Exposed – Russias Military Strategy in the New Millenium

Russia’s Military Strategy: Impacting 21st Century Reform and Geopolitics

Page Count: 460 pages
Date: 2015
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Originating Organization: U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, Foreign Military Studies Office
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Russia is a nation that has always been blessed with creative minds, whether it be literary giants like Fyodor Dostoyevsky and Leo Tolstoy, artists such as Peter Carl Faberge, composers such as Pyotr Tchaikovsky, or the military genius of an Aleksander Svechin or Aleksander Suvorov. Russia also has been blessed with the work of innovators in military equipment, such as Mikhail Kalashnikov, who created the world-renowned AK-47.

Today’s military innovators are the modern-day scientists and engineers who assist in the creation of contemporary and new concept weaponry; and the military theorists who study changes in the character of war. Digital specialists understand how to develop and employ the capabilities of electronic warfare equipment, satellite technology, and fiber optic cables. While Kalashnikov’s fame is imbedded in Russia’s culture, it may be harder to find a current digital entrepreneur whose legacy will endure as long as his: there are simply too many of them, and their time in the spotlight appears to be quite short, since even now we are about to pass from the age of cyber to that of quantum. It is difficult to predict whose discoveries will be the most coveted by tomorrow’s military-industrial complex, not to mention the decision-making apparatus of the Kremlin and General Staff. Military theorists are playing an important role as well. They are studying how new weaponry has changed the correlation of forces in the world, the nature of war, and the impact of weaponry on both forecasting and the initial period of war.

Russian Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov noted in March 2015 that the military’s main tasks are to maintain the combat readiness of the Armed Forces and to ensure the Russian Federation’s defensive capability. Russia’s military heritage will assist this process tremendously. Combat readiness includes updated strategic thought, new equipment revelations, and future-war projections. Defensive capability includes not just protecting Russia’s territory, but also the security of the nation’s national interests and conduct of geopolitics. Capturing the essence of these developments is the goal of this book. In the process a few templates for understanding Russian military thought and actions are offered for further consideration and use.

The work is divided into three parts. They address Russian methods of approaching strategy, future war (focusing on new weapons and organizations), and geopolitics. All three are important for foreign analysts to consider when attempting to predict the vector (s) in which Russian military capabilities and actions are heading. It is vital to remember that events that have transpired over the past 25 years have greatly affected Russia’s view of the world today and its strategic thought. Both the military and President Vladimir Putin’s colleagues in the Russian security complex are keen to overcome what they perceive as feelings of national humiliation and insecurity that they say were imposed upon them by the West.

Part One of this book contains three chapters. They are focused on the personality of President Vladimir Putin, the development of Russian strategic thought over the past several decades, and contemporary military thought on the use or non-use of force, to include how Russian military officers think. Chapter One provides details on how Putin thinks and how he has been affected by specific issues. Ideology, politics, and military issues affecting his decision-making are discussed. Included in the assessment are several thoughts from some US and Russian specialists with key insights into political thought in Moscow. Chapter Two represents a detailed look at the development of Soviet and now Russian military strategy. The chapter examines strategic thought from the time of Svechin to the present, highlighting, in particular, those elements of strategic thought that continue to influence how forces will be used even today. Chapter Three offers a look at how Russia utilizes indirect, asymmetric, and nonmilitary operations, as well as how this differs from most Western interpretations of the General Staff’s use of strategy. In particular, the chapter examines how Russian military officers think and offers commentary on cross-domain deterrence thinking in Russia, which is a topic usually discussed only as a nuclear issue. Here several other potential adaptations of deterrence theory are reviewed. The chapter offers a differing view than some on the issue of hybrid war as a Russian concept and ends with a look at Russian reflexive control theory.

Part Two examines Russia’s preparation for future wars. Included in the discussion are new military equipment and aerospace developments, future-war organizations, and digital expertise. Chapter Four deals with several new items of equipment that are now in the Russian inventory, including an extensive look at Russian unmanned aerial vehicles and electronic warfare equipment. Chapter Five is dedicated to the new Aerospace Force and the Strategic Rocket Forces. Defense Minister Sergey Shoygu has stated, “Their creation was prompted by a shift of the ‘center of gravity’ in combat struggle to the aerospace sphere.” The discussion includes the rationale behind Russia’s decision to integrate the Air Force, Air Defense Forces, and Space Forces into an Aerospace Force and to declare aerospace a new theater of military operations. The continued development of the Strategic Rocket Forces is covered, since it has found new impetus from the strategic guidance of President Putin. Chapter Six considers several organizational aspects of future-war thought, including equipment under development, organizational and doctrinal changes, and future-war thinking. Equipment under development includes robotics and laser research. Organizationally there is a look at Russia’s new science companies and the Advanced Research Foundation (the Russian military’s DARPA equivalent), followed by a summary of several articles discussing the future contours of conflict and the changing character or war. Chapter Seven discusses Russia’s cyber thinking and organizational development. This includes a review of a Russian-authored cyber book, recent cyber developments in Russia, treaties that Russia has made with other nations, and several policy efforts directed by the Kremlin and the Federal Security Service (FSB) to monitor cyber compliance. A section on military thinking on cyber issues is included, along with Russian efforts to control the international cyber environment. China is a main partner of Russia in this regard.

Part Three is an examination of the application of military power and strategy to Putin’s geopolitical goals, specifically as applied to military operations in the Arctic and Ukraine. Chapter Eight investigates the ongoing militarization of the Arctic. The two goals of the military in the region appear to be to establish an overarching monitoring capability and a quick response, powerful military deterrent. Russia has continued to improve its military presence and infrastructure in the region. The buildup includes two light brigades, two airborne divisions that are on-call, new Borei- and Yasen-class nuclear missile submarines, rebuilt airfields, and new aerospace defense units. Meanwhile, Russian administration officials are working feverishly with the United Nations and other organizations to establish legal claims to the Arctic. Putin has made the Arctic a region of his personal interest, noting that the Arctic has been under “our sovereignty for several years. This is how this will be in the future.” This does not bode well for the future of the Arctic’s peaceful development. Chapter Nine discusses how and why Russia became engaged in the conflict in Ukraine, to include the interventions into both Crimea and eastern Ukraine. Russia’s strategy and use of new concepts (new reality, self-determination, use of surrogates, nonmilitary issues, indirect and asymmetric thinking, etc.) are examined.


Virginia Police Domestic Terrorism and Extremist Groups Presentation


Domestic Terrorism and Extremist Groups

Page Count: 41 pages
Date: 2016
Restriction: Law Enforcement Sensitive
Originating Organization: Unknown
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File Size: 17,464,838 bytes
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Heroin and Fentanyl in the United States

Heroin and Fentanyl in the United States

Page Count: 22 pages
Date: November 2016
Restriction: None
Originating Organization: Drug Enforcement Administration
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File Size: 1,666,389 bytes
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Revealed – U.S. Army Commanders Guide to Human Intelligence (HUMINT)

Commanders Guide to Human Intelligence (HUMINT)

Page Count: 42 pages
Date: August 20, 2012
Restriction: For Official Use Only
Originating Organization: U.S. Army, Center for Army Lessons Learned
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Army commanders rely upon timely, relevant, and accurate combat information and intelligence in order to successfully plan, prepare, and execute operations. Human intelligence (HUMINT) and counterintelligence (CI) are two critical assets commanders have, either organic to their unit’s table of organization and equipment (TOE) or through attachment from a supporting command, which can provide input to both combat information and intelligence. While there are similarities between the methodology and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) used by HUMINT and CI, their training and missions are separate and distinct.

This publication serves as a guide to U.S. Army commanders with organic or attached HUMINT elements supporting their unit at the tactical level. This guide is designed to provide the supported commander with an understanding of the mission, capabilities, and effective employment of HUMINT personnel.


1-1. HUMINT collection capabilities include the ability to—

  • Collect information and cue from an almost endless variety of potential sources, including friendly forces, civilians, detainees, and source-related documents.
  • Focus on the collection of detailed information not available by other means. This includes information on threat intentions, and local civilian and threat force attitudes and morale. It also includes building interiors and facilities that cannot be collected on by other means due to restrictive terrain or environmental conditions.
  • Corroborate or refute information collected from other reconnaissance and surveillance assets.
  • Operate with minimal equipment and deploy in all operational environments in support of offensive, defensive, stability and reconstruction operations, or civil support operations. Based on solid planning and preparation, HUMINT collection can provide timely information if deployed forward in support of maneuver elements. Additional equipment and resources may be required for controlled source operations (CSO) due to mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations (mission variables) and operational environment considerations.


1-15. Some U.S. Army and MI leaders often misunderstand the differences between the HUMINT and CI disciplines or try to use the two interchangeably. While both disciplines utilize similar methodologies (talking to a human source) and TTP (used to collect and exploit the information), the overriding differences between the two collection activities are the type of information targeted and the objective of the collection. Both HUMINT and CI disciplines require specific training and certification criteria for those agents and collectors allowed to conduct these operations. Additionally, both disciplines have legal restrictions on who is authorized to conduct these operations, as well as when and where.


A-26. All U.S. Army commanders, especially commanders of MI units, must understand the capabilities and how to employ their HUMINT Soldiers to avoid misusing and wasting a valuable asset. HUMINT Soldiers are limited and valuable resources providing singular capabilities no one else can. The 2X can greatly assist the commander in understanding the full range of HUMINT capabilities and how to employ them in a manner which best assists the commander in obtaining PIRs, greater situational awareness, and a better understanding of the operational environment.

A-27. HUMINT collectors are Soldiers and are expected to conduct additional duties (for example, guard duty, escort duty, and others) like all unit Soldiers. However, HUMINT activities require significant time to establish and develop to fully support the commander. Even during times between significant operational activities (for example, patrols, raids, cordon and searches, and others), HCTs should be identifying and developing potential sources of information. The commander must balance assigning additional duties with their need for information to support current or future operations.

A-28. HUMINT collectors interact with and question other human beings and will often be a qualified linguist in the target area language. Based upon these skill sets, commanders may assign HUMINT collectors missions similar to activities often associated with civil affairs, MP, criminal investigative command, or interpreters or translators. However, this may be a misuse and potentially illegal. Requiring, or allowing, HUMINT collectors to perform functions outside their MOS can substantially degrade the HUMINT mission and the overall intelligence mission. This significantly reduces the amount of intelligence the commander receives and limits the commander’s situational awareness and situational understanding of the operational environment.

Summary of Report on Snowden Disclosures


Executive Summary of Review of the Unauthorized Disclosures of Former National Security Agency Contractor Edward Snowden

Page Count: 4 pages
Date: September 15, 2016
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Originating Organization: House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
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File Size: 764,355 bytes
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In June 2013, former National Security Agency (NSA) contractor Edward Snowden perpetrated the largest and most damaging public release of classified information in U.S. intelligence history. In August 2014, the Chairman and Ranking Member of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) directed Committee staff to carry out a comprehensive review of the unauthorized disclosures. The aim of the review was to allow the Committee to explain to other Members of Congress–and, where possible, the American people–how this breach occurred, what the U.S. Government knows about the man who committed it, and whether the security shortfalls it highlighted had been remedied.

Over the next two years, Committee staff requested hundreds of documents from the Intelligence Community (IC), participated in dozens of briefings and meetings with IC personnel, conducted several interviews with key individuals with knowledge of Snowden’s background and actions, and traveled to NSA Hawaii to visit Snowden’s last two work locations. The review focused on Snowden’s background, how he was able to remove more than 1.5 million classified documents from secure NSA networks, what the 1.5 million documents contained, and the damage their removal caused to national security.

The Committee,s review was careful not to disturb any criminal investigation or future prosecution of Snowden, who has remained in Russia since he fled there on June 23, 2013. Accordingly) the Committee did not interview individuals whom the Department of Justice identified as possible witnesses at Snowden’s trial, including Snowden himself, nor did the Committee request any matters that may have occurred before a grand jury. Instead, the IC provided the Committee with access to other individuals who possessed substantively similar knowledge as the possible witnesses. Similarly, rather than interview Snowden’s NSA coworkers and supervisors directly, Committee staff interviewed IC personnel who had reviewed reports of interviews with Snowden’s co-workers and supervisors. The Committee remains hopeful that Snowden will return to the United States to face justice.

The bulk of the Committee’s 36-page review, which includes 230 footnotes, must remain classified to avoid causing further harm to national security; however, the Committee has made a number of unclassified findings. These findings demonstrate that the public narrative popularized by Snowden and his allies is rife with falsehoods, exaggerations, and crucial omissions, a pattern that began before he stole 1.5 million sensitive documents.

First, Snowden caused tremendous damage to national security, and the vast majority of the documents he stole have nothing to do with programs impacting individual privacy interests-they instead pertain to military, defense? and intelligence programs of great interest to America,s adversaries. A review of the materials Snowden compromised makes clear that he handed over secrets that protect American troops overseas and secrets that provide vital defenses against terrorists and nation-states. Some of Snowden’s disclosures exacerbated and accelerated existing trends that diminished the IC’s capabilities to collect against legitimate foreign intelligence targets, while others resulted in the loss of intelligence streams that had saved American lives. Snowden insists he has not shared the full cache of 1.5 million classified documents with anyone; however, in June 2016, the deputy chairman of the Russian parliaments defense and security committee publicly conceded that “Snowden did share intelligence” with his government. Additionally, although Snowden’s professed objective may have been to inform the general public, the information he released is also available to Russian, Chinese, Iranian, and North Korean govemment intelligence services; any terrorist with Internet access; and many others who wish to do harm to the United States.

Counter-Da’esh Influence Operations Cognitive Space Narrative Simulation Insights

Counter-Da’esh Influence Operations Cognitive Space Narrative Simulation Insights

Page Count: 69 pages
Date: May 2016
Restriction: None
Originating Organization: Joint Staff J39
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File Size: 3,665,757 bytes
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When planning to deal with any adversary or potential adversaries, it is essential to understand who they are, how they function, their strengths and vulnerabilities, and why they oppose us. Events over the course of the last year and a half highlight the importance of those factors as they relate to the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL or Da’esh). One of Da’esh’s obvious strengths is its ability to propagate tailored messages that resonate with its audiences. If the US Government and our allies are to counter Da’esh effectively, we must attack this center of gravity.

The Joint Staff J-39 Strategic Multilayer Assessment (SMA) branch has been evaluating options in “Cognitive Space” to conduct Information Operations to disrupt Da’esh’s ability to command and control forces, neutralize its ability to maintain or increase moral, political, and financial support as well as recruit foreign fighters. This SMA effort continues to identify methods to psychologically isolate Da’esh leaders from one another and their respective constituencies inside and outside of the organization. Furthermore, this SMA effort has been assessing the value of “integrated neuro-cognitive-narrative maneuver” approaches to develop messages and actions that are more likely to have intended effects and less likely to have undesirable unintended or collateral effects, as well as to evaluate message delivery methods more effectively and efficiently by developing campaigns that achieve undercutting effects.

The cornerstone of the effort was the execution of a simulation facilitated by the University of Maryland ICONS team, which sought to

a. support the Psychological Operations (PSYOP) community in meeting training requirements in ways that reinforce the PSYOP process and enhance counter-Da’esh messaging.

b. support the PSYOP community in integrating neuro-cognitive and social science concepts to refine counter-Da’esh message content and increase the effectiveness of the Information Operations (IO) campaign.

c. assist the PSYOP community with understanding the operational environment (OE) and the human networks operating in the OE: friendly, threat, and neutral. Possible examples include providing a (Political, Military, Economic, Social, Information, and Infrastructure) PMESII-framed OE analysis and center of gravity analysis.

This white paper is a compilation of the key findings from the simulation.


Homegrown Terrorists Increasingly Prioritizing Civilian Targets

A graph showing

A chart from the August 2016 bulletin issued by the Department of Homeland Security, FBI, and National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) shows the increasing number of plots focusing on civilian targets.

A joint intelligence bulletin issued in late August by the Department of Homeland Security, FBI, and National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) assesses that homegrown violent extremists (HVEs) are “increasingly favoring civilian targets” as part of a wider “variety of targeting choices.”  Previous assessments have found that HVEs are most likely to prioritize attacks on “law enforcement personnel, military members, and US Government-associated targets.”  However, a recent shift towards civilian targets has likely been driven by the accessibility of “soft targets” that are often less secure than government facilities and provide greater opportunities for conducting mass casualty attacks.

Over the last year, seventy-seven percent of the “thirteen HVE attacks and disruptions . . . focused on civilian targets, in contrast to eleven percent of the eighteen HVE attacks and disruptions in the first seven months of 2015.”  Three separate HVE plots in 2016 targeted religious institutions, the “first such cases since a 2009 plot against a New York-based synagogue” according to the bulletin.  Since 2015, HVEs have “plotted against or attacked restaurants, a nightclub, a concert, a public ceremony, a place of employment, and a college classroom, demonstrating the variety of targeting choices.”  The bulletin was issued prior to the recent bombings in New York and New Jersey which also targeted civilian locations including a train station, charity race, and numerous public streets.

The bulletin states that a combination of factors ranging from “perceived lower levels of security” as well as “violent extremist messaging glorifying recent attacks on civilians” have motivated this shift in tactics.  The bulletin also highlights a newer trend which has led HVEs to select “familiar targets of personal significance to simplify plotting,” often capitalizing on preexisting grievances or a desire for revenge.  This is particularly relevant to cases such as the December 2015 attack on the Inland Regional Center in San Bernardino, during which Syed Rizwan Farook and his wife Tashfeen Malik killed fourteen people at a training event and Christmas Party hosted by the San Bernardino County Department of Public Health.  Farook, who worked for the county as a health inspector, had been attending the event earlier in the day prior to conducting the attack.  In another example cited in the bulletin, an eighteen-year-old freshman at the University of California at Merced named Faisal Mohammad stabbed a classmate and three other individuals at the college before being shot by a campus police officer.  The FBI later stated that Mohammad had been viewing extremist material online and they believe the attack was inspired by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).

To help prevent HVE attacks, the bulletin recommends that state and local authorities be vigilant and “report suspicious activities related to potential mobilization to violence in the Homeland by US-based individuals inspired by foreign terrorist organizations.”