Category Archives: BERND PULCH

Unveiled – Chinese Wiretap Like World Leaders and Crooks

When Hu Jintao, China’s top leader, picked up the telephone last August to talk to a senior anticorruption official visiting Chongqing, special devices detected that he was being wiretapped — by local officials in that southwestern metropolis.

The discovery of that and other wiretapping led to an official investigation that helped topple Chongqing’s charismatic leader, Bo Xilai, in a political cataclysm that has yet to reach a conclusion.

Until now, the downfall of Mr. Bo has been cast largely as a tale of a populist who pursued his own agenda too aggressively for some top leaders in Beijing and was brought down by accusations that his wife had arranged the murder of Neil Heywood, a British consultant, after a business dispute. But the hidden wiretapping, previously alluded to only in internal Communist Party accounts of the scandal, appears to have provided another compelling reason for party leaders to turn on Mr. Bo.

The story of how China’s president was monitored also shows the level of mistrust among leaders in the one-party state. To maintain control over society, leaders have embraced enhanced surveillance technology. But some have turned it on one another — repeating patterns of intrigue that go back to the beginnings of Communist rule.

“This society has bred mistrust and violence,” said Roderick MacFarquhar, a historian of Communist China’s elite-level machinations over the past half century. “Leaders know you have to watch your back because you never know who will put a knife in it.”

Nearly a dozen people with party ties, speaking anonymously for fear of retribution, confirmed the wiretapping, as well as a widespread program of bugging across Chongqing. But the party’s public version of Mr. Bo’s fall omits it.

The official narrative and much foreign attention has focused on the more easily grasped death of Mr. Heywood in November. When Mr. Bo’s police chief, Wang Lijun, was stripped of his job and feared being implicated in Bo family affairs, he fled to the United States Consulate in Chengdu, where he spoke mostly about Mr. Heywood’s death.

The murder account is pivotal to the scandal, providing Mr. Bo’s opponents with an unassailable reason to have him removed. But party insiders say the wiretapping was seen as a direct challenge to central authorities. It revealed to them just how far Mr. Bo, who is now being investigated for serious disciplinary violations, was prepared to go in his efforts to grasp greater power in China. That compounded suspicions that Mr. Bo could not be trusted with a top slot in the party, which is due to reshuffle its senior leadership positions this fall.

“Everyone across China is improving their systems for the purposes of maintaining stability,” said one official with a central government media outlet, referring to surveillance tactics. “But not everyone dares to monitor party central leaders.”

According to senior party members, including editors, academics and people with ties to the military, Mr. Bo’s eavesdropping operations began several years ago as part of a state-financed surveillance buildup, ostensibly for the purposes of fighting crime and maintaining local political stability.

The architect was Mr. Wang, a nationally decorated crime fighter who had worked under Mr. Bo in the northeast province of Liaoning. Together they installed “a comprehensive package bugging system covering telecommunications to the Internet,” according to the government media official.

One of several noted cybersecurity experts they enlisted was Fang Binxing, president of Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications, who is often called the father of China’s “Great Firewall,” the nation’s vast Internet censorship system. Most recently, Mr. Fang advised the city on a new police information center using cloud-based computing, according to state news media reports. Late last year, Mr. Wang was named a visiting professor at Mr. Fang’s university.

Together, Mr. Bo and Mr. Wang unleashed a drive to smash what they said were crime rings that controlled large portions of Chongqing’s economic life. In interviews, targets of the crackdown marveled at the scale and determination with which local police intercepted their communications.

“On the phone, we dared not mention Bo Xilai or Wang Lijun,” said Li Jun, a fugitive property developer who now lives in hiding abroad. Instead, he and fellow businessmen took to scribbling notes, removing their cellphone batteries and stocking up on unregistered SIM cards to thwart surveillance as the crackdown mounted, he said.

Li Zhuang, a lawyer from a powerfully connected Beijing law firm, recalled how some cousins of one client had presented him with a full stack of unregistered mobile phone SIM cards, warning him of local wiretapping. Despite these precautions, the Chongqing police ended up arresting Mr. Li on the outskirts of Beijing, about 900 miles away, after he called his client’s wife and arranged to visit her later that day at a hospital.

“They already were there lying in ambush,” Mr. Li said. He added that Wang Lijun, by reputation, was a “tapping freak.”

Political figures were targeted in addition to those suspected of being mobsters.

One political analyst with senior-level ties, citing information obtained from a colonel he recently dined with, said Mr. Bo had tried to tap the phones of virtually all high-ranking leaders who visited Chongqing in recent years, including Zhou Yongkang, the law-and-order czar who was said to have backed Mr. Bo as his potential successor.

“Bo wanted to be extremely clear about what leaders’ attitudes toward him were,” the analyst said.

In one other instance last year, two journalists said, operatives were caught intercepting a conversation between the office of Mr. Hu and Liu Guanglei, a top party law-and-order official whom Mr. Wang had replaced as police chief. Mr. Liu once served under Mr. Hu in the 1980s in Guizhou Province.

Perhaps more worrisome to Mr. Bo and Mr. Wang, however, was the increased scrutiny from the party’s Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, which by the beginning of 2012 had stationed up to four separate teams in Chongqing, two undercover, according to the political analyst, who cited Discipline Inspection sources. One line of inquiry, according to several party academics, involved Mr. Wang’s possible role in a police bribery case that unfolded last year in a Liaoning city where he once was police chief.

Beyond making a routine inspection, it is not clear why the disciplinary official who telephoned Mr. Hu — Ma Wen, the minister of supervision — was in Chongqing. Her high-security land link to Mr. Hu from the state guesthouse in Chongqing was monitored on Mr. Bo’s orders. The topic of the call is unknown but was probably not vital. Most phones are so unsafe that important information is often conveyed only in person or in writing.

But Beijing was galled that Mr. Bo would wiretap Mr. Hu, whether intentionally or not, and turned central security and disciplinary investigators loose on his police chief, who bore the brunt of the scrutiny over the next couple of months.

“Bo wanted to push the responsibility onto Wang,” one senior party editor said. “Wang couldn’t dare say it was Bo’s doing.”

Yet at some point well before fleeing Chongqing, Mr. Wang filed a pair of complaints to the inspection commission, the first anonymously and the second under his own name, according to a party academic with ties to Mr. Bo.

Both complaints said Mr. Bo had “opposed party central” authorities, including ordering the wiretapping of central leaders. The requests to investigate Mr. Bo were turned down at the time. Mr. Bo, who learned of the charges at a later point, told the academic shortly before his dismissal that he thought he could withstand Mr. Wang’s charges.

Mr. Wang is not believed to have discussed wiretapping at the United States Consulate. Instead, he focused on the less self-incriminating allegations of Mr. Bo’s wife’s arranging the killing of Mr. Heywood.

But tensions between the two men crested, sources said, when Mr. Bo found that Mr. Wang had also wiretapped him and his wife. After Mr. Wang was arrested in February, Mr. Bo detained Mr. Wang’s wiretapping specialist from Liaoning, a district police chief named Wang Pengfei.

Internal party accounts suggest that the party views the wiretapping as one of Mr. Bo’s most serious crimes. One preliminary indictment in mid-March accused Bo of damaging party unity by collecting evidence on other leaders.

Party officials, however, say it would be far too damaging to make the wiretapping public. When Mr. Bo is finally charged, wiretapping is not expected to be mentioned. “The things that can be publicized are the economic problems and the killing,” according to the senior official at the government media outlet. “That’s enough to decide the matter in public.”

Advertisements

DoD Stability Operations Capabilities Assessment 2012 – SECRET

https://publicintelligence.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/DoD-StabilityOpsAssessment.png

 

This report provides an assessment of Department of Defense (DoD) efforts over the past two years to implement requirements set forth in the 2009 DoD Instruction 3000.05, Stability Operations. It highlights significant initiatives currently underway or planned throughout DoD and provides recommendations and key findings to achieve further progress.

The overarching theme of the report is that the Department must learn from previous hard-won experience in stability operations and institutionalize, enhance, and evolve the lessons learned and capabilities acquired by the U.S. military for current and future operations. As part of a risk -balanced strategy, one ofthe Pentagon’s top priorities should be to prepare for the predominant sources of conflict in the 21 5t Century, specifically fragile states and the irregular challenges that they spawn. Even if we anticipate participating more selectively in these operations in the future, the U.S. military should capitalize on the adaptation in thinking that occurred as a result of the experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq by preserving perishable expertise, and retaining key capabilities and the appropriate skill sets for these operations.

As U.S. defense strategy shifts from an emphasis on today’s wars to preparing for future challenges, the task of promoting stability in a volatile strategic environment remains one of our Nation’s top concerns. Emphasizing more effective non-military means and military-to-military cooperation can help to prevent instability from triggering conflicts, thereby reducing demand for large-scale stability operations aimed at bringing such conflicts to closure. As part of a prudent down-sizing of our posture, the U.S. military must be able to retain otherwise perishable skills, expertise and specialized capabilities acquired as a consequence of its hard-won experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan. Retaining these capabilities requires an enduring investment in people, the wherewithal to institutionalize lessons learned, and the retention of forces that can be quickly regenerated to meet future demands.

The Department of Defense (DoD) has taken positive steps since 2009 toward enhancing its stability operations capabilities. Joint doctrine is now on a firmer foundation; the Services have strengthened relevant proficiencies at the unit level; and investments in civil-military planning, exercising, field-level coordination and capacity-building are noteworthy. Even so, these gains are ad hoc and temporary for the most part and will be fleeting unless affirmative steps are taken to preserve stability operations capabilities in the years ahead.

To help achieve this goal, this report recommends the following specific steps:

• DoD should continue to emphasize stability operations as a core military capability in all of its key policy and strategy documents.
• DoD should continue to make refinements to existing doctrine as new lessons emerge and develop a process to fast-track doctrine that absorbs these lessons based on operational necessities.
• DoD should persist in its efforts to translate such lessons into stability operations-related training and education at all levels. To help sustain civil-military training capacities, it should consider ways of incentivizing U.S. whole-of-government training and exercises, possibly through a pooled funding approach. It could also consider combining multiple exercises into a single capstone event focused on interagency integration.
• In close coordination with interagency partners, DoD should mitigate the negative effects of predictable gaps in civilian capacity in uncertain and hostile operational environments by continuing to place emphasis upon preparing U.S. military forces for likely stability operations tasks. We should continue to advocate for increased civilian agency capacity and resources, while also promoting the development of civilian-military capacity of allies and other partners to address stability operations and related activities.
• As defense resources shift back from contingency funding to our base budget, DoD should continue to work with Department of State, interagency partners and the Congress to review the adequacy of legal authorities and funding for the full range of security assistance and coalition support programs requiring coordinated defense, diplomacy, and development efforts in the stability operations arena. Specifically, the Congressionally-mandated annual review of the Global Security Contingency Fund execution, and other resultant lessons learned documents, could help in mapping out possible legislative changes and in recommending interagency planning process improvements.

Unsolved Mysteries of the Second World War – Hitler’s Secret Weapons – Full Movie

This is the most amazing documentary to date covering the technologies and mysteries of the second world war. There is footage in this film that I have never seen before! Amazing, that’s all I can say.

truthseekertimes.ca

 

Unveiled – Central Intelligence Agency Office of Research and Development Technologies Used in U.S.

Citation: [Central Intelligence Agency Office of Research and Development Technologies Used in U.S.; Attached to Routing and Record Sheet; Includes Memoranda Entitled “Repeated Survey of ORD for Non-foreign Intelligence Activities”; “Contacts with Other U.S. Government Agencies Which Could or Have Resulted in Use of CIA-Developed Technology in Addressing Domestic Problems”; “Domestic Tests for Agency Research and Development Efforts”; “Survey of ORD for Non-foreign Intelligence Activities”; “[Excised] ORD Contacts with Domestic Council Agencies”; “Processing of Audio Tape for Bureau of Narcotics Dangerous Drug Division” [Two Versions]; “Assistance to Bureau of Narcotics: Enhancement of Noisy Audio Tape Recordings”; “Telecon This Morning concerning Any OSA Activities Which Could Put the Agency into an Embarrassing Situation”; “Correspondence Received by Chairman Hébert, House Armed Services Committee, concerning [Excised]”; and “Policy regarding Assistance to Agencies outside the Intelligence Community on Speech Processing Problems”; Heavily Excised]
Top Secret, Compendium, May 09, 1973, 41 pp.
Collection: The CIA Family Jewels Indexed
Item Number: FJ00022
Origin: United States. Central Intelligence Agency. Directorate of Science and Technology. Office of Research and Development
Individuals/
Organizations Named:
Aerospace Corporation; Colby, William E.; Colson, Charles W.; Halperin, Morton H.; Hébert, Felix E.; McMahon, John N.; National Institutes of Health (U.S.); Schlesinger, James R.; United States Intelligence Board. Technical Surveillance Countermeasures Committee; United States. Air Force; United States. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; United States. Army; United States. Atomic Energy Commission; United States. Cabinet Committee on International Narcotics Control; United States. Central Intelligence Agency. Directorate of Intelligence. National Photographic Interpretation Center; United States. Central Intelligence Agency. Directorate of Intelligence. Office of Scientific Intelligence; United States. Central Intelligence Agency. Directorate of Science and Technology. Deputy Director; United States. Central Intelligence Agency. Directorate of Science and Technology. Office of Research and Development; United States. Coast Guard; United States. Congress. House. Committee on Armed Services; United States. Defense Intelligence Agency; United States. Department of Agriculture; United States. Department of Commerce; United States. Department of Justice. Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs; United States. Department of Justice. Law Enforcement Assistance Administration; United States. Department of State; United States. Department of the Interior; United States. Department of the Treasury; United States. Department of the Treasury. Customs Service; United States. Environmental Protection Agency; United States. Executive Office of the President; United States. Federal Aviation Administration; United States. Federal Bureau of Investigation; United States. Internal Revenue Service; United States. National Aeronautics and Space Administration; United States. National Security Agency; United States. Navy; United States. Office of Telecommunications Policy; United States. Secret Service
Subjects: Agricultural products | Communications interception | Counterintelligence | Defectors | Electronic surveillance | Hijacking | Human behavior experiments | Mexico-United States Border | Narcotics | Natural disasters | Natural resources | Nuclear reactors | Opium production | Photographic intelligence | Police assistance | Polygraph examinations | Psychological assessments | Research and development | Riot control | San Francisco (California) | Satellite reconnaissance | Surveillance countermeasures | Surveillance equipment | Telephone monitoring | U-2 Aircraft | Watergate Affair (1972-1974)
Abstract: Describes Central Intelligence Agency Office of Research and Development technology and assistance provided to or requested by military and law-enforcement organizations.
Full Text: Document – PDF – this link will open in a new window (1.5 MB)

Durable URL for this record

Confidential – Individual Indicted in Connection with Machine Gun Attack on U.S. Embassy in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 2011

WASHINGTON—Mevlid Jasarevic, 23, a citizen of Serbia, was indicted today by a federal grand jury in the District of Columbia on charges of attempted murder and other violations in connection with his alleged machine gun attack on the U.S. Embassy in Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina on October 28, 2011.

The indictment was announced by Lisa Monaco, Assistant Attorney General for National Security; Ronald C. Machen, Jr., U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia; and James W. McJunkin, Assistant Director in Charge of the FBI’s Washington Field Division.

The 10-count indictment charges Jasarevic with one count of attempt to murder U.S. officers or employees; one count of attempt to murder U.S. nationals within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States (the U.S. Embassy); one count of assault with a dangerous weapon with intent to do bodily harm within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States; one count of assaulting U.S. officers or employees with a deadly weapon; one count of destruction of property within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States; and five counts of use of a firearm during a crime of violence.

Yesterday, authorities in Bosnia-Herzegovina brought charges against Jasaveric and two others in connection with the alleged attack on the U.S. Embassy. Jasaveric is in the custody of Bosnia-Herzegovina authorities. The United States has closely cooperated with Bosnia-Herzegovina authorities in their investigation of the U.S. Embassy attack and strongly supports their decision to charge and prosecute those allegedly involved. The United States will continue to cooperate fully with authorities in Bosnia-Herzegovina to bring to justice those involved.

The case is being investigated by the FBI Washington Field Office. The case is being prosecuted by Assistant U.S. Attorney Robert Bowman of the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Columbia and Trial Attorney Joshua Larocca of the Counterterrorism Section of the Justice Department’s National Security Division. The Office of International Affairs in the Justice Department’s Criminal Division also provided assistance.

The attempted murder charges against Jasarevic, as well as the charges of assaulting U.S. officers and employees with a deadly weapon, and destruction of property each carry a maximum sentence of 20 years. Each charge of using a firearm during a crime of violence carries a mandatory minimum sentence of 30 years for use of a machine gun. The charge of assault with a dangerous weapon with intent to do bodily harm within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States carries a maximum sentence of 10 years.

The public is reminded that an indictment contains mere allegations. Defendants are presumed innocent unless and until proven guilty in a court of law.