Exposed – U.S. Army TRISA Threat Tactics Report: Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant

The following report is part of a series produced by the TRADOC G-2 Intelligence Support Activity (TRISA) Complex Operational Environment and Threat Integration Directorate (CTID).  While the reports contain no control markings, they are not released publicly.

USArmy-TRISA-ISIL

TRISA-CTID Threat Tactics Report: ISIL

  • 30 pages

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The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) has risen to prominence as a danger to peace and a regional threat with global impact. This perception comes, in large measure, because of its successes in Syria and then a rapid takeover of northern Iraq. Its military victories are largely due to successful recruiting, intra-insurgent conflict, large cash reserves, and ineffective opponents. There is much to learn from how ISIL is fighting. The ready availability of recruits, many of whom are foreigners attracted to ISIL successes, and large amounts of money for payroll and purchasing war materiel are critical considerations, but it is also important to consider how ISIL is fighting on the ground.

This report is intended to identify key aspects of tactics and techniques used in ISIL’s actions in Iraq and Syria. ISIL, unlike its predecessors and competitors, is a paramilitary insurgency. While the baseline techniques being used by ISIL do not differ significantly from those it has employed since its early days as an al-Qaeda affiliate in Iraq, its capabilities have increased in scope and complexity. Techniques making use of suicide vehicle-borne IEDS (SVBIED) and vehicle-borne IEDs (VBIED) have become more sophisticated. ISIL’s use of information warfare (INFOWAR) has become more refined and pervasive with the adaptation of social media technology and increased technical competency among recruits. ISIL has targeted infrastructure such as dams, oil refineries, and power plants for use in population control and financing. ISIL has also demonstrated the ability to execute military tactics that require a level of competence and control uncommon in recent experience.

Executive Summary

• ISIL is an evolution of an insurgent group that has changed its name to reflect an increasing geographic vision.
• ISIL’s advantage to date has been an increasingly large number of fighters and deep cash reserves to fund its operations. This provides greater capacity to organize, train, and equip like a military organization.
• ISIL executes military tactics to the best of its capability. This is a greater capability than that shown by previous insurgencies in the area, but still not best practice in a number of warfighting functions and key tasks.
• High value targets for ISIL have included such infrastructure as dams and oil refineries, which also contribute to its cash flow.
• Social media use has reached a new level of refinement as ISIL has capitalized on Western recruits’ language skills and a new generation of technically savvy apprentices.

Command and Control

Abu Bakr al Baghdadi, the ISIL-appointed caliph, governs through a bureaucratic organization that includes close advisors and specialty, regional, and local councils. Al Baghdadi requires a theologically-based pledge of loyalty and fealty. Until recent US airstrikes, ISIL had relatively unfettered movement capabilities along a corridor spanning northern Syria and Iraq. Command and control under these circumstances did not require the kinds of considerations now necessary with the US airstrikes targeting ISIL communication nodes. The use of couriers is likely to become an important part of communicating to ISIL’s network of fighters.
ISIL’s growth has come from its ability to coopt, dominate, or absorb competitor organizations. Some of these organizations may only be fair-weather friends and leave the coalition when the time is deemed right. There is a very real chance that ISIL leadership will lose control through splintering and infighting. With a varied and diverse demographic of foreign fighters, Sunni tribes, former Baathist leaders, etc., the challenge for ISIL will be controlling both the message and the fight.

A key element of ISIL’s command and control infrastructure is social media. During the attack on Mosul, for example, ISIL sent tens of thousands of tweets in a way that avoided the Twitter spam trigger. While social media companies are constantly identifying and deleting questionable accounts, it is easy to simply open a new account. A new, tech-savvy generation of jihadists opens up new means of communicating to vast audiences for recruiting, propaganda, and bureaucratic control.

Anti-Armor

ISIL’s anti-armor arsenal now contains a number of highly effective weapons that can be used against Iraqi and Syrian security forces. Anti-armor weapons with shape charges increase the likelihood of targeted armor vehicle crew casualties, but may not completely destroy the targeted vehicle during the engagement.15 However, due to Iraqi Security Forces’ (ISF) challenges in maintaining larger armored vehicles like the M1, it is possible this platform has been denied future use. The most common systems in use right now are the Kornet, the M79 Osa Rocket Launcher, and the ubiquitous rocket-propelled grenade launcher. In addition, ISIL has also captured a number of Russian and US tanks which, while more difficult to maintain and larger targets, can be used to attack enemy convoys.

Not surprisingly, these weapons are of choice use for the prosecution of offensive actions like assaults and ambushes. In July 2013, ISIL fighters ambushed an ISF convoy in the Khalidiyah area in Anbar Province. The convoy consisted of at least three M1A1 Abrams tanks and nine M113 armored personnel carriers. The attack occurred on a rural dirt road, initiated with IEDs and followed with anti-tank fire. The graphic below shows the missile hitting the tank. Even more recently, on 20 April 2014, ISF lost a formation with mixed armored vehicles including T-62 tanks.

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA against Fifa Manager – The Indictment – Fifa Anklageschrift im Original

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“Insider enthüllen mutmaßliche GoMoPa-Gesellschafter”-Liste

“GoMoPa”-Genosse “Klaus-Dieter Maurischat”

Die mutmaßlichen Gesellschafter:

Hubert Altenried, Aichstetten
Guido Annovazzi, Rheinstetten
Peter Okon, Altach
Michael Bartneck, Delmenhorst
Prof. Dr.Reinhold Berz, Independencia
Selma Beyeler, Berlin
Erwin Bieregger, Sattledt
Klaus Borchers, Homburg- Saar
Fritz Felsinger, Seeboden
Peter Fenk, Wien
Michael Geckeler, Hohenstein-Ödenwaldstetten
Michael Geppert, Marwitz
Kirsten Kraeter, Dubai
Dr. Manfred Hanke, Heidelberg
Max Häring, Weil im Schönbuch
Kurt Hartel, Freising
Peter Heidrich, Mahlberg
Brigitte Held, Kirchheim/ Teck
Erich Hellmund, Darmstadt
Christoph M. Herter, Klein Meckelsen
Sieghart K. Herter, Klein Meckelsen
Matthias Heuschmidt, Ravensburg
Thomas Höder, Bad Tölz
Michael Holzberger, Wassermungenau
Timo Jakob, Eisenach
Dr. Dirk Janssen, München
Dr. Siegfried Jedamzik, Ingolstadt
Janos Kaiser, Freiburg
Bernd Kaubisch, Fassberg
Uwe Keschke, Niederteufen
Fritz-Heinrich Klausmeyer, Hille
Raimund Kößler, Berlin
Torsten Kurz, Berlin
Matthias Lehr, Wiesloch
Olaf Lindner, Chemnitz
Theodor Mack, Ludwigshafen
Klaus Maurischat, Berlin
Dr. Bernd Mayer, Mühlacker
Ljiljana Milosavljevic, Wien
Eric Mozanowski, Berlin
Stefan Odrazka, Bruchköbel
Ferdinand Pilz, Krumberg
Poschmann Immobilien (Jürgen Poschmann), Leipzig
Peter Reski, Verden/Aller
Dennis Reiter, Petersberg
Michael Salusa, Aschersleben
Gabriele Schiffer, München
Franz Georg Schluifelder, Landsberg
Sven Schmidt, Berlin
Horst-Dieter Schulz, Oestrich- Winkel
Achim Schurig, Esslingen
Hüseyin Sevinc, Kempten
Michael Sievers, Tübingen
Herbert Eder, Bratislava/Slov.Rep.
Michael Spatz, Tutzing-Traubing
Jochem Spelsberg, Erkelenz
Michael Stolz, Neu Ulm/Reutti
Franz Tramberger, Amstetten
Juan-Francisco Vizcaino-Luque, Zug
Oskar Edler von Schickh, Bremen
Inge Vornkahl, Dörverden
Mark Vornkahl, Dörverden
Benno Wagner, Poxdorf
Enrico Walter, Hagenow
René Wanzlik, Möser
Ulrich Weidauer, Zorneding
Andreas Zarth, Rastow

Die mutmaßliche “GoMoPa”-Gesellschafter-Liste,besonders bemerkenswert ist “GoMoPa”-CTO Sven Schmidt, seines Zeichens für die offiziellen (und inoffiziellen) Web-“Auftritte der “GoMoPa”-Genossen, verantwortlich.

Es fehlen hier noch die Hintermänner und IM, über die wir an anderer Stelle berichten.

Quelle: GoMoPa Crime

Revealed – U.S. Army TRISA Threat Report: Attacks Against the Iranian Nuclear Program

 

 

The following report is part of a series produced by the TRADOC G-2 Intelligence Support Activity (TRISA). While the reports contain no control markings, they are not released publicly.

TRADOC G2 Intelligence Support Activity (TRISA) OEA Team Threat Report

  • 36 pages

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USArmy-TRISA-IranNukeProgram_Page_01 USArmy-TRISA-IranNukeProgram_Page_02 USArmy-TRISA-IranNukeProgram_Page_04 USArmy-TRISA-IranNukeProgram_Page_12 USArmy-TRISA-IranNukeProgram_Page_15 USArmy-TRISA-IranNukeProgram_Page_17

Der bizarre Sex der STASI-Kamarilla – Kinder & Orgien

 

Während sich der oberste STASI-Chef, der große Erich Honecker, auf Orgien vergnügte, suchen sich seine Epigonen Opfer über ihr Kinder-Portal “GoMoPa4Kids”, das zwischenzeitlich untergetaucht ist und unter anderem Namen mutmaßlich weiter existiert.

Lesen Sie hier die ganze Geschichte:

Der Bundesnachrichtendienst hat auf Antrag des “Spiegel” Akten über Erich Honecker – von 1971 bis 1989 Staats- und Parteichef der DDR – freigegeben. Darin findet sich nach Angaben des Nachrichtenmagazins die Notiz aus dem Jahr 1967, Honecker sei “nach Kriegsende oft nach Westberlin gefahren, wo in Berlin-Grunewald Orgien veranstaltet wurden”.

Bereits vor drei Jahren hatte der BND auf Antrag Akten zu Honecker freigegeben. Damals war zu erfahren, dass Honeckers Ehe mit seiner dritten Frau Margot in den 80er Jahren zerrüttet war und nur “aus Gründen der Partei- und Staatsräson” aufrechterhalten worden sei. Die Informanten des BND glaubten, dass Honecker ein Verhältnis mit seiner Ärztin hatte.

Der westdeutsche Geheimdienst wusste auch, dass die Ehe der beiden 1953 nur auf Druck des SED-Politbüros zustande kam, damit “seine häufigen Affären mit jungen Mädchen ein Ende” fanden. Bis 1955 war Honecker Vorsitzender der kommunistischen Jugendorganisation der DDR “Freie Deutsche Jugend” (FDJ).

In den jetzt freigegebenen Notizen findet sich der Hinweis aus dem Jahr 1973, dass Honecker heimlich “Schauspiel- und Sprachunterricht” nehme – zu DDR-Zeiten wurden Witze über die nuschelige Aussprache des gebürtigen Saarländers gemacht.Aus Sicht des BND sei Honecker “ein sehr harter Gegner des Westens” gewesen, allerdings “nicht so verschlagen” wie 1971 von ihm entmachteter Vorgänger Walter Ulbricht. Angeblich trug Honecker unter Diplomaten des früheren Ostblocks den Spitznamen “deutscher Chinese” – laut “Spiegel” eine Anspielung auf seine hohen Wangenknochen und schmalen Augen.

 

DDR-Militär Heinz Hoffmann

Er gilt als Vater des Schießbefehls, war Armeegeneral, DDR-Verteidigungsminister und geschätzt von der Truppe. Jetzt enthüllen Stasi-Akten, dass Heinz Hoffmann (1910 bis 1985) offenbar alles andere als ein akkurater Militär war. In den Papieren ist von „Saufgelagen“ die Rede, von einer „regelrechten Orgie“.

Zu der soll es im Juni 1964 während einer Stabssitzung im Sonderzug des Ministers gekommen sein. Laut Akten seien dort Frauen zunächst mit Alkohol abgefüllt worden, dann hätten Hoffmann und Genossen sie „unmöglich betastet, abgeknutscht“ und „teilweise die Kleider zerrissen“. Es heißt, die Männer seien „geil wie ein paar gehörnte Böcke“ gewesen. Stasi-Chef Erich Mielke (1907 bis 2000) stufte Hoffmann als Sicherheitsrisiko ein, vor allem wegen dessen Wodka-Konsums. So finden sich in den knapp 1000 Blatt Berichte, wonach Hoffmann und seine wichtigsten Generäle tranken – „oftmals bis es nicht mehr ging“.

 

“Kinder-Sex-Aufklärer” “Klaus-Dieter Maurischat, oder wie auch immer er wirklich heißen mag…

Die Krönung hiervon ist natürlich das Kinder-Sex-Portal “GoMoPa4Kids”.

 

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http://berndpulch.org/kinder-sexualaufklarung-unter-falscher-flagge-gomopa-4-kids-over-and-out/

TOP-SECRET – The Secret List of KGB Spies in Eastern Europe, Part 73, ER,

wolf-im-schafspelz

 

IPN BU 001043/2860 ERBEL BARBARA ELŻBIETA
IPN BU 00945/822 ERBEL MARIAN – STANISŁAW
IPN BU 001198/2496 ERBEL WŁODZIMIERZ
IPN BU 0193/5463 ERBEN PIOTR
IPN BU 00200/776 ERCHARD-KORNEL-KORNACKA MARIA IZABELA
IPN BU 0194/2077 ERDE (BITTERMAN) ALICJA
IPN BU 01137/106 ERDE ALEKSANDER
IPN BU 0194/2395 ERDEMAN MIECZYSŁAW
IPN BU 00328/1593 ERDENBERGER EWA IRENA
IPN BU 001134/2585 ERDENBERGER EWA IRENA
IPN BU 645/248 ERDMAN LIDIA
IPN BU 001043/453 ERECIŃSKI TADEUSZ
IPN BU 001102/614 ERENFEICHT JACEK
IPN BU 0901/1094 ERENFEICHT PRZEMYSŁAW
IPN BU 01013/354 ERENS ZOFIA
IPN BU 002082/279 ERHARDT LUDWIK JERZY
IPN BU 002086/699 ERHARDT LUDWIK JERZY
IPN BU 0772/2614 ERLEWEIN WŁADYSŁAW
IPN BU 01137/107 ERLICH STEFAN
IPN BU 01434/162 ERLICH ZYGMUNT ZEJFLIK
IPN BU 698/753 ERLICKI FELIKS
IPN BU 0772/2615 ERM JADWIGA
IPN BU 645/284 ERMAN JÓZEF
IPN BU 0604/1750 ERNST (DUDA) IRENA
IPN BU 02063/25 ERNST ANNA
IPN BU 0193/449 ERNST EDMUND
IPN BU 1161/160 ERNST RYSZARD
IPN BU 00945/1953 EROL MEHMET – NURI
IPN BU 01434/300 EROL MEHMET NURU
IPN BU 0193/1753 ERT JERZY
IPN BU 001052/849 ERTEL WŁODZIMIERZ
IPN BU 698/756 ERTMAN JAN
IPN BU 0218/3135 ERTMAN JERZY
IPN BU 698/754 ERTMAŃSKI JAN