TOP SECRET – France assesses Chemical Attacks in Syria – Document

Following the Syrian regime’s resumption of its military offensive, as well as high levels of air force activity over the town of Douma in Eastern Ghouta, two new cases of toxic agents employment were spontaneously reported by civil society and local and international media from the late afternoon of 7 April. Non-governmental medical organizations active in Ghouta (the Syrian American Medical Society and the Union of Medical Care and Relief Organizations), whose information is generally reliable, publicly stated that strikes had targeted in particular local medical infrastructure on 6 and 7 April.

A massive influx of patients in health centres in Eastern Ghouta (at the very least 100 people) presenting symptoms consistent with exposure to a chemical agent was observed and documented during the early evening. In total, several dozens of people, more than forty according to several sources, are thought to have died from exposure to a chemical substance.

The information collected by France forms a body of evidence that is sufficient to attribute responsibility for the chemical attacks of 7 April to the Syrian regime.

1. — Several chemical attacks took place at Douma on 7 April 2018.

The French services analysed the testimonies, photos and videos that spontaneously appeared on specialized websites, in the press and on social media in the hours and days following the attack. Testimonies obtained by the French services were also analysed. After examining the videos and images of victims published online, they were able to conclude with a high degree of confidence that the vast majority are recent and not fabricated. The spontaneous circulation of these images across all social networks confirms that they were not video montages or recycled images. Lastly, some of the entities that published this information are generally considered reliable.

French experts analysed the symptoms identifiable in the images and videos that were made public. These images and videos were taken either in enclosed areas in a building where around 15 people died, or in local hospitals that received contaminated patients. These symptoms can be described as follows (cf. annexed images):

Suffocation, asphyxia or breathing difficulties,
Mentions of a strong chlorine odour and presence of green smoke in affected areas,
Hypersalivation and hypersecretions (particularly oral and nasal),
Cyanosis,
Skin burns and corneal burns.

No deaths from mechanical injuries were visible. All of these symptoms are characteristic of a chemical weapons attack, particularly choking agents and organophosphorus agents or hydrocyanic acid. Furthermore, the apparent use of bronchodilators by the medical services observed in videos reinforces the hypothesis of intoxication by choking agents.

On the basis of this overall assessment and on the intelligence collected by our services, and in the absence to date of chemical samples analysed by our own laboratories, France therefore considers (i) that, beyond possible doubt, a chemical attack was carried out against civilians at Douma on 7 April 2018; and (ii) that there is no plausible scenario other than that of an attack by Syrian armed forces as part of a wider offensive in the Eastern Ghouta enclave. The Syrian armed and security forces are also considered to be responsible for other actions in the region as part of this same offensive in 2017 and 2018. Russia has undeniably provided active military support to the operations to seize back Ghouta. It has, moreover, provided constant political cover to the Syrian regime over the employment of chemical weapons, both at the UN Security Council and at the OPCW, despite conclusions to the contrary by the JIM.

 

Home Security – Removal Of Kaspersky Products in American Institutions

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

(U//FOUO) DHS Final Decision on Removal of Kaspersky-Branded Products

The following assessment was included in court filings made by Kaspersky in their case against the U.S. Government for banning the use of Kaspersky products.

Financial Decision on Binding Operational Directive 17-01, Removal of Kaspersky-Branded Products

Page Count: 25 pages

Date: December 4, 2017

Restriction: For Official Use Only

Originating Organization: Department of Homeland Security, Office of Cybersecurity and Communications

File Type: pdf

File Size: 504,629 bytes

File Hash (SHA-256): 6F6A660D2CFCD36CBDFAE3675E6F7C76CEEF404DB26736D44AD196A139592100

BOD 17-01 requires all federal executive branch departments and agencies to (1) identify the use or presence of “Kaspersky-branded products” on all federal information systems within 30 days of BOD issuance (i.e., by October 13); (2) develop and provide to DHS a detailed plan of action to remove and discontinue present and future use of all Kaspersky-branded products within 60 days of BOD issuance (i.e., by November 12); and (3) begin to implement the plan of action at 90 days after BOD issuance (i.e., December 12), unless directed otherwise by DHS in light of new information obtained by DHS, including but not limited to new information submitted by Kaspersky.

The Secretary of Homeland Security is authorized to issue BODs, in consultation with the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, for the purpose of safeguarding federal information and information systems from a known or reasonably suspected information security threat, vulnerability, or risk. I recommended issuing the BOD in the Information Memorandum, and the rationale for issuance of the BOD was summarized in your Decision Memorandum. As described further below, your decision to issue BOD 17-01 was based on three interrelated concerns that rested on expert judgments concerning national security: the broad access to files and elevated privileges of anti-virus software, including Kaspersky software; ties between Kaspersky officials and Russian government agencies; and requirements under Russian law that allow Russian intelligence agencies to request or compel assistance from Kaspersky and to intercept communications transiting between Kaspersky operations in Russia and Kaspersky customers, including U.S. government customers. Because of these interrelated concerns, you determined that Kaspersky-branded products present a “known or reasonably suspected information security threat, vulnerability, or risk.” In addition, you found that these risks exist regardless of whether Kaspersky-branded products have ever been exploited for malicious purposes. The BOD is a tool for protecting federal information and information systems from any “known or reasonably suspected information security threat, vulnerability, or risk,” and the Department’s authority to issue it does not depend on whether Kaspersky-branded products have been exploited by the Russian Government or Kaspersky to date.

BRG evaluated specific Kaspersky products according to the following objectives:

(1) To evaluate whether it is feasible for an intelligence agency to passively monitor and decrypt traffic between users of Kaspersky-branded products and the Kaspersky Security Network (“KSN”), a cloud-based network that receives and analyzes information about possible threats from installed Kaspersky software;

(2) To determine whether turning KSN off ― or using the Kaspersky Private Security Network (“KPSN”) ― can reliably prevent potentially sensitive data from being transmitted inadvertently to Kaspersky; and

(3) To evaluate whether a malicious actor leveraging KSN can conduct targeted searches of Kaspersky users for specific information.

As explained in the NCCIC Supplemental Assessment, the BRG analysis not only is largely unresponsive to DHS’s security concerns, but also supports DHS’s concerns in certain areas. For example, on objective (1), BRG analyzed only to the security of the connection between the antivirus software and the KSN; BRG did not address the security of communications within the KSN or between KSN and Kaspersky’s non-KSN IT infrastructure, such as Kaspersky offices and datacenters. BRG also evaluated the potential for “passive” interception of communications by intelligence agencies, but DHS is concerned about “active” operations involving access by Russian intelligence to Kaspersky offices and servers in Russia, as discussed in Section III.A.4 below and Part III.E of the Information Memorandum.

3. Kaspersky Ties to the Russian Government

In the Information Memorandum, I described certain ties, past and present, between Kaspersky officials and Russian government agencies. Kaspersky concedes key aspects of this account, such as Eugene Kaspersky’s former studies at an institute overseen by the KGB and other state institutions and his service as a software engineer at a Ministry of Defense institute. It also admits that its officials might have “acquaintances, friends, and professional relationships within the [Russian] government,” although Kaspersky states that, “in itself,” does not mean that these connections were or are “inappropriate” or “improper.” Furthermore, Kaspersky does not deny various connections to Russian intelligence described in the Information Memorandum, including that Eugene Kaspersky has saunas with a group that usually includes Russian intelligence officials; that Kaspersky’s Chief Legal Officer Igor Chekunov manages a team of specialists who provide technical support to the FSB and other Russian agencies; that the team can gather identifying information from individual computers; and that this technology has been used to aid the FSB in investigations

Professor Maggs makes a number of significant conclusions. Specifically, Professor Maggs

concludes that:

(a) Russian law requires FSB bodies to carry out their activities in collaboration with various entities in Russia, including private enterprises, and thus including Kaspersky.

(b) Private enterprises, including Kaspersky, are under a legal obligation to assist FSB bodies in the execution of the duties assigned to FSB bodies, including counterintelligence and intelligence activity.

(c) Russian law permits FSB service personnel to be seconded to private enterprises, including Kaspersky, with the consent of the head of the enterprise and with the FSB personnel remaining in FSB military service status during the secondment.

(d) Kaspersky qualifies as an “organizer of the dissemination of information on the Internet” and, as such, is required (1) to store in Russia and provide to authorized state bodies, including the FSB, metadata currently and content as of July 1, 2018; and, based on this or other laws, (2) to install equipment and software that enables the FSB and potentially other state authorities to monitor all data transmissions between Kaspersky’s computers in Russia and Kaspersky customers, including U.S. government customers.

Exclusive – Homeland Security’s Cyberstrategy 2018 Revealed




DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Department of Homeland Security Cybersecurity Strategy 2018
May 20, 2018

U.S. Department of Homeland Security Cybersecurity Strategy
Page Count: 35 pages
Date: May 15, 2018
Restriction: None
Originating Organization: Department of Homeland Security
File Type: pdf
File Size: 278,548 bytes
File Hash (SHA-256): 65DED01F461679F5028AFE8C2B0FE08CBFE0EE17BD530F4815D12EF738FB3656

Download File below

https://info.publicintelligence.net/DHS-CybersecurityStrategy-2018.pdf

 


The American people are increasingly dependent upon the Internet for daily conveniences, critical services, and economic prosperity. Substantial growth in Internet access and networked devices has facilitated widespread opportunities and innovation. This extraordinary level of connectivity, however, has also introduced progressively greater cyber risks for the United States. Long-standing threats are evolving as nation-states, terrorists, individual criminals, transnational criminal organizations, and other malicious actors move their activities into the digital world. Enabling the delivery of essential services—such as electricity, finance, transportation, water, and health care—through cyberspace also introduces new vulnerabilities and opens the door to potentially catastrophic consequences from cyber incidents. The growing number of Internet-connected devices and reliance on global supply chains further complicates the national and international risk picture. More than ever, cybersecurity is a matter of homeland security and one of the core missions of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS).

At DHS, we believe that cyberspace can be secure and resilient. We work every day across the Department and with key partners and stakeholders to identify and manage national cybersecurity risks. We do this by adopting a holistic risk management approach. Like every organization, no matter how big or small, we must minimize our organizational vulnerability to malicious cyber activity by protecting our own networks. DHS also has broader responsibilities to protect the larger federal enterprise and improve the security and resilience of other critical systems. At the same time, we seek to reduce cyber threats by preventing and disrupting cyber crimes, and to lessen the consequences of cyber incidents by ensuring an effective federal response when appropriate. Finally, we work to create conditions for more effective cyber risk management through efforts to make the cyber ecosystem more fundamentally secure and resilient. This strategy sets forth our goals, objectives, and priorities to successfully execute the full range of the Secretary of Homeland Security’s cybersecurity responsibilities.

During the last several decades, advances in technology have fundamentally changed the world. Substantial growth in Internet access, use of Internet-enabled devices, and the availability of high speed information technology systems and large datasets have facilitated productivity, efficiencies, and capabilities across all major industries. The proliferation of technology also presents new cybersecurity challenges and leads to significant national risks. More than 20 billion devices are expected to be connected to the Internet by 2020. The risks introduced by the growing number and variety of such devices are substantial.

The United States faces threats from a growing set of sophisticated malicious actors who seek to exploit cyberspace. Motivations include espionage, political and ideological interests, and financial gain. Nation-states continue to present a considerable cyber threat. But non-state actors are emerging with capabilities that match those of sophisticated nation-states. Criminal actors are increasingly empowered by modern information and communications technologies that enable them to grow in sophistication and transnational reach. Transnational criminal organizations also increasingly collaborate through cyberspace. Complicating the threat picture, nation-states are increasingly using proxies and other techniques that blur the distinction between state and non-state cyber activities. In a number of cases, malicious actors engaged in significant criminal cyber activity appear to have both criminal and nation-state affiliations.

These diverse threats can impact federal and nonfederal information systems. Attempted incursions into government networks occur on a daily basis; the number of cyber incidents on federal systems reported to DHS increased more than ten-fold between 2006 and 2015. In 2015, a high-profile intrusion into a single federal agency resulted in the compromise of personnel records of over 4 million federal employees and ultimately affected nearly 22 million people. The growing interconnection of cyber and physical systems within critical infrastructure also creates the potential risk for malicious cyber activity to result in direct physical consequences; for example, the December 2015 overriding of controls in the Ukrainian electric grid resulted in widespread loss of power. Ransomware incidents such as WannaCry and NotPetya demonstrate how the rapid growth of the internet-of-things further complicates the threat as everyday devices can be targeted by malicious cyber actors with potentially far-reaching consequences.

Guiding Principles

DHS advances our mission and will accomplish our cybersecurity goals by aligning departmental activities according to the following guiding principles:

  1. Risk prioritization. The foremost responsibility of DHS is to safeguard the American people and we must prioritize our efforts to focus on systemic risks and the greatest cybersecurity threats and vulnerabilities faced by the American people and our homeland.
  2. Cost-effectiveness. Cyberspace is highly complex and DHS efforts to increase cybersecurity must be continuously evaluated and reprioritized to ensure the best results for investments made.
  3. Innovation and agility. Cyberspace is an evolving domain with emergent risks. Although the proliferation of technology leads to new risks, it also provides an opportunity for innovation. DHS must lead by example in researching, developing, adapting, and employing cutting-edge cybersecurity capabilities and remain agile in its efforts to keep up with evolving threats and technologies.
  4. Collaboration. The growth and development of the Internet has been primarily driven by the private sector and the security of cyberspace is an inherently cross-cutting challenge. To accomplish our cybersecurity goals, we must work in a collaborative manner across our Components and with other federal and nonfederal partners.
  5. Global approach. Robust international engagement and collaboration is required to accomplish our national cybersecurity goals. DHS must engage internationally to manage global cyber risks, respond to worldwide incidents, and disrupt growing transnational cyber threats as well as encourage other nations and foreign entities to adopt the policies necessary to create an open, interoperable, secure, and reliable Internet.
  6. Balanced equities. Cyberspace empowers people and enables prosperity worldwide. Cybersecurity is not an end unto itself, and efforts to mitigate cybersecurity risks must also support international commerce, strengthen international security, and foster free expression and innovation.
  7. National values. DHS must uphold privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties in accordance with applicable law and policy. The Department empowers our cybersecurity programs to succeed by integrating privacy protections from the outset and employing a layered approach to privacy and civil liberties oversight.

TOP-SECRET Bilderberg Meeting Documents Exposed

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Bilderberg Meetings 1954 Conference Report Osterbeek, Netherlands
June 11, 2016
The following document is part of a series of Bilderberg documents obtained from academic institutions, diplomatic libraries and legal archives spanning a large portion of the group’s history.

BILDERBERG CONFERENCE May 29th-31st, 1954
Page Count: 29 pages
Date: May 1954
Restriction: NOT FOR PUBLICATION EITHER IN WHOLE OR IN PART
Originating Organization: Bilderberg Group
File Type: pdf
File Size: 2,873,892 bytes
File Hash (SHA-256): 7068F9DF51D95CC7625523409ECD6AD42EC558FC878C85C047CC6DDC46932AC7

Download File below

https://info.publicintelligence.net/bilderberg/BilderbergConferenceReport1954.pdf


The Bilderberg Conference was prepared by a group of men of good-will from twelve Western European countries and from the United States of America. Its general purpose was to study the relationship between America and Western Europe in order, by means of a free and frank exchange of views, to lay the foundations for improving mutual understanding between Europeans and Americans on problems of common concern.

The task of choosing the participants fell on this small group, who based their choice on the following considerations: first, men of high integrity; secondly, men internationally, or at least nationally well known; thirdly, men who within their own field hold a position of authority and enjoy the confidence of their fellow-men; fourthly, men having no obvious nationalistic bias and being neither strongly for nor against any other country of the Atlantic Community; fifthly, men well acquainted with the problems of the relations between the United States and Western Europe.

Since the problems confronting the Conference were not only politicians, but concerned the whole field of public activities, the number of politicians invited was, with certain variations, not more than a third. As regards the remainder, slightly under one-third were businessmen and Trade Unionists, the others being intellectuals, professional men, and leaders of public opinion. The Conference was convened by H.R.H. The Prince of the Netherlands. In order to permit people to speak freely, the Conference was private, neither the public nor the press being admitted, and the participants stayed together at country hotels near Arnhem. The costs of the Conference were covered by private subscriptions from Europe, principally from the Netherlands. Every participant, whatever his position in public life – minister, leader of a party, head of an association – attended in his personal capacity; his speeches, declarations, etc., engaged only his personal responsibility.

Three members who had accepted invitations were prevented through illness from attending the Conference, and the absence on this score of one French member and of two Italians was much regretted. Certain others were prevented from attending by important political activities in their own countries, and this was the case so far as two of the French participants were concerned. Unfortunately no politician was able to come from the United States because of pressure of business there facing both the House of Representatives and the Senate.

As was to be expected, the discussions were lively and on a very high level throughout the Conference. As a result of the frankness which prevailed, coupled with the knowledge that discretion was assured, arguments seldom used in public were presented, and helped to clarify many points.

The object of the Conference being to discuss the relations between Western Europe and the United States, it was decided to start with a general debate, followed by a discussion of respective approaches to the main problems which are the cause of divergencies and misunderstandings.

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The five main problems were:-

  1. The general attitude towards Communism and Soviet Russia.
  2. Unification of Europe.
  3. European Defence Community and European Defence.
  4. Problems of Overseas Territories.
  5. Economic problems.

During the discussions these were extended to cover the present situation regarding East-West trade, the present events in South East Asia, and the industrial use of nuclear energy.

To prepare the discussion, five Europeans, as well as five Americans, were asked to present reports on the five subjects.

The intimate atmosphere of the Conference, the frequency of the meetings, all of which were plenary, with no division into committees, created an environment of mutual trust and friendship. Thus, when it came to dealing with controversial subjects, more was accomplished than had been expected.

For a variety of reasons, and in particular in order to allow people to speak with the utmost frankness a,nd with the certainty that their words would reach their fellow-participants only, and nobody else, a plea for the utmost discretion was made by the Chairman at the end of the Conference. That is why, for instance, in the present note, while certain views and arguments are repeated (in no case arc the actual words spoken quoted), the names of the speakers are not given. The participants are therefore requested to exercise the greatest care in the use of this document, which should be treated as strictly confidential. On the other hand, this document is meant to serve as a basis of enlightenment of various views which the participants to the Conference agreed to disseminate and which we hope they will try to make understood in their particular sphere of influence.

At the end of the Conference a Press Statement was released, in which were summarised the principal points of agreement reached on the various subjects under discussion. In this report the relevant paragraphs of that statement are quoted, since they give a balanced picture of the conclusions, but they have been expanded through the addition of a number of views and arguments put forward in the course of the meetings.

The Participants List of the Bilderberg Annual Meeting in Turin 2018

2018 Bilderberg Meeting
Turin, Italy 7-10 June 2018

CHAIRMAN STEERING COMMITTEE

Castries, Henri de (FRA), Chairman, Institut Montaigne

PARTICIPANTS

Achleitner, Paul M. (DEU), Chairman Supervisory Board, Deutsche Bank AG; Treasurer, Foundation Bilderberg Meetings

Agius, Marcus (GBR), Chairman, PA Consulting Group

Alesina, Alberto (ITA), Nathaniel Ropes Professor of Economics, Harvard University

Altman, Roger C. (USA), Founder and Senior Chairman, Evercore

Amorim, Paula (PRT), Chairman, Américo Amorim Group

Anglade, Dominique (CAN), Deputy Premier of Quebec; Minister of Economy, Science and Innovation

Applebaum, Anne (POL), Columnist, Washington Post; Professor of Practice, London School of Economics

Azoulay, Audrey (INT), Director-General, UNESCO

Bildergebnis für bilderberg

Baker, James H. (USA), Director, Office of Net Assessment, Office of the Secretary of Defense

Barbizet, Patricia (FRA), President, Temaris & Associés

Barroso, José M. Durão (PRT), Chairman, Goldman Sachs International; Former President, European Commission

Beerli, Christine (CHE), Former Vice-President, International Committee of the Red Cross

Berx, Cathy (BEL), Governor, Province of Antwerp

Beurden, Ben van (NLD), CEO, Royal Dutch Shell plc

Blanquer, Jean-Michel (FRA), Minister of National Education, Youth and Community Life

Botín, Ana P. (ESP), Group Executive Chairman, Banco Santander

Bouverot, Anne (FRA), Board Member; Former CEO, Morpho

Brandtzæg, Svein Richard (NOR), President and CEO, Norsk Hydro ASA

Brende, Børge (INT), President, World Economic Forum

Brennan, Eamonn (IRL), Director General, Eurocontrol

Brnabic, Ana (SRB), Prime Minister

Burns, William J. (USA), President, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Burwell, Sylvia M. (USA), President, American University

Caracciolo, Lucio (ITA), Editor-in-Chief, Limes

Carney, Mark J. (GBR), Governor, Bank of England

Castries, Henri de (FRA), Chairman, Institut Montaigne; Chairman, Steering Committee Bilderberg Meetings

Cattaneo, Elena (ITA), Director, Laboratory of Stem Cell Biology, University of Milan

Cazeneuve, Bernard (FRA), Partner, August Debouzy; Former Prime Minister

Cebrián, Juan Luis (ESP), Executive Chairman, El País

Champagne, François-Philippe (CAN), Minister of International Trade

Cohen, Jared (USA), Founder and CEO, Jigsaw at Alphabet Inc.

Colao, Vittorio (ITA), CEO, Vodafone Group

Cook, Charles (USA), Political Analyst, The Cook Political Report

Dagdeviren, Canan (TUR), Assistant Professor, MIT Media Lab

Donohoe, Paschal (IRL), Minister for Finance, Public Expenditure and Reform

Döpfner, Mathias (DEU), Chairman and CEO, Axel Springer SE

Ecker, Andrea (AUT), Secretary General, Office Federal President of Austria

Elkann, John (ITA), Chairman, Fiat Chrysler Automobiles

Émié, Bernard (FRA), Director General, Ministry of the Armed Forces

Enders, Thomas (DEU), CEO, Airbus SE

Fallows, James (USA), Writer and Journalist

Ferguson, Jr., Roger W. (USA), President and CEO, TIAA

Ferguson, Niall (USA), Milbank Family Senior Fellow, Hoover Institution, Stanford University

Fischer, Stanley (USA), Former Vice-Chairman, Federal Reserve; Former Governor, Bank of Israel

Gilvary, Brian (GBR), Group CFO, BP plc

Goldstein, Rebecca (USA), Visiting Professor, New York University

Gruber, Lilli (ITA), Editor-in-Chief and Anchor “Otto e mezzo”, La7 TV

Hajdarowicz, Greg (POL), Founder and President, Gremi International Sarl

Halberstadt, Victor (NLD), Professor of Economics, Leiden University; Chairman Foundation Bilderberg Meetings

Hassabis, Demis (GBR), Co-Founder and CEO, DeepMind

Hedegaard, Connie (DNK), Chair, KR Foundation; Former European Commissioner

Helgesen, Vidar (NOR), Ambassador for the Ocean

Herlin, Antti (FIN), Chairman, KONE Corporation

Hickenlooper, John (USA), Governor of Colorado

Hobson, Mellody (USA), President, Ariel Investments LLC

Hodgson, Christine (GBR), Chairman, Capgemini UK plc

Hoffman, Reid (USA), Co-Founder, LinkedIn; Partner, Greylock Partners

Horowitz, Michael C. (USA), Professor of Political Science, University of Pennsylvania

Hwang, Tim (USA), Director, Harvard-MIT Ethics and Governance of AI Initiative

Ischinger, Wolfgang (INT), Chairman, Munich Security Conference

 

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Jacobs, Kenneth M. (USA), Chairman and CEO, Lazard

Kaag, Sigrid (NLD), Minister for Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation

Karp, Alex (USA), CEO, Palantir Technologies

Kissinger, Henry A. (USA), Chairman, Kissinger Associates Inc.

Knot, Klaas H.W. (NLD), President, De Nederlandsche Bank

Koç, Ömer M. (TUR), Chairman, Koç Holding A.S.

Köcher, Renate (DEU), Managing Director, Allensbach Institute for Public Opinion Research

Kotkin, Stephen (USA), Professor in History and International Affairs, Princeton University

Kragic, Danica (SWE), Professor, School of Computer Science and Communication, KTH

Kravis, Henry R. (USA), Co-Chairman and Co-CEO, KKR

Kravis, Marie-Josée (USA), Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute; President, American Friends of Bilderberg

Kudelski, André (CHE), Chairman and CEO, Kudelski Group

Lepomäki, Elina (FIN), MP, National Coalition Party

Leyen, Ursula von der (DEU), Federal Minster of Defence

Leysen, Thomas (BEL), Chairman, KBC Group

Makan, Divesh (USA), CEO, ICONIQ Capital

Massolo, Giampiero (ITA), Chairman, Fincantieri Spa.; President, ISPI

Mazzucato, Mariana (ITA), Professor in the Economics of Innovation and Public Value, University College London

Mead, Walter Russell (USA), Distinguished Fellow, Hudson Institute

Michel, Charles (BEL), Prime Minister

Micklethwait, John (USA), Editor-in-Chief, Bloomberg LP

Minton Beddoes, Zanny (GBR), Editor-in-Chief, The Economist

Mitsotakis, Kyriakos (GRC), President, New Democracy Party

Mota, Isabel (PRT), President, Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation

Moyo, Dambisa F. (USA), Global Economist and Author

Mundie, Craig J. (USA), President, Mundie & Associates

Neven, Hartmut (USA), Director of Engineering, Google Inc.

Noonan, Peggy (USA), Author and Columnist, The Wall Street Journal

Oettinger, Günther H. (INT), Commissioner for Budget & Human Resources, European Commission

O’Leary, Michael (IRL), CEO, Ryanair D.A.C.

O’Neill, Onora (GBR), Emeritus Honorary Professor in Philosophy, University of Cambridge

Osborne, George (GBR), Editor, London Evening Standard

Özkan, Behlül (TUR), Associate Professor in International Relations, Marmara University

Papalexopoulos, Dimitri (GRC), CEO, Titan Cement Company S.A.

Parolin, H.E. Pietro (VAT), Cardinal and Secretary of State

Patino, Bruno (FRA), Chief Content Officer, Arte France TV

Petraeus, David H. (USA), Chairman, KKR Global Institute

Pichette, Patrick (CAN), General Partner, iNovia Capital

Pouyanné, Patrick (FRA), Chairman and CEO, Total S.A.

Pring, Benjamin (USA), Co-Founder and Managing Director, Center for the Future of Work

Rankka, Maria (SWE), CEO, Stockholm Chamber of Commerce

Ratas, Jüri (EST), Prime Minister

Rendi-Wagner, Pamela (AUT), MP (SPÖ); Former Minister of Health

Rivera Díaz, Albert (ESP), President, Ciudadanos Party

Rossi, Salvatore (ITA), Senior Deputy Governor, Bank of Italy

Rubesa, Baiba A. (LVA), CEO, RB Rail AS

Rubin, Robert E. (USA), Co-Chairman Emeritus, Council on Foreign Relations; Former Treasury Secretary

Rudd, Amber (GBR), MP; Former Secretary of State, Home Department

Rutte, Mark (NLD), Prime Minister

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Sabia, Michael (CAN), President and CEO, Caisse de dépôt et placement du Québec

Sadjadpour, Karim (USA), Senior Fellow, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Sáenz de Santamaría, Soraya (ESP), Deputy Prime Minister

Sawers, John (GBR), Chairman and Partner, Macro Advisory Partners

Schadlow, Nadia (USA), Former Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategy

Schneider-Ammann, Johann N. (CHE), Federal Councillor

Scholten, Rudolf (AUT), President, Bruno Kreisky Forum for International Dialogue

Sikorski, Radoslaw (POL), Senior Fellow, Harvard University; Former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Poland

Simsek, Mehmet (TUR), Deputy Prime Minister

Skartveit, Hanne (NOR), Political Editor, Verdens Gang

Stoltenberg, Jens (INT), Secretary General, NATO

Summers, Lawrence H. (USA), Charles W. Eliot University Professor, Harvard University

Thiel, Peter (USA), President, Thiel Capital

Topsøe, Jakob Haldor (DNK), Chairman, Haldor Topsøe Holding A/S

Turpin, Matthew (USA), Director for China, National Security Council

Wahlroos, Björn (FIN), Chairman, Sampo Group, Nordea Bank, UPM-Kymmene Corporation

Wallenberg, Marcus (SWE), Chairman, Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB

Woods, Ngaire (GBR), Dean, Blavatnik School of Government, Oxford University

Yetkin, Murat (TUR), Editor-in-chief, Hürriyet Daily News

Zeiler, Gerhard (AUT), President, Turner International

DHS Warns – Cybersecurity Endangered By Unmanned Aircrafts

 

Bildergebnis für cybersecurity

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS)/National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD)/Office of Cyber and Infrastructure Analysis (OCIA) assesses that unmanned aircraft systems (UASs) provide malicious actors an additional method of gaining undetected proximity to networks and equipment within critical infrastructure sectors. Malicious actors could use this increased proximity to exploit unsecured wireless systems and exfiltrate information. Malicious actors could also exploit vulnerabilities within UASs and UAS supply chains to compromise UASs belonging to critical infrastructure operators and disrupt or interfere with legitimate UAS operations.

UAS FACILITATE PHYSICAL ACCESS TO UNSECURED SYSTEMS

UASs provide malicious actors an additional method of gaining proximity to networks and equipment within critical infrastructure sectors. Malicious actors could then use the proximity provided by a UAS to wirelessly exploit unsecured systems and extract information from systems they cannot otherwise access remotely or may not be able to access due to range limitations. This includes networks and devices within secured buildings, as well as networks and devices behind fencing and walls.

UASs can also allow a malicious actor to wirelessly exploit vulnerabilities from a distance (figure 1). The prevalent ownership and operation of UASs by the general public, the distance from which UAS can be operated, and a lack of tracking data can also provide malicious actors a level of anonymity that otherwise may not be available. UASs, in particular UASs, are typically more difficult to detect than a malicious actor attempting to trespass beyond physical barriers.

UAS FOR WIRELESS SYSTEM EXPLOITATION

Malicious actors could utilize UASs in order to wirelessly exploit access points and unsecured networks and devices. This can include using UASs in order to inject malware, execute malicious code, and perform man-in-the-middle attacks. UASs can also deliver hardware for exploiting unsecured wireless systems, allowing malicious actors persistent access to the wireless system until the hardware is detected or runs out of power. While OCIA does not know of a confirmed incident utilizing UASs to exploit wireless systems, researchers have demonstrated this capability.

MALICIOUS ACTORS CAN EXPLOIT COMPROMISED UAS

While UASs can be used as a tool for an attacker, they are also vulnerable to exploitation. Many commercial UAS variations, for example, currently communicate with ground stations and operators using unencrypted feeds. This can allow a malicious actor to intercept and review data sent to and from the UAS.