Category Archives: COMMUNISTS

Top-Secret History of KGB, – The Original Files

Viktor Chebrikov
Виктор Чебриков
Viktor Chebrikov.jpg
6th Chairman of the Committee for State Security (KGB)
In office
17 December 1982 – 1 October 1988
Premier Nikolai Tikhonov
Nikolai Ryzhkov
Preceded by Vitaly Fedorchuk
Succeeded by Vladimir Kryuchkov
Member of the Secretariat
In office
30 September 1988 – 20 September 1989
Full member of the Politburo
In office
23 April 1985 – 20 September 1989
Candidate member of the Politburo
In office
26 December 1983 – 23 April 1985
Personal details
Born 27 April 1923
Dnipropetrovsk, Ukrainian SSR, Soviet Union
Died 2 July 1999 (aged 76)
Moscow, Russian Federation
Nationality Soviet and Russian
Political party Communist Party of the Soviet Union
Other political
affiliations
Communist Party of Ukraine

 

Top-Secret History of KGB, 1977, Chapters 1-12 and appendix. This top-secret 639-page history of the Soviet state security organs was completed in 1977 under the auspices of Viktor Chebrikov, the deputy head of the KGB (who later became head of the agency). The book was intended for use in the KGB’s special academy for the training of senior officers. The book provides a detailed history of the KGB and its predecessor agencies from 1917 through the mid-1970s. The book is still classified top secret in Moscow and is unavailable there. The copy here was obtained in Riga, Latvia in July 1997, courtesy of Indulis Zalite, a Latvian archival researcher. Unlike in Russia, the Latvian government has declassified all documents from the Soviet era, and they are now freely available to researchers.

 

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Viktor Mikhailovich Chebrikov (Russian: Виктор Михайлович Чебриков) (27 April 1923 – 2 July 1999) was a Soviet Union public official and security administrator and head of the KGB from December 1982 to October 1988.[1]

Born in the industrial city of Dnipropetrovsk in eastern Ukraine on 27 April 1923,[2] he finished military school in 1942 and served in World War II as a battalion commander.[3] After the war Chebrikov wanted to continue his military career, but was refused by the prestigious Frunze Military Academy because of his bad eyesight;[4] abandoning his military ambitions, he earned an engineering degree, joined the Communist Party in 1950, and embarked on a political-administrative career, rising through the Ukrainian party ranks until he became First Secretary of the Dnipropetrovsk Party Committee in 1961.[4] In 1967, he was brought to Moscow as personnel manager for the Central Committee.[3] He was Deputy chairman of the KGB under Yuri Andropov from 1968-1982. They began an anti-corruption drive that continued until Andropov’s death. Following a brief period under Konstantin Chernenko, Chebrikov was appointed head of internal security under Mikhail Gorbachev.

Through information supplied by American spy Aldrich Ames, Chebrikov was able to dismantle the network of CIA operatives in his country. Chebrikov was highly respected for his skills among his American counterparts; according to Kenneth E. deGraffenreid, the senior White House intelligence official in the Reagan years: “One has to say that this (Chebrikov’s years as KGB chief) was the heyday of the KGB in terms of foreign intelligence. In terms of intelligence production -spies, and dishing the Americans on the secrets- they were going strong right up to the end. We uncovered 80 spies during those years. These guys were on the make, and there was no question about their influence.”[3]

Chebrikov-Ustinov memoranda

In 1992, Russian president Boris Yeltsin disclosed five top-secret memos dating from a few weeks after the downing of KAL 007 in 1983. The memos contained Soviet communications from Chebrikov and Defence Minister Dmitriy Ustinov to head of state Yuri Andropov that indicated that they knew the location of KAL 007’s wreckage while they were simulating a search and harassing the American Navy; they had found the sought-after flight data recorder on 20 October 1983 (50 days after the incident), and had decided to keep this knowledge secret, the reason being that the tapes could not unequivocally support their firmly-held view that KAL 007’s flight to Soviet territory was a deliberately planned intelligence mission.[citation needed]

Due to differing views regarding reforms, in October 1988, Mikhail Gorbachev replaced Chebrikov with General Vladimir Kryuchkov (who in 1991 attempted a coup against Gorbachev).[5]

References

  1. Montgomery, Isobel (7 July 1999). Viktor Chebrikov: KGB chief who favoured modest Soviet reforms. The Guardian
  2. Dennis Kavanagh (1998). “Chebrikov, Viktor”. A Dictionary of Political Biography. Oxford University Press. p. 99. Retrieved 31 August 2013. – via Questia (subscription required)
  3. New York Times, 5 July 1999
  4. The Guardian, 7 July 1999
  5. Wines, Michael (5 July 1999). Viktor Chebrikov, 76, Leader Of K.G.B. in Spying Heyday. New York Times
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PLA Hacker Unit 61398 Eyeball – Chinese Hackers Headquarters exposed

The email attachment looked like a brochure for a yoga studio in Toulouse, France, the center of the European aerospace industry. But once it was opened, it allowed hackers to sidestep their victim’s network security and steal closely guarded satellite technology.

The fake yoga brochure was one of many clever come-ons used by a stealth Chinese military unit for hacking, said researchers at CrowdStrike, an Irvine, Calif., security company. Their targets were the networks of European, American and Japanese government entities, military contractors and research companies in the space and satellite industry, systematically broken into for seven years.

Just weeks after the Justice Department indicted five members of the Chinese army, accusing them of online attacks on United States corporations, a new report from CrowdStrike, released on Monday, offers more evidence of the breadth and ambition of China’s campaign to steal trade and military secrets from foreign victims.

This 12-story building on the outskirts of Shanghai is the headquarters of Unit 61398 of the People’s Liberation Army. China’s defense ministry has denied that it is responsible for initiating digital attacks.

The report, parts of which The New York Times was able to corroborate independently, ties attacks against dozens of public and private sector organizations back to a group of Shanghai-based hackers whom CrowdStrike called Putter Panda because they often targeted golf-playing conference attendees. The National Security Agency and its partners have identified the hackers as Unit 61486, according to interviews with a half-dozen current and former American officials.

 

 


 

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13 April 2014 Google Earth31°17’16.42″ N 121°27’17.56″ E

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Neue Ergebnisse zu STASI-Spitzeln bei der Polizei – Studie

 

Die wissenschaftliche Untersuchung der Stasi-Spionage bei der West-Berliner Polizei ist abgeschlossen. Die Ergebnisse des zweiten Teils der Analyse für die Jahre 1973 bis 1989 würden am Mittwoch nächster Woche vorgestellt, teilte die Polizei am Dienstag mit. Der erste Teil bis 1972 wurde 2011 veröffentlicht. Der damalige Polizeipräsident Dieter Glietsch hatte die Untersuchung beim Forschungsverbund SED-Staat der Freien Universität in Auftrag gegeben, nachdem 2009 der frühere West-Berliner Polizist Karl-Heinz Kurras als Stasi-Spitzel enttarnt worden war. Kurras hatte 1967 den Studenten Benno Ohnesorg erschossen.

Über Jahrzehnte versuchte die DDR-Staatssicherheit die West-Berliner Polizei auszuspionieren. Die Stasi-Akten dazu sind inzwischen ausgewertet worden. Der zweite Teil der wissenschaftlichen Untersuchung für die Jahre 1973 bis 1989 wird an diesem Mittwoch von Experten und der Polizei vorgestellt. Der erste Teil bis 1972 wurde bereits 2011 veröffentlicht.

Der damalige Polizeipräsident Dieter Glietsch hatte die Untersuchung beim Forschungsverbund der Freien Universität in Auftrag gegeben, nachdem 2009 der frühere West-Berliner Polizist Karl-Heinz Kurras als Stasi-Spitzel enttarnt worden war. Kurras hatte 1967 den Studenten Benno Ohnesorg erschossen.

Bis Anfang der 70er Jahre hatten ständig etwa 10 bis 20 West-Berliner Polizisten Informationen an die Stasi geliefert. Dabei ging es um Adressen, Autokennzeichen, Telefonnummern und Lagepläne von Polizeistationen.

 

Die zentrale Erkenntnis: Die Stasi erfasste bis Ende der 80er Jahre etwa 80 Prozent der West-Berliner Polizisten namentlich. In vielen Fällen wusste sie viel mehr als Name, Geburtsdatum und Dienstgrad. Sie interessierte sich auch für ihre Wohnadresse, Kontostand und das private Umfeld. Die Daten beschaffte sie sich auch per Computerangriff. Die Stasi-Hacker schafften es, in Inpol einzudringen, das interne Informationssystem. „Dass sie fast alles über die West-Berliner Polizei wussten, das hätten wir nie gedacht“, sagt Schroeder.

Im Gegensatz zu den 1950er und 60er Jahren gelang es der Stasi ab 1972 aber kaum noch, Spitzel bei der Polizei jenseits der Mauer zu platzieren. Gerade einmal 11 inoffizielle Mitarbeiter in den Reihen der West-Berliner Polizei konnten die Forscher ermitteln. In den beiden Jahrzehnten zuvor waren es noch insgesamt rund 200. Im Umfeld von Polizisten waren aber bis zum Ende der DDR eine ganze Reihe Zuträger der Stasi unterwegs.

Dass es die Stasi trotz immensen Aufwandes nicht geschafft hat, die West-Berliner Polizei zu unterwandern, ist für den Berliner Polizeipräsidenten Klaus Kandt ein „gutes Ergebnis aus unserer Sicht“. Sein Vorgänger hatte die Studie in Auftrag gegeben, nachdem herauskam, dass Karl-Heinz Kurras Stasi-IM war. Das ist der Polizist, der 1967 den Studenten Benno Ohnesorg erschoss.

Neue Erkenntnisse zu La Belle-Anschlag

Dass die Stasi über die West-Berliner Polizei Bescheid wusste, überrascht Georg Schertz nicht so richtig. Der 79-Jährige war von 1987 bis 1992 Polizeipräsident in Berlin, aus persönlichem Interesse ist er wegen der Studie an seinen alten Arbeitsplatz gekommen. „Es lag auf der Hand, dass wir ein Hauptzielpunkt der anderen Seite waren“, sagt er.

An spezielle Maßnahmen zur Spionageabwehr könne er sich nicht erinnern, aber man habe schon über besonders wichtige Dinge nicht am Telefon gesprochen. Überraschend sei nur, dass die Stasi es nicht schaffte, Spitzel an entscheidenden Positionen unterzubringen. Vielleicht liege das daran, dass die West-Berliner Polizei damals „stark antikommunistisch orientiert war“.

Die Forscher stießen bei ihrer Recherche auch auf Dinge, die zwar nichts direkt mit der West-Berliner Polizei zu tun haben, aber einiges über die DDR erzählen. Das Aufsehenerregendste: Die Stasi wusste schon im Vorhinein detailliert über den Bombenanschlag auf die Schöneberger Disco La Belle Bescheid. 1986 wurden bei dem Akt libyscher Terroristen drei Menschen getötet. Die Stasi hatte einen Spitzel in einer Gruppe, die an den Vorbereitungen beteiligt war. Sechs Tage vor dem Anschlag stellte sie zudem bei der Kontrolle eines libyschen Diplomaten einen Zettel sicher. Darauf drei Adressen, darunter die des La Belle.

Die Polizei war die am stärksten überwachte Berufsgruppe in West-Berlin, sagen die Forscher. Aber im Blickfeld der Stasi sei im Prinzip die komplette Politik und Verwaltung gewesen. Studienleiter Schroeder bemängelt, dass bislang keine andere West-Berliner Institution ihre Stasi-Vergangenheit aufgearbeitet hat. „Man will wahrscheinlich nichts Genaueres wissen.“

■ „Feindwärts der Mauer. Das Ministerium für Staatssicherheit und die West-Berliner Polizei“, Peter Lang Edition

 

STASI-Treff bei Hochzeit von “DDR”-Innenminister . Diestel, Gysi, Krenz, de Maiziere.

http://www.bunte.de/meldungen/peter-michael-diestel-gregor-gysi-als-treuzeuge-bei-dritter-hochzeit-87944.html

Joseph Stalin In Private – Film

 

A Portrait of Stalin: Secret Police – The Film

MONSTER: A PORTRAIT OF STALIN IN BLOOD
1992.
This six part series, produced by Alexandre Ivankin at Contact Studio, Moscow, uses never before released films from the Russian archives and personal interviews to tell the true story of the annihilation of approximately 40 million Russians by Stalin.
Episode 2: Stalin’s Secret Police: Stalin’s rise to power is attributed largely to his control of the vast secret police complex, known first as the Cheka and later the NKVD, which became the KGB. At Stalin’s direction the secret police becomes the bludgeon with which Stalin enforces his political and personal will, liquidating party rivals, purging the Red Army, and creating the Gulag, massive system of slave labor and liquidation camps.

Stalin was born Joseph Dzhugashvili in the Georgian town of Gori in 1879. He was an early activist in the Bolshevik movement, where he first assumed the pseudonym Stalin (which means “man of steel”). He was named General Secretary of the Communist Party in 1922, a post Stalin used to fortify his power base. When Vladimir Lenin died in 1924, a struggle for control broke out hat pitted Stalin against his nemesis, Leon Trotsky, and a host of lesser party figures. Stalin’s victory was slow and hard-fought, but by 1927 he had succeeded in having Trotsky expelled from the party.
By 1928, Stalin was entrenched as supreme Soviet leader, and he wasted little time in launching a series of national campaigns (the so-called Five-Year Plans) aimed at “collectivizing” the peasantry and turning the USSR into a powerful industrial state. Both campaigns featured murder on a massive scale.
The millions of deaths in Stalin’s “Gulag Archipelago” (the network of labour camps [gulags] scattered across the length and breath of Russia) were a consequence of Stalin’s drive for total control, and his pressing need for convict labour to fuel rapid industrialization.
For Stalin, dissident viewpoints represented an unacceptable threat. This was the origin of the “cult of personality” that permeated Soviet politics and culture, depicting Stalin as infallible, almost deity-like. Beginning in 1935, the series of immense internal purges sent millions of party members and ordinary individuals to their deaths, either through summary executions or in the atrocious conditions of the “Gulag Archipelago.” Soviet institutions and sectors like the Communist Party, the Army, the NKVD, and scientists and engineers were decimated by these purges.
The “Old Bolshevik” elite was targeted in three key “show trials” between 1936 and 1938, in which leaders such as Lev Kamenev, Nikolai Bukharin, and Grigori Zinoviev were accused of conspiring with Trotskyite elements to undermine communism in the USSR.
When the “Old Bolsheviks” had been consigned to oblivion, their successors and replacements quickly followed them. The destruction of the officer corps, about 35,000 military officers shot or imprisoned, and, in particular, the execution of the brilliant chief-of-staff Marshal Tukhachevsky, is considered one of the major reasons for the spectacular Nazi successes in the early months of the German invasion in WWII.
The impetus to “cleanse” the social body rapidly spilled beyond these elite boundaries, and the greatest impact of the Purge was felt in the wider society. Relatives of those accused and arrested, including wives and children down to the age of twelve, were themselves often condemned under the “counter-terrorism” legislation.
With the fall of communism and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Soviet scholars like Edvard Radzinsky and Dmitri Volkogonov have published prominent exposés of Stalinist rule, based on newly-opened archives. And the estimates of the death toll arrived at by Robert Conquest and others, long denounced as craven exaggerations, have been shown instead to be, if anything, understated.

See the works of Robert Conquest, and Aleksandr Solhenitsyn

Film – A Portrait of Stalin: Mind Control

 

MONSTER: A PORTRAIT OF STALIN IN BLOOD
1992.
This six part series, produced by Alexandre Ivankin at Contact Studio, Moscow, uses never before released films from the Russian archives and personal interviews to tell the true story of the annihilation of approximately 40 million Russians by Stalin.
Episode 1: Stalin and Mind Control
Stalin marshalls Soviet media to manipulate the minds of his population. All organs of communication are taken under Stalin’s control, including painting, sculpture, poetry, theater, cinema and architecture–even opera and ballet.

Stalin was born Joseph Dzhugashvili in the Georgian town of Gori in 1879. He was an early activist in the Bolshevik movement, where he first assumed the pseudonym Stalin (which means “man of steel”). He was named General Secretary of the Communist Party in 1922, a post Stalin used to fortify his power base. When Vladimir Lenin died in 1924, a struggle for control broke out hat pitted Stalin against his nemesis, Leon Trotsky, and a host of lesser party figures. Stalin’s victory was slow and hard-fought, but by 1927 he had succeeded in having Trotsky expelled from the party.
By 1928, Stalin was entrenched as supreme Soviet leader, and he wasted little time in launching a series of national campaigns (the so-called Five-Year Plans) aimed at “collectivizing” the peasantry and turning the USSR into a powerful industrial state. Both campaigns featured murder on a massive scale.

The millions of deaths in Stalin’s “Gulag Archipelago” (the network of labour camps [gulags] scattered across the length and breath of Russia) were a consequence of Stalin’s drive for total control, and his pressing need for convict labour to fuel rapid industrialization.
For Stalin, dissident viewpoints represented an unacceptable threat. This was the origin of the “cult of personality” that permeated Soviet politics and culture, depicting Stalin as infallible, almost deity-like. Beginning in 1935, the series of immense internal purges sent millions of party members and ordinary individuals to their deaths, either through summary executions or in the atrocious conditions of the “Gulag Archipelago.” Soviet institutions and sectors like the Communist Party, the Army, the NKVD, and scientists and engineers were decimated by these purges.
The “Old Bolshevik” elite was targeted in three key “show trials” between 1936 and 1938, in which leaders such as Lev Kamenev, Nikolai Bukharin, and Grigori Zinoviev were accused of conspiring with Trotskyite elements to undermine communism in the USSR.
When the “Old Bolsheviks” had been consigned to oblivion, their successors and replacements quickly followed them. The destruction of the officer corps, about 35,000 military officers shot or imprisoned, and, in particular the execution of the brilliant chief-of-staff Marshal Tukhachevsky, is considered one of the major reasons for the spectacular Nazi successes in the early months of the German invasion in WWII.
The impetus to “cleanse” the social body rapidly spilled beyond these elite boundaries, and the greatest impact of the Purge was felt in the wider society. Relatives of those accused and arrested, including wives and children down to the age of twelve, were themselves often condemned under the “counter-terrorism” legislation.
With the fall of communism and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Soviet scholars like Edvard Radzinsky and Dmitri Volkogonov have published prominent exposés of Stalinist rule, based on newly-opened archives . And the estimates of the death toll arrived at by Robert Conquest and others, long denounced as craven exaggerations, have been shown instead to be, if anything, understated.

See the works of Robert Conquest, and Aleksandr Solhenitsyn