FBI – Bank Crime Statistics for Second Quarter of 2011

During the second quarter of 2011, there were 1,023 reported violations of the Federal Bank Robbery and Incidental Crimes Statue, a decrease from the 1,146 reported violations in the same quarter of 2010.1 According to statistics released today by the FBI, there were 1,007 robberies, 15 burglaries, one larceny, and two extortions of financial institutions2 reported between April 1, 2011 and June 30, 2011.

Highlights of the report include:

  • Loot was taken in 91 percent of the incidents, totaling more than $7.8 million.
  • Of the loot taken, 23 percent of it was recovered. More than $1.8 million was recovered and returned to financial institutions.
  • Bank crimes most frequently occurred on Friday. Regardless of the day, the time frame when bank crimes occurred most frequently was between 9:00 a.m. and 11:00 a.m.
  • Acts of violence were committed in 4 percent of the incidents, resulting in 31 injuries, one death, and three persons taken hostage.3
  • Demand notes 4 were the most common modus operandi used.
  • Most violations occurred in the Southern region of the U.S., with 373 reported incidents.

These statistics were recorded as of August 2, 2011. Note that not all bank crimes are reported to the FBI, and therefore the report is not a complete statistical compilation of all bank crimes that occurred in the U.S.

Bank Crime Statistics (BCS)
Federal Insured Financial Institutions
April 1, 2011 – June 30, 2011

I. Violations of the Federal Bank Robbery and Incidental Crimes Statute, Title 18, United States Code, Section 2113

Violations by Type of Institution

Robberies

Burglaries

Larcenies

Commercial Banks

909

11

1

Mutual Savings Banks

4

0

0

Savings and Loan Associations

20

2

0

Credit Unions

74

2

0

Total

1,007

15

1


Grand Total—All Violations: 1,023

Loot Taken and Recovered

Loot was taken in 933 (91 percent) of the 1,023 incidents. Loot taken is itemized as follows:

Cash

$7,820,347.96

Securities—Face Value

$0.00

Checks (Including Traveler’s Checks)

$209.88

Food Stamps

$0.00

Other Property

$0.00

Total

$7,820,557.84

Full or partial recovery of loot taken was reported by law enforcement agencies in 215 (23 percent) of the 933 incidents in which loot was taken. Loot recovered is itemized as follows:

Cash

$1,801,073.18

Securities—Face Value

$0.00

Checks (Including Traveler’s Checks)

$0.00

Food Stamps

$0.00

Other Property

$0.00

Total

$1,801,073.18

Number, Race, and Sex of Perpetrators

The number of persons known to be involved in the 1,023 robberies, burglaries, and larcenies was 1,226. The following table shows a breakdown of the 1,226 persons who have been identified by race and sex. In a small number of cases, the use of full disguise makes determination of race and sex impossible.

White Black Hispanic Other Unknown

Male

459 540 71 14 44

Female

40 37 4 0 0

Unknown Race/Sex: 17

Investigation to date has resulted in the identification of 519 (42 percent) of the 1,226 persons known to be involved. Of these 519 identified persons, 183 (35 percent) were determined to be users of narcotics and 85 (16 percent) were found to have been previously convicted in either federal or state court for bank robbery, bank burglary, or bank larceny.

Occurrences by Day of Week and Time of Day

Monday

179

6-9 a.m.

32

Tuesday

192

9-11 a.m.

309

Wednesday

172

11 a.m.-1 p.m.

240

Thursday

165

1-3 p.m.

190

Friday

204

3-6 p.m.

212

Saturday

78

6 p.m.-6 a.m.

40

Sunday

12

Not determined

0

Not Determined

21

Total

1,023

Total

1,023 

Institution/Community Characteristics

Type of Financial Institution Office

Main Office

29

Branch Office

963

Store

24

Remote Facility/Other

7

Total

1,023

Location of Financial Institution Office

Commercial District

667

Shopping Center

244

Residential

62

Other Location

50

Total

1,023

Community Type

Metropolitan

456

Suburban

185

Small City/Town

362

Rural

20

Total

1,023

Institutional Areas Involved

Counter

974

Night Depository

1

Vault/Safe

57

Auto. Teller Machine

0

Safe Deposit Area

5

Courier/Messenger

0

Office Area

25

Armored Vehicle

11

Drive-In/Walk-Up

14

Other

10

Security Devices Maintained by Victim Institutions

Alarm System

1,005

Surveillance Cameras

1,008

Bait Money

641

Guards

51

Tear Gas/Dye Packs

253

Electronic Tracking

124

Bullet-Resistant Enclosures

117

Security Devices Used During Crimes

Alarm System Activated

926

Surveillance Cameras Activated

997

Bait Money Taken

352

Guards on Duty

42

Tear Gas/Dye Packs Taken

119

Electronic Tracking Activated

65

Security Devices Functioned

Alarm System Functioned

917

Surveillance Cameras Functioned

984

Modus Operandi Used

Demand Note Used

548

Firearm Used1

275

   Handgun

264

   Other Firearm

17

Other Weapon Used2

24

Weapon Threatened3

477

Explosive Device Used or Threatened

37

Oral Demand

575

Vault or Safe Theft

6

Depository Trap Device

0

Till Theft

13

Takeover

58

1 “Handgun” and “Other Firearm” added together may not coincide with “Firearm Used” since, in some cases, both handguns and other firearms are used during the same crime.
2 “Other Weapon Used” includes knives, other cutting instruments, hypodermic needles, clubs, etc.
3 “Weapon Threatened” includes those cases where a weapon was threatened or implied either orally or in a demand note but not actually observed.

Injuries, Deaths, and Hostages Taken

Acts of violence were committed during 44 (4 percent) of the 1,023 robberies, burglaries, and larcenies, which occurred during the three-month period. These acts included 14 instances involving the discharge of firearms, 28 instances involving assaults, and three hostage situations. (One or more acts of violence may occur during an incident.) These acts of violence resulted in 31 injuries, one death, and three persons taken hostage.

Injuries

Customer

4

Employee

15

Employee Family

0

Perpetrator

6

Law Officer

4

Guard

1

Other

1

Total

31

Number of incidents in which injuries occurred: 20

Deaths

Customer

0

Employee

0

Employee Family

0

Perpetrator

1

Law Officer

0

Guard

0

Other

0

Total

1

Number of incidents in which deaths occurred: 1

Hostages Taken

Customer

2

Employee

1

Employee Family

0

Law Officer

0

Guard

0

Other

0

Total

3

Number of incidents in which hostages were taken: 3

II. Bank Extortion Violations Which Were Investigated Under the Federal Bank Robbery and Incidental Crimes Statute, Title 18, United States Code, Section 2113 (April 1, 2011 – June 30, 2011)

Violations by Type of Institution

Commercial Banks

2

Mutual Savings Banks

0

Savings and Loans Associations

0

Credit Unions

0

Armored Car

0

Total

2

Loot Taken and Recovered

There was no loot taken or recovered.

Number, Race, and Sex of Perpetrators

The number of persons known to be involved in the two extortion incidents was zero. In a number of cases, the number and description of individuals involved are unknown due to nonobservance of the perpetrator by the victim(s) or the use of disguises.

Occurrences by Day of Week and Time of Day

Monday

0

6-9 a.m.

2

Tuesday

0

9-11 a.m.

0

Wednesday

0

11 a.m-1 p.m.

0

Thursday

1

1-3 p.m.

0

Friday

0

3-6 p.m.

0

Saturday

1

6 p.m.-6 a.m.

0

Sunday

0

Not Determined

0

Not Determined

0

Total

2

Total

2

Institution/Community Characteristics

Type of Financial Institution Office

Main Office

0

Branch Office

2

Store

0

Remote Facility/Other

0

Total

2

Location of Financial Institution Office

Commercial District

0

Shopping Center

1

Residential

1

Other Location

0

Total

2

Community Type

Metropolitan

0

Suburban

0

Small City/Town

2

Rural

0

Total

2

Security Devices Maintained by Victim Institutions

Alarm System

2

Surveillance Cameras

2

Bait Money

2

Guards

0

Tear Gas/Dye Packs

0

Electronic Tracking

0

Bullet-Resistant Enclosures

0

Security Devices Used During Crimes

Alarm System Activated

1

Surveillance Cameras Activated

0

Bait Money Taken

0

Guards on Duty

0

Tear Gas/Dye Packs Taken

0

Electronic Tracking Activated

0

Modus Operandi Used

Demand Note Used

2

Firearm Used

0

Other Weapon Used

0

Weapon Threatened

0

Explosive Device Used or Threatened

0

Telephone Call

0

Injuries, Deaths, and Hostages Taken

There were no injuries, deaths, or hostages taken during the three-month period.

III. Bank Robbery Statute Violations by Regions, Geographic Divisions, States, and Territories (April 1, 2011 – June 30, 2011)

Regional Summary

Bank Robberies

Bank Burglaries

Bank Larcenies

Bank Extortions

Northeast

134

4

0

0

North Central

214

1

0

0

South

362

8

1

2

West

291

2

0

0

Territories

6

0

0

0

Totals

1,007

15

1

2

Bank Robberies Bank Burglaries Bank Larcenies Bank Extortions

Northeast

134

4

0

0

 

 

 

 

New England

40

0

0

0

   Connecticut

18

0

0

0

   Maine

0

0

0

0

   Massachusetts

17

0

0

0

   New Hampshire

1

0

0

0

   Rhode Island

4

0

0

0

   Vermont

0

0

0

0

Middle Atlantic

167

4

0

0

   New Jersey

31

3

0

0

   New York

79

1

0

0

   Pennsylvania

57

0

0

0

Bank Robberies Bank Burglaries Bank Larcenies Bank Extortions

North Central

214

1

0

0

East North Central

152

0

0

0

   Illinois

28

0

0

0

   Indiana

18

0

0

0

   Michigan

36

0

0

0

   Ohio

62

0

0

0

   Wisconsin

8

0

0

0

West North Central

62

1

0

0

   Iowa

10

0

0

0

   Kansas

11

1

0

0

   Minnesota

12

0

0

0

   Missouri

26

0

0

0

   Nebraska

2

0

0

0

   North Dakota

1

0

0

0

   South Dakota

0

0

0

0

Bank Robberies Bank Burglaries Bank Larcenies Bank Extortions

South

362

8

1

2

 

 

 

 

South Atlantic

205

3

1

1

   Delaware

1

0

0

0

   District of Columbia

3

1

1

0

   Florida

41

0

0

0

   Georgia

46

0

0

0

   Maryland

28

0

0

0

   North Carolina

28

0

0

0

   South Carolina

20

2

0

0

   Virginia

35

0

0

0

   West Virginia

3

0

0

1

East South Central

45

2

0

0

   Alabama

11

0

0

0

   Kentucky

12

0

0

0

   Mississippi

3

2

0

0

   Tennessee

19

0

0

0

West South Central

112

3

0

1

   Arkansas

5

1

0

1

   Louisiana

11

0

0

0

   Oklahoma

25

0

0

0

   Texas

71

2

0

0

Bank Robberies Bank Burglaries Bank Larcenies Bank Extortions

West

291

2

0

0

 

 

 

 

Mountain

101

1

0

0

   Arizona

40

0

0

0

   Colorado

31

0

0

0

   Idaho

3

0

0

0

   Montana

3

0

0

0

   Nevada

5

0

0

0

   New Mexico

15

0

0

0

   Utah

4

1

0

0

   Wyoming

0

0

0

0

Pacific

190

1

0

0

   Alaska

2

0

0

0

   California

135

1

0

0

   Hawaii

3

0

0

0

   Oregon

14

0

0

0

   Washington

36

0

0

0

Bank Robberies Bank Burglaries Bank Larcenies Bank Extortions

Territories

6

0

0

0

Guam

0

0

0

0

Puerto Rico

6

0

0

0

Virgin Islands

0

0

0

0

Totals

1,007

15

1

2

IV. Violations Involving Armored Carriers Investigated Under the Hobbs Act, Title 18, United States Code, Section 1951 (April 1, 2011 – June 30, 2011)

Armored Carrier Incidents

Hobbs Act

12

Total

12

Loot Taken and Recovered

Loot was taken in nine (75 percent) of the 12 incidents. Loot taken is itemized as follows:

Cash

$749,769.00

Securities—Face Value

$0.00

Checks (Including Traveler’s Checks)

$0.00

Food Stamps

$0.00

Other Property

$200.00

Total

$749,969.00

Full or partial recovery of loot was reported by law enforcement agencies in two of the 10 incidents in which loot was taken. Loot recovered is itemized as follows:

Cash

$30,040.00

Securities—Face Value

$0.00

Checks (Including Traveler’s Checks)

$0.00

Food Stamps

$0.00

Other Property

$200.00

Total

$30,240.00

Number, Race, and Sex of Perpetrators

The number of persons known to be involved in the 12 armored carrier incidents was 28. In a number of cases, the number and description of individuals involved are unknown due to nonobservance of the perpetrator by the victim(s) or the use of disguises. The following table shows a breakdown of the 28 known individuals involved by race and sex:

White Black Hispanic Other Unknown

Male

0 22 0 0 2

Female

0 0 0 0 0

Unknown Race/Sex: 4

Occurrences by Day of Week and Time of Day

Monday

1

6-9 a.m.

3

Tuesday

1

9-11 a.m.

7

Wednesday

2

11 a.m-1 p.m.

1

Thursday

4

1-3 p.m.

0

Friday

2

3-6 p.m.

1

Saturday

1

6 p.m.-6 a.m.

0

Sunday

1

Not Determined

0

Not Determined

0

Total

12

Total

12

Community Characteristics

Location

Commercial District

6

Shopping Center

4

Residential

2

Rural

0

Total

12

Community Type

Metropolitan

8

Suburban

3

Small City/Town

1

Rural

0

  Total

12

Modus Operandi Used

Firearm Used4

11

    Handgun

10

    Other Firearm

1

Other Weapon Used5

0

Weapon Threatened6

6

Explosive Device Used or Threatened

0

Oral Demand

9

Vault or Safe Theft

0

4 “Handgun” and “Other Firearm” added together may not coincide with “Firearm Used” since, in some cases, both handguns and firearms are used during the same crime. 
5 “Other Weapon Used” includes knives, other cutting instruments, hypodermic needles, clubs, etc. 
6 “Weapon Threatened” includes those cases where a weapon was threatened or implied either orally or in a demand note but was not actually observed. 

Injuries, Deaths, and Hostages Taken 

Acts of violence were committed during six of the 12 armored carrier incidents which occurred during the three-month period. These acts of violence resulted in one death, three injuries, and no hostages taken when the violent acts were committed. (One or more acts of violence may occur during an incident.)

Injuries

Customer

0

Employee

0

Perpetrator

1

Law Officer

0

Guard

2

Other

0

Total

3

Number of incidents in which injuries occurred: 3

Deaths

Customer

0

Employee

0

Perpetrator

1

Law Officer

0

Guard

0

Other

0

Total

1

Number of incidents in which deaths occurred: 1

Any statistical information furnished in this booklet is subject to change upon the investigation of bank robbery incidents, which occurred during 2011.

The BCS provides a nationwide view of bank robbery crimes based on statistics contributed by FBI field offices responding to bank robberies or otherwise gathered when provided to the FBI from local and state law enforcement.

Statistics recorded as of 08/02/2011, at FBI Headquarters.

Note: Not all bank robberies are reported to the FBI, and therefore BCS is not a complete statistical compilation of all banrk obberies that occur in the United States.

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Leslie Janous Sentenced to 110 Months in Prison for Wire Fraud and Money Laundering

KNOXVILLE, TN—Leslie Janous, 36, of Knoxville, Tenn., was sentenced today in U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee, by the Honorable Leon Jordan, Senior U.S. District Judge, to serve 110 months in federal prison. The sentence was the result of guilty pleas by Janous on February 24, 2011, to a federal grand jury indictment charging her with wire fraud and an information charging her with money laundering.

In April 2011, while awaiting sentencing for her offenses, Janous fled from the Knoxville area. She was apprehended by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) on May 6, 2011, in Apache Junction, Ariz., and held in custody pending sentencing.

In addition to her term in prison, Janous was ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $6,651,829.07 to her former employer, Scancarbon, Inc., the company that she defrauded. Judge Jordan also ordered that all proceeds of her offenses are subject to forfeiture.

U.S. Attorney Bill Killian said, “If there was ever a case of aggravated embezzlement, this was it. So far, throughout the indictment, arrest, plea of guilty and her subsequent efforts to escape, Leslie Janous has shown no remorse for her conduct. Service of this sentence will prove the seriousness of her criminal acts.”

The indictment and subsequent conviction of Janous was the result of an investigation conducted by the FBI, U.S. Postal Inspection Service, Internal Revenue Service, and Knox County Sheriff’s Office. Assistant U.S. Attorney Frank M. Dale, Jr., represented the United States.

Developer Guilty of Fraud in the Development of the East St. Louis Bowman Estates Project

A Clayton developer pled guilty in U.S. District Court on October 27, 2011, for his role in the failed Bowman Estates construction project, the United States Attorney for the Southern District of Illinois, Stephen R. Wigginton, announced today. Harold Rosen, age 80, was indicted by a federal grand jury on January 21, 2011, for attempting to obtain more than $1.9 million of public financing under false pretenses.

As part of his plea, Rosen admitted that he provided cash payments and a promise of future employment to Arthur M. Johnson, the director of the Community Development Department for the city of East St. Louis, to receive favorable treatment from the city as he attempted to develop the Bowman Estates project. Johnson pled guilty on May 20, 2011, to aiding and abetting a portion of Rosen’s wire fraud and to bribery charges for accepting improper benefits in connection with business conducted by his office. Johnson is set for sentencing on November 8, 2011.

Rosen was convicted of seven counts of wire fraud in connection with his contract with the city of East St. Louis to construct a $5.6 million low-income, affordable housing project to be known as “Bowman Estates.” To obtain the construction contract, Rosen lied about his background and experience, falsely portraying himself as a wealthy man with extensive experience as a developer. He supplied fictitious tax returns and bogus financial statements when he applied for bank loans, and he fabricated loan commitments and a financing contract to mislead the city and the East St. Louis Financial Advisory Authority (FAA) into believing that he had obtained more than $3.6 million of private financing required as a pre-condition to the start of his construction project. Having deceived the city as to his financial wherewithal and expertise as a developer, Rosen then attempted to pass off considerably cheaper prefab modular housing manufactured in the State of Indiana in lieu of the promised on-site construction in East St. Louis that would have provided job opportunities to local construction workers. Rosen also created phony invoices and lien waivers that were submitted to the city and the FAA in order to obtain reimbursement for expenses that he had not actually paid order to generate working capital for the project.

Rosen attempted to obtain more than $1.9 million of public financing under false pretenses and he was successful in actually obtaining more than $60,000 by fraud. The East St. Louis Financial Advisory Authority (“FAA”), a state agency that oversees East St. Louis city spending, is credited for saving the city from additional losses by successfully blocking the expenditure of public funds from August, 2008, through June, 2009. The FAA also blocked the payment of a fraudulent $40,000 invoice.

The crime of wire fraud is punishable by not more than 20 years’ imprisonment, a $250,000 fine, and not more than three years’ supervised release upon release from prison. However, the United States Sentencing Guidelines must be applied to the case and considered by the court during sentencing. Sentencing has been scheduled for February 1, 2012.

The investigation was conducted through the Metro East Public Corruption Task Force by agents from the Internal Revenue Service, The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The case is being prosecuted by Assistant United States Attorney Steven D. Weinhoeft.

Eight Northern California Real Estate Investors Agree to Plead Guilty to Bid Rigging at Public Foreclosure Auctions

WASHINGTON—Eight Northern California real estate investors have agreed to plead guilty today for their roles in two separate conspiracies to rig bids and commit mail fraud at public real estate foreclosure auctions in Northern California, the Department of Justice announced.

Charges were filed today in U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California in San Francisco against Gary Anderson of Saratoga, Calif.; Patrick Campion of San Francisco; James Doherty of Hillsborough, Calif.; Keith Goodman of San Francisco; Troy Kent of San Mateo, Calif.; Craig Lipton of San Francisco; Henry Pessah of Burlingame, Calif.; and Laith Salma of San Francisco.

According to the felony charges, the real estate investors participated in a conspiracy to rig bids by agreeing to refrain from bidding against one another at public real estate foreclosure auctions in San Francisco County and San Mateo County. Doherty, Goodman and Lipton participated in the conspiracy in San Francisco, and Anderson, Campion, Kent, Pessah and Salma participated in the conspiracy in San Mateo.

“The collusion taking place at these auctions allowed the conspirators to line their pockets with funds that otherwise would have gone to lenders and, at times, financially distressed homeowners,” said Sharis Pozen, Acting Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division. “The investigation into collusion at these foreclosure auction markets is ongoing, and the Antitrust Division will continue to pursue the perpetrators of these fraudulent schemes until they are brought to justice.”

“The FBI and the Antitrust Division are working closely together to ensure that those who engage in fraudulent bid-rigging and other anticompetitive activities at foreclosure auctions are brought to justice,” said FBI Special Agent in Charge Stephanie Douglas. “We will continue to hold individuals accountable for crimes that damage the real estate market and defraud unsuspecting victims of their right to a fair marketplace.”

The department said that the primary purpose of the conspiracies was to suppress and restrain competition and to conceal payoffs in order to obtain selected real estate offered at San Francisco County and San Mateo County public foreclosure auctions at noncompetitive prices. When real estate properties are sold at these auctions, the proceeds are used to pay off the mortgage and other debt attached to the property, with remaining proceeds, if any, paid to the homeowner.

According to court documents, the eight real estate investors conspired with others not to bid against one another at public real estate foreclosure auctions in Northern California, participating in a conspiracy for various lengths of time between November 2008 and January 2011. The real estate investors were also charged with conspiracies to use the mail to carry out a fraudulent scheme to make payoffs to obtain title to selected real estate at fraudulently suppressed prices, to receive payoffs and to divert money to co-conspirators and away from mortgage holders and others with a legal interest in these properties.

Each violation of the Sherman Act carries a maximum penalty of 10 years in prison and a $1 million fine for individuals. Each count of conspiracy to commit mail fraud carries a maximum sentence of 30 years in prison and a $1 million fine. The maximum fine for the Sherman Act charges may be increased to twice the gain derived from the crime or twice the loss suffered by the victim if either amount is greater than the $1 million statutory maximum.

The charges today are the latest cases filed by the department in its ongoing investigation into bid rigging and fraud at public real estate foreclosure auctions in San Francisco, San Mateo, Contra Costa and Alameda counties, Calif. To date, as a result of the investigation, 18 individuals have agreed to plead guilty.

The ongoing investigation into fraud and bid rigging at certain real estate foreclosure auctions in Northern California is being conducted by the Antitrust Division’s San Francisco Office and the FBI’s San Francisco office. Anyone with information concerning bid rigging or fraud related to public real estate foreclosure auctions should contact the Antitrust Division’s San Francisco Office at 415-436-6660, visit http://www.justice.gov/atr/contact/newcase.htm or call the FBI tip line at 415-553-7400.

Today’s charges are part of efforts underway by President Barack Obama’s Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force. President Obama established the interagency Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force to wage an aggressive, coordinated, and proactive effort to investigate and prosecute financial crimes. The task force includes representatives from a broad range of federal agencies, regulatory authorities, inspectors general and state and local law enforcement who, working together, bring to bear a powerful array of criminal and civil enforcement resources. The task force is working to improve efforts across the federal executive branch, and with state and local partners, to investigate and prosecute significant financial crimes, ensure just and effective punishment for those who perpetrate financial crimes, combat discrimination in the lending and financial markets, and recover proceeds for victims of financial crimes. For more information on the task force, visit http://www.StopFraud.gov.

The Robert Gates File – The Iran-Contra Scandal

The Robert Gates File

The Iran-Contra Scandal,Confirmation Hearings, and Excerpts from new book Safe for Democracy

National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 208

Related article

“Robert Gates: A Look at the Record”
By Tom Blanton and Peter Kornbluh
The New York Times
May 27, 1991

Praise for Safe for Democracy

“John Prados has written the first really comprehensive history of the CIA, thereby illluminating a basic fact of American intelligence–if you want to know what the CIA is doing, listen to what the president is saying; and if you want to know what the president really wants, watch what the CIA is doing. Safe for Democracy is history for adults–not White House spin but what really happened and why. For more than half a century the CIA, with marching orders from the president, has been trying to make the world safe for democracy. As Prados describes it, the result of these adventures–little safety, less democracy–tells us what to expect from the latest crusade in Iraq.”
— THOMAS POWERS, Pulitzer Prize-winner for national reporting and author of Intelligence Wars: American Secret History from Hitler to Al-Qeada

“A masterful account of the CIA’s covert and not-so-covert activities around the globe. Drawing on thousands of newly declassified documents, Prados brings together in one colorful narrative a sweeping history of America’s covert wars from the high plains of Tibet to the back alleys of Cairo. The result is an authoritative book that demythologizes the agency and poses hard questions about the true costs of secrecy to democracies everywhere.”
— KAI BIRD, co-author of American Prometheus: The Triumph and Tragedy of J. Robert Oppenheimer, winner of the 2006 Pulitzer Prize for biography

“John Prados is one of the most prolific and respected authors on national security issues today. In his troubling new book, Safe for Democracy, he draws on his many years of research to show that while the CIA wields the dagger, its aim is directed by the White House, often with disastrous results over the decades. At a time when the CIA is swallowed up in preemptive wars overseas and bureaucratic battles at home, this definitive history of covert action is both timely and necessary.”
— JAMES BAMFORD, author of The Puzzle Palace, Body of Secrets, and A Pretext for War
“John Prados has put it all together here in one great panorama of the CIA’s covert actions. The chapters on Eisenhower make clear that he was the key president in promoting the schemes, setting the pattern for the Cold War. Highly readable, this is intelligence history, and intelligent history, at its best.”
— LLOYD GARDNER, author of Approaching Vietnam, Spheres of Influence, and Pay Any Price


“John Prados has again demonstrated his excellence as a researcher and writer–coupled with his in-depth understanding of intelligence issues–to provide a comprehensive and up-to-date account of the CIA’s ‘secret wars.’ Safe for Democracy will be carefully read by those in and out of the intelligence community–in many countries.”
NORMAN POLMAR, co-author, Spy Book: The Encyclopedia of Espionage

 

Washington D.C., November 10, 2006 – Bush administration nominee for Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates had a long career in government which showed a notable combination of ambition and caution, according to a new book by Archive senior analyst John Prados [Safe for Democracy: The Secret Wars of the CIA (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2006)] which deals with Gates among its much wider coverage of the agency since its inception.

As Director of Central Intelligence in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, Gates faced criticism for moving slowly with reforming the agency for the new era, and thus missing a moment of extraordinary opportunity that occurred at that time. In earlier posts at top levels of the CIA, Gates figured in the Iran-Contra affair, in which he engaged in sins of omission if not commission, hesitating to make inquiries and pass warnings that might have headed off this abuse of power. As the CIA’s top manager for intelligence analysis in the early 1980s he was accused of slanting intelligence to suit the predilections of the Reagan administration and his boss, Director William J. Casey.

Excerpts from Safe for Democracy related to Mr. Gates are here posted by the Archive. They are accompanied by the full three volumes of the extraordinary confirmation hearings of Gates for CIA director which took place in 1991, and which at the time constituted the most detailed examination of U.S. intelligence practices carried out since the Church and Pike investigations of the 1970s. Also posted is the portion of the report by Iran-Contra special prosecutor Lawrence Walsh which concerns Mr. Gates, along with his response to those findings.

Six Presidents Served

A career intelligence officer, Robert M. Gates has emphasized the number of presidents he served and the long sweep of history he witnessed. The sixty-three year old Gates indeed worked under every U.S. president from Richard M. Nixon to George Herbert Walker Bush, and has now been nominated by the second President Bush as secretary of defense. His resume includes some key periods in contemporary history, serving in a White House role as Deputy National Security Adviser during the first Gulf War, leading the U.S. intelligence community in the wake of the fall of the Soviet Union, being implicated in the Iran-Contra affair, taking an active role in directing CIA intelligence analysis during the Reagan administration, fulfilling assignment as a staff aide to National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski during the Carter administration, working on U.S. national intelligence estimates on the Soviet Union, and playing a peripheral role in nuclear arms limitation talks during their early years. Gates holds a PhD from Georgetown University, graduated from the University of Indiana, and was born and raised in Wichita, Kansas. His only direct military experience was as a young officer in the United States Air Force, where he worked primarily as an intelligence analyst, including for the Minuteman ICBM missile wing stationed at Whiteman Air Force Base in Missouri.

The record suggests that Gates combines caution and ambition. As Director of Central Intelligence, leading the CIA after the Cold War, Gates promised many reforms but went slowly in implementing them, carefully marshaling agency support before embarking on those reforms. In Iran-Contra, the record of the special prosecutor’s investigation shows that Gates learned of a number of the key developments at a time when he could have intervened, but remained hesitant to do so. That caution cost him the first two times he was nominated for Senate confirmation-in both cases, to head the CIA-in 1987 and 1991. In the first instance, he was forced to withdraw from consideration. Gates’ second nomination, in 1991, led to the contentious hearings posted here.

As a manager of intelligence analysis under CIA Director Casey, Gates again demonstrated his two most recognizable traits. Knowing that Casey wanted to see certain kinds of analyses, for instance that painted the Soviet threat in bleak terms, Gates, according to former intelligence officers, demanded that his staff comply and encouraged reporting that some insisted was blatantly slanted, to a degree that led a variety of intelligence analysts to oppose his nomination as director. Such opposition was and remains unprecedented in the history of the CIA. On the other hand, on the Nicaragua covert operation of the mid-1980s, Gates showed caution in advising Casey near the end of 1984, when Congress was on the verge of cutting off all aid to the U.S.-backed Contra rebels to hand off the project to some other U.S. agency, which would protect CIA from charges that resulted from questionable activities. In the Carter White House and as an aide to CIA Director Stansfield Turner, Gates also displayed his guardedness. Until 1986, when he emerged as Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, Gates functioned in a quintessentially staff role.

Given his narrow background in military affairs, Robert Gates may be expected to go slowly in innovating new policy or strategy as Secretary of Defense, to devote considerable effort to reestablishing rapport between the Secretary’s office and the military service chiefs, and to work loyally in support of White House objectives. On Iraq, that may mean shifts in nuance but not direction. On the other hand, the Gates appointment may be a moderating influence on U.S. Iran policy, since he has dealt with this issue and has knowledge of the players going back more than two decades, was burned by policy missteps on Iran during the Reagan administration, and has in the past favored an opening to the Teheran government.


Excerpts from Safe for Democracy: The Secret Wars of the CIA (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2006)
By John Prados
Pages 572-574:

AN UNCOMFORTABLE INTERREGNUM followed Bill Casey’s collapse [on December 15,1986]. With Casey in and out of the hospital, Robert M. Gates served as acting DCI. On February 2, 1987, Casey resigned. The White House faced the sudden need to find a new director of central intelligence. Years before, at the outset of Ronald Reagan’s presidency, Gates had told colleagues he wanted the top job. Now he came close to getting it. So close. The day Casey resigned, President Reagan nominated Gates as DCI in his own right. Perhaps the Reagan White House, beset by Iran-Contra, had not the energy or vision to seek out a new candidate for DCI. Or possibly Reagan saw Gates as a loyalist. Perhaps the call was for a professional but not someone with roots in the clandestine service. Gates fit that bill too. In any event, for a time it looked like Bob Gates would be moving into the director’s office.

The Senate would have to approve the Gates nomination, but the White House had clearly felt out the ground there. In the 1986 off-year elections the Democrats regained control of Congress, making Oklahoma Senator David L. Boren chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. Boren and a number of others reacted positively to the Gates nomination. Even Vermont’s Pat Leahy saw the Gates appointment as a wise move. Opinion held that Gates would be asked tough questions on Iran-Contra but then confirmed.

Bob Gates put his best foot forward. There could be no denying his background as a superbly qualified intelligence officer. He had done that work for the air force and the CIA, beginning with Soviet nuclear weapons. He had seen diplomacy on the U.S. delegation to arms control talks. Gates had crafted the NIEs as an assistant national intelligence officer, as national intelligence officer, and later as ex officio chairman of the National Intelligence Council. He had done management as an assistant to a CIA director, an executive staff director, and as deputy director. Gates had headed one of the agency’s tribes as deputy director for intelligence. He knew the White House, serving there under Jimmy Carter. As DDCI he had gotten a taste of covert operations and the clandestine service. In twenty-one years, in other words, Robert Gates had acquired wide agency experience. He had made some enemies, in particular as he handled intelligence reporting during the Reagan years, but in 1987 those people did not contest his nomination, which seemed unstoppable.

Except for Iran-Contra. Gates gave that his best shot too. Not coincidentally it became known that when he took over as acting director, Gates had recorded a classified video affirming that the CIA would act only under legal authorities and would never again do anything like the Iran arms shipments without a proper presidential finding. When hearings opened on February 17 [1987], Gates quickly made it known that he felt Iran-Contra had broken all the rules. He would resign if ordered to do something like that. Gates regretted not following up on the scattered indications of illegality he had perceived, But the nominee’s assurances foundered on the rocks of the Iran-Contra investigations. A number of questions had yet to be answered then, including whether Gates had helped mislead Congress, the extent of his participation in concocting false chronologies, his role in efforts to have the CIA take over the Secord “Enterprise,” when Gates learned of the diversion of funds to the contras, and what he had done once he knew it.

The more questions, the more Bob Gates’s chances disappeared into the maw of assorted illegalities. Had Gates known of violations o the Arms Export Control Act? Had he known of the “retrospective” finding? What had he done? Again and again. At this point Congress created a joint committee to investigate Iran-Contra, and it did not expect answers for months. Then, on February 22, the public learned that in 1985 Gates had sent the White House a memorandum from one of his national intelligence officers advocating the improvement of relations with Iran through arms sales, a view at variance with existing estimates. Two days later the Joint committee asked that Gates s nomination be put on hold. Senator Boren posed the alternatives of a vote or a withdrawal of the nomination while senior congressional leaders warned the White House that a fight over Gates would concentrate yet more attention on Iran Contra. Reagan who had just released a presidential commission report in an effort to put the scandal behind him did not care to hear that.

Robert Gates decided to withdraw. The next day the administration took back the nomination. Gates issued a statement defending his actions during the Iran-Contra affair denying he had covered up evidence or suppressed improprieties. Eventually the joint committee cleared Gates of illegal actions, and the Iran Contra special prosecutor affirmed that conclusion, but there had been failings. Gates cites mitigating circumstances in his memoirs, where he writes:

I would go over those points in my mind a thousand times in the months and years to come, but the criticisms still hit home. A thousand times I would go over the “might-have-beens” if I had raised more hell than I did with Casey about nonnotification of Congress, if I had demanded that the NSC get out of covert action, if I had insisted that CIA not play by NSC rules, if I had been more aggressive with the DO in my first months as DDCI, if I had gone to the Attorney General.

It became Robert Gates’s misfortune to be swept up in a web of illegality so immense it brought dangers of the impeachment of a president, which made Gates small fry indeed and virtually overnight neutered Ronald Reagan.

In withdrawing the Gates nomination, President Reagan simultaneously announced his appointment of William B. Webster to lead the agency. Webster liked to be called “Judge”-he had been a jurist on the federal bench, eventually on the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. Where CIA denizens begrudged Stansfield Turner his preferred title of admiral, no one held back with Judge Webster. Dedication to the law and to his native St. Louis, at least as deep as Turner’s to the navy, had seen Webster through law school at Washington University, then a decade as a St. Louis attorney, another as a U.S. district attorney, and then the bench. In 1978 President Carter named Webster to head the FBI, the post he held when Reagan asked him to move to Langley. Three days shy of his fifty-third birthday, Judge Webster came with stellar reviews-squeaky clean, exactly what Reagan then needed. The Senate intelligence committee approved his nomination in early May, and the full Senate consented to it shortly thereafter. Judge Webster was sworn in immediately.

Bob Gates felt the weight of Iran-Contra lifted from his shoulders, only to hear from his brother that their father had just died. As Gates dealt with personal tragedy, Webster established himself at Langley. Again like Admiral Turner, Judge Webster brought in a coterie as his inner circle-this time of former FBI aides. That move scarcely endeared Webster to CIA staff, though he took some of the sting away by announcing Gates would remain DDCI.

The new CIA director had a background in government and even in the security field, where his ‘time at the FBI had included notable investigations of corruption among congressmen, the Korean CIA, and, of course, Iran-Contra. In Webster’s last months at the FBI the Bureau had looked into Southern Air Transport, the agency’s quasi-proprietary. But Webster’s knowledge of intelligence, mostly peripheral, resulted from participation in the National Foreign Intelligence Board, the DCI’s committee of the directors of all the U.S. intelligence agencies. His background in foreign affairs, even thinner, did not help in the corridors at Langley.

Webster’s tenure has received mixed reviews. Melissa Boyle Mahle, an officer with the DO’s Near East Division, saw the Judge as isolating himself, managing rather than leading CIA, passing Olympian judgments, treating the agency as something dirty or infectious. “He did not lead the troops, or ever really try to get to know them,” she writes. The chief of station in Brussels, Richard Holm, felt Webster never really fit in but nevertheless had been a good choice, and Holm was sorry when he left. Floyd Paseman, by 1987 a branch chief in the East Asia Division soon elevated to the management staff, believes Webster “did a terrific job of restoring the CIA’s image.” Dewey Clarridge asserts that Webster “didn’t have the stomach for bold moves of any sort.” Robert Gates acknowledges the criticisms but calls Webster a “godsend” to the CIA, observing that none of the complaints “amounted to a hill of beans compared to what he brought to CIA that May: leadership, the respect of Congress, and a sterling character.”

Pages 582-585:

Judge Webster may have been the most prominent casualty of the Gulf War. During the long interregnum between Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait and the beginning of the coalition military campaign came a period of diplomacy and economic sanctions. In Capitol Hill debates and the struggle for public opinion, Webster was called upon to render opinions on the effectiveness of sanctions, Iraqi intent, and the balance of forces. Others seized on Webster’s words as ammunition. This did not please Bush. Never that comfortable at Langley, Judge Webster decided he had had enough. He let a few weeks go by after the Gulf triumph, then stepped down. The DO shed few tears.

The White House announced the resignation on May 8, 1991. Appearing briefly with Webster, President Bush said he had yet to think of a successor but praised Robert Gates. That same day Bush summoned Gates to his cabin aboard Air Force One and asked if the former spook would accept the CIA nomination. Gates immediately agreed. He expected a painful confirmation process, and he got one. Iran-Contra investigations continued, and Bob Gates would not be definitively cleared until the special prosecutor’s final report, still two years in the future. When Alan Fiers pleaded guilty in July 1991, Gates feared that Fiers would implicate him in some way. “The lowest point in my life came the day before the plea bargain was announced,” Gates recalls. Acutely conscious of the fact that civil servants rarely rise to head their departments, Gates realized it had been a generation since Bill Colby had been confirmed. Gates had been close to some quite controversial people, from Kissinger to Casey. Then the summer of 1991 brought the final collapse of the Soviet Union, kicking off the debate as to whether the CIA had failed to predict it. Of course Gates had had a dominant role in CIA analysis of Russia for years. But this time, unlike 1987, Gates resolved to proceed with the confirmation process no matter what.

Charges that Robert Gates had politicized intelligence took center stage when confirmation hearings opened in September [1991]. At first an extended examination of the nominee was not planned. Marvin C. Ott, deputy director of the SSCI staff at the time, recalls that the predisposition to let Gates sail through created a staff presumption that there was nothing to look into. Committee staff and members were flummoxed by the appearance of a succession of analysts who gave chapter and verse on many Gates interventions in intelligence analysis. Reports on Afghanistan and Nicaragua were among those cited. Evidence emerged that current employees, reluctant to criticize openly, also saw Gates as an interventionist. Far from pro forma nomination hearings, those on Gates morphed into a major CIA inquiry.

The nominee presented a preemptive defense, attempting to disarm critics with examples of how he had simply tried to push analysts to back up their assertions, picturing some alleged interventions as his effort to tease out better reporting. Then a number of former analysts went before the committee to dispute that rendering, most notably Mel Goodman, who had been a colleague for years; Jennifer L. Glaudemans, a former Soviet analyst; and Harold P. Ford, one of the CIA’s grand old men. Alan Fiers appeared as part of the committee’s fairly extensive coverage of Iran-Contra, but his testimony did Gates no harm. Others supported the nomination. Gates himself returned for “something fairly dramatic,” a round of follow-up testimony refuting critics. The hearings became the most extensive examination of U.S. intelligence since the Church and Pike investigations. Work at Langley ground to a halt as CIA officers watched every minute on television, much like Americans riveted by the 0. J. Simpson murder trial.

The intelligence committee wrestled with its quandary. President Bush intervened, invoking party discipline to ensure that members backed the nominee. Ott believes Gates appealed to the White House for this measure. Committee chairman David Boren staged his own covert operation, acting impartially in the camera’s eye while laboring in secret to build support for the nominee. Boren agreed to one of the most extensive committee reports on a nomination ever, in which his committee attempted to reconcile Gates’s testimony with the charges against him. In Ott’s view, this episode became the first time in a decade where partisanship reigned on the SSCI. Finally the committee approved Bush’s appointee. Gates was confirmed early in November.

For all the drama of the hearings, the sequel did not live up to the fears of opponents. Director Gates strove to preserve flexibility as Langley marched into the post-Cold War era. He showed a healthy appreciation for the need to change, forming a whole range of task forces, fourteen in all, each to recommend changes in some aspect of CIA activity. A group on openness figured among them, advising that a swath of records be made public. In 1992 Gates spoke before a conference of diplomatic historians and promised that the agency would open up, even in regard to covert operations. As an earnest of its intentions, the CIA declassified large portions of the body of NIEs on the Soviet Union and that December sponsored a conference reflecting on the period. Stansfield Turner gave the keynote address.

One of the Gates study groups considered politicization. Although its instructions were drawn so narrowly it could conclude there had been none, Gates gathered a large contingent of officers in The Bubble in March 1992 to ventilate the issue. Directly confronting the matter that had clouded his confirmation, Gates squared the circle by acknowledging that whether or not there had been politicization in the past, it was a danger to be guarded against. The director declared his determination to find better ways to prevent policy driven analysis.

Another task force focused on covert action. Among the novelties there, a delegation of senior clandestine services officers met with scholars at the Institute of Policy Studies, a leftist think tank, to solicit their views on directions the agency might take. They did not flinch when told the DCI ought to abolish the Directorate for Operations. Of course no such advice made its way into the final report, but DDO Thomas Twetten was placed on notice that the old days were gone. Twetten, one of the anointed, who thought nothing of rejecting a Freedom of Information Act request for Mongoose documents whose substance was already in the Church Committee report, was forced to retrench. The directorate consolidated operations in several African countries closing a number of stations-a move that soon came back to haunt the agency.

A national center to target human intelligence assets flowed from Gates’s concern for more spies. But DO officers in the field met with silence when they proposed new operations or recruitments. Iran Contra showed that Langley would not back its officers in trouble, and now morale became difficult to sustain. One Latin American division field man told his mates, “Pay attention this is the end of an era.” Clandestine officer Melissa Mahle pictures the atmosphere well: “We were not listening. Operations officers felt they had been made the scapegoat of a failed White House policy… We did not hear the call to do …business in a new way, in a way that would be more attuned to the attitudes of the post-Cold War 1990s. In a climate in which the agency’s goal seemed to have been achieved, Robert Gates could not stem the retirements and resignations that began about then. The clandestine service denigrated him as a mere analyst who did not understand operations.

As far as covert action is concerned, Mahle makes the apt point that part of the CIA’s problem was rooted in Reagan-era practice, in which covert operations were conducted openly and made the subject of political debate and partisan accusation, all to avoid explanations when projects did not go as advertised. She writes: “The CIA entered into a new phase of ‘overt covert action,’ a marvelous oxymoron that should join the ranks of ‘jumbo shrimp’ and ‘military intelligence.” The consequences of acting overtly included constant demands for specifics-from Congress, the press, the public, foreign governments-that meant secrecy headaches. Operational details could be exposed. Political tumult could terminate actions in midstream, magnifying the fear of abandonment of CIA’s proxies. And overt action amplified tensions between CIA and the Pentagon too, as the special warfare community pressed for greater control. Worse, the CIA’s role became that of bag man, hiring the proxies, whether foreign security services or local factions, as spearpoints for U.S. action. Paramilitary capabilities atrophied with cutbacks in the Special Activities Division. Operations also became less controllable as CIA steadily reduced its direct role.

The growing importance of proxies had implications for the use of covert action to implant democracy. To the old dilemma of shady means in service of lofty goals was added the spoiler of agents who acted in America’s name with their own agendas, or those who took the CIA cash and wouldn’t stay “bought.” These problems were, and are, intractable.

As director, Robert Gates’s vision involved gradual, planned change. He put teeth into the idea of support for military operations. One of the task forces worked on that alone. He tried to turn the agency toward the challenges of proliferation and transnational threats. Director Gates wanted more and better training for analysts, use of open source information, and techniques like competitive analysis. He ordered the revamping of CIA file systems. He opposed restructuring, including talk of a national agency for mapping and photographic interpretation, but agreed with the Pentagon on reforms at the National Reconnaissance Office. When Gates came to Langley, 6o percent of the CIA budget aimed at Russia; when he left that figure had dropped to 13 percent. But Gates never completed his mission. George H. W. Bush lost the 1992 election to William J. Clinton. A few days later, on November 7, Gates announced his retirement. He stayed only long enough for Clinton to choose his own director.


Documents
Note: The following documents are in PDF format.
You will need to download and install the free Adobe Acrobat Reader to view.
Chapter 16, “Robert M. Gates” – Excerpt from the Final Report of the Independent Counsel for Iran/Contra Matters, Volume I: Investigations and Prosecutions, August 4, 1993

Robert M. Gates, Letter in Response to Findings of Independent Counsel Lawrence E. Walsh, September 22, 1993 – Excerpt from Final Report of the Independent Counsel for Iran/Contra Matters, Volume III: Comments and Materials Submitted by Individuals and Their Attorneys Responding to Volume I of the Final Report, December 3, 1993

“Nomination of Robert M. Gates,” Hearings Before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Volume I, September 16, 17, 19, 20, 1991 – Part 1 of 2 (16MB) – Part 2 of 2 (16MB)

“Nomination of Robert M. Gates,” Hearings Before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Volume II, September 24, October 1, 2, 1991 – Part 1 of 2 (10MB) – Part 2 of 2 (17MB)

“Nomination of Robert M. Gates,” Hearings Before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Volume III, October 3, 4, 18, 1991 (15MB)

TOP-SECRET-Spy Satellite Engineer’s Top Secret Is Revealed

Phil Pressel designed cameras for the government's top-secret Hexagon project. He's only recently been able to speak about his life's work.

Phil Pressel designed cameras for the government’s top-secret Hexagon project. He’s only recently been able to speak about his life’s work.

 

Every day for decades, engineer Phil Pressel would come home from work and be unable to tell his wife what he’d been doing all day.

Now, Pressel is free to speak about his life’s work: designing cameras for a top-secret U.S. government spy satellite. Officially known as the KH-9 Hexagon, engineers called it “Big Bird” for its massive size.

Until the government declassified it last month, Hexagon had been a secret for 46 years.

“The challenge for this satellite, to design it, was to survey the whole globe,” Pressel tells weekends on All Things Considered host Guy Raz.

It was a grand challenge for Pressel. Born in Belgium, he survived the Holocaust as a young boy when a French family hid him from the Nazis. Pressel says he never expected to come to America, much less become an engineer on a top-secret American spy satellite.

Hexagon’s main purpose was, in a way, to prevent wars. It was designed to spot Soviet missile silos and troop movements.

“It permitted President Nixon, in the early 1970s, to sign the SALT-1 treaty, the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty,” Pressel says. Photos sent down from Hexagon enabled the U.S. to verify the Soviet Union’s claims about its weapons stockpiles.

Those photos themselves were a technological marvel. Pressel says that even 40 years after its original launch, Hexagon is still one of the most complicated vehicles ever to orbit the earth because it used film.

“It was the last film-recovery system used for reconnaissance,” he says. Each Hexagon satellite launched with 60 miles worth of film and an immensely complicated electromechanical system that controlled the cameras.

Once a reel of film was finished, it was loaded into a re-entry pod and sent back to earth. “And then at around 50,000 feet, a parachute would slow it down, and a C-130 airplane caught it in midair over the Pacific,” Pressel says.

After all the film was sent back to earth, the satellite was abandoned, and a new one launched, he says. Nineteen of them went up before the program ended in 1986.

Pressel says he’s immensely proud of the work he and his colleagues did on Hexagon. “We did all of this incredibly complicated work with slide rules, without microprocessors, without solid state electronics,” he says.

“We used old technology, and it worked!”