Gehackte Polit- und Promidaten bis auf weiteres weiter online via Blockchain

 

 

Die gehackten Polit- und Promidaten werden wohl bis auf weiteres online bleiben. Dank der Blockchain-Technologie.

Die mutmasslich rechts orientierten Hacker haben die Daten auf einschlägige Webseiten verteilt. Durch die dezentrale Blockchain-Technologie wird es kaum möglich sein, alle Webseiten lahmzulegen. Uns liegen alle Daten vor.

Die Auswahl der gecrackten Daten sowie die Aufmachung und die Hauptzielpersonen sprechen eindeutig für einen rechtsextrem motivierten Hackerangriff von einem Dutzend Personen für einen mittelfristigen bis langfristigen Zeitraum via Outlook, Phishing, Honeypots, Viren und Trojanern.

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TOP SECRET – The U.S. Treasury About Russian Oligarchs

http://fuckyeahstupidgifs.tumblr.com/post/5043279727/frankisaurusrex-boredyet-source-no-joke

 

Department of the Treasury, Russia
U.S. Treasury Report Identifying Russian Senior Foreign Political Figures and Oligarchs
February 19, 2018
Report to Congress Pursuant to Section 241 of the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act of 2017 Regarding Senior Foreign Political Figures and Oligarchs in the Russian Federation and Russian Parastatal Entities
Page Count: 9 pages
Date: January 29, 2018
Restriction: None
Originating Organization: Department of the Treasury
File Type: pdf
File Size: 653,958 bytes
File Hash (SHA-256): 7B075365AF3BBA0A5CDA1C1E3E296620F8DB3B37745C119238B9E1E0335DD47A

 

Section 241 of the Countering Americaメ s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act of 2017 (???TSA) requires the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of State, to submit to the appropriate congressional committees 180 days after enactment ? detailed report ?? senior political figures and oligarchs in the Russian Federation (Section 241 (a)(l)) and on Russian parastatal entities (Section 241 (?)(2)). Pursuant to Section 241(?), the report shall ?? submitted in an unclassified form but may have ? classified annex. This is the unclassified portion of the report.

As required ?? Section 241 (a)( l)(A) of CAATSA, the Department of the Treasury is providing in this unclassified report ? list of senior foreign political figures and oligarchs in the Russian Federation, as determined ?? their closeness to the Russian regime and their net worth. For purposes of this unclassified portion of the report, this determination was made based ?? objective criteria related to individuals ム official position in the case of senior political figures, or ? net worth of $1 billion or more for oligarchs.

?? determine the list of senior political figures, the Department of the Treasury considered the definition in CAATSA Section 24 1 (?)(2), which incorporates ?? reference the definition of モsenior foreign political figureヤ in section 1?10.605 , title 31 of the Code of Federal Regulations. For purposes of this unclassified portion of the report, such names consist of: i) senior members of the Russian Presidential Administration; ii) members of the Russian Cabinet, Cabinet-rank ministers, and heads of other major executive agencies; iii) other senior political leaders, including the leadership of the State Duma and Federation Council, other members of the Russian Security Council, and senior executives at state-owned enterprises. These individuals are listed in Appendix 1 of this report.

CAATSA Section 24 1(?)(2)-(5) requires ? report on Russian parastatal entities, including an assessment of their role in the economy of the Russian Federation; an overview of key U.S. economic sectorsメ exposure to Russian persons and entities; an analysis of the potential effects of imposing additional debt and equity restrictions on parastatal entities; and the possible impact of additional sanctions against oligarchs, senior political figures, and parastatals on the U.S. and Russian economies.

Russian parastatals have origins in the Soviet Unionメs command economy. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Russian government conducted large-scale privatization of these entities; in the early 2000s, it began to renationalize large companies. The Russian government has responded to economic shocks, including the financial crisis in 2008 and the imposition of sanctions in 2014, ?? increasing its role in the economy and ownership of parastatals. As of 2016, Russian parastatals accounted for one-third of all jobs in Russia and 70 percent of Russiaメs GDP.

 

TOP SECRET – France assesses Chemical Attacks in Syria – Document

Following the Syrian regime’s resumption of its military offensive, as well as high levels of air force activity over the town of Douma in Eastern Ghouta, two new cases of toxic agents employment were spontaneously reported by civil society and local and international media from the late afternoon of 7 April. Non-governmental medical organizations active in Ghouta (the Syrian American Medical Society and the Union of Medical Care and Relief Organizations), whose information is generally reliable, publicly stated that strikes had targeted in particular local medical infrastructure on 6 and 7 April.

A massive influx of patients in health centres in Eastern Ghouta (at the very least 100 people) presenting symptoms consistent with exposure to a chemical agent was observed and documented during the early evening. In total, several dozens of people, more than forty according to several sources, are thought to have died from exposure to a chemical substance.

The information collected by France forms a body of evidence that is sufficient to attribute responsibility for the chemical attacks of 7 April to the Syrian regime.

1. — Several chemical attacks took place at Douma on 7 April 2018.

The French services analysed the testimonies, photos and videos that spontaneously appeared on specialized websites, in the press and on social media in the hours and days following the attack. Testimonies obtained by the French services were also analysed. After examining the videos and images of victims published online, they were able to conclude with a high degree of confidence that the vast majority are recent and not fabricated. The spontaneous circulation of these images across all social networks confirms that they were not video montages or recycled images. Lastly, some of the entities that published this information are generally considered reliable.

French experts analysed the symptoms identifiable in the images and videos that were made public. These images and videos were taken either in enclosed areas in a building where around 15 people died, or in local hospitals that received contaminated patients. These symptoms can be described as follows (cf. annexed images):

Suffocation, asphyxia or breathing difficulties,
Mentions of a strong chlorine odour and presence of green smoke in affected areas,
Hypersalivation and hypersecretions (particularly oral and nasal),
Cyanosis,
Skin burns and corneal burns.

No deaths from mechanical injuries were visible. All of these symptoms are characteristic of a chemical weapons attack, particularly choking agents and organophosphorus agents or hydrocyanic acid. Furthermore, the apparent use of bronchodilators by the medical services observed in videos reinforces the hypothesis of intoxication by choking agents.

On the basis of this overall assessment and on the intelligence collected by our services, and in the absence to date of chemical samples analysed by our own laboratories, France therefore considers (i) that, beyond possible doubt, a chemical attack was carried out against civilians at Douma on 7 April 2018; and (ii) that there is no plausible scenario other than that of an attack by Syrian armed forces as part of a wider offensive in the Eastern Ghouta enclave. The Syrian armed and security forces are also considered to be responsible for other actions in the region as part of this same offensive in 2017 and 2018. Russia has undeniably provided active military support to the operations to seize back Ghouta. It has, moreover, provided constant political cover to the Syrian regime over the employment of chemical weapons, both at the UN Security Council and at the OPCW, despite conclusions to the contrary by the JIM.

 

Home Security – Removal Of Kaspersky Products in American Institutions

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

(U//FOUO) DHS Final Decision on Removal of Kaspersky-Branded Products

The following assessment was included in court filings made by Kaspersky in their case against the U.S. Government for banning the use of Kaspersky products.

Financial Decision on Binding Operational Directive 17-01, Removal of Kaspersky-Branded Products

Page Count: 25 pages

Date: December 4, 2017

Restriction: For Official Use Only

Originating Organization: Department of Homeland Security, Office of Cybersecurity and Communications

File Type: pdf

File Size: 504,629 bytes

File Hash (SHA-256): 6F6A660D2CFCD36CBDFAE3675E6F7C76CEEF404DB26736D44AD196A139592100

BOD 17-01 requires all federal executive branch departments and agencies to (1) identify the use or presence of “Kaspersky-branded products” on all federal information systems within 30 days of BOD issuance (i.e., by October 13); (2) develop and provide to DHS a detailed plan of action to remove and discontinue present and future use of all Kaspersky-branded products within 60 days of BOD issuance (i.e., by November 12); and (3) begin to implement the plan of action at 90 days after BOD issuance (i.e., December 12), unless directed otherwise by DHS in light of new information obtained by DHS, including but not limited to new information submitted by Kaspersky.

The Secretary of Homeland Security is authorized to issue BODs, in consultation with the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, for the purpose of safeguarding federal information and information systems from a known or reasonably suspected information security threat, vulnerability, or risk. I recommended issuing the BOD in the Information Memorandum, and the rationale for issuance of the BOD was summarized in your Decision Memorandum. As described further below, your decision to issue BOD 17-01 was based on three interrelated concerns that rested on expert judgments concerning national security: the broad access to files and elevated privileges of anti-virus software, including Kaspersky software; ties between Kaspersky officials and Russian government agencies; and requirements under Russian law that allow Russian intelligence agencies to request or compel assistance from Kaspersky and to intercept communications transiting between Kaspersky operations in Russia and Kaspersky customers, including U.S. government customers. Because of these interrelated concerns, you determined that Kaspersky-branded products present a “known or reasonably suspected information security threat, vulnerability, or risk.” In addition, you found that these risks exist regardless of whether Kaspersky-branded products have ever been exploited for malicious purposes. The BOD is a tool for protecting federal information and information systems from any “known or reasonably suspected information security threat, vulnerability, or risk,” and the Department’s authority to issue it does not depend on whether Kaspersky-branded products have been exploited by the Russian Government or Kaspersky to date.

BRG evaluated specific Kaspersky products according to the following objectives:

(1) To evaluate whether it is feasible for an intelligence agency to passively monitor and decrypt traffic between users of Kaspersky-branded products and the Kaspersky Security Network (“KSN”), a cloud-based network that receives and analyzes information about possible threats from installed Kaspersky software;

(2) To determine whether turning KSN off ― or using the Kaspersky Private Security Network (“KPSN”) ― can reliably prevent potentially sensitive data from being transmitted inadvertently to Kaspersky; and

(3) To evaluate whether a malicious actor leveraging KSN can conduct targeted searches of Kaspersky users for specific information.

As explained in the NCCIC Supplemental Assessment, the BRG analysis not only is largely unresponsive to DHS’s security concerns, but also supports DHS’s concerns in certain areas. For example, on objective (1), BRG analyzed only to the security of the connection between the antivirus software and the KSN; BRG did not address the security of communications within the KSN or between KSN and Kaspersky’s non-KSN IT infrastructure, such as Kaspersky offices and datacenters. BRG also evaluated the potential for “passive” interception of communications by intelligence agencies, but DHS is concerned about “active” operations involving access by Russian intelligence to Kaspersky offices and servers in Russia, as discussed in Section III.A.4 below and Part III.E of the Information Memorandum.

3. Kaspersky Ties to the Russian Government

In the Information Memorandum, I described certain ties, past and present, between Kaspersky officials and Russian government agencies. Kaspersky concedes key aspects of this account, such as Eugene Kaspersky’s former studies at an institute overseen by the KGB and other state institutions and his service as a software engineer at a Ministry of Defense institute. It also admits that its officials might have “acquaintances, friends, and professional relationships within the [Russian] government,” although Kaspersky states that, “in itself,” does not mean that these connections were or are “inappropriate” or “improper.” Furthermore, Kaspersky does not deny various connections to Russian intelligence described in the Information Memorandum, including that Eugene Kaspersky has saunas with a group that usually includes Russian intelligence officials; that Kaspersky’s Chief Legal Officer Igor Chekunov manages a team of specialists who provide technical support to the FSB and other Russian agencies; that the team can gather identifying information from individual computers; and that this technology has been used to aid the FSB in investigations

Professor Maggs makes a number of significant conclusions. Specifically, Professor Maggs

concludes that:

(a) Russian law requires FSB bodies to carry out their activities in collaboration with various entities in Russia, including private enterprises, and thus including Kaspersky.

(b) Private enterprises, including Kaspersky, are under a legal obligation to assist FSB bodies in the execution of the duties assigned to FSB bodies, including counterintelligence and intelligence activity.

(c) Russian law permits FSB service personnel to be seconded to private enterprises, including Kaspersky, with the consent of the head of the enterprise and with the FSB personnel remaining in FSB military service status during the secondment.

(d) Kaspersky qualifies as an “organizer of the dissemination of information on the Internet” and, as such, is required (1) to store in Russia and provide to authorized state bodies, including the FSB, metadata currently and content as of July 1, 2018; and, based on this or other laws, (2) to install equipment and software that enables the FSB and potentially other state authorities to monitor all data transmissions between Kaspersky’s computers in Russia and Kaspersky customers, including U.S. government customers.

Exclusive – Homeland Security’s Cyberstrategy 2018 Revealed




DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Department of Homeland Security Cybersecurity Strategy 2018
May 20, 2018

U.S. Department of Homeland Security Cybersecurity Strategy
Page Count: 35 pages
Date: May 15, 2018
Restriction: None
Originating Organization: Department of Homeland Security
File Type: pdf
File Size: 278,548 bytes
File Hash (SHA-256): 65DED01F461679F5028AFE8C2B0FE08CBFE0EE17BD530F4815D12EF738FB3656

Download File below

https://info.publicintelligence.net/DHS-CybersecurityStrategy-2018.pdf

 


The American people are increasingly dependent upon the Internet for daily conveniences, critical services, and economic prosperity. Substantial growth in Internet access and networked devices has facilitated widespread opportunities and innovation. This extraordinary level of connectivity, however, has also introduced progressively greater cyber risks for the United States. Long-standing threats are evolving as nation-states, terrorists, individual criminals, transnational criminal organizations, and other malicious actors move their activities into the digital world. Enabling the delivery of essential services—such as electricity, finance, transportation, water, and health care—through cyberspace also introduces new vulnerabilities and opens the door to potentially catastrophic consequences from cyber incidents. The growing number of Internet-connected devices and reliance on global supply chains further complicates the national and international risk picture. More than ever, cybersecurity is a matter of homeland security and one of the core missions of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS).

At DHS, we believe that cyberspace can be secure and resilient. We work every day across the Department and with key partners and stakeholders to identify and manage national cybersecurity risks. We do this by adopting a holistic risk management approach. Like every organization, no matter how big or small, we must minimize our organizational vulnerability to malicious cyber activity by protecting our own networks. DHS also has broader responsibilities to protect the larger federal enterprise and improve the security and resilience of other critical systems. At the same time, we seek to reduce cyber threats by preventing and disrupting cyber crimes, and to lessen the consequences of cyber incidents by ensuring an effective federal response when appropriate. Finally, we work to create conditions for more effective cyber risk management through efforts to make the cyber ecosystem more fundamentally secure and resilient. This strategy sets forth our goals, objectives, and priorities to successfully execute the full range of the Secretary of Homeland Security’s cybersecurity responsibilities.

During the last several decades, advances in technology have fundamentally changed the world. Substantial growth in Internet access, use of Internet-enabled devices, and the availability of high speed information technology systems and large datasets have facilitated productivity, efficiencies, and capabilities across all major industries. The proliferation of technology also presents new cybersecurity challenges and leads to significant national risks. More than 20 billion devices are expected to be connected to the Internet by 2020. The risks introduced by the growing number and variety of such devices are substantial.

The United States faces threats from a growing set of sophisticated malicious actors who seek to exploit cyberspace. Motivations include espionage, political and ideological interests, and financial gain. Nation-states continue to present a considerable cyber threat. But non-state actors are emerging with capabilities that match those of sophisticated nation-states. Criminal actors are increasingly empowered by modern information and communications technologies that enable them to grow in sophistication and transnational reach. Transnational criminal organizations also increasingly collaborate through cyberspace. Complicating the threat picture, nation-states are increasingly using proxies and other techniques that blur the distinction between state and non-state cyber activities. In a number of cases, malicious actors engaged in significant criminal cyber activity appear to have both criminal and nation-state affiliations.

These diverse threats can impact federal and nonfederal information systems. Attempted incursions into government networks occur on a daily basis; the number of cyber incidents on federal systems reported to DHS increased more than ten-fold between 2006 and 2015. In 2015, a high-profile intrusion into a single federal agency resulted in the compromise of personnel records of over 4 million federal employees and ultimately affected nearly 22 million people. The growing interconnection of cyber and physical systems within critical infrastructure also creates the potential risk for malicious cyber activity to result in direct physical consequences; for example, the December 2015 overriding of controls in the Ukrainian electric grid resulted in widespread loss of power. Ransomware incidents such as WannaCry and NotPetya demonstrate how the rapid growth of the internet-of-things further complicates the threat as everyday devices can be targeted by malicious cyber actors with potentially far-reaching consequences.

Guiding Principles

DHS advances our mission and will accomplish our cybersecurity goals by aligning departmental activities according to the following guiding principles:

  1. Risk prioritization. The foremost responsibility of DHS is to safeguard the American people and we must prioritize our efforts to focus on systemic risks and the greatest cybersecurity threats and vulnerabilities faced by the American people and our homeland.
  2. Cost-effectiveness. Cyberspace is highly complex and DHS efforts to increase cybersecurity must be continuously evaluated and reprioritized to ensure the best results for investments made.
  3. Innovation and agility. Cyberspace is an evolving domain with emergent risks. Although the proliferation of technology leads to new risks, it also provides an opportunity for innovation. DHS must lead by example in researching, developing, adapting, and employing cutting-edge cybersecurity capabilities and remain agile in its efforts to keep up with evolving threats and technologies.
  4. Collaboration. The growth and development of the Internet has been primarily driven by the private sector and the security of cyberspace is an inherently cross-cutting challenge. To accomplish our cybersecurity goals, we must work in a collaborative manner across our Components and with other federal and nonfederal partners.
  5. Global approach. Robust international engagement and collaboration is required to accomplish our national cybersecurity goals. DHS must engage internationally to manage global cyber risks, respond to worldwide incidents, and disrupt growing transnational cyber threats as well as encourage other nations and foreign entities to adopt the policies necessary to create an open, interoperable, secure, and reliable Internet.
  6. Balanced equities. Cyberspace empowers people and enables prosperity worldwide. Cybersecurity is not an end unto itself, and efforts to mitigate cybersecurity risks must also support international commerce, strengthen international security, and foster free expression and innovation.
  7. National values. DHS must uphold privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties in accordance with applicable law and policy. The Department empowers our cybersecurity programs to succeed by integrating privacy protections from the outset and employing a layered approach to privacy and civil liberties oversight.