U.S. Army Report About North Korea – TOP SECRET

Executive Summary

A North Korean regular infantry division is the most likely type of division a US unit would face on the Korean peninsula. While the Korean People’s Army (KPA) fields armor and mechanized units, the number of regular infantry units far exceeds the other types (pg 3).
KPA offensive operations include the heavy use of artillery with chemical munitions; a primary focus of attacks on combat support (CS), combat service support (CSS), and command and control (C2) units; and deep operations conducted by KPA special-purpose forces (SPF) (pgs 3–4, 11–16, 21–23).
KPA defensive operations focus on the elimination of enemy armor through the heavy use of artillery; battalion, regiment, and division antitank kill zones; and the use of counterattack forces at all levels above battalion-sized units (pgs 16–19, 23–26).
While US forces will face KPA conventional infantry to their front, KPA SPF will initiate offensive operations in the US/South Korean rear areas to create a “second front” (pgs 15–16).
KPA regular forces and SPF will remain in place to conduct stay-behind annihilation ambushes on CS, CSS, and C2 units passing through the passed unit’s area of operations (pg 25).
The KPA divisions are already prepared to fight US and Republic of Korea (ROK) forces today. The vehicles and equipment may be different in the future, but their tactics and techniques will be similar to those used today (pgs 10–26).
Since 2003, the KPA has created seven divisions that are specialized to operate in urban and mountain terrain using irregular warfare techniques. It is expected that the KPA will use several techniques deemed successful in Afghanistan and Iraq against US/ROK forces (pg 20).
TRADOC G-2 ACE Threats Integration (ACE-TI) is the source of the threat tactics series of products. The Threat Tactics Report: North Korea versus the United States (US) and the other similar products serve to describe the foreign nation’s most common combat division with an order of battle, its offensive and defensive doctrine as articulated in its manuals or recent military actions, and an analysis of how this actor would fight if facing the US in the future.

This document is intended primarily for US Army training organizations, but will be applicable across the wider community of US Army Combatant Commands, Army Service Component Commands, and allied partners.

North Korean Infantry Division Major Weapon Systems

The KPA uses a variety of primarily Tier 2, 3, and 4 equipment in its units, as it rarely disposes of any weapons. The best units receive new(er) weapons and their systems are then cascaded through the lower-quality units. Some of the KPA’s weapons and vehicles date back to World War II. Units will attempt to field the same type of weapon systems to reduce logistical issues. The following are some of the major weapons found in a KPA infantry division or infantry regiment.

The KPA prefers the offense over the defense and will stay on the defensive only until it can gather the strength to attack again. The KPA will attempt to avoid US/ROK combat units and will attempt to attack CS, CSS, and C2 units and vulnerable high-value targets in the rear areas in order to reduce the effectiveness of the US/ROK combat units. With assistance in creating a second front via the KPA SPF making these attacks in the US/ROK rear areas, the KPA believes the US/ROK combat units will become combat ineffective, making them vulnerable to KPA follow-on forces.

When forced to go on the defensive the KPA will concentrate its efforts in eliminating its enemy’s tanks. Any units bypassed by enemy forces are directed to continue to fight as a unit or, if the unit becomes combat ineffective, the soldiers are expected by their leaders to continue resistance by conducting irregular warfare operations against any enemy units in their area. Prepared UGFs exist throughout North Korea, especially within 50 miles of the DMZ. If forced on the defensive in these areas, the KPA will fight from these previously prepared positions.

US/ROK units will face intense indirect fire including chemical munitions, conventional KPA units to their front, and SPF elements in their rear areas. US/ROK units will need to simultaneously defeat the KPA divisions attacking their combat units, while defending all units from KPA SPF or stay-behind forces in their rear areas.

TOP SECRET – Defense Intelligence Study About Invisibility

TOP SECRET – Defense Intelligence Study About Invisibility


The idea of invisibility has fascinated people for millennia, inspiring many myths, novels, and films. Invisibility cloaking has recently become a subject of science and technology. This paper describes the important current theoretical and experimental developments and tries to project into the future.


Invisibility may be achieved through three principal methods: camouflage, transparency, and cloaking. Many animals and some plants use camouflage to disguise themselves from predators-for example, by assuming the shapes and colors of objects in their surroundings. The military has long used forms of camouflage; a recent military application of camouflage is stealth technology.

Stealth planes have aerodynamically unusual, edgy shapes and are coated with a special material. Both features serve the same purpose: to make the plane “invisible” to radar. How does it work? In radar, electromagnetic microwaves are emitted by a source, and their reflection by an object-an airplane, for example-is detected. From the direction and the time delay of the reflected waves, the direction and distance of the object are inferred. If the object does not reflect the electromagnetic microwaves back to the source, it will not appear on the radar. This is precisely what stealth technology achieves. Owing to the edgy shape of the stealth plane, most of the incident electromagnetic waves are reflected in different directions; the coating of the plane absorbs the rest. In this way, the stealth plane has become completely black in the spectral range of radar. As for radar waves, the sky is black, not blue, and the plane has assumed the color of the background: the stealth plane is camouflaged.

Optical Metamaterials

As light is simply an electromagnetic wave with shorter wavelengths than microwave radiation, one could imagine an optical cloaking device as the microwave cloak but with much smaller cells, fitted to the smaller wavelength. However, this simple idea is too simple, for two different reasons. One is that metals like the copper of the circuit board or the gold of ruby glass are more electrically resistant to currents oscillating with the frequency of visible light than to currents in the microwave range of the spectrum. Second, and more important, the cells of a metamaterial also emit electromagnetic radiation in an incoherent way, not just as a coherent response to the incoming electromagnetic wave, similar to the spontaneous emission of light by atoms and molecules. The spontaneous emission is significantly stronger in the optical range of the spectrum. In short, metamaterials do not scale; they must be designed differently for visible light, and the loss of light by absorption and incoherent scattering usually is greater for visible light than for microwaves. Figure 13 below illustrates the idea 19 for an optical cloaking metamaterial. Instead of split-ring resonators, nano-scale metal wires are embedded in a transparent host material, for example glass. The wires replace the split-ring resonators on the circuit board of the microwave-cloaking device. They act similarly to the gold particles embedded in ruby glass; their optical properties depend on their lengths and on their arrangement, which, in principle, can be tailormade and controlled using the tools of modern nanotechnology. The thin wires will have lower electric losses than split-ring resonators, and their radiation losses by the equivalent of spontaneous emission are reduced as well. Such optical cloaking devices do not yet exist, but one can gauge the progress in the required technology by considering the progress in negatively refracting optical materials.

Download the study here:



Drug Enforment Administration (DEA) – Emerging Threat Report

The Special Testing and Research Laboratory’s Emerging Trends Program compiled the data for this report through a query of archived seizure and analysis information from drug evidence analyzed by the Drug Enforcement Administration’s laboratory system. This data is representative of drug evidence seized and analyzed in the date ranges annotated. This is not a comprehensive list of all new psychoactive substances and is not representative of all evidence analyzed by DEA. This data is a quarterly snapshot of the new psychoactive substance market in the United States.

The term new psychoactive substance (NPS) describes a recently emerged drug that may pose a public health threat. This includes synthetic cannabinoids, substituted cathinones, phenethylamines, opioids, tryptamines, benzodiazepines, and a variety of other chemical classes. Due to the recent increase in seizures, fentanyl is also included in this report.

An identification is made when authenticated reference material is available for comparison. When reference material is not available, the drug evidence is identified as “substance unconfirmed”. A single unit of drug evidence may have multiple sub-units. For the purposes of this document, each unit of drug evidence counts as one identification regardless of the number of sub-units. Some seized drug evidence contains more than one active ingredient; therefore, more than one identification can be made for a single unit.

Download here


United Nations – West Bank Access Restrictions – Confidential

A complex series of concrete walls, electronic fences, and other obstacles to control Palestinian pedestrian and vehicular movement. Palestinian access to land and communities located behind the Barrier is subject to a permit or prior coordination regime. In its 2004 Advisory Opinion, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) established that the sections of the Barrier which run inside the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, together with the associated gate and permit regime, violate Israel’s obligations under international law.