SEYMOUR M. HERSH – THE INTELLIGENCE GAP


29 November 1999. Thanks to The New Yorker and SH.
Source: Hardcopy The New Yorker, December 6, 1999, pp. 58-76.


ANNALS OF NATIONAL SECURITY
___________________

THE INTELLIGENCE GAP

How the digital age left our spies out in the cold.

BY SEYMOUR M. HERSH

THE National Security Agency, whose Cold War research into code breaking and electronic eavesdropping spurred the American computer revolution, has become a victim of the high-tech world it helped to create. Through mismanagement, arrogance, and fear of the unknown, the senior military and civilian bureaucrats who work at the agency’s headquarters, in suburban Fort Meade, Maryland, have failed to prepare fully for today’s high-volume flow of E-mail and fibre-optic transmissions — even as nations throughout Europe, Asia, and the Third World have begun exchanging diplomatic and national-security messages encrypted in unbreakable digital code.

The N.S.A.’s failures don’t make the headlines. In May, 1998, India’s first round of nuclear tests, which took place in Pokharan, southwest of New Delhi, caught Washington by surprise, and provoked criticism of the Central Intelligence Agency from the press and from Congress. But it was the N.S.A., in the days and weeks before the detonations, that did not detect signs of increased activity or increased communications at Pokharan. “It’s a tough problem,” one nuclear-intelligence expert told me, because India’s nuclear-weapons establishment now sends encrypted digital messages by satellite, using small dishes that bounce signals beyond the stratosphere through a system known as VSAT (“very small aperture terminal”) — a two-way version of the system widely used for DirecTV.

Similarly, the North Koreans, with the help of funds from the United Nations, according to one United States intelligence official, have bought encrypted cell phones from Europe, high-speed switching gear from Britain, and up-to-date dialling service from America — a system that the N.S.A. cannot readily read. The official said of the North Koreans,”All their military stuff went off ether into fibre” — from high-frequency radio transmission to fibre-optic cable lines, which transmit a vast volume of digital data as a stream of light. A former high-level Defense Department official told me, “It’s a worldwide problem. You could wire up all of Africa for less than two billion dollars.” This former official, like most of the two dozen signals-intelligence (SIGINT) experts interviewed for this account, agreed to speak only after being assured of anonymity. A 1951 federal law prohibits any discussion or publication of communications intelligence.

The decline of the N.S.A. is widely known in Washington’s national-security community. “The dirty little secret is that fibre optics and encryption are kicking Fort Meade in the nuts,” a recently retired senior officer in the C.I.A.’s Directorate of Operations told me. “It’s over. Everywhere I went in the Third World, I wanted to have someone named Ahmed, a backhoe driver, on the payroll. And I wanted to know where the fibre-optic cable was hidden. In a crisis, I wanted Ahmed to go and break up the cable, and force them up in the air” — that is, force communications to be broadcast by radio signals. The number of daily satellite-telephone calls in the Arab world, many of which are encrypted, is in the millions, creating severe difficulties for eavesdroppers. The mobile-telephone system used by Saddam Hussein at the height of Iraq’s dispute last year with a United Nations arms-control inspection team operated on more than nine hundred channels. Each channel was separately encrypted, with multiple keys, and Saddam’s conversations bounced from channel to channel with each call. A U.N. intelligence team eventually gained access to the telephone system’s technical manuals and other data, and was able to record the encrypted conversations, but without these materials it could not have made sense of the intercepts. The code-makers are leaving the code-breakers far behind.

IN its heyday, during the Cold War, the N.S.A. had nearly ninety-five thousand employees, more than half of them military, monitoring communications from hundreds of sites around the world. It played a dominant role in American intelligence gathering behind the Iron Curtain and elsewhere, producing by the end of the nineteen-sixties more than a thousand intelligence reports a day. The N.S.A.’s intercepts were the government’s most reliable and important sources of intelligence on the Soviet Union — far outstripping the intelligence collected by the C.I.A. and its agents abroad. In Western Europe, N.S.A. linguists and Army G.I.s sat in unmarked vans monitoring the daily conversations of Soviet tank units on the other side of the Berlin Wall. In the Pacific, Air Force radiomen and N.S.A. technicians, in specially configured Boeing 707s, flew huge figure eights over the ocean, copying Morse-code transmissions from North Korea and the Soviet Far East. In the Mediterranean, Navy signalmen worked hectic shifts with their N.S.A. colleagues, eavesdropping on government communications in the Middle East. Many of the most sophisticated Soviet codes were broken, including the diplomatic traffic to Moscow from its Embassy in Washington. By the time President Nixon was in office, the agency was listening to telephone conversations of Soviet leaders as they were driven in limousines to and from the Kremlin. In the upper reaches of the United States government, access to the agency’s daily top-secret “take” was a sign of importance and success. Henry A. Kissinger, Nixon’s national-security adviser, went as far as to order the agency to scan the diplomatic traffic from Washington, isolate references to him, and deliver the cables to his office, without any further distribution inside the government. Many of his successors have received the same service.

These successes were the payoff for years of painstaking technical research. In the nineteen-fifties and sixties, the N.S.A.’s engineers, working closely with the American computer industry, coordinated and financed much of the early work in telecommunications, underwriting research on semiconductors, high-speed circuitry, and transistorized computers. With its research into microelectronics, the agency also helped to develop the early guidance systems for intercontinental ballistic nuclear missiles. And the agency’s team of mathematicians — aided by outside advisers, many of whom were tenured at places such as Harvard, Dartmouth, and Princeton — steadily tore through the Soviet cipher systems.

By the mid-seventies, as the world began routinely communicating by microwave, the agency maintained its edge with innovative use of satellite intelligence, and its mathematicians and computer experts were sometimes able to thwart the Russians’ attempts to scramble their signals. Even undersea and underground coaxial cables — the most secure means then of relaying telephone conversations and electronic communications — could be intercepted. Books and newspaper articles have described the penetration of Soviet cables at sea by N.S.A. units aboard Navy submarines as some of the most daring intelligence operations of the Cold War.

The collapse of Communism, in 1989, and the collapse of the Soviet Union, in 1991, led to a revised mission for the N.S.A., with more focus on international terrorism and drug dealing — both highly elusive targets. The agency’s budget was cut back. In the early nineties, as more nations turned to fibre optics, the N.S.A. shut down twenty of its forty-two radio listening posts around the world. (In some cases, equipment was left behind to be monitored remotely.) The agency’s overseas military personnel have been reduced by half.

The N.S.A.’s status within the government has also been diminished. Last year, Richard Lardner, a reporter for the Washington newsletter Inside the Pentagon, revealed that the agency had been “reined in” and would no longer be authorized to report directly to the Secretary of Defense. The N.S.A. was ordered instead to report through an Assistant Secretary. In recent years, according to a congressional study, the N.S.A.’s contribution to the President’s daily intelligence brief — a secret summary prepared at the C.I.A. every morning for the White House — has fallen by nearly twenty per cent. The N.S.A. was being jarred by the difficulties of tracking terrorism, and by the rapid spread of unbreakable codes. The agency also discovered that it had few advocates in the White House and among those officials at the Office of Management and Budget who control the flow of money to the top-secret world. The agency was not allowed to keep the funds it had saved by reducing manpower and drastically cutting overseas stations.

The N.S.A. is also getting very little help from its colleagues in the American intelligence community. One legislative aide told me that George Tenet, the director of Central Intelligence, who has nominal responsibility for all intelligence gathering, had expressed alarm upon taking office about the N.S.A.’s weakness, and told congressmen of his desire to rescue the agency from what appeared to be a “precipitous calamity.” But, the aide added,” he didn’t do it.”

The N.S.A.’s strongest supporters — the members and staffs of the Senate and House intelligence committees — are also its most vocal critics. The agency is now facing the most caustic congressional scrutiny in its history, amid much pessimism that it can right itself without major changes in its management. Staff members of the intelligence-oversight committees traditionally prefer not to be quoted by name, but John Millis, a former C.I.A. officer who is staff director of the House intelligence committee, openly discussed the N.S.A.’s problems in the fall of 1998 at a luncheon meeting with a group of retired C.I.A. officers. “Signals intelligence is in a crisis,” Millis told his former colleagues, who reprinted the speech in a newsletter. “We have been living in the glory days of SIGINT over the last fifty years, since World War II.” He went on, “Technology has been the friend of the N.S.A., but in the last four or five years technology has moved from being the friend to being the enemy.” Millis also made it clear that any significant increase in the agency’s budget was made more difficult by the fact that”there is no management of the intelligence community. There is no one in a position to make the tradeoffs within the intelligence community that will make a coherent, efficient organization that will function as a whole. So we end up doing it on Capitol Hill. And I’ve got to tell you, if you are depending on Capitol Hill to do something as important as this, you’re in trouble.”

SENATOR ROBERT KERREY, of Nebraska, the ranking Democrat on the Senate’s intelligence committee, told me that there was little he could add to Millis’s assessment, because most information dealing with the agency and its work is highly classified. Kerrey also pointed out that secrecy “does not equal security,” and can be self-defeating. For example, the agency is in desperate need of more money to get started on information-retrieval programs for the Internet which should have been under way years ago. “But I can’t tell you how much they need,” Kerrey said, “and I can’t tell you how much they have. The public doesn’t know about the N.S.A., or what it is. There are no editorials in the New York Times, no advocates. Does the public know that the nation might be more secure if more was invested? Out of sight, out of mind.”

Last July, during a little-noticed Senate colloquy on an intelligence-spending bill, Kerrey hinted at the N.S.A.’s problems. “The signals are becoming more complex and difficult to process,” he said. “And they are becoming more and more encrypted.” Because of the sophistication of current encryption systems for E-mail and other communications,” he said, “we will find our people on the intelligence side coming back and saying, ‘Look, I know something bad happened . . . I couldn’t make sense of the signal. We intercept, and all we get is a buzz and background noise. We cannot interpret. We can’t convert it.’ “

Kerrey says that his concern was heightened by a report on the N.S.A. that was filed last year by an unusual study group that he and Senator Richard C. Shelby, Republican of Alabama and the committee’s chairman, had put together. Secret congressional studies are routine, but the Senate team, known as the Technical Advisory Group, included a number of prominent outsiders — men who were in charge of re search and technology for major American high-tech corporations, such as George Spix, of Microsoft, Bran Ferren, of the Walt Disney Company, and a nuclear-weapons physicist, Dr. Lowell Wood, of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. The outsiders were given full clearance and access to many of the most sensitive areas at the Fort Meade headquarters. Their conclusions were devastating. “We told them that unless you totally change your intelligence-collection systems you will go deaf,” one involved official told me. “You’ve got ten years.”

The advisory group put much of the blame for the agency’s problems on the stagnation and rigidity of the senior civilian management. “The N.S.A.’s party line to Congress is ‘We’re fine. We don’t need to change,’ ” the official told me. “It’s like a real Communist organization. Free thought is not encouraged” among the managers. Referring to the senior bureaucracy, the official said that the agency would “have to fire almost everyone.” This official and others singled out Barbara A. McNamara, the current N.S.A. deputy director, as someone especially resistant to change. “She’s leading a cohort of thirty-year veterans who go back to radio” — a reference to high-frequency radio transmissions — “and think nothing is needed,” the official said. In secret testimony this fall before Congress, he added, McNamara talked about “how good the N.S.A. is — how it caught this and that drug guy. They got a whole bunch of horseshit from Barbara.”

In subsequent interviews, many former N.S.A. managers endorsed the advisory group’s findings. One former official described the civilian leadership as “a self-licking ice-cream cone,” with little tolerance for dissent or information it did not wish to hear. “If you didn’t support their position, you weren’t considered a team player,” this person told me. “You couldn’t go into a meeting, put your best ideas on the table, have it out, get the best idea, and then go have a beer.” McNamara’s authority stems from her longevity: the admirals and generals who serve the agency director remain on the job for an average of three years before retiring or going on to other military assignments. The agency’s top civilians have worked together, in many cases, for nearly thirty years, and inevitably share the same insular points of view. Another recently retired official told me that the N.S.A. has become a dynastic bureaucracy, in which the fathers have made room for their sons, with the wives and mothers of favored employees hired as mid-level staff in the human-resources office. “The place is full of warlords and fiefdoms,” the former official said. “Now we’re getting to the grandchildren.” Such insider hiring has led to the quip, which I heard from a number of officials, that the N.S.A. functions as a “Glen Burnie W.P.A. project.” Glen Burnie is a nearby suburb, and home to many N.S.A. employees. Questions also were raised during my interviews about the effectiveness of many of the senior military officers who are routinely assigned to the N.S.A. for two-, three-, or four-year tours of duty. Some perform brilliantly, but far too many find themselves put in charge of units for which they are unqualified, and end up relying extensively on their civilian staffs. “We call them the summer help,” a former manager told me, adding that the smart ones generally seek to get reassigned as soon as possible.

The Technical Advisory Group urged that the agency immediately begin a major reorganization, and start planning for the recruitment of several thousand skilled computer scientists. One of their missions would be to devise software and write information-retrieval programs that would enable the agency to make sense of the data routinely sucked up by satellite and other interception devices. The vast majority of telephone calls, E-mails, and faxes are not encrypted — almost all are sent as plain text — but the N.S.A. has been overwhelmed by the sheer volume of the intercepted data, much of which is irrelevant. “They’re still collecting a lot of digital,” one of the agency’s consultants told me,”and can’t do anything with it.” The consultant added that agency managers recently estimated that Fort Meade had three years’ worth of storage capacity for intercepted Internet traffic. “They filled it in eleven months,” he said.

“The bottom line is they’ve got to retool,” the advisory-group official said. “It will take a lot of money and effort — like starting the N.S.A. again.” Far from being able to retool, the agency has suffered a severe brain drain in recent years, losing mid-career managers to the high pay and upward mobility of private industry. One former senior official described the process as self-defeating: the agency’s recognized need for more outside contact with, and stimulation by, the computer world is offset by the fact that its budding young experts “meet new people and then get hired away by them.”

THE N.S.A.’s current alienation from the computer gurus in industry and academia might not have occurred if two Californians with a fascination for the mathematics of cryptoanalysis hadn’t decided to compare notes more than two decades ago. A 1951 law gave the government the right to classify as secret any invention considered potentially harmful to national security, but in November, 1976, Whitfield Diffie, a computer scientist, and Martin E. Hellman, a Stanford University electrical engineer, published a revolutionary technical paper on what has become known as public key cryptography Before their work, an encrypted message could be understood only if the sender and receiver had the same key, or decoder, to turn the scrambled letters into readable text. The beauty of the Diffie-Hellman breakthrough was its simplicity: the message would have two keys — one could be registered in a public directory (today it might be on the Internet) and the other would be known only to the intended recipient. One key would be used to encipher the message and the other to decipher it. A senior N.S.A. official has described the Diffie-Hellman concept as a series of computations that are easy to do but hard to reverse, like breaking a window.

To the agency’s dismay, the world now had access to a sophisticated level of cryptography that had not been previously fully understood even by N.S.A. analysts. In 1978, when George I. Davida, a computer scientist at the University of Wisconsin, tried to patent an encryption device he had invented, the N.S.A. invoked the 1951 secrecy law. Davida took his case to the media, and the agency, prodded by attorneys in the Carter Administration, eventually backed down, but the message was clear — the agency would do all it could to prevent public access to encryption techniques.

By the early nineties, the telephone system had been deregulated, the computer market was booming, and the Internet was beginning its ride, but the N.S.A.’s policy remained static: encryption was defined as a a weapons system whose export was controlled by the government. The debate over encryption was now a public controversy, with the government arrayed against privacy advocates, academics, and a computer industry that was bemoaning the annual loss of billions of dollars to foreign manufacturers whose computers included high-powered encryption.

In 1993, law-enforcement officials further infuriated the computer industry by beginning a criminal investigation of Philip R. Zimmermann, a software engineer then living in Boulder, Colorado. Zimmermann’s crime was being a free-spirited hacker; he cobbled together a cryptography program called P.G.P. — for Pretty Good Privacy — and gave it away. P.G.P. was the agency’s nightmare — it offered the average computer user a nontechnical and nonthreatening entry into easy, daily use of cryptography. P.G.P. soon found its way to the Internet, and it quickly spread around the world — making Zimmermann, in the government’s view, an exporter of munitions. A grand jury inquiry began. The computer industry rallied around Zimmermann, and after three years the case was dropped. Zimmermann eventually explained to a Senate committee, “I wrote P.G.P. from information in the open literature…. This technology belongs to everybody.” By the mid-nineteen-nineties, the Software Publishers Association was telling journalists that the number of cryptographic products being sold by foreign companies had reached three hundred and forty.

President Clinton and his senior advisers, under pressure from the law-enforcement and national-security communities, tried to compromise on the issue. The export of encryption for computers could go forward, the government said, if the industry agreed to install a government-approved encryption chip, known as the Clipper Chip, that could be directly accessed by law-enforcement officers. Under another proposal, American computer manufacturers would have been permitted to export new encryption products if a spare set of decoding keys were accessible to the government. The proposals, known as key recovery or key escrow, were assailed by privacy proponents, who demanded to know whether the Clinton Administration would have dared to advocate that citizens be required to give the keys to their house or safety-deposit box to a third person.

The cultural divide between Fort Meade and Silicon Valley was widening. The agency’s senior managers were unable to comprehend what every programmer and researcher in academia and industry intuitively understood: encryption could not be stopped. The managers had ample warning. In 1991, a secret study predicted that the use of encryption would grow exponentially — a prediction largely ignored by the agency’s senior management. A former N.S.A. director recalled that in the early nineties he had had a series of conversations with the civilian managers, urging them not to insist on their version of key recovery. “I couldn’t believe their proposals,” he said, adding that he had warned the managers that, given the public’s attitude toward privacy, key recovery “could not work if the government held the key. They were so arrogant. They knew all there was to know.”

“Export control is a legitimate concern to the agency,” one former senior official told me, but the issue made the top managers “paralyzed and afraid to move into the future.” He and many colleagues had argued for a two-prong approach — continuing to do all that was possible to maintain export controls while also planning for a fully encrypted world. The agency’s long fight against encryption delayed its widespread use by many years, but the agency’s senior managers spent those years “holding on to what we have today” instead of seeking ways to lessen encryption’s impact. The official lamented, “We were squandering time” while continuing to make more enemies inside the computer industry.

Today, the encryption fight is all but over. The Commerce Department is scheduled to issue new export regulations on December 15th that, many experts believe, will permit American computer companies to include advanced cryptography, with fewer restrictions, on equipment sold worldwide. “We’ve won,” Phil Zimmermann told me, jubilantly. “And they tried to put me in prison! Now we can export strong crypto and they can’t stop us. We can do whatever we wish.”

N.S.A.’s short-term solution to the encryption dilemma has been to urge the C.I.A. to go back to the world of dirty tricks and surreptitious entry. According to a 1996 congressional staff study, the next century will require a clandestine agency that “breaks into or otherwise gains access to the contents of secured facilities, safes and computers” and “steals, compromises and influences foreign cryptographic capabilities so as to make them exploitable” by the N.S.A.

Such information theoretically could help Washington policymakers disrupt future terrorist activity, intercept illicit shipments of nuclear arms, or uncover acts of espionage against American defense corporations. Unfortunately, several C.I.A. officers I spoke with found the proposal too ambitious. One retired case officer told me that while he was on a clandestine assignment years ago in the Third World, “I was designated to get a certain black box. I worked on it for three and a half years, and I got nowhere. If I had worked on it for ten years, and with a true stroke of luck, I might have gotten within ten feet of it.” Another retired operations officer, similarly skeptical of the C.I.A.’s chances of obtaining cryptological intelligence, told me that sometimes the clandestine operatives in the field have to report back, “This is too hard. “

Many Americans, of course, are deeply distrustful of the N.S.A. — a view reflected in recent Hollywood movies like “Enemy of the State” and “Mercury Rising.” The traditional American belief in privacy and constitutional protection is at odds with a superspy agency capable of monitoring unencrypted telephone conversations and E-mail exchanges anywhere in the world. Abuses have occurred. In the nineteen-seventies, the Senate intelligence committee revealed that the agency had systematically violated the law by surveilling American citizens, including more than twelve hundred anti-war and civil-rights activists. The revelations led to a public outcry and to the 1978 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, which made monitoring of American targets illegal without a warrant from a special federal court. (The court rarely turns down such requests from the government.) The act, and a supporting executive order, set rules for the handling of intercepts or other intelligence involving Americans who were overheard or picked up in the course of legitimate foreign surveillance.

The N.S.A.’s bitter fight over encryption, with its tell-all computer chips and key-recovery proposals, has renewed long-standing fears that one of the agency’s satellite-data collection programs, code-named ECHELON, is routinely collecting and analyzing unencrypted telephone conversations and Internet chatter around the world. ECHELON was launched, in the mid-nineteen-seventies, to spy on Soviet satellite communications. “Imagine,” the BBC exclaimed last month — one of hundreds of such reports in the past ten years — “a global spying network that can eavesdrop on every single phone call, fax, or E-mail, anywhere on the planet. It sounds like science fiction, but it’s true.” The agency does routinely collect vast amounts of digital data, and it is capable of targeting an individual telephone line or computer terminal in many places around the world. But active and retired N.S.A. officials have repeatedly told me that the agency does not yet have the software to make sense out of more than a tiny fraction of the huge array of random communications that are collected. If the agency were able to filter through the traffic, the officials noted, international terrorists like Osama bin Laden would not be able to remain in hiding.

The fact is that ECHELON, far from being one of the N.S.A.’s secret weapons, as some believe, is viewed as a fiscal black hole by the Senate and House intelligence committees. John Millis, in his private talk to the retired C.I.A agents, complained that the United States was spending “incredible amounts of money” on satellite collection. “It threatens to overwhelm the intelligence budget.” Using satellites to sweep up communications indiscriminately, he said, “doesn’t make a lot of sense…. You shouldn’t be spending one more dollar than we do to try and intercept communications from space.” Millis’s point was that the data collected from satellites, like the data collected from the Internet, cannot be sorted or analyzed in any meaningful way.

THE agency’s critics, in and out of the government, told me that they see a glimmer of hope for the N.S.A. in the appointment, last May, of Lieutenant General Michael Hayden as its new director. Hayden, who joined the Air Force after earning a master’s degree in American history at Duquesne University, in Pittsburgh, has been praised for his intelligence and open-mindedness. “Hayden gets it,” one intelligence-committee aide told me. “But he’s parachuted in there, and faced with a deputy director whose job is to foil what the director wants to do. There’s no question that it’s the hardest job in the intelligence community. He’s got to manage a multibillion-dollar corporation that has a blue-collar mentality.”

General Hayden’s initial goal will be to convince Congress and the White House that he can do what his predecessors did not — develop a specific management plan and a budget for analyzing intelligence from the Internet and other digital sources. “We’ve criticized the N.S.A. for not having a well-coordinated strategy,” one legislative aide told me, “but we’re not in a position to tell them where to go.” The issues, of course, are highly technical, and it’s not clear that more money — even billions of dollars — will get the job done. The amount of data flowing through the Internet is growing exponentially, and skilled computer scientists are at a premium. The agency’s war against encryption has left a legacy of bitterness throughout the computer industry, and today’s technical advances are taking place not at Fort Meade but on university campuses and in corporation laboratories across America. Those computer whizzes who might have been attracted to high-level government work are instead being attracted by the far higher pay scales offered by private industry.

There also is little evidence that President Clinton and his national-security team view the agency’s signals-intelligence plight as significant. This year’s classified Defense Department budget request included a boost of nearly two hundred million dollars for the agency, with the funds ear-marked for long-range research into signals intelligence. The money never made it through the White House’s Office of Management and Budget, however. “George Tenet didn’t support it,” a former congressional aide explained. A similar secret request, for four hundred million dollars or more to modify the Jimmy Carter, a Seawolf-class nuclear submarine, for top-secret agency intelligence work, was approved — evidence that the White House believes that more covert operations will solve the nation’s coming intelligence problems.

Hayden also will have to contend with those, in and out of the government, who remain dubious about the N.S.A. One firm skeptic is the encryption expert Whitfield Diffie, who is now at Sun Microsystems. Diffie, a leading advocate of computer privacy, was quick to suggest that the current alarm in the N.S.A. may be a self-interested ruse. When I brought up the N.S.A.’s problems with new technology, he replied, “What bothers me is that you are saying what the agency wants us to believe — they used to be great, but these days they have trouble reading the newspaper, the Internet is too complicated for them, there is so much traffic and they can’t find what they want. It may be true, but it is what they have been ‘saying’ for years. It’s convenient for N.S.A. to have its targets believe it is in trouble. That doesn’t mean it isn’t in trouble, but it is a reason to view what spooky inside informants say with skepticism.”

Shortly after his appointment, Hayden assembled a group of highly regarded mid-level managers and gave them free rein to evaluate the agency. He also began a series of meetings, outside Fort Meade, to get independent advice. The evaluations were consistently “brutal,” according to one official, in terms of the ongoing management problems. On November 15th, Hayden announced to the N.S.A. workforce that he was beginning what he called One Hundred Days of Change. The next day, he made his move against the establishment. He dissolved the agency’s leadership structure, despite a bitter protest from Barbara McNamara, and announced the formation of a five-member executive group, under his leadership, which would be responsible for decision-making.

LAST month, General Hayden agreed to speak to me, at his unpretentious top-floor offices at Ops 2, the N.S.A. headquarters building. He is an affable spymaster, who laughs easily, offers no slogans, and promises no quick fixes for the agency’s problems. He seemed to understand that his new troops — computer gurus and mathematicians — are unlike any others he had commanded before.

When I brought up the agency’s long-standing war against the export of encryption, Hayden quickly dismissed it as yesterday’s lost battle. He also took issue with those who criticized Barbara McNamara and other civilian managers for their failure to anticipate the communications upheaval. “Barbara McNamara has been a good deputy to me,” he said. “But I make the decisions.”

Hayden emphasized that the personnel problems are far less significant than the technological ones: “The issue is not people but external changes. For the N.S.A., technology is a two-edged sword. If technology in the outside world races away from us — at breakneck speed — our mission is more difficult. It can be our enemy.”

When I asked Hayden about the agency’s capability for unwarranted spying on private citizens — in the unlikely event, of course, that the agency could somehow get the funding, the computer scientists, and the knowledge to begin making sense out of the Internet — his response was heated. “I’m a kid from Pittsburgh with two sons and a daughter who are closet libertarians,” he said. “I am not interested in doing anything that threatens the American people, and threatens the future of this agency. I can’t emphasize enough to you how careful we are. We have to be so careful — to make sure that America is never distrustful of the power and security we can provide.”

General Hayden made no effort to minimize his agency’s plight. During the Cold War, he said, the N.S.A. was “technologically more adept than our adversary. Now it’s harder to predict where America!s interests will need to be in the future.” His goal in the near future, he added, speaking carefully, is to determine which of the agency’s past practices are applicable to today’s high-tech world — “and which of them may be counterproductive.”

“A lot of the choices are Sophie’s choices,” he said. “The trade-off is between modernizations (recruiting computer scientists and beginning long-range programs to tackle the Internet) “and readiness” — that is, meeting the hectic operational needs of the Defense Department and the White House for immediate intelligence. “We have a high ops tempo,” he added, “but choices have to be made.” In other words, he made clear, some ongoing N.S.A. intelligence-collection programs will have to be curtailed, or eliminated, so that funds are available for futuristic research.

“In its forty-year struggle against Soviet Communism,” Hayden noted, “the N.S.A. was thorough, stable, and focussed.” Then he asked “What’s changed?” and he answered, “All of that.”

© The New Yorker 1999


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Video – Ebola Outbreak 2014: From the Hot Zone of this Deadly Virus Raging Out of Control

 

Ebola Outbreak 2014: From the Hot Zone of this Deadly Virus Raging Out of Control

Ebola is raging out of control in Western Africa! See how quickly we went from Patient Zero in December 2013 to over a 1000 fatalities across numerous countries in just over 8 months. Fear is growing of a worldwide pandemic outbreak if the virus is not contained. Ebola is one plane ride away from reaching other countries.

Exposed – UNODC World Drug Report 2014

UNODC-WorldDrugReport-2014

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

  • 128 pages
  • June 2014
  • 6.99 MB

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The World Drug Report provides an annual overview of the major developments in drug markets for the various drug categories, ranging from production to trafficking, including development of new routes and modalities, as well as consumption. Chapter 1 of the World Drug Report 2014 provides a global overview of the latest developments with respect to opiates, cocaine, cannabis and amphetamines (including “ecstasy”) and the health impact of drug use. Chapter 2 zeroes in on the control of precursor chemicals used in the manufacture of illicit drugs.

On the basis of comprehensive information on supply, as well as the relatively limited new information on demand, it can be concluded that overall the global situation with regard to the prevalence of illicit drug use and problem drug use1 is generally stable, with the total global number of drug users increasingly commensurate with the growth of the world population.

That said, each region exhibits its own peculiarities with respect to specific drugs. Polydrug use, which is generally understood as the use of two or more substances at the same time or sequentially, remains a major concern, both from a public health and a drug control perspective.

D. OPIATES: OVERVIEW

Cultivation and production

The global area under illicit opium poppy cultivation in 2013 was 296,720 hectares (ha), the highest level since 1998 when estimates became available. An increase in cultivation was seen in both Afghanistan and Myanmar. The main increase was observed in Afghanistan, where the area of opium poppy cultivation increased 36 per cent, from 154,000 ha in 2012 to 209,000 ha in 2013. The main area of cultivation in Afghanistan was in nine provinces in the southern and western part of the country, while the major increase was observed in Helmand and Kandahar. In Myanmar, the increase in the area of cultivation was not as pronounced as in Afghanistan.

In South-East Asia, the total area under cultivation in the Lao People’s Democratic Republic in 2013 was estimated as 3,900 ha (range: 1,900-5,800 ha). However, the 2013 estimates are not comparable with the estimates of 2012 due to the varying methodology in the use of high-resolution satellite images and time of conducting the helicopter survey. Myanmar continued the trend of increasing cultivation that began after 2006.89 (See tables in annex I for details on opium poppy cultivation and production in the different countries and regions).

The potential production of opium in 2013 is estimated at 6,883 tons, which is a return to the levels observed in 2011 and 2008. The opium production in Afghanistan accounts for 80 per cent of the global opium production (5,500 tons). The potential production of heroin (of unknown purity) has also increased to 560 tons, comparable to 2008 estimates of 600 tons (see figure 16).

afghan-opium-productionglobal-opium-production

Recent trends

Although global supply and demand may be evening out globally in the long term, the illicit market for opiates is far from static, especially when shorter-term trends are taken into account. There is growing evidence of significant changes in the flows of heroin out of Afghanistan, of heroin from Afghanistan becoming more available in consumer markets other than the long-established European destinations, and of the interplay between the illicit and licit markets for opioids (including opiates).

European markets and their relationship to Afghanistan

It appears that the flow of heroin along the long-established Balkan route, from Afghanistan to Western and Central Europe via Iran (Islamic Republic of ) and Turkey, has declined in recent years. Various factors may have contributed to the decline in seizures along this route, including the success of law enforcement authorities in key transit countries and a decline in demand in the destination market.

Based on UNODC estimates, the number of past-year users of opiates in Western and Central Europe may have declined by almost one third between 2003 and 2012 (from 1.6 million to 1.13 million). This is also observed for example, in the data from Germany, where the number of people arrested for the first time for heroin use fell steadily between 2003 and 2012 — overall, by more than one half. Even so, in 2011 and 2012, there may have been a certain deficiency in the available supply of heroin (which may yet be corrected), as the purity-adjusted price of heroin underwent a distinct transition between 2010 and 2011, and maintained the increased level in 2012. Indeed, the decline in heroin flowing on the Balkan Route appears to have been too sudden to be accompanied by a corresponding drop in demand. The ensuing shortfall may have helped trigger the development of routes serving as alternatives to the Balkan route — whose emergence is suggested by other evidence — to supply Europe, possibly via the Near and Middle East and Africa, as well as directly from Pakistan, suggesting that the so called Southern Route is expanding.

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Schweizer Medien über “IM Erika” aka Angela Merkel – in Deutschland zensiert

Ist der Ruf erst ruiniert,

lebt sich’s völlig ungeniert!

Manch eine “weiße” Weste läßt sich sogar mit Chemie nicht mehr grau oder gar weiß hinbekommen. Es hilft nur noch die Weste samt Inhalt zu entsorgen. Dabei ist der Inhalt erst mit Hilfe der CIA an die Spitze gebracht worden, indem Ranghöhere ob einer Stasi-Vergangenheit auf das Abstellgleis geschoben wurden. Wer, wann – stets mit dem Argument einer mit der Stasi-befleckten Vergangenheit – beiseite geschoben wurde, um das “Sternchen” Angela Merkel in Position zu bringen, war für jeden bereits bei http://www.zeit-fragen.ch nachlesbar.

Selbstverständlich kennt man im Kreml Angelas Vergangenheit. So muß es denn für eine, die auf Kanzlerin mimt, mehr als peinlich sein, sich mit Staatschefs im Gespräch zu befinden, die alles über sie wissen – – – ALLES ! ! ! Sich derartig entbößt zu wissen, ist nicht nur peinlich – es macht diese “Dame” auch völlig politikunfähig. Ihr bleibt denn nur noch, den Auftrag der Zerstörung Deutschlands zu vollenden. Und dies ist ersichtlich aus verlogenen Inflationsraten, die unter das Volk gestreut werden, aus verlogenen Arbeitslosenziffern mit denen das Denkvermögen des Volkes benebelt werden sollen (bei gleichzeitig immer neuen Stellenkürzungen zwecks Gewinn-Maximierung der Unternehmen), mit gesundheitsschädlichen Sprühaktionen mittels Aerosolen – genannt Chemtrails, Verschweigen der Uran-Belastung … nicht nur im Trinkwasser. Und last but not least, ihre systematische Zerstörung guter Beziehungen zu Russland – ganz im Auftrage der USA. Zu Präsident Medwedew, wie zum Alt-Präsidenten Putin waren ihre Beziehungen … ja wie waren sie denn? Hier zeigen wohl der Gesichtsausdruck auf den Fotos genauer, als es sonst in Worte zu fassen wäre.

Über die Vergangenheit der Frau “weiße” Weste

Deutsche Kanzlerin Merkel ein Stasi-Spitzel ?

Die Deutsche Kanzlerin soll als Stasi – Mitarbeiterin an Bespitzelungen des ehemaligen DDR Regimekritikers Robert Havemann, im Jahr 1980 teilgenommen haben.

Robert Havemann erhielt 1965 ein Berufsverbot und wurde am 1. April 1966 aus der Akademie der Wissenschaften der DDR ausgeschlossen der auch Angela Merkel angehörte.. In den Folgejahren wurden von ihm zahlreiche SED-kritische Publikationen in Form von Zeitungsbeiträgen und Büchern (unter anderem Fragen Antworten Fragen; Robert Havemann: Ein deutscher Kommunist; Morgen) veröffentlicht.

1976 protestierte er gegen die Ausbürgerung des DDR-kritischen Liedermachers Wolf Biermann. Er tat dies in Form eines Briefes, den er an den Staatsratsvorsitzenden Erich Honecker gerichtet hatte und ließ den Brief im westdeutschen Nachrichtenmagazin Der Spiegel veröffentlichen. Im Jahr 1976 verhängte das Kreisgericht Fürstenwalde einen unbefristeten Hausarrest gegen Havemann (auf seinem Grundstück in Grünheide). Sein Haus und seine Familie (und auch die Familie seines Freundes Jürgen Fuchs, die er 1975 in sein Gartenhaus aufnahm) wurden rund um die Uhr von der Stasi überwacht.

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Jugendliche im Alter von Angela Merkel haben die Stasiobservation am Grundstück rund um die Uhr übernommen. Zeitweise wurden bis zu 200 Stasiagenten auf das Grundstück angesetzt und ausser Hausarrest hatte Havemann seit 1976 mit einem gekappten Telefonanschluss zu leben. Die Überwachung kostete 740 000 DDR Mark.

Vor einigen Jahren plante man, in der Redaktion des Westdeutschen Rundfunks, den Bericht ” Im Auge der Macht- die Bilder der Stasi” und wollte über die Stasiarbeit recherchieren.

Die Redakteure stiessen dabei auf ein Foto, dass eine junge Frau, die sich um 1980 in dieser Zeit dem Grundstück der Familie Havemann in Grünheide bei Berlin näherte: Auf dem Foto soll ANGELA MERKEL zu sehen sein, die sich dem Grundstück Havemann in der Zeit der Observation und der Isolation von Havemann näherte.

Das vom WDR gefundene Merkel Bild durfte nicht gesendet werden, weil Angela Merkel die Ausstrahlung des Fotos im WDR Film untersagt hatte.

Die Doku des WDR gibt es hier:

http://www.lernzeit.de/sendung.phtml?detail=612797

der entsprechende Vorabbericht des Spiegels und als Quellennachweis

http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/vorab/0,1518,377389,00.html

Besonders spannend dürfte jetzt die Debatte um den PDS Abgeordneten Gregor Gysi werden.Viele Deutsche Medien sowie der CDU Generalsekretär Ronald Pofalla, fordern den Bundestags-Fraktionschefs Gregor Gysi auf, seine DDR-Vergangenheit nicht unter den Teppich zu kehren.Wir können gespannt sein, ob der Generalsekretär dies auch von seiner Chefin der Kanzlerin Angela Merkel verlangt.

Fatal in diesem Zusammenhang dürfte die Rolle des Boulevardblattes “Bild” sein. Hat man sich gerade richtig gut darauf eingeschossen Gregor Gysi seine Stasi Vergangenheit vorzuwerfen, muss “Bild” sich nun auf seine so geliebte Kanzlerin fokussieren, wenn man nicht mit zweierlei Maass messen will. Eine mit Stasi Vorwürfen belastete Kanzlerin dürfte allemal schwerer wiegen als ein Bundestags-Fraktionschef.

Die weitere Berichterstattung der Deutschen Medien, in diesem allen seit langem bekannten Fall, dürfte den Deutschen einen erkenntnisreichen Einblick in die Aufrichtigkeit, Redlichkeit und Vertrauenswürdigkeit ihrer Medien gewähren.

Angela Merkel – das Glückskind

 

Erst vom Westen in den Osten gezogen und in der DDR eine politische Karriere gemacht, die Jugend indoktriniert mit Parolen im Auftrag der Partei – denn die Jugend, wenn sie einmal die Schule verlassen hat, befindet sich nach der vorherigen Wehrertüchtigungen in der FDJ im gerade rechten Alter für die NVA – die Nationale Volks-Armee.

 

 

Aber um mit dem richtigen Geist eines Tages der NVA anzugehören, muß die Jugend schon im Rahmen der FDJ mit den richtigen Parolen gefütterr werden. Und da tat sich die heutige von der CIA nach vorne gebrachte Angela Merkel hervor – als Scharfmacherin künftiger Mauerschützen: als FDJ-Propagandistin !!!

Ebenso betätigt sie sich heute als Scharfmacherin gegen demokratisch gewählte Konkurrenten!

 

Angela Merkel hat schon immer ein sehr eigenartiges Verhältnis zur Demokratie bewiesen – und hat dies auch in der BRD unter Beweis gestellt, indem die BRD OHNE Volksabstimmung in die EU gebracht werden soll

Angela Merkel, eine Neokonservative als Prдsidentin der Europдischen Union

von Thierry Meyssan *

Angela Merkel wurde 1954 in Hamburg geboren. Kurz nach ihrer Geburt traf ihre Familie die ungewöhnliche Entscheidung, nach Ostdeutschland überzusiedeln. Ihr Vater, Pfarrer der lutheranischen Kirche, gründete wenig später ein Seminar in der DDR und übernahm die Leitung eines Behindertenheims. Er verzichtete auf jegliche öffentliche Kritik am Regime und genoss einen privilegierten sozialen Status: Er verfügte über zwei Autos und reiste oft in den Westen.

Angela Merkel ist eine brillante Studentin und schliesst ihr Physikstudium mit dem Doktorat ab. Sie heiratet den Physiker Ulrich Merkel, von dem sie sich bald darauf wieder scheiden lässt. Später lebt sie mit Professor Joachim Sauer zusammen, selbst auch geschieden und Vater von zwei Kindern. Frau Merkel wird Forscherin in Quantenphysik an der Akademie der Wissenschaften.

Gleichzeitig engagiert sie sich politisch bei der Freien Deutschen Jugend (FDJ), einer staatlichen Jugendorganisation. Sie steigt dort bis zur Sekretärin der Abteilung für Agitation und Propaganda auf und wird eine der wichtigsten Experten für politische Kommunikation in der sozialistischen Diktatur. Aus beruflichen und politischen Gründen reist sie oft in die UdSSR, vor allem nach Moskau, was durch ihre guten Russischkenntnisse erleichtert wird. Obwohl der Fall der Berliner Mauer schon lange erwünscht und vorbereitet wird, überrascht er im November 1989 alle Regierungen. Die CIA versucht die neuen Regierungsmitglieder selbst zu bestimmen, indem sie Verantwortliche des alten Regimes rekrutiert, die bereit sind, den USA zu dienen, wie sie früher der UdSSR dienten.

Einen Monat später wechselt Angela Merkel die Seite und schliesst sich von einem Tag auf den anderen dem Demokratischen Aufbruch an, einer von den westdeutschen Christdemokraten inspirierten neuen Bewegung. Sie nimmt dort von Anfang an die gleiche Stellung ein wie vorher, ausser dass ihr Posten nun den westdeutschen Begriffen angepasst wird: Sie ist nun «Pressesprecherin». Bald einmal wird bekannt, dass der Vorsitzende des Demokratischen Aufbruchs, Wolfgang Schnur, ein ehemaliger Stasi-Mitarbeiter ist. Angela Merkel teilt diese schmerzliche Nachricht der Presse mit. Herr Schnur muss zurücktreten, was ihr ermöglicht, an seiner Stelle Vorsitzende der Bewegung zu werden.

Nach den letzten Parlamentswahlen der DDR tritt sie in die Regierung von Lothar de Maizière ein und wird deren Sprecherin, obwohl der Demokratische Aufbruch nur 0,9 Prozent der Stimmen erhalten hat. In dieser Übergangsperiode beteiligt sie sich aktiv sowohl an den «2+4»-Gesprächen, die der Aufteilung Berlins in 4 Sektoren und der alliierten Besetzung ein Ende setzen, als auch an den Verhandlungen zur deutschen Wiedervereinigung. Um, wie sie sagt, einen massiven Exodus von Ost nach West zu verhindern, setzt sie sich für den sofortigen Eintritt der DDR in die Marktwirtschaft und die D-Mark-Zone ein. Ihr Lebenspartner Joachim Sauer ist bei der US-amerikanischen Firma Biosym Technology angestellt. Er verbringt ein Jahr in San Diego (Kalifornien) im Labor dieser Firma, die für das Pentagon arbeitet. Er bleibt in der Folge Experte bei Accelrys, einer anderen für das Pentagon arbeitenden Gesellschaft in San Diego. Angela Merkel ihrerseits verbessert ihr Englisch, das sie von nun an bestens beherrscht.

Als die DDR in die Bundesrepublik und der Demokratische Aufbruch in die CDU übergeführt sind, wird Angela Merkel in den Bundestag gewählt und tritt in Helmut Kohls Regierung ein. Obwohl dieser sehr sittenstreng ist, wählt er diese junge Dame aus dem Osten, geschieden, ohne Kinder und im Konkubinat lebend, zu seiner Jugend- und Frauenministerin. Innert 14 Monaten hat sich die Verantwortliche für kommunistische Propaganda bei der DDR-Jugend zur christdemokratischen Ministerin für Jugend in der Bundesrepublik gewandelt. In dieser ersten Amtszeit hinterlässt sie jedoch eine sehr magere Bilanz. Ihre Karriere bei der CDU weiter verfolgend, versucht Angela Merkel erfolglos, sich als Regionalpräsidentin der Partei in Brandenburg wählen zu lassen. Lothar de Maizière, der Vizepräsident der nationalen Partei geworden ist, werden entfernte Kontakte zur Stasi vorgeworfen; er muss demissionieren, worauf Frau Merkel ihn ersetzt.

1994 wird Klaus Töpfer, Minister für Umwelt, Naturschutz und Reaktorsicherheit, zum Direktor des Umweltprogramms der Vereinten Nationen ernannt, dies nach langen scharfen Angriffen der Deutschen Industrie- und Handelskammer (DIHK). Diese wirft Töpfer vor, die wirtschaftlichen Realitäten zu unterschätzen. Helmut Kohl beruft darauf seinen Schützling Angela Merkel an dessen Stelle, was zur Beendigung der Krise führt. Sofort nach ihrem Amtsantritt entlässt sie alle höheren Beamten, die ihrem Vorgänger treu geblieben sind. In dieser Zeit verbindet sie sich freundschaftlich mit ihrer damaligen französischen Amtskollegin Dominique Voynet. 1998 lässt Bundeskanzler Kohl die USA wissen, dass er der internationalen Intervention in Kosovo nicht zustimmt. Dies zur gleichen Zeit, zu der Gerhard Schröders Sozialdemokraten und Joschka Fischers Grüne Slobodan Milosevic mit Adolf Hitler vergleichen und zum humanitären Krieg aufrufen.

Die US-freundliche Presse wettert daraufhin gegen den Bundeskanzler los, indem sie ihm die wirtschaftlichen Schwierigkeiten des Landes nach der Wiedervereinigung anlastet. Die Christdemokraten werden in den Wahlen von 1998 von einer rot-grünen Welle weggespült. Schröder wird Bundeskanzler und ernennt Fischer zum Aussenminister. Bald darauf wird Helmut Kohl und seinem Umfeld vorgeworfen, geheime Gelder der CDU angenommen zu haben, aber er weigert sich, auf Grund eines Versprechens, die Namen der Spender bekanntzugeben. Angela Merkel veröffentlicht daraufhin eine Stellungnahme in der «Frankfurter Allgemeinen Zeitung», [1] um sich von ihrem Mentor zu distanzieren. Dadurch zwingt sie Helmut Kohl, sich aus der Partei zurückzuziehen, und kurz danach auch den neuen Vorsitzenden der CDU, Wolfgang Schäuble, zurückzutreten. Im Namen der öffentlichen Moral übernimmt sie so den Vorsitz der Partei. In der Folge passt sie sich der christdemokratischen Moral an und heiratet ihren Lebenspartner.

Von nun an wird Angela Merkel von zwei wichtigen Pressegruppen offen unterstützt. Sie kann auf Friede Springer zählen, der Erbin der Axel-Springer-Gruppe (180 Zeitungen und Zeitschriften, darunter «Bild», «Die Welt»). Die Journalisten der Gruppe müssen eine Verlagsklausel unterschreiben, die festlegt, dass sie sich für die Entwicklung der Transatlantischen Verbindungen und für die Verteidigung des Staates Israel einsetzen. Angela Merkel kann auch auf ihre Freundin Liz Mohn zählen, Direktorin der Bertelsmann-Gruppe, Nummer 1 der europäischen Medien (RTL, Prisma, Random House usw.). Frau Mohn ist auch Vizepräsidentin der Bertelsmann-Stiftung, die den intellektuellen Stützpfeiler der euro-amerikanischen Verbindungen bildet.

Angela Merkel stützt sich auf die Ratschläge von Jeffrey Gedmin, der vom Bush-Clan speziell für sie nach Berlin geschickt wurde. Dieser Lobbyist hat zuerst für das American Enterprise Institute (AEI) [2] unter der Direktion von Richard Perle und der Frau von Dick Cheney gearbeitet. Er ermutigt sie sehr, den Euro dem Dollar anzupassen. In der AEI hat er zuvor die New Atlantic Initiative (NAI) geleitet, die alle wichtigen amerikafreundlichen Generäle und Politiker Europas vereinte. Er hat auch am Project for a New American Century (PNAC) mitgewirkt und das Kapitel über Europa in diesem Programm der Neokonservativen verfasst. Dort schreibt er, dass die EU unter der Kontrolle der Nato bleiben muss und dass dies nur möglich sein werde, wenn «die europäischen Forderungen nach Emanzipation» geschwächt werden können. [3] Gleichzeitig ist er auch Verwalter des CCD (Council for a Community of Democracies), [4] der eine Uno der zwei Geschwindigkeiten fordert, und er übernimmt die Leitung des Aspen-Instituts in Berlin. [5] Das Angebot seines Freundes John Bolton, [6] Stellvertretender Botschafter der USA bei der Uno zu werden, lehnt er ab, damit er sich ganz der Betreuung von Angela Merkel widmen kann. 2003 vertraut das State Departement Jeffrey Gedmin und Craig Kennedy ein ausgedehntes Programm für «öffentliche Diplomatie» an, das heisst für Propaganda, welches unter anderem die geheime Subvention von Journalisten und Meinungsbildungsstellen in Westeuropa beinhaltet. [7] 2003 widersetzt sich Gerhard Schröder der anglo-amerikanischen Operation im Irak. Angela Merkel veröffentlicht daraufhin eine Stellungnahme in der Washington Post, [8] in der sie die Chirac-Schröder-Doktrin der Unabhängigkeit Europas zurückweist, ihre Dankbarkeit und Freundschaft gegenüber «Amerika» betont und den Krieg unterstützt.

Im Mai 2004 verwirrt sie die Situation, indem sie die Wahl des Bankiers Horst Köhler zum Bundespräsidenten durchsetzt, dem Hauptredaktor des Maastrichter Vertrags, dem Vertrag zur Einführung des Euro, und ehemaligen Präsidenten der Europäischen Bank für Wiederaufbau und Entwicklung (EBRD) und Direktor des IWF. Daraufhin lanciert sie eine «patriotische» Kampagne gegen den radikalen Islamismus.
Während der ganzen Kampagne für die Bundestagswahlen von 2005 prangert sie die steigenden Arbeitslosenzahlen an und die Unfähigkeit der Sozialdemokraten, diese einzudämmen. Die CDU erhält daraufhin in den Umfragen einen Vorsprung von 21 Prozentpunkten. In dieser Situation veröffentlicht ihr geheimer Berater Jeffrey Gedmin in «Der Welt» einen offenen Brief an sie. Nachdem er das deutsche Wirtschaftsmodell kritisiert hat, schreibt er weiter: «Bevor Sie das Land voranbringen können, müssen Sie diese Nostalgiker intellektuell überwältigen. Sollte Herr Sarkozy Herrn Chirac nachfolgen, wird Frankreich vielleicht einen Aufschwung erleben. Es wäre schade, wenn Deutschland weiter zurückfiele.»

Dieser Einladung folgend, gibt Angela Merkel endlich ihre Lösungsvorschläge bekannt. Sie schiebt einen ihrer Berater, den ehemaligen Richter am Verfassungsgerichtshof, Paul Kirchhof, vor und betraut ihn mit der Initiative «Neue Soziale Marktwirtschaft». [9] Sie kündigt den Stop der Progression der Einkommenssteuer an: der Prozentsatz soll der gleiche sein für Bedürftige wie für Superreiche. Gerhard Schröder, der scheidende Bundeskanzler, kritisiert dieses Projekt in einer Fernsehdiskussion scharf. Der Vorsprung der CDU wird pulverisiert. Schliesslich erhält die CDU 35% der Stimmen und die SPD 34%, der Rest verteilt sich unter den kleineren Parteien. Die Deutschen wollen Schröder nicht mehr, aber sie wollen auch Merkel nicht. Nach langwierigen und mühsamen Verhandlungen wird eine grosse Koalition gebildet: Angela Merkel wird Bundeskanzlerin, aber sie muss die Hälfte der Ministerposten an die Opposition abgeben.

Anlässlich der israelischen Intervention in Libanon setzt sie den Einsatz der deutschen Flotte im Rahmen der FINUL durch, indem sie erklärt: «Wenn die Daseinsberechtigung Deutschlands darin besteht, das Existenzrecht von Israel zu garantieren, können wir jetzt, wo dessen Existenz in Gefahr ist, nicht untätig bleiben.» Seit dem 1. Januar 2007 steht Angela Merkel der Europäischen Union vor. Sie macht aus ihrem Ansinnen keinen Hehl, Frankreich und die Niederlande zu zwingen, eine zweite Version des Entwurfs für eine europäische Verfassung anzunehmen, obwohl diese Länder eine erste Version in einem Referendum abgelehnt haben. Auch verbirgt sie ihre Absicht nicht, das Projekt des Zusammenschlusses der nordamerikanischen Freihandelszone mit der europäischen zur Bildung eines «grossen transatlantischen Marktes» – den Vorstellungen von Sir Leon Brittan entsprechend – wiederzubeleben.

Thierry Meyssan Journalist und Schriftsteller, ist Präsident des “Réseau Voltaire“

1] Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung vom 22.12.1999.
[2] «L’Institut amйricain de l’entreprise а la Maison-Blanche», Rйseau Voltaire vom 21.6.2004.
[3] «Europe and Nato: Saving the Alliance» von Jeffrey Gedmin in Present Dangers. Crisis and Opportunity in American Foreign and Defense Policy unter der Leitung von Robert Kagan et William Kristol, Encounter Books 2000.
[4] «La dйmocratie forcйe» von Paul Labarique, Rйseau Voltaire vom 25.1.2005.
[5] «L’Institut Aspen йlиve les requins du business», Rйseau Voltaire vom 2.9.2004.
[6] «John Bolton et le dйsarmement par la guerre», Rйseau Voltaire vom 30.11.2004.
[7] «Selling America, Short» von Jeffrey Gedmin und Craig Kennedy, The National Interest Nr. 74, Winter 2003.
[8] «Schroeder Doesn’t Speak for All Germans» von Angela Merkel, The Washinton Post vom 20.2.2003.
[9] Dieser Think tank beruft sich auf die soziale Marktwirtschaft, die Bundeskanzler Ludwig Erhard in Abstьtzung auf den Marshall-Plan 1963–66 einrichtete.