apply to the Norwegian government for an export license.[12]

According to Olaf Solli, a nuclear energy expert with the Norwegian Foreign Ministry, some British officials wanted to “inform” Washington of the Israeli heavy water deal, but ultimately London did not share the information, according to British press reports in 2005 and 2006 based on new declassifications in British archives.[13]

In any event, on 5 June 1959, the Norwegian Foreign Ministry informed AEC official William M. Fullerton, a division chief at the Office of International Affairs, about the agreement to sell heavy water to Israel — subject to “safeguards and inspections” — but the size of the transaction was not reported. The U.S Embassy in Oslo prepared the memo of conversation and some days later, on 15 June, embassy political officer Richard Kerry forwarded it to Philip J. Farley, the assistant to the secretary of state for disarmament and atomic energy, asking that Fullerton and his boss, Algie Wells, receive copies.

For unknown reasons the memo was lost in the shuffle and was not disseminated above the middle levels of the State Department and the AEC. Top Department officials, not to mention those at the CIA or from State Department intelligence, did not see that June 1959 memo until December 1960, although months before the CIA had learned there had been a deal.[14] Accordingly, the questions about the sale that could have been asked of the Israelis, the Norwegians, and the British were not.

In a follow-up conversation, Richard Kerry learned more, indirectly, about the political sensitivity of Norwegian secret deals with Israel from Gunnar Randers, the director of the Atomic Energy Institute, and the key figure in Norwegian nuclear policy after World War II. Referring to NORATOM’s negotiations with the Egyptians over “isotope work,” Randers saw a “delicate” situation concerning transactions with Israel, but as long as they did not reach the public the Norwegians would not face any “difficulties” from Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser. Randers was a close friend of the IAEC chair, David Bergmann, and this story supported Israel’s need for secrecy but it also suited Randers who had not kept the upper levels of the Norwegian Foreign Ministry in the picture (seeDocument 20).


Document 3: “French Atomic Energy Project in Israel”

U.S. Embassy Tel Aviv Despatch 75 to State Department, “French Atomic Energy Project in Israel,” 2 August 1960, Confidential

Source: National Archives (College Park), Record Group 59, Department of State records (RG 59), Central Decimal Files 1960-1963, 884A.1901/8-260

American Machine and Foundry (AMF) Atomics was the company which installed for Israel the 1 MW swimming pool type light water nuclear reactor at Nachal Soreq (known today as the Soreq Nuclear Research Center) that Israel received as a gift from the U.S. under the1955 “Atoms for Peace” bilateral agreement. In late July 1960, U.S. Embassy officials learned from a conversation with D. Anderson, an AMF employee, that French personnel were involved in building “a 60 megawatt atomic power reactor” in the Beersheba area. Anderson stated that this was his “impression, gained on conversations he had with an Israeli, Daniel Kimhi, the director of the Naptha Petroleum Company. According to Kimhi, the French nationals were working on a project described to him as ‘gas cooled power reactor capable of producing approximately 60 megawatts of electrical power.'” Anderson’s understanding was that the project had been under way for “about two years” with the completion date two years off.

As of this writing, this document is the first and earliest available declassified US document that makes explicit reference to the Dimona project. We should note that at the National Archives (College Park), over one hundred additional documents from 1960-1961 remain classified in the decimal files. A declassification request for them is pending.

The embassy reported this conversation to Washington and asked that the U.S. embassy in Paris look into the French government’s role, if any, in the alleged development. It took a few weeks before this information went to nuclear energy intelligence experts in Washington (at the AEC and CIA) who came to realize that they had missed other pieces of intelligence (See Document 27A) and began looking more closely at what was going on at the Dimona site.


Documents 4A-B: “The French CEA Was Not Collaborating with the Israelis”

A: State Department Instruction CA-3636 to U.S. Embassy Paris, “Reported Atomic Reactor Power Project at Beersheba,” 19 October 1960, confidential

B: U.S. Embassy Paris Airgram G-766 to State Department, 22 November 1960, Confidential

Sources: A: Record Group 84, Records of Foreign Service Posts, Classified Records of the U.S. Mission to the International Atomic Energy Agency, 1955-1963, box 1, Atomic Energy Developments Israel 1959-61; B: Freedom of Information release

When the U.S intelligence community got wind of the Tel Aviv embassy report on the French-Israeli reactor project (see Document 2), it took time to digest it; U.S. officials realized that more information was needed because apparently they had no independent sources to corroborate the report. (It is still a puzzle whether, and to what extent, U-2 overhead photographs were especially telling or whether they were being distributed within the intelligence community.)[15] According to the post-mortem (see Document 27A, PDF page 23), the CIA formulated a list of technical questions about French-Israeli collaboration, including the organizations involved in the project, reactor specifications, and plans for spent fuel, e.g. whether the Israelis were building a chemical separation plant. The State Department sent the CIA questions as an “Instruction” to the U.S. embassy in Israel, with the embassy in Paris and the U.S. mission to the IAEA also receiving copies. The request for information did not get high priority; it had a “Routine collection priority.”

If the U.S. embassy in Israel ever sent back a formal response, it is still classified. But U.S. military attaches at the Embassy in Tel Aviv did begin collecting information and sent photographs back to Washington. Another attempt to ferret out information is known: John Rouleau, the AEC’s representative in Paris, tried, but he met with complete denial from an unnamed member of the French Atomic Energy Commission. The latter, according to Rouleau’s account, “stated flatly that the French CEA was not collaborating with the Israelis in the construction of a nuclear power reactor.” Furthermore, the official denied that any French company could be working with the Israelis on a power reactor because “prior permission from the CEA would be required and such permission has neither been requested nor granted.”

While the French official denied any bilateral cooperation with Israel on a power reactor, he acknowledged the existence of an earlier 1954 agreement between the two national atomic energy commissions under which the bodies collaborated in two specific areas: (1) heavy water production and (2) extracting uranium from phosphates. In retrospect, it is impossible to say whether the CEA interlocutor truly knew nothing about the Dimona project-the Israeli-French deal was highly compartmentalized and secret within the CEA-or whether he made a deliberate effort to mislead the United States. Strictly speaking, however, his statement was not a lie because the Dimona reactor was not a power reactor.


Document 5: “The Know-How on Building Crude Atomic Bombs”

Memorandum of conversation, “Safeguards for Reactors,” 25 November 1960, Secret

Source: National Archives (College Park), Record Group 59, Department of State Records (hereinafter RG 59), Records of Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Atomic Energy and Outer Space, Records Relating to Atomic Energy Matters, 1948-1962, box 305, 12H P.U.S File: 18. Safeguards September-December 1960 [Part 2 of 3]

Despite the lack of cooperation from the French government, Washington was piecing together information about the site in the Negev Desert from a variety of intelligence sources. By 25 November, Secretary of State Herter was confident enough in the information accumulated so far to share its essence with British Ambassador Harold Caccia. While intelligence experts in London and Washington had already been consulting each other (see chronology with Document 27A), Herter took it to a higher level by telling Caccia that Washington had unconfirmed reports that a “plutonium-producing reactor may be being built in Israel with French aid.” Furthermore, France may be giving the Israelis the “know how” to build “crude atomic bombs.” What made the existence of the Israeli reactor project of special concern was that for months Washington and its allies had been trying to build a consensus at the IAEA in favor of effective safeguards on nuclear power plants; this “new factor emphasized the importance of providing adequate atomic energy safeguards.”


Documents 6A-C: Professor Gomberg’s Discoveries

A: Paris Embassy Telegram 2162 to State Department, 26 November 1960, Secret

B: Memorandum of conversation, [Title excised], 1 December 1960, Secret, excised copy

C: Central Intelligence Agency, Information Report, “Nuclear Engineering/Large Nuclear and Electric Power Plant Near Beersheba/French Nuclear Assistance to Israel/Israeli Attitude Toward the Announcement of its Large Scale Nuclear Effort/Opportunity for U.S. Participation in Nuclear Powered Water Conversion,” 9 February 1961, Confidential

Sources: A: RG 59, Records of Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Atomic Energy and Outer Space, Records Relating to Atomic Energy Matters, 1948-1962, box 305, 12H P.U.S File: 18. Safeguards September-December 1960 [Part 2 of 3], B: Freedom of Information release; C: RG 59, Records of Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Atomic Energy and Outer Space, 1948-1961, box 501, Z1.50 Country File Israel f. Reactor 1960

Flying back to Ann Arbor on his way back from Israel, Professor Henry Gomberg, on the faculty of the University of Michigan’s nuclear engineering department, briefly stopped in Paris on 25 November and met with Roleau. As a guest of the Israeli Atomic Energy Commission and a consultant on matters of nuclear education, Gomberg had picked up some “urgent and secret” pieces of information — and suspicions — about the Israeli nuclear program that he wanted to share with U.S. government officials. He tantalized Rouleau by holding back what he had learned, but the little he said implied that Israel, with French aid, was engaged in some sort of a large scale secret nuclear power project. Gomberg also noted that he learned from an unnamed personal friend of Ben-Gurion [he probably meant Dr. Bergmann] that within a few weeks Israel would announce a five year [atomic energy] plan and would disclose the construction at the Beersheba site.

Several days later, on 1 December, Gomberg came to Washington for a full debriefing of AEC and State Department representatives. His name is redacted from this release of the memorandum of that conversation (declassified in the early 1990s) but it is evident that Gomberg was the subject of the debriefing. The same is true of the subsequent CIA report dated 9 February which also masked Gomberg’s identity. This document, apparently based on an interview at the time of Gomberg’s visit, contains detailed information, including his observations and tentative conclusions.

Based on various meetings in Israel, Gomberg became convinced that the large site the Israelis had described as an “agricultural experiment station” was actually a “large classified project.” It was evident to him that all his Israeli interlocutors were “thoroughly briefed to restrict their discussion within security bounds,” and yet his discussions at the Technion led him to believe that the Israelis were creating a much larger and more thorough nuclear training program than was needed by their own declared programs. He got a similar impression in his discussions at the Weizmann Institute (Plant [Machon] #4) where one person distressed his guide by mentioning that Plant [Machon] #4 was expected “to be working with gram quantities of Plutonium and curie quantities of polonium.” The plutonium issue was probably the most sensitive matter for the Israelis because of its weapons implications.

Gomberg concluded that the classified project was probably “a large nuclear and electrical power plant,” whose construction had been underway for some three years, located east of Beersheba. In another part of his report he described the reactor as “far beyond any kind of a training reactor and it will be capable of producing weapons grade plutonium.” Gomberg noted that he believed the Israelis had the technical capability to construct and operate a nuclear plant up to the level of 200 MW thermal. Then he estimated that the power level of the Beersheba project would be approximately 250 MW thermal. Later Gomberg noted that US photographs that were shown to him indicated a very close resemblance to the French G-1 reactor in Marcoule.

In his last meeting with Dr. Bergmann, Gomberg pressed him for information about “activities which were not freely discussed”; the latter acknowledged that the original intention was to announce the Beersheba facility later in 1961, but that because of the many rumors Ben-Gurion would make an announcement about a power reactor project in about three weeks time.


Document 7: The “Cover Story Would Not be Successful for Long”

Memorandum from Deputy Operations Coordinator Charles E. Rogers, Office of Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, to Mr. Jones and Mr. Farley, 7 December 1960, Secret

Source: RG 59, Records of Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Atomic Energy and Outer Space, Records Relating to Atomic Energy Matters, 1948-1962, box 501, CF 21.50 Israel F. Reactor 1960

While the U.S. intelligence community was finalizing its estimate of the secret Israeli reactor, senior officials had already discussed the problem and what to do about it at a luncheon meeting of the Operations Coordinating Board, which served as the coordinating and implementing unit for President Eisenhower’s National Security Council system. After Gordon Gray, the president’s national security assistant, opened the discussion, Deputy Under Secretary of State Livingston Merchant emphasized the subject’s “political sensitivity” and cautioned against any comments that cast doubt upon an anticipated Israeli announcement, even though it was generally agreed that the Israeli “cover story would not be successful for long.” This was probably a reference to the description of the plant as a “power reactor.” In the entire matter, “the Department of State would be the sole spokesman.” A skeptical reader, possibly Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs G. Lewis Jones, wrote “Ha!” next to the “sole spokesman” comment because Jones believed that too many other agencies “wanted to get into the act” (see Jones letter to Reid with Document 19 below).


Document 8: “Plutonium Production for Weapons Is At least One Major Purpose

Special National Intelligence Estimate Number 100-8-60, “Implications of the Acquisition by Israel of a Nuclear Weapons Capability,” 8 December 1960, with Memoranda to Holders Attached, 22 and 29 December 1960, attached, Secret, Excised copy

Source: MDR appeal to ISCAP, declassified in 2009, presently undergoing further review

On the basis of intelligence collected during the summer and fall of 1960 (of which much remains classified), possibly including the most recent information from Henry Gomberg, on 8 December 1958 Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles signed off on a Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE) entitled “Implications of the Acquisition by Israel of a Nuclear Weapons Capability.” The U.S. Intelligence Board, whose member agencies participated in the drafting process, concurred in the estimate that same day. The SNIE began with a firm factual determination that “Israel is engaged in construction of a nuclear reactor complex in the Negev near Beersheba.” Acknowledging that there could be various ways to interpret the function of the Dimona complex, the authors believed that “on the basis of all available evidence” that “plutonium production for weapons is at least one major purpose of this effort.” The “surrounding” secrecy and Dimona’s remote location was strong evidence of the military purposes. The SNIE estimated “that Israel will produce some weapons grade plutonium in 1963-64 and possibly as early as 1962.”

France’s extensive aid was noted but the exact nature of the assistance, including details on the reactor, and whether, and to what extent, the complex also included plutonium extraction (reprocessing), has been excised from this version of the SNIE. Also excised is the information mentioned in several subsequent updates (“Memorandum to Holders” on 22 and 29 December 1960). The Norwegian heavy water sale to Israel was noted — the CIA had discovered the purchase earlier in the year — but whether the State Department had rediscovered its documentation on the transaction by this point is not clear.

The SNIE also included a detailed discussion of the broader implications of the Dimona reactor: what it said about French and Israeli motivations, the possible reactions by the Arab world and the Soviet bloc, as well as the overall “repercussions” among western allies.

The SNIE became controversial as soon as it was published because senior intelligence officials were learning that the intelligence agencies and other U.S. government organizations had collected telling evidence several years earlier indicating that Israel had a secret nuclear reactor program under way. This recognition led to the production of an intelligence post-mortem to look at what had been missed and why (See Document 27A).


Document 9: Memorandum of Discussion at the 470th Meeting of the National Security Council, December 8, 1960, Top Secret, excised copy

Source: U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960 Volume XIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute; United Arab Republic; North Africa (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1992)

The day that the SNIE was issued, the National Security Council met, with Eisenhower presiding, and received a briefing on the estimate by Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles who passed around photos of Dimona taken by the U.S. Army attaché. Dulles began by noting that Israel was constructing, with French assistance, a nuclear complex in the Negev. The complex contained a reactor capable of “producing weapons-grade plutonium.” His initial statement included three more lines which are still classified. As to the French assistance, it included equipment, personnel and training, as well as “fuel elements.” Neither CIA nor the AEC believed, contrary to Israel’s anticipated statement that the project was “solely for peaceful purposes.” Secretary of State Herter noted that the Arab reaction to the discovery would be “severe.” (At that point four-and-a-half lines of Herter’s comment are classified.) He also claimed that the cost of the reactor might be 40 to 80 million dollars.

During the discussion of the nuclear proliferation implications of an Israeli weapons program, the conversation briefly turned to how the plant was financed. Under Secretary of the Treasury Fred Scribner suggested that an important funding source may have been “Jewish charitable organizations in the U.S.” which received tax-deductible contributions. This had caused past problems because some charitable funds had been “diverted to government operations in Israel.”

The still-classified portions of this meeting record are the subject of a mandatory declassification review request filed in 2014.


Document 10: “Considerable Weapons Potential”

Telephone Call Logs of Secretary of State Christian Herter, 9 December 1960, Unclassified

Source: Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Christian Herter Papers

On 9 December, Secretary of State Herter summoned Israeli ambassador Avraham Harman to the State Department and showed him photos of the Dimona reactor, asking for an explanation that would remove “bases for concern.” Harman said he knew nothing of the project but would inform his government. Later that afternoon, Herter called Claude Lebel, the chargé d’affaires at the French embassy, and asked about French involvement in the project. Herter prefaced his question by referring to a report he had received from his embassy in Tel Aviv that Prime Minister Ben-Gurion was about to announce that a new experimental reactor had been built in the Negev with French aid. Herter noted that, according to information the United States had ascertained, Israel had been involved since 1958 in constructing a reactor “which is at least ten times as large as claimed,” and that the design appeared to be not for power but for plutonium production, hence, it would provide Israel “considerable weapons potential.” Furthermore, Herter noted that the cost of the reactor was between 40 to 80 million dollars. Lebel had no information to offer and promised to pass the query on to Paris.


Document 11: “He Assumed the Money Came From” the United States

Paris Embassy Telegram CAHTO 4, 16 December 1960, Top Secret

Source: RG 59. Records of the Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Office of the Country Director for Israel and Arab-Israeli Affairs, Records Relating to Israel, 1964-1966, box 8, Israel Atomic Energy Program

A week later, Herter was in Paris for a NATO meeting where he met with his French counterpart, Foreign Minister Maurice Couve de Murville. The latter directly acknowledged the secret French-Israeli deal to build a “replica of [the] Marcoule plant.” Under the agreement, Couve de Murville added, France would supply the raw materials and receive any plutonium produced by the plant. The Israelis would not make any public statement without first consulting the French government. In reply to Herter’s question about how the plant was financed, Couve stated that he “assumed the money came from US.” Herter understood that comment to mean that the project was financed by the “diversion of US government or private [American] aid.”


Document 12: Meet the Press

Memorandum of Conversation, ” Suggested Guidance for Chairman McCone’s Use in ‘Meet the Press’ Interview December 18 If Asked About Reported Israeli Atomic Weapons Developments,” 17 December 1960, Secret

Source: Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Dwight D. Eisenhower Papers, White House Office, Office of the Staff Secretary, International Series, box 8, Israel (3):

With AEC Chairman John McCone slated to appear on “Meet the Press,” AEC and State Department officials met to develop an integrated approach to ensure that what he said comported with the government’s over-all position. The officials developed an approach that he could follow “with dignity” and not “be drawn into implications” that the U.S. was associated with an alleged Israeli nuclear weapons program. With respect to earlier press reports from London about an Israeli atomic bomb project, McCone would not comment. He could say that the U.S. opposed the proliferation of nuclear weapons capabilities, and that it was “firmly established policy” that “our law does not permit us to assist other countries to develop” such capabilities, If questioned, McCone could acknowledge U.S. support for Israeli research under the “Atoms for Peace” program.

In his comments on “Meet the Press,” McCone took his own approach; his main disclosure was an acknowledgement that the Israelis had not “revealed” the reactor to the U.S. He further stated that Washington was trying to get more information, that the existence of the reactor did not necessarily mean a bomb project, although the reactor could produce plutonium, and that Israeli compliance with IAEA safeguards would provide a good test case for inspection and “allay fear of weapons intent.”[16]


Documents 13A-B: “Israel Should Forthwith Open the Plants”

A: White House Office of the Staff Secretary, “Memorandum of Conference with the President December 19, 1960”, 12 January 1961, Secret, Excised Copy

B: Department of State, “U.S. Notes Reports of Israel’s Atomic Energy Activities,” 19 December 1961

Sources: A: Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Dwight D. Eisenhower Papers, White House Office, Office of the Staff Secretary, International Series, box 8, Israel (3); B: Department of State Bulletin, 9 January 1961, No. 1124, page 45.

With the Washington Post and the New York Times publishing stories about Dimona, partly based on leaks by John McCone,[17] President Eisenhower convened his top aides to discuss the Israeli reactor, how to respond to the publicity, and what kind of a public stance it was appropriate to take. This record of a meeting between Eisenhower and his closest advisers was probably not the president’s first discussion of the discovery of Dimona and its implications, but it was probably the highest level formal gathering and the most wide-ranging discussion. The conference record reveals some remarkable points:

  • Purpose of the Dimona Complex and Reliability of US knowledge : Secretary of Defense Thomas S. Gates pointed out that “our information is that the plant is not for peaceful uses.” The President’s science advisor, Dr. George Kistiakowsky, responded that “there is some doubt about this” because it is unclear whether a chemical separation is on site (or being constructed). AEC Chairman McCone responded that his people believed that “there is a chemical separation plant there.” He added that it would make no sense that the Israelis would do just “part of the job.” This issue, whether Dimona had or did not have a secret separation plant, would haunt the US intelligence community for at least a decade. In retrospect, Gates and McCone were right from the start.
  • Cost and US financial Involvement: McCone observed that the Dimona plant “had probably been financed from US support to Israel” and Herter supported the claim, adding that “it is clear that they [the Israelis] have constructed this plant through diversions from private and public [US] aid to Israel.” Eisenhower himself noted that “we had evidence” that the project cost was in a range between $100 and $200 million. (Incidentally, these figures are more than double the figure Herter cited at the National Security Council meeting a week earlier.) The president added, “we do not know where they have obtained the funds,” but the US government has a strong interest in knowing “because of the aid we are giving them.” Eisenhower’s remark is one of the rare mentions of a financial estimate for the Dimona project.
  • Inspection: When McCone urged that the U.S. insist the Dimona plant be under IAEA safeguards, Gates suggested that the Israelis be asked to open the plant for inspection because Israel had signed the agreement that established the IAEA. Eisenhower agreed: the US statement should express confidence that because Israel was an IAEA member and had claimed that the reactor was for peaceful uses, it should allow inspections. When national security assistant Gordon Gray asked whether the US would insist on visiting the site, Eisenhower replied that it would not be necessary if the US was successful in forcing IAEA inspections.
  • Intentions and Concealment: CIA Director Allen Dulles noted that Israel was trying to create confusion by associating the Dimona plant, “which is a large production installation,” with the very small Soreq reactor built with U.S. aid.

The meeting ended with the decision that Dimona should be handled by the Department of State, not the White House. Since the issue had emerged in the very last weeks of the Eisenhower presidency it was apparent the White House could not set a lasting policy but if any public statement was to be made it was to be coordinated with Herter. Nevertheless, for Eisenhower, the key objective was for the government of Israeli to accept IAEA inspections on the plant so that they could demonstrate its peaceful purposes.

During the meeting Herter had said that a U.S. statement should “remove [us] from suspicion” because Washington was not complicit in Dimona. Thus, the public statement made later that day noted the press reports about the reactor and “welcomed” Israel’s assurance that the government had “no intention of producing nuclear weapons.” The U.S. had provided no assistance because that would be contrary to U.S. nonproliferation policy and the Atomic Energy Act. The U.S. was concerned about the Israeli project and had asked Ambassador Harman for information. “A response has not been received.”


Document 14: State Department telegram 3311 to U.S. Embassy London, 20 December 1960, Secret

Source: Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Dwight D. Eisenhower Papers, White House Office, Office of the Staff Secretary, International Series, box 8, Israel (3)

On 20 December Herter met with Ambassador Harman for the second time to discuss Dimona. At this meeting Harman answered Herter’s earlier questions by providing a narrative that became Israel’s basic cover story: Yes, Israel was building an additional reactor in the Negev with 24 megawatt capacity, meaning, but it had “no industrial importance.” The purpose of the Dimona reactor was “the development of scientific knowledge for eventual industrial, agricultural, medical and other scientific purposes, as an interim step toward enabling Israel to build its own power reactors.” The project “would take some 3 to 4 years to complete and it would have no relationship to a weapons capacity.” Several times during the meeting Herter raised questions about safeguards and the plutonium that would be produced in the reactor; Harman could not answer them, but asserted that upon completion the facility would be open to students from “friendly counties” and that it was for peaceful purposes.


Document 15: “We have been misbehaving a little”

U.S. Embassy Tel Aviv telegram 574 to State Department, 23 December 1960, Secret

Source: National Archives, Record Group 469, U.S. Operations Mission to Israel, Executive Office Classified Central Files 1952-1961, box 10, Atomic Matters 1960

Far more candid than Harman was Addy Cohen, the Finance Ministry’s director of economic assistance; a graduate of Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service, he served as a liaison to the U.S. embassy. Classified in the State Department’s “Roger Channel” for sensitive intelligence, this surprising telegram memorialized several conversations on 21 and 22 December between Cohen and U.S. diplomats and foreign aid officials: Deputy Chief of Mission Murat Williams, Director of the U.S. Operations Mission [USOM][18] C. Reed Liggit, and Agricultural Attaché Grover Chappell. In these discussions Cohen gave the impression that the reactor would “eventually be used for weapons purposes,” which could offer a “‘deterrent’ to Arab action against Israel.” He volunteered that he had concealed the nature of the “top secret” project during several helicopter fly-bys with U.S. officials; during one of them’, in February 1960, he had characterized the reactor construction site as a “textile plant” because as he put it “that was our story at the time.” Admitting that the government of Israel had “been misbehaving a little,” Cohen thought that displeasure over the reactor might be the reason why Washington had delayed the signing of the PL 480 agreement (on food aid to Israel). Finally, commenting on a recent Jerusalem Post article claiming that 250 million Israeli pounds had been spent on the project, Cohen said that Israel had not “spent that much yet.”

Also according to this message, an unidentified official close to Prime Minister Ben-Gurion had told the Canadian ambassador that the secrecy was unjustifiable and that it was “a stupid mistake on the part of Israel.” As to why the subject had come up at this time, December 1960, the same source speculated that the CIA had been “caught off guard” in 1956 when Israel invaded the Sinai desert and this time “did not want to be caught napping.”


Document 16: “Why in [the United] States is Everything Being Told [to] Everybody?”

U.S. Embassy Israel Telegram 577 to State Department, 24 December 1960, Secret

Source: Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Dwight D. Eisenhower Papers, White House Office, Office of the Staff Secretary, International Series, box 8, Israel (3)

On 22 December Prime Minister Ben-Gurion gave a statement in the Knesset claiming the reactor was for peaceful purposes, a statement which the State Department welcomed.[19] Two days later, Ambassador Ogden Reid finally had a long discussion about Dimona with Ben-Gurion. The latter was plainly irritated about the questions and the press reports: “Why in [the] States is everything being told everybody?” He justified the secrecy because of the Arab boycott; the participating companies did not want their role disclosed so Israel had to protect their interests. Yet his account of the Dimona project consisted of the same story that he had told the Knesset (and the same story that he would use for his meeting with President Kennedy in late May 1961): the project was for the economic development of Israel and of the Negev in particular; electric power was a badly needed resource.[20]Yet when Reid asked if the reactor would be producing power, Ben-Gurion said no; it was for research and training.

On safeguards for plutonium, Ben-Gurion said that Israel was “three or four years” away from facing that problem. But, he declared: “When we get to that point we won’t be behind any power in the world in respect to safeguards.” A few weeks later, Ben-Gurion would take a different position (See Document 23).

Referring to Egyptian President Nasser’s declaration that an Israeli nuclear weapons program would mean war, Reid asked what Israel could do to alleviate those concerns; Ben-Gurion replied that the State Department’s statement welcoming the Israeli declarations, had been helpful.


Document 17: The Need for a Visit by “Internationally Known Scientists”

U.S. Embassy Israel Telegram 590 to State Department, 28 December 1960, Secret, excised copy

Source: Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Dwight D. Eisenhower Papers, White House Office, Office of the Staff Secretary, International Series, box 8, Israel (3)

Mulling over Ben-Gurion’s evasions, Ambassador Reid suggested to the Department some ideas for bringing up the question of safeguards and inspection with Foreign Minister Golda Meir. One was to suggest a visit of “IAEA scientific designee or internationally known scientists”; another, a more low key approach, was to use an AEC inspection visit to the smaller American reactor in Nachal Rubin [Soreq] to ask Israel to visit the new [Dimona] reactor. While doubting whether Ben-Gurion would favor any such proposals, Reid thought State should press Israel to request IAEA safeguards as a step toward “tranquility and peace” in the region. Getting Ben-Gurion to go along would probably require concerted action by the U.S., France, and the United Kingdom. The note included also the embassy’s own estimate of the cost of the Dimona project, which by then was the lowest of all the U.S. estimates: 17.8 million dollars in foreign exchange and some 29.2 million in local currency (Israeli pounds) costs. In comments, Reid noted that Israel would need to be assured that the names of foreign firms involved in the project would be protected from inspectors. Moreover, until the Department agreed, Reid suggested deferring a proposal by Chief of Naval Operations Arleigh Burke for a visit to Dimona by a Navy nuclear expert, Commander Ragnwald Muller, who was with the Office of Naval Intelligence in Frankfurt, West Germany.


Document 18: Israel had “By No Means Come Clean with Us”

Memorandum from Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Livingston Merchant to

Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs G. Lewis Jones, 28 December 1960, Secret

Source: RG 59, Records of Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Atomic Energy and Outer Space, Records Relating to Atomic Energy Matters, 1948-1962, box 501, CF 21.50 Israel F. Reactor 1960

Under Secretary of State Merchant briefed Assistant Secretary Lewis Jones about an Operations Coordinating Board [OCB] discussion of the Israel nuclear problem where Allen Dulles had grumbled that Israel had “by no means come clean with us.” The participants were also annoyed that the Development Loan Fund (DLF) had authorized a loan to Israel despite the OCB’s agreement that such action should be delayed. Eisenhower’s national security assistant, Gordon Gray, emphasized that the president wanted further efforts to secure Israel’s agreement to IAEA inspections. Such efforts, however, were not to reach the press and any initiative should be “conducted quietly through diplomatic channels.”


Document 19: “It Was Stupid of Them”

Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs G. Lewis Jones to Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Livingston Merchant, “Israel’s Atomic Energy Activities,” 30 December 1960, Secret, with attachments [Transcript of letter from Jones to Reid, 28 December 1960 attached]

Source: RG 59. Records of the Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Office of the Country Director for Israel and Arab-Israeli Affairs, Records Relating to Israel, 1964-1966, box 8, Israel Atomic Energy Program

Responding to Merchant’s request for an update on recent developments, Lewis Jones sent him documents relating to six different actions that various offices within the State Department were taking relating to the Israeli reactor, including his recent letter to Ambassador Reid and a message to the Embassy in Norway. In the letter, Jones let his hair down, writing about the “intemperate reaction” in Washington, which his bureau was trying to “calm down,” the “unnecessary Israeli caper;” the widespread impression that “the Israelis have inexcusably duped us;” the need for Israel to dispel doubts by letting U.S. scientists visit the site; and the possibility that the situation will “worsen” as suspicion grows. A briefing that Jones gave to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in early January conveyed a similar sense of being duped and the anger that influential members of the Senate felt about Israel’s secretiveness and evasive responses.

In the telegram to Oslo, the State Department asked the U.S. Embassy to seek further information on the Norwegian sale of heavy water to Israel and to ask that the government “exercise fully its safeguard rights” under the agreement. With the Norwegian heavy water sale being one of the pieces of the intelligence puzzle that Washington had missed, the administration was now investigating why, and what it had missed earlier.

Jones also enclosed a draft message to Ambassador Reid that had been prepared (not attached to this memo, but see Document 21) asking for replies to “unanswered questions” and to let Merchant know that other bureaus were preparing messages to get more information from the French and to advance the possibility of IAEA safeguards. Jones agreed with Merchant that what was most important was avoiding further publicity and the necessity for quiet diplomacy.


Document 20: “The Possibility of [It] Embarrassing the Government”

Letter from Richard Kerry, U.S. Embassy Oslo, to William Burdette, Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs, 30 December 1960, with Israeli-Norwegian agreement attached, with routine slip dated 6 January 1961

Source: RG 59, Records of Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Atomic Energy and Outer Space, 1948-1961, box 512, Z1.69 Country File Norway a. Norway-Israel Agreement 1961

In response to the State Department request, embassy officers in Oslo obtained more information on the Israel-Norway heavy water deal and the terms of the sale agreement, which included a “peaceful uses” stipulation. On 30 December, political officer Richard Kerry obtained a copy of the agreement which he believed could be embarrassing to the Norwegian government in light of its efforts to play the role of “honest broker” in international conflicts, including the Middle East. The agreement included an Israeli commitment that the use of the heavy water was for peaceful purposes, including an inspection clause.

According to Kerry’s letter, a major problem was that the heavy water sale had been initially treated as a commercial sale by the Norwegian firm NORATOM without appropriate vetting by political experts at the Foreign Ministry (like an earlier controversial sale of weapons to the Batista dictatorship in Cuba). Kerry asked the State Department to keep the transaction a secret and so it stayed until the late 1970s when the Stockholm Institute of Peace Research disclosed it. Kerry did not mention the British role in the affair and may, in fact, have forgotten it.[21]


Document 21: “Clearly Apparent Lack of Candor”

State Department telegram 502 to U.S. Embassy Tel Aviv, 31 December 1960, Secret

Source: Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Dwight D. Eisenhower Papers, White House Office, Office of the Staff Secretary, International Series, box 8, Israel (3)

This telegram, originally published in the FRUS in an excised version, showed how unhappy the State Department was with Ben-Gurion’s explanation of the Dimona reactor: his answers “appear evasive.” The State Department saw the “clearly apparent lack of candor [as] difficult to reconcile with [the] confidence which had traditionally characterized U.S.-Israel relations.” To restore confidence, Israel needed to answer questions about its plans to dispose of plutonium, the application of safeguards to plutonium produced, visits by IAEA or other scientists to the reactor site, and whether there were plans to build a third reactor. Moreover, “can Israel state unequivocally that it has no plans for producing nuclear weapons?”


Document 22: “Until All Reactors Are Treated as Equals”

Embassy Tel Aviv telegram 625, 4 January 1961, as summarized in a Chronology of Israel Assurances of Peaceful Use of Atomic Energy and Related Events,” enclosed with a “Memorandum from Benjamin Read, Executive Secretary, Department of State, for McGeorge Bundy, The White House, “Israel’s Assurances Concerning Use of Atomic Energy,” 18 March 1964, Secret, published as document number 9 in National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 432

In early January, Ambassador Reid had a meeting with Ben-Gurion, who provided answers to the State Department’s questions. The reporting telegram remains classified at the National Archives but a summary is available. The essence of the matter, according to Ben-Gurion, was that: 1) Israel “has no plans for producing nuclear weapons,” 2) Israel had no plutonium but “as far as we know” returning the plutonium produced by the reactor was a “condition” imposed by the country (France) that sold the uranium, 3) it would not accept IAEA inspection, especially if Russians were involved, or international safeguards “until all reactors are treated as equals,” 3) visits by representatives of “friendly powers” were possible, and 4) Israel had absolutely no plans for a third reactor. How State Department officials interpreted these statements remains unknown, but some may have seen the statement about nuclear weapons as equivocal and evasive.[22]


Document 23: “Damaging Air of Secrecy or Suspicions”

State Department telegram 2821 to U.S. Embassy Paris, 6 January 1961, Secret

Source: Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Dwight D. Eisenhower Papers, White House Office, Office of the Staff Secretary, International Series, box 8, Israel (3)

Believing that neither France nor Israel had been forthright and that the lack of candor had damaging implications for Middle East stability, Herter asked U.S. Ambassador Amory Houghton to meet with Couve de Murville and discuss his earlier statement about the French-Israeli nuclear project. If the Dimona project is a “large scale production reactor,” the French need to be “unequivocally clear that [their] assistance is directed solely to peaceful uses.” The reply to this telegram is not yet available, but the substance can be found in Document 26.


Documents 24A-B: Molotov: “I Stayed Awake All Night and Worried”

A: U.S. Mission to International Atomic Energy Agency (Vienna) telegram 1087 to State Department, 11 January 1961, Secret

B: State Department telegram 1194 to U.S. Mission to International Atomic Energy Agency (Vienna), 13 January 1961, Secret

Source for both: RG 59, Central Decimal Files 1960-1963, 398.1901-IAEA/1-1161

The U.S. Mission to the IAEA which had been in the forefront of U.S. efforts to develop an effective safeguards policy, asked for policy guidance if the Dimona issue came up for debate at the upcoming meeting of the Board of Governors. Ben-Gurion’s declaration to the Knesset that the reactor was for peaceful purposes was “hardly adequate” because the Mission had been at loggerheads with the Soviets and the Indians who had argued that assurances were the only safeguards that were needed. Recognizing that the Israeli situation would be used to support arguments for strong safeguards, Vayecheslav Molotov, one of the senior Soviet representatives to the Agency (and once Stalin’s right hand man) sarcastically commented that he had “stayed awake all night and worried” when he read about the Israel reactor program.

Following the approach recommended by Lewis Jones and others, the State Department advised the IAEA Mission of the importance of promoting a “period of calm.” In discussions in Vienna, the Mission should “avoid impugning” Israeli statements about peaceful purposes but also avoid a “whitewash” of the Israeli position. It was in the U.S. “interest” to send scientists to visit the reactor site and to get “first-hand information” but the Department noted that the Israelis have “reacted strongly” against any proposal for inspection and are not likely to change in the “immediate future.”


Document 25: “Some Israel[i] Evasions”

Murat W. Williams to William L. Hamilton, “A Catalog of Replies Regarding the Reactor,” 16 January 1961, Secret, with transcript attached

Source: RG 59, Records of Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Atomic Energy and Outer Space, 1948-1961, box 501, Z1.50 Country File Israel f. Reactor 1961, Part 1 of 2

On his way to an ambassadorship in El Salvador, Murat W. Williams, who had just left his post as deputy chief of mission at the Embassy in Tel Aviv, provided background on the various Israeli cover stories for the Dimona project. Apparently the most truthful response came from Minister of Development director general Eliezer Preminger who told Jack [John James] Haggerty, then the USOM director, that the site was a “military installation” and that he should ask the military attaché to look into it. Williams recounted the dissembling responses from Addy Cohen and other Israeli Foreign Liaison Officers [FLO] who, as noted elsewhere in this posting, had told Ambassador Reid and others that the construction site was for a textile factory, metallurgical research, meteorological installation, and part of a research program at a “new university.”


Document 26: “Israel Has No Plans for the Production of Atomic Weapons”

Letter, William B. McComber, Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Affairs, to James T. Ramey, Executive Director, Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy, 19 January 1961, Secret

Source: FOIA release

As the Eisenhower administration was winding down, the State Department submitted this comprehensive report (also published in the FRUS) to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy as a summary of all the information that the State Department had received officially from the Israeli and French governments in response to questions about the Dimona reactor. One must assume this body of information was used to brief the incoming Kennedy administration on what the Israelis and French had said on the record. Some of the answers may have been provided in response to the State Department telegram sent on 31 December (Document 21 above), for example, the statement that all plutonium to be produced in Dimona would be returned to France, and the ambiguous assurance that “Israel has no plans for the production of atomic weapons.” As for the French, they asserted that plutonium produced in the reactor would be returned to France, that France and Israel had agreed that the reactor was for “exclusively peaceful use,” and that French inspectors would be visiting the reactor. Oddly, what is missing is a claim, positive or negative, whether the complex actually included a chemical separation plant that could produce plutonium. Also, the financial estimate was a little different from that cited before (Document 13A).


Documents 27A-B: The Post-Mortem

A: U.S. Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee, “Post-Mortem on SNIE 100-8-60: Implications of the Acquisition by Israel of a Nuclear Weapons Capability,” 31 January 1961, Draft, Secret

B: Memorandum, Phillip Farley to Hugh Cumming, Director of Intelligence and Research, “Post-Mortem on SNIE 100-8-60,” 28 January 1961

Source: RG 59, Records of Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Atomic Energy and Outer Space, 1948-1961, box 501, Z1.50 Country File Israel f. Reactor 1961, Part 1 of 2

This “post-mortem” study on SNIE 100-8-60 is one of the most intriguing documents in this collection. Its aim was to explain why the US intelligence community had failed to detect in real time the Israeli nuclear project, and indeed how late it was in making that determination. The chronology, on pages 8 through 17, provides an account of what was known, and when, about the Israeli nuclear program, concluding that Washington might have seen through Israeli “secrecy or deception” and better understood Israeli intentions at least a year earlier if the “atomic energy intelligence community had properly interpreted” the available information. In essence, the overall conclusion was that the root cause of the delay was not so much the absence of information as that some important reports and items of information had been lost in the shuffle and the dots not properly connected.

As the classification of this document is only “secret,” and the document is relatively brief and deliberately vague about the intelligence means and sources employed in the final determination (e.g. it does not refer explicitly to the U-2 flights), it is possible that the intelligence community had more sensitive information that it excluded from this version of the post-mortem or that a more thorough report on the subject existed with higher classification.

[Note: Several of the documents reproduced above were first published 1998 in “Israel and the Bomb” edited by Avner Cohen.]

Thanks to Ori Rabinowitz (Tel Aviv University), Sharik Bashir (University of Michigan) and Alexandra Hale (George Washington University) for their assistance with this project.



[1] Shimon Peres, Battling for Peace: Memoirs, Edited by David Landau (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1995), 133-35.

[2] Avner Cohen, Israel and the Bomb (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 44-47, 50-52, 65, 81-82.

[3] Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, 49-55, 57-60.

[4] Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, 32-34, 60-62, 83, 87.

[5] Note by Avner Cohen: During interviews I conducted in the 1990s for Israel and the Bomb I heard from different people more conspiratorial explanations for the U.S. intelligence failure on Dimona. Some interviewees claimed that certain people in the U.S. intelligence community were sympathetic to the Israelis and deliberately concealed or bypassed certain information instead of passing it along. For example, the late John Hadden, the CIA station chief in Tel Aviv from 1964-68, held that view strongly. He asked me to treat his suspicions with discretion so I did not publicize them when he was alive. According to Seymour Hersh’s The Samson Option (New York: Random House, 1991), the AEC chairman, Lewis Strauss, “knew as much about Dimona as anybody in the intelligence community by the time he left the AEC in 1958. There is no evidence, however, that he raised questions about the Israeli weapons program while in government. He most certainly did not tell McCone about it.” (83, 90) There are others who also believed that senior officials of the Eisenhower administration, including President Eisenhower himself , had known about Dimona early on but decided not to interfere. According to Dino A. Brugioni, who served at the CIA Photographic Intelligence Center, when U-2 photos of the excavations of the Beersheba site were taken sometimes in early-mid 1958 the activity was determined to be a “probable” nuclear-related site. The photos were shown by the Center director, Arthur C. Lundah, to both President Eisenhower and AEC chair Lewis Strauss, but neither reacted. “Lundhal and Brugioni were left with the impression that Eisenhower wanted Israel to acquire nuclear weapons” (Israel and the Bomb, 83). The same anecdote appears in much greater detail in Hersh’s The Samson Option (50-59).

[6] Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, 90-95; Avner Cohen, The Worst-Kept Bargain (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), 60-62.

[7] Choosing this strategy created long-terms risks and problems as well. In essence, it made it much more difficult for Israel to extract any security benefits from, or for, the nuclear project, even if Israel was willing at some point in the future to trade the project’s products for other security benefits. For a more detailed analysis of this evasive disclosure strategy, see Cohen, The Worst-Kept Secret, 61-62.

[8] When we refer to intelligence community, we mean not only the CIA, but also intelligence offices of the Atomic Energy Commission, the Department of State, and the armed services, all of which played a role in colleting and/or analyzing information about Dimona.

[9] On the French-Israeli 1954 bilateral agreement of cooperation in the field of atomic energy, based on the Israeli patents, see Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, 32-34.

[10] Indeed, Bergmann and his IAEC were hardly consulted, let alone involved in the negotiations that Shimon Peres had conducted with the French. As became known years later, Peres, who was Dimona’s prime visionary and promoter, decided to compartmentalize and bypass Bergmann and the IAEC almost entirely about Dimona. In February 1958 all seven IAEC members except Bergmann resigned; the details of this incident remain obscure but it may have been a protest against the exclusion of the IAEC. There was even a time when Bergmann was not allowed to visit the Dimona site. See Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, 14-17, 67-71.

[11] Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, 16-17.

[12] For background, see Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, 60-62; Kristine Werdelin Bergan, editor, “The Norway-United Kingdom-Israel Heavy Water Deal, 1957-1959: New Translations from Norwegian Archives,” forthcoming electronic dossier for the Nuclear Proliferation International History Project.

[13] See “UK Helped Israel Get Nuclear Bomb,” BBC News, 4 August 2005; David Leigh, “US kept in the dark as secret nuclear deal was struck,” The Guardian, 3 August 2005; “Britain’s dirty secret: Exclusive – Secret papers show how Britain helped Israel make the A-bomb in the 1960s, ” The New Statesman, 13 March 2006. See also the Foreign Office Statement, 9 March 2006, BBC Two.

[14] Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, 62, 83.

[15] On the U-2 issue, Seymour Hersh provides a fascinating and persuasive account, but the recollections of key participants need to be supported by government records. See The Samson Option, at pages 50-58.

[16] Warren Kornberg, “Israel Reactor ‘Not Revealed to Us,’ Says McCone, Avoiding Word ‘Secret,'” The Washington Post, 19 December 1960. See also, Hersh, The Samson Option, 77.

[17] Ibid., 71-72, for McCone’s role in leaking to the New York Times.

[18] The U.S. Operations Mission managed U.S. foreign aid programs.

[19] “U.S. Welcomes Israel Promises on Reactor,” The Washington Post, 23 December 1960.

[20] Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, 92-93.

[21] In 1986, Norway asked Israel whether the heavy water had been used in ways that were consistent with the agreement’s “peaceful uses” conditions. See Charles R. Babcock, “Norway Eyes Israel’s Use of Nuclear Ingredient,”Washington Post, 10 November 1986.

[22] Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, 93-95.