Washington D.C., July 31st 2011 – Twenty years ago today, the commander of the Soviet Limited Contingent in Afghanistan Boris Gromov crossed the Termez Bridge out of Afghanistan, thus marking the end of the Soviet war which lasted almost ten years and cost tens of thousands of Soviet and Afghan lives.
As a tribute and memorial to the late Russian historian, General Alexander Antonovich Lyakhovsky, the National Security Archive today posted on the Web (www.nsarchive.org) a series of previously secret Soviet documents including Politburo and diary notes published here in English for the first time. The documents suggest that the Soviet decision to withdraw occurred as early as 1985, but the process of implementing that decision was excruciatingly slow, in part because the Soviet-backed Afghan regime was never able to achieve the necessary domestic support and legitimacy – a key problem even today for the current U.S. and NATO-supported government in Kabul.
The Soviet documents show that ending the war in Afghanistan, which Soviet general secretary Mikhail Gorbachev called “the bleeding wound,” was among his highest priorities from the moment he assumed power in 1985 – a point he made clear to then-Afghan Communist leader Babrak Karmal in their first conversation on March 14, 1985. Already in 1985, according to the documents, the Soviet Politburo was discussing ways of disengaging from Afghanistan, and actually reached the decision in principle on October 17, 1985.
But the road from Gorbachev’s decision to the actual withdrawal was long and painful. The documents show the Soviet leaders did not come up with an actual timetable until the fall of 1987. Gorbachev made the public announcement on February 8, 1988, and the first troops started coming out in May 1988, with complete withdrawal on February 15, 1989. Gorbachev himself, in his recent book (Mikhail Gorbachev, Ponyat’ perestroiku … Pochemu eto vazhno seichas. (Moscow: Alpina Books 2006)), cites at least two factors to explain why it took the reformers so long to withdraw the troops. According to Gorbachev, the Cold War frame held back the Soviet leaders from making more timely and rational moves, because of fear of the international perception that any such withdrawal would be a humiliating retreat. In addition to saving face, the Soviet leaders kept trying against all odds to ensure the existence of a stable and friendly Afghanistan with some semblance of a national reconciliation process in place before they left.
The documents detail the Soviet leadership’s preoccupation that, before withdrawal of troops could be carried out, the Afghan internal situation had to be stabilized and a new government should be able to rely on its domestic power base and a trained and equipped army able to deal with the mujahadeen opposition. The Soviets sought to secure the Afghan borders through some kind of compromise with the two other most important outside players—Pakistan, through which weapons and aid reached the opposition, and the United States, provider of the bulk of that aid. In the process of Geneva negotiations on Afghanistan, which were initiated by the United Nations in 1982, the United States, in the view of the Soviet reformers, was dragging its feet, unwilling to stop arms supplies to the rebels and hoping and planning for the fall of the pro-Soviet Najibullah regime after the Soviet withdrawal.
Internally, the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan did everything possible to prevent or slow down the Soviet withdrawal, putting pressure on the Soviet military and government representatives to expand military operations against the rebels.
Persistent pleading on the part of Najibullah government as late as January 1989 created an uncharacteristic split in the Soviet leadership, with Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze suggesting that the withdrawal should be slowed down or some forces should remain to help protect the regime, while the military leadership argued strongly in favor of a complete and decisive withdrawal.
According to the American record, Shevardnadze had already informed Secretary of State George Shultz as early as September 1987 of the specific timetable for withdrawal. But many senior officials did not believe the Soviet assurances; in fact, deputy CIA director Robert Gates famously bet a State Department diplomat on New Year’s Eve 1987 that Gorbachev would make no withdrawal announcement until after the end of the Reagan administration. Gates believed the Chinese saying about the Soviet appetite for territory: “What the bear has eaten, he never spits out” – and only in his memoirs did he admit he was making “an intelligence forecast based on fortune cookie wisdom.” (Robert Gates, From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider’s Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War (New York: Simon&Shuster, 1996, pp. 430-431). Of course, Gates’ hardline views on Gorbachev would take over U.S. policy as the George H.W. Bush administration came into office in January 1989.
By this time, however, the Soviet leaders well realized that the goal of building socialism in Afghanistan was illusory; and at the same time the goal of securing the southern borders of the Soviet Union seemed to be still within reach with the policy of national reconciliation of the Najibullah government. So the troops came out completely by February 15, 1989. Soon after the Soviet withdrawal, however, both superpowers seemed to lose interest in what had been so recently the hottest spot of the Cold War.
Najibullah would outlast Gorbachev’s tenure in the Kremlin, but not by much: Within three years Najibullah would be removed from power and brutally murdered, and Afghanistan would plunge into the darkness of civil war and the coming to power of the Taliban. Twenty years later, the other superpower and its Cold War alliance are fighting a war in Afghanistan against forces of darkness that were born among the fundamentalist parts of mujahadeen resistance to the Soviet occupation. In such a context, the language and the dilemmas in these 20-year-old documents still provide some resonance today.
This posting is also a tribute to and a commemoration of one of our long-standing partners in the pursuit of opening secrets and writing the new truly international history of the Cold War. General Alexander Lyakhovsky passed away from a heart attack while standing on a Moscow Metro platform on February 3, 2009, less than two weeks before the 20th anniversary of the end of the war in which he served as an officer, and which he studied for many years as a scholar. He is survived by his wife Tatyana and their children Vladimir and Galina.
The National Security Archive mourns the passing of our dear friend and partner, Alexander Antonovich. It is fitting and proper that here we express our deepest appreciation for his remarkable knowledge, his scholarly and personal integrity, and his generosity both in expertise and the documents that he always shared with us, while he educated us and the world. His memory lives on in all of us who ever read his work, heard him speak, or best of all, listened to him sing the sad songs of the Afghan war.
– Svetlana Savranskaya, director of Russia programs, Thomas Blanton, executive director, National Security Archive, and Malcolm Byrne, Deputy Director, National Security Archive.
Document 1. Memorandum of Mikhail Gorbachev’s Conversation with Babrak Karmal, March 14, 1985
In his first conversation with the leader of Afghanistan, who was installed by the Soviet troops in December of 1979, Gorbachev underscored two main points: first that “the Soviet troops cannot stay in Afghanistan forever,” and second, that the Afghan revolution was presently in its “national-democratic” stage, whereas its socialist stage was only “a course of the future.” He also encouraged the Afghan leader to expand the base of the regime to unite all the “progressive forces.” In no uncertain terms, Karmal was told that the Soviet troops would be leaving soon and that his government would have to rely on its own forces.
Document 2. Anatoly Chernyaev Diary, April 4, 1985
Chernyaev reflects on the “torrent of letters” about Afghanistan received recently by the Central Committee and the Pravda newspaper. They reflect the growing dissatisfaction of the population with the drawn-out war and the consensus that the troops should be withdrawn.
Document 3 Anatoly Chernyaev Diary, October 17, 1985.
At the Politburo session of October 17, 1985, General Secretary Gorbachev proposed to make a final decision on Afghanistan and quoted from citizens’ letters regarding the dissatisfaction in the country with the Soviet actions in Afghanistan. He also described his meeting with Babrak Karmal during which Gorbachev told the Afghan leader: “we will help you, but with arms only, not troops.”Chernyaev noted Gorbachev’s negative reaction to the assessment of the situation given by Defense Minister Marshal Sergey Sokolov.
Document 4. Politburo Session, June 26, 1986.
The Politburo discusses the first results of Najibullah’s policy of national reconciliation. Gorbachev emphasizes that the decision to withdraw the troops is firm, but that the United States seems to be a problem as far as the national reconciliation is concerned. He proposes early withdrawals of portions of troops to give the process a boost, and proposes to “pull the USA and Pakistan by their tail” to encourage them to participate in it more actively.
Document 5 Politburo Session, November 13, 1986.
The first detailed Politburo discussion of the process and difficulties of the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Afghanistan, which included the testimony of Marshal Sergei Akhromeev.
Document 6 Politburo Session, January 21, 1987
The Politburo discusses the results of Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze and Head of the Central Committee International Department Anatoly Dobrynin’s trip to Afghanistan. Shevardnadze’s report is very blunt and pessimistic about the war and the internal situation. The main concern of the Politburo is how to end the war but save face and ensure a friendly and neutral Afghanistan.
Document 7 Politburo Session, February 23, 1987
Gorbachev talks about the need to withdraw while engaging the United States and Pakistan in negotiations on the final settlement. He is willing to meet with the Pakistani leader Zia ul Khaq, and maybe even offer him some payoff. The Soviet leader also shows concern about the Soviet reputation among non-aligned countries and national liberation movements.
Document 8 Politburo Session, February 26, 1987
In his remarks to the Politburo, General Secretary returns to the issue of the need to withdraw Soviet troops from Afghanistan several times. He emphasizes the need to withdraw the troops, and at the same time struggles with the explanation for the withdrawal, noting that “we not going to open up the discussion about who is to blame now.” Gromyko admits that it was a mistake to introduce the troops, but notes that it was done after 11 requests from the Afghan government.
Document 9 Colonel Tsagolov Letter to USSR Minister of Defense Dmitry Yazov on the Situation in Afghanistan, August 13, 1987
Criticism of the Soviet policy of national reconciliation in Afghanistan and analysis of general failures of the Soviet military mission there are presented in Colonel Tsagolov’s letter to USSR Defense Minister Dmitry Yazov of August 13, 1987. This letter represents the first open criticism of the Afghan war from within the military establishment. Colonel Tsagolov paid for his attempt to make his criticism public in his interview with Soviet influential progressive magazine “Ogonek” by his career—he was expelled from the Army in 1988.
Document 10 CC CPSU Letter on Afghanistan, May 10, 1988
On May 10, 1988, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the USSR issued a “closed” (internal use) letter to all Communist Party members of the Soviet Union on the issue of withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan. The letter presents the Central Committee analysis of events in Afghanistan and Soviet actions in that country, the problems and the difficulties the Soviet troops had to face in carrying out their mission. In particular, the letter stated that important historic and ethnic factors were overlooked when the decisions on Afghanistan were made in the Soviet Union. The letter analyzes Soviet interests in Afghanistan and the reasons for the withdrawal of troops.
Document 11 Politburo Session January 24, 1989
This Politburo session deals with the issue of the completion of the withdrawal and the post-war Soviet role in Afghanistan, as well as possible future development of the situation there. The discussion shows the split among the Soviet leadership with Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze arguing for leaving some personnel behind to help protect the Najibullah regime or delaying the full withdrawal.
Document 12 Excerpt from Alexander Lyakhovsky and Vyacheslav Nekrasov, Grazhdanin, Politik, Voin: Pamyati Shakha Masuda (Citizen, Politician, Fighter: In Memory of Shah Masoud), (Moscow, 2007), pp. 202-205
Document 13 Excerpt from Statement of the Soviet Military Command in Afghanistan on the Withdrawal of Soviet Troops, February 14, 1989
On April 7, 1988, USSR Defense Minister signed an order on withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan. In February 1989, the Defense Ministry prepared a statement of the Soviet Military Command in Afghanistan on the issue of withdrawal of troops, which was delivered to the Head of the UN Mission in Afghanistan on February 14, 1989—the day when the last Soviet soldier left Afghanistan. The statement gave an overview of Soviet-Afghan relations before 1979, Soviet interpretation of the reasons for providing internationalist assistance to Afghanistan, and sending troops there after the repeated requests of the Afghan government. It criticized the U.S. role in arming the opposition in disregard of the Geneva agreements, and thus destabilizing the situation in the country. In an important acknowledgement that the Vietnam metaphor was used to analyze Soviet actions in Afghanistan, they military explicitly referred to “unfair and absurd” comparisons between the American actions in Vietnam and the presence of Soviet troops in Afghanistan.
Document 14. Official Chronology of the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan with quotes from documents from the Archive of the Gorbachev Foundation, Moscow.
Books By Alexander Lyakhovsky
Grazhdanin,Politik,Voin, Plamya Afgana and Zacharovannye svobodoj
VZCZCXRO2713 RR RUEHAO RUEHCD RUEHGD RUEHHO RUEHMC RUEHNG RUEHNL RUEHRD RUEHRS RUEHTM DE RUEHMU #0013/01 0071743 ZNY CCCCC ZZH R 071743Z JAN 10 FM AMEMBASSY MANAGUA TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0368 INFO WESTERN HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS DIPL POSTS RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC RHEFHLC/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC RHMFISS/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC RHMFISS/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHINGTON DC RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC RUEHC/DEPT OF LABOR WASHINGTON DC RUEHC/USAID WASHDC 0004 C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 MANAGUA 000013 SIPDIS AMEMBASSY BRIDGETOWN PASS TO AMEMBASSY GRENADA AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PASS TO AMCONSUL QUEBEC AMEMBASSY BRASILIA PASS TO AMCONSUL RECIFE E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/01/07 TAGS: SNAR SOCI ASEC PGOV PHUM PREL KCOR NU SUBJECT: Lords of the Narco-Coast: Part II - Community Reaction Divided, FSLN Blames U.S. for Crisis REF: A) 2009 MANAGUA 1149 (LORDS OF NARCO-COAST PART I) B) 2009 MANAGUA 1051 (PRIMER ON MISKITO INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT) C) 2009 MANAGUA 1047 (MISKITO INDEPENDENCE RALLY TURNS DEADLY) D) 2008 MANAGUA 1517 AND PREVIOUS (FRAUD IN RAAN ELECTIONS) E) 2008 MANAGUA 419 AND PREVIOUS (GON SUSPENDS RAAN MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS) CLASSIFIED BY: Robert J. Callahan, Ambassador; REASON: 1.4(A), (B), (D) SUMMARY ¶1. (C): On December 8, after a plane laden with cocaine and cash crash-landed in the remote, small village of Walpa Siksa in the North Atlantic Autonomous Region (RAAN), a deadly confrontation took place between Nicaraguan anti-drug units and drug smugglers allied with some number of local residents. This message is the second in a series that reports on the Walpa Siksa incident and its immediate aftermath, and explores what these events have revealed about the actual state of organized trafficking operations in Nicaragua's Atlantic Coast. ¶2. (C) In the aftermath of the incident, public reactions have been divided. Some regional politicians and leaders of the indigenous Yatama political party have called the incident and subsequent government operations in the region a new "Red Christmas Massacre" - a reference to the Sandinistas' deadly attacks on indigenous Miskitos in the 1980s, assertions the military contests are false. Religious leaders have denounced these same political leaders for turning a blind eye to the increased drug activity. Former Vice President (and ex-Sandinista), Sergio Ramirez, has decried the presence of trafficking organizations as a national security threat, while a senior current FSLN official accused the United States, specifically the CIA, of "promoting" the drug trade to destabilize the country. Underneath all lies a subtext of the perennial rivalry and racial conflict between Nicaragua's Pacific (Hispanic) and Atlantic (Afro-Caribbean and Amerindian) cultures. Yet, also through the dissonance, the Walpa Siksa incident and its aftermath seem to indicate stronger linkages between drug smugglers and local communities in Nicaragua's Atlantic region than previously believed. END SUMMARY REGIONAL POLITICIANS BLAME THE MILITARY - SEEK A NEW CRISIS ¶3. (C) The Walpa Siksa village, where the December 8 incident occurred, is in a region historically controlled by Yatama; the regional, indigenous Miskito political party. Much of Yatama's leadership itself has been co-opted by the ruling Sandinista Party (REF D) over the last few years. Even so, regional politicians and several Yatama leaders have taken to the airwaves, primarily on their new Yatama radio station (reportedly funded by the government), to condemn the Nicaraguan military for its continuing operations in the vicinity of Walpa Siksa and Prinzapolka. These leaders, including Brooklyn Rivera, a Yatama National Assembly Deputy; Reynoldo Francis, Governor of the North Atlantic Autonomous Region (RAAN); Roberto Wilson, the RAAN Vice Governor; and Elizabeth Enriquez Francis, former mayor of RAAN capital Bilwi (and ex-wife of Governor Francis), have used Miskito-language radio broadcasts from the new station to claim that the Nicaraguan anti-drug unit had violated human rights in pursuing its investigation and by detaining suspects from Walpa Siksa. These leaders vehemently denied that these coastal communities support, house and abet drug smugglers, as had been charged by some critics. Rivera told national media that "the soldiers are all from the Pacific coast. There has been racism, robberies and looting of indigenous people's homes." Other Miskito leaders claim that the soldiers have killed livestock and stolen food donated to the community by the World Food Program. ¶4. (C) Rivera, Francis, Wilson, and Enriquez have all called for and even led several protests against police and navy forces stationed in Bilwi, creating a new crisis in the region. They have denounced the "human rights violations" by the anti-drug unit against the "innocent" indigenous people and claim that the military "occupation" of Walpa Siksa is rife with abuses. This racially-charged agitation led some in the Miskito community to set up illegal road blocks at the town of Sinsin, preventing traffic on the only road between Bilwi and Managua. There were also attempts to take over the Bilwi International Airport and the capital's main wharf. These Yatama leaders and radicalized supporters have demanded that the Navy cease all operations on the Atlantic Coast, withdraw from the region, and immediately release the roughly two dozen suspects detained in Walpa Siksa and Prinzapolka. (see SEPTEL). Rivera also told reporters that the Walpa Siksa community elders had decided to abandon their community if the military did not depart or carried out its plan to establish a permanent presence in the area. MORAVIAN CHURCH LEADER CONDEMNS GOVERNMENT COLLUSION ¶5. (U) The Moravian Church is the largest denomination on the Atlantic Coast and a large majority of indigenous Miskitos belong to it, making the church the moral authority in the region; even more so than the Catholic Church. On Friday, December 13, Moravian Church Superintendant Cora Antonio issued a grave statement against the local Walpa Siksa community leaders, police officials and military officials in the Atlantic, whom she claimed knew about the narco-trafficking base in Walpa Siksa, but took no action until the recent plane crash. Antonio, who will finish her two-year term in January 2010, complained that drug smugglers had established their networks unchallenged by the GON and exploited the extreme poverty on the Coast. She also claimed that elected officials, including Francis, Wilson, and Lidia Coleman, the mayor of nearby Prinzapolka, as well as police and military authorities, "knew from the beginning of the installation of this narco-traffickers' base, but never did anything about it." She also stated that in certain Caribbean communities the narco-traffickers exercised the highest authority, above that of the community judge, the village elders, even the pastor or "sindico," and that they frequently commanded the "last word" on community decisions. Antonio also said the Moravian Church had recently removed a reverend from the Walpa Siksa village out of fear that he would be physically attacked for preaching against drugs from the pulpit. WIHTA TARA ALSO SAYS MILITARY SHOULD LEAVE ¶6. (U) Other non-FSLN-aligned indigenous leaders took aim at the President Ortega and at the military's recent actions. The Wihta Tara of the Miskito Nation, aka the Rev. Hector Williams, who denounced the Managua government and called for Miskito independence, told the media that Columbian drug traffickers had already left, so the military should leave as well. NOTE: The Wihta Tara (Miskito for "great judge"), was elected by the Council of Elders of the Miskito Nation and leads Miskito separatist movement that mounted protests which were violently suppressed this past October (REF E) END NOTE. Williams stated that "the army is after the money that they think is hidden in the community." Building on the racial inequality theme, another separatist leader, Steady Alvarado, publicly questioned why the military felt it could take actions in the indigenous communities that it would never attempt on the Pacific Coast. The Miskito Council of Elders itself issued a statement on December 12 blaming President Ortega directly for the "tortures, persecutions and death of our community members in Walpa Siksa." It also accused Ortega of being "incapable of neutralizing" drug trafficking activity on the Atlantic Coast, and for again "bearing a grudge" against the Coastal peoples, "like he did during the Navidad Roja (Red Christmas Massacre)." NOTE: The Red Christmas Massacre occurred in 1981, when Sandinista military operations in the Atlantic Coast killed dozens and forcibly relocated hundreds of Miskitos thought to be collaborating with the Contras. END NOTE. ARMY CHIEF DENIES RIGHTS VIOLATIONS - YIELD "NOT ONE INCH TO NARCOS" ¶7. (U) General Omar Halleslevens, Commander of the Nicaraguan military, told reporters that the Army would not leave Walpa Siksa, nor would it stop searching neighboring communities for drug traffickers. He insisted that the Army would remain and would take appropriate measures to protect the area from again becoming a haven for drug trafficking. Halleslevens denied accusations that the military had violated human rights, saying "our line has been from the very beginning to respect life, human rights, private property and the law ... as we are completing our duty to support the police in applying the law." He further declared that the military would "not give a rock, nor even an inch of the national territory, to narco-traffickers" and called on government institutions and the population to support law enforcement in its fight. NOTE: Thus far, Post has no/no credible evidence of human rights violations by law enforcement related to this operation. We continue to monitor the situation closely and will report relevant developments if they occur. END NOTE. FORMER FSLN VICE PRESIDENT CONDEMNS NARCOS, BLAMES GOVERNMENT ¶8. (U) Adding to the chorus of concern about the absentee national government was author and former Nicaraguan/FSLN vice president, Sergio Ramirez, who said in an op-ed that the strong narco-traffickers presence on the Caribbean Coast threatened Nicaragua's sovereignty and territorial integrity. He believed that the "narco-traffickers will promote the separation of the Caribbean Coast (REF E) and already have the social base to do it" because of the significant resources drug smugglers enjoy and the rampant political corruption in the region. Ramirez also said the confrontation between the anti-drug units and the Walpa Siksa community demonstrated that criminal organizations had achieved enormous influence on the Atlantic Coast while the "government does not do anything to stop the problem." FSLN LEADER BLAMES THE U.S., CIA FOR THE CRISIS, MAY CANCEL ELECTIONS ¶9. (U) In contrast, during December 16 interviews, Steadman Fagoth, a Miskito indigenous leader, former Contra commander, and now ardent Ortega supporter, told FSLN-controlled media that United States had created the Walpa Siksa crisis. Fagoth, who is also president of the Government's Fishing Authority (INPESCA), spoke to Multinoticias Channel 4, owned and operated by the Ortega-Murillo family, and to "El 19," the official on-line newspaper of the Sandinista Government. He claimed that the United States, through the CIA, was trying to provoke an uprising in the Atlantic Coast against the government by supporting narco-criminals. He added that Alberto Luis Cano, the fugitive Colombian drug leader and passenger of the crashed drug airplane (see SEPTEL-Part I) had been hired by the CIA to promote an uprising among the native population, by playing on the racial animosity between Nicaragua's Pacific and Atlantic populations. Perhaps Fagoth's most troubling comment was that because of the current unrest, the government might delay regional elections scheduled for March 2010. COMMENT ¶10. (C) In the cacophony following the Walpa Siksa incident, statements of FSLN official Steadman Fagoth are perhaps the most politically ominous. Fagoth is a regular proxy for Ortega's Atlantic policy. His remarks frequently represent test balloons for how Ortega perceives the situation and how the President seeks to position himself against any fallout. Fagoth's anti-U.S. accusations are outrageous, but not unexpected -- that the United States and CIA employed a drug trafficker to created this crisis, destabilize the region and overthrow the government. He made similar accusations about the United States and CIA when the Wihta Tara announced the separatist movement several months ago. In 2008, the GON delayed RAAN municipal elections (REF E) on dubious grounds. Thus Fagoth's comment about delaying the March 2010 regional elections may indicate Ortega's true intent: freeze everyone in place. ¶11. (C) The Walpa Siksa incident and its aftermath aggravated underlying tensions and divisions that persist in the Atlantic, and may have exposed new evidence about the nature and extend of narco-trafficking activity. Serious concerns about threats to national security and sovereignty have been raised by critics of the government. Some community leaders, such as Moravian Superintendent Cora Antonio, have spoken out about what they see as rampant drug corruption and political collusion by RAAN political leaders. We find it odd that these same political leaders, such as Rivera, Francis, Wilson and Enriquez agitated against military counter-drug operations, and virtually denied the existence of any narco-trafficking activity. At a minimum, their efforts to fan latent racial resentments seem self-serving re-election efforts in the run-up to regional elections. For its part, the military denies any human rights abuses in this, its largest anti-drug land operation in the Caribbean in years. In a subsequent message we will provide more detail about the figures caught up in the Walpa Siksa incident and outline some of the networks and relationships that we believe traffickers may have been able to establish. CALLAHAN
VZCZCXRO2201 RR RUEHAO RUEHCD RUEHGD RUEHHO RUEHMC RUEHNG RUEHNL RUEHRD RUEHRS RUEHTM DE RUEHMU #1149/01 3552241 ZNY CCCCC ZZH R 212241Z DEC 09 FM AMEMBASSY MANAGUA TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0312 INFO WESTERN HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS DIPL POSTS RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC RHEFHLC/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC RHMFISS/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC RHMFISS/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHINGTON DC RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC RUEHC/DEPT OF LABOR WASHINGTON DC RUEHC/USAID WASHDC 0001 C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MANAGUA 001149 SIPDIS AMEMBASSY BRIDGETOWN PASS TO AMEMBASSY GRENADA AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PASS TO AMCONSUL QUEBEC AMEMBASSY BRASILIA PASS TO AMCONSUL RECIFE E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019/12/21 TAGS: SNAR SOCI PGOV PHUM PREL KCOR ASEC NU SUBJECT: Lords of the Narco-Coast: Part I - Deadly Confrontation at Walpa Siksa REF: MANAGUA 1051 (MOSQUITO COAST INDEPENDENCE) CLASSIFIED BY: Robert J. Callahan, Ambassador, State, Embassy Managua; REASON: 1.4(A), (B), (D) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: On December 8, after a plane laden with cocaine and cash crash landed in the remote, small village of Walpa Siksa in the North Atlantic Autonomous Region (RAAN), a deadly confrontation took place between Nicaraguan anti-drug units and drug smugglers allied with a some number of local residents. Stories of how the clash came to pass on December 8 are divergent, but the Walpa Siksa incident, the ensuing actions of regional leaders and local residents, as well as the enhanced posture of security forces seems to indicate there are stronger linkages between drug smugglers and local communities than previously believed. This message is the first in a series that reports on the Walpa Siksa incident and its immediate aftermath, and explores what these events have revealed about the actual state of organized trafficking operations in Nicaragua's Atlantic Coast. END SUMMARY WALPA SIKA: THE OFFICIAL ACCOUNT ¶2. (C) On Tuesday, December 8, a Nicaraguan anti-drug unit clashed with suspected drug traffickers, leaving two sailors dead and five other government security forces wounded. The following account of events is based on Government of Nicaragua (GON) official briefings and conversations between senior GON law enforcement/military officials and Embassy personnel. On Tuesday, December 8, a Nicaraguan anti-drug unit combined force of navy and national police traveled to the remote, small village of Walpa Siksa in the North Atlantic Autonomous Region (RAAN) to investigate reports of a plane crash linked to drug smugglers. The joint patrol arrived in the evening and was ambushed by civilians from the remote village, who were allegedly defending the drug traffickers. In the melee, two sailors were killed, and three other military personnel and one police officer were severely wounded. One villager from Walpa Siksa was also killed. On Wednesday, December 9, a joint Nicaraguan navy-army patrol returned to Walpa Siksa to detain those suspected of involvement in the ambush, only to find the community abandoned of all males. On Thursday, December 10, anti-drug forces from the Navy confronted an additional group of drug smugglers near the community of Prinzapolka, in which one suspect was killed and another wounded. Two more were detained, and the fifth suspect escaped. Subsequent missions by the anti-drug unit over several days resulted in 20 suspects arrested (18 in connection with the first clash), and confiscation of a powerboat, several guns, ammunition, small quantities of drugs and $177,960 in cash. Nicaraguan security forces have seized and are now operating out of several homes in the Walpa Siksa community that are believed to have housed drug smugglers. The military has announced plans to establish a permanent presence in the area to discourage drug traffickers from using it as a base of operations any longer. ¶3. (U) Capt. Roger Gonzalez, newly-installed chief of the Nicaraguan naval forces, told the press that "we understand there is a Colombian criminal, suspected drug trafficker, [Alberto Ruiz Cano] who has $500,000 and has armed certain area individuals, and we are searching for him." Police investigators revealed that Ruiz Cano, whose real name is Amauri Pau, was illegally issued a Nicaraguan national identity card (cedula) and owns several properties and businesses in Managua believed to be involved in money laundering (see SEPTEL). Ruiz Cano is also believed to have been on the crashed plane and is suspected of leading the December 8 attack against the anti-drug unit. Officials detained two Colombians -- Ruiz Cano's father [Fernando Melendez Paudd known as "el Patron"] and his cousin [Catalina del Carmen Ruiz] -- but neither has been willing to talk to police about Ruiz Cano or his whereabouts. Ruiz Cano's associates have hired attorney Julian Holmes Arguello to defend them. The presence of Holmes Arguello, a well-known and expensive attorney, has reinforced official suspicions about Holmes own possible drug connections. WALPA SIKSA: EYE-WITNESS ACCOUNTS -- EARLY "WHITE" CHRISTMAS OR FAILED DRUG RESCUE? ¶4. (U) The national daily newspaper El Nuevo Diario "END" (left-of-center) has provided continuous coverage of the Walpa Siksa incident, since it came to light on the evening of December 8th. According to the paper's accounts, events leading up to the deadly December 8 firefight differ somewhat from the official account. The paper's sources, who requested anonymity for fear of possible reprisals from traffickers, other residents and the government, stated that the plane crash-landed in the Walpa Siksa cemetery on Sunday, December 6 at 11 a.m. The impact killed the pilot and co-pilot instantly, and broke the plane into several pieces scattering packets of cocaine and bundles of dollars in the debris. Walpa Siksa residents quickly discovered the dead pilots and one crash survivor, to whom they gave medical attention. They were also surprised at the large quantity of cocaine the plane was carrying. According to the paper's sources, some community elders wanted to immediately contact the police and navy about the plane crash and drugs, but others argued that it would be better to divide the cash and drugs within the community and then burn the plane to hide the evidence. According to the media reports, the latter group prevailed and armed themselves with weapons (pistols, AK-47 rifles) that had been stored since the 1980's. According to the eye-witness accounts, on December 7 at 2 p.m. two boats with approximately 40 Colombian narco-traffickers, who were "armed to the teeth," arrived in Walpa Siksa to rescue the pilots and the third passenger (known as "el Jefe" or "the boss," believed to be Alberto Ruiz Cano), and to recover the plane's lost "merchandise." The Colombians spent the night of December 7 and all day December 8 trying to convince the community to return the missing drugs and cash. According to END reports, when the narco-traffickers learned that a government anti-drug unit was coming from Bilwi to investigate the plane crash, they armed the community in order to repel the Navy. As soon as the two Navy boats arrived, the narco-traffickers opened fire on the sailors, who also shot back, killing four community members [NOTE: only one death in the community has been confirmed. END NOTE]. The navy boats returned to Bilwi at 7 p.m. with their dead and wounded. On December 9, the wounded civilians from Walpa Siksa were taken to a nearby village and, by the afternoon, the Walpa Siksa village was evacuated because villagers feared reprisals by the Government. ¶5. (C) Our Embassy contacts on the ground in the RAAN have relayed an account similar to that reported in the newspaper, but that differs on some important details. According to our sources, on Friday, December 4, an airplane carrying hundreds of pounds of cocaine and sacks of cash ran out of fuel on its way to a clandestine runway in the RAAN and was forced to make an emergency landing on the beach near Walpa Siksa. The plane's pilot and two passengers, allegedly Colombians, suffered minor injuries and were sheltered by the local community. Members of the community quickly emptied the airplane of its cargo, estimated to be approximately a half-ton of cocaine separated into individual one kilo packets. Our contacts told us that word of the plane crash quickly spread throughout the coastal communities and on Saturday morning, December 5, several local merchants left Bilwi with their boats full of commercial goods and food to sell to the community with its sudden new windfall. By Saturday evening narco-trafficker "rescue boats" carrying approximately 40 Colombians and Hondurans (reportedly from Honduras and San Andres) arrived in the community to save the pilot/passengers and recover the drugs and cash. Over the ensuing three days, village elders urged by the narco "recovery team" tried to persuade the community to sell the cocaine packets back at a price of $3,000 a kilo. According to our contacts, the major sticking point was that the $3,000 price was only half the $6,000 per kilo price that locals knew they could get by taking their windfall slightly up the coast to Honduras. When one group of Walpa Siksa residents ultimately refused to sell back their stash to the narco-traffickers, they were attacked and robbed of their "windfall." This group subsequently traveled to Bilwi on the morning of Tuesday, December 8, and filed a formal complaint with the police there, which confirmed rumors of a drug-plane crash. Our contacts told us that it was this formal complaint that lead to the government dispatching the counter-drug unit to investigate at Walpa Siksa. The anti-drug unit arrived in two boats to Walpa Siksa at approximately 6 p.m. Our contacts told us that there had been no ambush when they arrived, but rather an "amicable" meeting between law enforcement and village elders. However, things turned sour after one of the Colombians from the "rescue team," who was drunk and under the impression they were under attack, shot his automatic weapon into the group of uniformed sailors, killing one and seriously wounding several other counter-drug unit members. Our contacts told us that the "ambush" story was fabricated later by authorities to account for their dead and wounded. COMMENT ¶6. (C) Walpa Siksa has obliged us to revise our views about the nature and extent of trafficking activity on the Atlantic. Previously, our assessment had been that the majority of the local indigenous Miskito villages were too xenophobic to actively support outsiders (even Nicaraguans from the Pacific side of Hispanic descent) in transporting drugs (or, frankly, any other activity) for extended periods. We had also believed that local interaction with traffickers had been intermittent, and normally took place upon the instruction or advice of a small number of corrupt political and indigenous leaders in the region. We maintain our basic assessment is still valid; however, all three versions of the Walpa Siksa incident reveal evidence that there is likely a much higher degree of cooperation and support than we previously believed between foreign drug trafficking organization and, at least, the more remote local communities of Nicaragua's Atlantic Coast. In some cases there may be persistent and pervasive relationships within an entire community. We fear that it now appears that organized criminal elements may have made major inroads within some remote coastal communities, convincing them to join forces by offering perhaps the only secure and steady employment opportunity on the Coast - maintaining drug trafficking supply routes. Nicaragua's Atlantic is a key mid-point for an increasingly busy transit corridor of South American drug shipments bound for the United States. It is also the most underdeveloped and economically backward region of the country and has been generally ignored by the current and previous central governments in Managua. This combination of political neglect, limited economic opportunity and daily shipments of drugs creates conditions for a possible "perfect storm" where Nicaragua's Atlantic Coast could degenerate into an ungoverned "Narco-Coast," with serious repercussions for Nicaragua's political stability and U.S. counternarcotics cooperation. In subsequent messages we will address reaction to Walpa Siksa by local, regional and national figures. We will also provide more detailed reporting about the key figures caught up in the Walpa Siksa incident and outline some of the networks and relationships that we believe traffickers have been able to establish. CALLAHAN
VZCZCXRO6805 OO RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR DE RUEHSF #0641/01 2761002 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 021002Z OCT 08 FM AMEMBASSY SOFIA TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5430 INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SOFIA 000641 SIPDIS FOR SPECIAL ENVOY BOYDEN GRAY E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/30/2018 TAGS: ECON ENRG PGOV BU SUBJECT: BULGARIA AND THE ENERGY KNOT: SCENESETTER FOR OCT 7 VISIT OF SPE GRAY Classified By: Ambassador Nancy McEldowney for reasons 1.4. (b) and (d) . ¶1. (C) Summary: The quandary over energy facing all our European partners is particularly acute here in Bulgaria. With few hydrocarbons of its own, Bulgaria relies on Russia for seventy percent of its total energy needs and over ninety percent of its gas. Though previously a net exporter of electricity, the EU's decision to force closure of blocks 3 and 4 of the communist-era nuclear plant Kozluduy cost the Bulgarian economy over USD 1.4 billion and put a squeeze on Serbia, Macedonia and Greece, who had purchased the bulk of the exports. The hard reality of today's energy picture is that Russia is not only the dominant supplier, it is also the dominant player -- your visit here is the first by a senior U.S. energy official in a year, whereas Putin has personally engaged both the President and Prime Minister on energy issues in multiple sessions over the past ten months. But the cartoon strip portraying a passionately eager Bulgaria in bed with the muscle bound duo of Gazprom and Lukoil is only partially true -- it is a tryst driven less by passion and more by a perceived lack of options. Prime Minister Stanishev recently described Russian tactics on South Stream as blackmail and Energy Minister Dimitrov complains openly of psychological warfare. At the same time, the Bulgarians are deeply worried about the prospects for Nabucco and are convinced that Azeri gas supplies will be held up by Turkey. Their bid to hold an energy summit in the spring, the ostensible focus of your visit, is designed to catalyze greater coordination -- and negotiating leverage -- amongst transit countries while also getting the United States more actively engaged. Background on specific issues likely to arise in your discussions with President Parvanov, Prime Minister Stanishev, Foreign Minister Kalfin and Energy Minister Dimitrov follows below. End Summary. TIMING ------ ¶2. (C) Your visit to Sofia comes when Bulgaria is striving to sell itself as a European energy center. With six active or potential pipelines transiting the country, the creation of a new energy mega-holding company, and the construction of a new nuclear plant, Bulgaria is setting itself up to be an important regional energy player, despite being overly dependent on Russian energy sources. The proposal to host a major gas summit in April 2009 -- which Putin has already promised to attend -- is the latest attempt to put Bulgaria on the energy map. Your visit will guide the Bulgarians as they formulate an agenda and goals for this summit. It will also focus Bulgarian policy makers on U.S. views on Russian energy strategy and South Stream, answer growing skepticism about Nabucco's prospects, and give solid counter-arguments to those who say there is no real alternative to dependence on Russian energy. THE SUMMIT ---------- ¶3. (C) At the January 19 signing of the South Stream Intergovernmental Agreement, President Parvanov, with Putin at his side, announced Bulgaria would host an energy summit intended as a follow-on to the June 2007 Zagreb energy conference. Upon Putin's departure, Sofia fell under heavy criticism both at home and abroad for hastily joining South Stream, and the energy summit idea lost steam. Ambassador for Energy Security Peter Poptchev told us the Bulgarians resented perceived Russian pressure to hold such a summit. In July the Bulgarians independently resurrected the summit idea as a way to show Bulgarian support for Nabucco and diversification, as well to balance European, U.S. and Russian interests in the Caspian and Black Sea regions. With the potential for six pipelines passing through its territory, the Bulgarians also have high hopes to become a regional energy hub. The summit, they believe, will help put Sofia on the map not only as an energy center, but as a place that brokers discussions between the West, Russia and Eurasia. ¶4. (C) The Bulgarians requested your visit to advise on the summit. They envision a spring conference (tentatively April 24-25) that would bring together heads of state from Eurasian and European producer, transit and consumer countries. PM Stanishev told Ambassador September 19 that Putin has agreed to attend. The summit will be gas-focused and will attempt to put "real solutions" on sources, routes and quantities on the table. Well-aware of the potential for East European energy conference fatigue in the first half of 2009, the Bulgarians are proposing that all key participants, including the EU, the United States and Russia, view the proposed Hungarian, Bulgarian and Czech conferences as a linked continuum. The April Sofia conference would take care of any unfinished business left from the January Hungary Conference and the proposed Czech conference would take up where the Sofia conference leaves off. To distinguish the Bulgarian summit, Sofia is considering including an as-yet undeveloped "industry component." ¶5. (C) The Bulgarians will seek U.S. views and your advice on the proposed agenda of the summit and whether it will advance U.S. goals in the region. They want recommendations on how to coordinate the Hungarian, Bulgarian and Czech conferences and may seek advice on the proposed industry component of the Sofia summit. They are interested in, but may not ask directly about, U.S. views on whether Sofia has a future as an intermediary between Europe, the United States and Russia on energy and other issues affecting the Black Sea region. They are interested in your analysis of recent Azeri and Turkish energy moves. They will also request high level U.S. attendance at the summit. BULGARIAN ENERGY PROJECTS -------------------------- ¶6. (C) SOUTH STREAM: The Bulgarians signed the South Stream intergovernmental agreement in January and Parliament ratified the agreement in July. Negotiations between Bulgargaz and Gazprom resumed in September to work out a pre-shareholders agreement. At our recommendation, and at the direction of the Government, state-owned Bulgargaz reluctantly hired outside legal counsel (the U.S. law firm Paul Hastings) to represent it in South Stream negotiations. With the creation of a new, state-owned energy mega-holding in September, Bulgargaz has lost much of its previously-considerable independence. The acting head of the Bulgarian Energy Holding is Deputy Energy Minister Galina Tosheva, previously lead South Stream negotiator for the Bulgarian Government. Tosheva has a healthy suspicion of Russia's intentions in Bulgaria and has directed Bulgargaz to rely on its legal counsel for expert advice. Tosheva told us that Gazprom negotiators are taking a hard line now that negotiations have resumed. They are proposing to re-route gas currently transiting Bulgaria (for which Bulgartransgas makes a healthy profit) to South Stream, meaning South Stream would not represent 31 bcm of new gas for Europe, but something significantly lower. The Bulgarians state that this is contrary to the spirit of the IGA and are preparing to fight the Russian proposal. ¶7. (C) NABUCCO: Despite the strong public support they have shown Nabucco this year, the Bulgarians are turning into Nabucco-skeptics. In March, Sofia signed what it thought was an agreement for Azerbaijan to supply 1 bcm of gas that Bulgaria would eventually take as its Nabucco quota. In advance of Nabucco, Bulgaria planned to access the gas via a potential hook-up to the Turkey-Greece-Italy interconnector. Realizing now that the agreement was not, in fact, a commitment on Azerbaijan's part, the Bulgarians feel burned. The government is now in dire need of a pep talk on the Nabucco. They state firmly that both South Stream and Nabucco are critical and that one cannot be allowed to preclude the other. At the same time, they are nervous about both Azerbaijani willingness to supply Nabucco and Turkish willingness to support the project. They will be interested in your view of Nabucco's prospects. ¶8. (C) TGI HOOK-UP: The Bulgarians are in negotiations with Greece about this possible interconnector. Energy Holding CEO Tosheva said this is Bulgaria's most immediate source of diversification and energy security. The Greeks apparently are cool to the idea, saying there is insufficient gas. In response, the Bulgarians have proposed the purchase of LNG to be delivered to Greece in exchange for either TGI access or gas currently going through the export pipeline from Russia and transiting Bulgarian territory. Your Bulgarian interlocutors may ask for U.S. support for these schemes in our discussions with the Greeks and Turks. ¶9. (C) BURGAS-ALEXANDROUPOLIS (BAP) and AMBO: The Bulgarians, Russians and Greeks signed a shareholders agreement for the BAP oil pipeline in January during the Putin visit. Since then, the project company has been registered, but little more progress has been made. The Bulgarians are still confident the pipeline will be built, and seem surprisingly uninterested in the dynamics surrounding CPC expansion. With BAP's relative progress, the AMBO (Albania-Macedonia-Bulgaria) oil pipeline project has lost momentum. Still, Bulgaria remains committed to AMBO and is ready to move forward if and when AMBO attracts supply and financing. ¶10. (C) BELENE: In 2006 the GOB selected Russian AtomstroyExport as the contractor for the new Belene nuclear plant. Bulgaria is keeping majority ownership of the plant, but is in the process of selecting a strategic investor for the other 49 percent. RWE and the Belgian Electrabel are in the running. We have stated repeatedly that the choice of a Russian contractor for Belene decreased Bulgaria's bid for greater independence from Russian energy sources. The lack of transparency surrounding the tender has led to the inescapable conclusion that the decision to choose Russia as the Belene contractor was linked to the re-negotiation of Bulgaria's long-term gas transit contract with Gazprom in December 2006. YOUR MEETINGS ------------- ¶11. (C) President Parvanov began his second five-year term in 2007. Parvanov's desire to exercise behind-the-scenes influence over the government has led to tensions with his former protege, Prime Minister Sergei Stanishev. Parvanov has close ties to Russian politicians and held no less than eight meetings with Vladimir Putin in the last seven years. The energy summit will be under his aegis. --Prime Minister Sergei Stanishev is a 42-year-old progressive Socialist. He is pro-west and eager to have Bulgaria viewed as a good friend and partner of the United States. He returned September 30 from a week-long visit to the United States where he met with U/S Burns, spoke at the Harvard Business School and held an investment forum. He understands that Bulgaria is overly dependent on Russian energy sources, but sees Bulgaria as having few options for greater energy independence. --Foreign Minister Kalfin is close to both Stanishev and Parvanov and as Deputy Prime Minister oversees the Economy and Energy Ministry. He is a strong supporter of close Bulgarian-U.S. relations and is highly conversant on energy issues. --Economy and Energy Minister Petar Dimitrov is a relative new-comer to energy issues. He is largely seen as taking direction on energy matters from former Energy Minister Rumen Ovcharov, who is linked with Russian energy interests and left office in June 2007 after a corruption scandal. ¶12. (C) Your visit will also highlight, though meetings and press outreach, the need for Bulgaria to focus on a long-term energy strategy not solely based on the transit of hydrocarbons or the production of Russian-based nuclear energy, but on the development of renewables, clean coal and greater energy efficiency. Bulgaria will always be dependent on Russian energy to one extent or another. But as the most energy inefficient economy in Europe, it can make meaningful strides toward greater diversity away from Russian energy sources. With the price of energy at near record highs, Russia's hydrocarbon-generated wealth is increasingly circulating through the Bulgarian economy, making Bulgaria all the more susceptible to Russian leverage. An energy strategy that focuses on renewables and efficiency is one tool Bulgaria can use to put a noticeable dent in negative Russian influence. The other tool is transparency. Hub status in any industry is bestowed only on places which offer transparent, efficient service. To achieve its goal of becoming a true energy center, we should recommend that Bulgaria present itself not as the place with closest ties to Russia, but as the most transparent place to do energy deals. McEldowney
VZCZCXRO4957 RR RUEHAO RUEHCD RUEHFL RUEHGA RUEHGD RUEHHA RUEHHO RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHMC RUEHNG RUEHNL RUEHQU RUEHRD RUEHRG RUEHRS RUEHSR RUEHTM RUEHVC DE RUEHROV #0562/01 3571109 ZNY CCCCC ZZH R 231109Z DEC 05 FM AMEMBASSY VATICAN TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0207 INFO RUEHWH/WESTERN HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS DIPL POSTS RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE RUEHROV/AMEMBASSY VATICAN 0232 TAGS: PGOV PHUM KIRF PREL VT MX VE C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 VATICAN 000562 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR EUR/WE LARREA E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/23/2015 TAGS: PGOV PHUM KIRF PREL VT MX VE SUBJECT: VATICAN WARY OF LEFTIST LATINOS REF: A. REFS: A) LARREA-MARTIN EMAIL; B) CARACAS 3757; C) VATICAN 551 ET AL.; D) VATICAN 552 ¶B. A) LARREA - MARTIN 12/9 EMAIL; B) CARACAS 3757; C) VATICAN 551 ET AL.; D) VATICAN 552 VATICAN 00000562 001.2 OF 002 CLASSIFIED BY: Peter Martin, Pol/Econ Chief, Vatican, State. REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) ----------- Summary ----------- ¶1. (C) The Ambassador shared ref (a) points on Venezuela's nefarious influence in the region with Holy See internal affairs chief (Vatican number three) Archbishop Leonardo Sandri December ¶17. Some points were news to Sandri, but he was not surprised and said he shared U.S. concerns about Chavez and other leftist leaders in Latin America. An interlocutor from the Vatican MFA as well told the Ambassador that he and his superiors were wary of connections among these leaders. Neither prelate thought the Vatican would become more aggressive in speaking out against these figures, both because of recent history and the potential for a backlash against the Church. The Ambassador will see FM Lajolo after the holidays to continue this dialogue. End Summary. ------------------------------- Sandri Under No Illusions ------------------------------- ¶2. (C) The Ambassador met with Archbishop Leonardo Sandri December 17 for a wide-ranging conversation on the Church in Latin America. Sandri, an Argentine and former nuncio to Venezuela, is the chief of Vatican internal operations and generally regarded as the Holy See's number three behind the pope and Secretary of State. Ambassador discussed ref (a) points, emphasizing the danger Chavez poses to the governments around him. Sandri was aware of some points, but others came as news to him. In any case, he was not surprised. Sandri said he was convinced that Chavez was dangerous from the time he took office and Sandri was stationed in Caracas. The archbishop said he had taken a harder line than the U.S. Embassy at the time, who told him to "wait and see" what Chavez did in office. ------------------------- Holy See Concerned ------------------------- ¶3. (C) According to Sandri, who said he knew the pope's thinking on the subject, the Holy See is concerned about a general leftward shift in Latin America. He mentioned concerns about several figures who seemed to be looking to Castro and Chavez, including Mexico's Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador. Holy See MFA Country Director for the U.S. and Mexico Monsignor Paolo Gualtieri told the Ambassador in a separate meeting December 15 that his superiors in the MFA were of a similar mindset. They see the connections between Chavez, Castro, and other leftist politicians in Latin America, and are concerned about the dangers they present on many levels. --------------- What to Do? --------------- ¶4. (C) While the Vatican agrees that these figures are dangerous, it sees the question of how to deal with them as more complicated. The Ambassador's conversation with Sandri tracked closely with the description of the pope's concern on Venezuela noted in ref (b). However, Sandri stuck to the previous Vatican line on engagement there; he did not see the Holy See changing its non-confrontational approach to Chavez given the recent history between Venezuela and the Holy See (ref c). He responded favorably to the idea that direct aid from the U.S. Catholic Church to the Venezuelan Church to help the latter build up its social programs could help counteract Chavez's appeal and blunt his attacks on the Church. Gualtieri noted that in the case of someone like Lopez Obrador, the Church had to be careful not to overstep its bounds into politics, no matter how it felt. He said Masonic groups and some segments of Mexican society were ready to pounce on bishops or clergy who strayed into the political realm (ref d). ------------ Comment ----------- ¶5. (C) The Holy See continues to feel that a non-confrontational approach to Chavez is the right strategy for the time being, but the Vatican hierarchy is under no illusions about the danger of Chavez and kindred souls - and the connections between them. Sandri has great influence in the Vatican and as a former nuncio to Venezuela his views on that country carry particular weight. But his formal competency is the internal affairs of the Church. The Ambassador will see Gualtieri's boss, FM Lajolo, after the holidays to continue this dialogue, as Lajolo has the lead on all questions of foreign policy. ROONEY
VZCZCXRO8319 PP RUEHAO RUEHCD RUEHGA RUEHGD RUEHHA RUEHHO RUEHMC RUEHMT RUEHNG RUEHNL RUEHQU RUEHRD RUEHRG RUEHRS RUEHTM RUEHVC DE RUEHCV #0269/01 0621545 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 031545Z MAR 09 FM AMEMBASSY CARACAS TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2674 INFO RUEHWH/WESTERN HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS DIPL POSTS RUEAHLC/DHS WASHDC RULSDMK/DEPT OF TRANSPORTATION RUEABND/DEA HQ WASHINGTON DC RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY RUMIAAA/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL C O N F 1 D E N TIA L SECTION 01 OF 02 CARACAS 000269 SIPDIS HQ SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD TREASURY FOR MMALLOY COMMERCE FOR 4431/MAC/WH/JLAO E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/28/2019 TAGS: ECON PGOV PREL ETRD EINV EAIR VE SUBJECT: VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT IGNORES USG OVERTURES ON AVIATION REF: 2008 CARACAS 647 CARACAS 00000269 001.2 OF 002 Classified By: Economic Counselor Damall Steuart for reasons 1.4 (b)and(d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: A Venezuelan private sector organization advocated strongly for the Venezuelan civil aviation authority (INAC) to support the issuance of visas for F AA inspectors and to meet with the Embassy to discuss visa matters. The Venezuelan govemment (GBRV) has not acceded to either request. While five intemational airlines recent1y received a disbursement of dollars from Venezuelan exchange control agency (CADIVI), no US carriers were inc1uded. Charge Caulfield's request to meet with CAD IVI to discuss US company requests for dollars has also gone unanswered. END SUMMARY. LOCAL SUPPORT FOR THE USG HAS NOT BUDGED THE GBRV ¶2. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX told Econoffs in January that INAC wanted a solution to its US visa issues with an emphasis on obtaining visas for Venezuelan military pilots. On February 11, the AlDCM called INAC and offered to discuss visa matters with INAC President Jose Martinez. Although XXXXXXXXXXXX met with Martinez and encouraged him to meet with the AlDCM, INAC has yet to respond to the Embassy's offer. ¶3. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX was also a strong proponent of an FAA visit. Two of Venezuela's three FAA-certified aircraft maintenance facilities have lost their certifications as F AA inspectors have been unable to obtain visas. The third facility will lose its certification in June 2009. XXXXXXXXXXXX explained that this situation is extremely detrimental for Venezuelan businesses in the aviation sector, but that he and his association members have been unsuccessful in convincing the Venezuelan govemment to issue FAA visas. (Note: After failing in their second attempt to obtain visas, F AA inspectors withdrew their passports from the Venezuelan Embassy in early February.) FOREIGN EXCHANGE PAIN ¶4. (C) On February 10, the Charge requested a meeting with CADIVI to discuss the outstanding dollar requests by US businesses in all sectors. CAD IVI has not responded to the Charge's request to date. All three US carriers with operations in Venezuela strongly support a meeting between the Embassy and CAD IVI and would be willing to provide whatever documentation Post might need for their sector. (Note: CADIVI is the agency that administers the GBRV's currency controls. To receive US dollars at the official exchange rate for transactions such as dividend repatriation and operating costs, a company must obtain CAD IVI approval. There are no reliable figures for how much money US companies as a whole have requested from CADIVI, but most believe the number is in the billions. See reftel for more information on CADIVI.) ¶5. (C) On February 17, Econoffs met with XXXXXXXXXXXX And XXXXXXXXXXXX. Both said they would encourage CAD IVI President Manuel Barroso to respond to the Embassy's request. However, neither was optimistic. XXXXXXXXXXXX pointed out that the Vice President ofIATA had come to Venezuela twice for appointments with CADIVI but Barroso "stood him up" both times. ¶6. (C) Three months ago when it became c1ear that Venezuela's supply of dollars would dwindle, XXXXXXXXXXXX said, Barroso started approving all dollar authorizations personally. The approvals are "completely arbitrary" according to XXXXXXXXXXXX who argued that Barroso is a military man and a "mini Chavez" who "wants all the power in his own hands." XXXXXXXXXXXX said Barroso recent1y asked Chavez for another year as the head of CADIVI and Chavez agreed as Barroso used to be a member of Chavez' personal security detachment and remains his "good friend." Nevertheless, XXXXXXXXXXXX argued that CADIVI was not discriminating against US airlines when it recent1y disbursed dollars to five non-U S carriers. XXXXXXXXXXXX explained that there are simply not enough dollars to go around. American Airlines, the largest operator in the Venezuelan market, is awaiting the most substantial dollar disbursement of any airline. COMMENT ¶7. (C) While there is strong private sector support for increased bilateral cooperation on aviation issues, the GBRV chooses not to respond to USG overtures. Sources in the sector report that sorne in INAC want to accept the Embassy's repeated offers to begin a dialogue on technical issues. However, INAC officials current1y answer direct1y to the Venezuelan Vice President who does not seem disposed to increasing cooperation with the USG. (A more detailed discussion of intemal INAC operations will follow septel.) US airlines, and indeed the intemational business community, are increasingly concemed with the difficulty in obtaining dollars from CAD IVI in part due to the rumored possibility that the GBRV may devalue in the near future. The GBRV unfortunately seems uninterested in their concems. GENNA TIEMPO
VZCZCXYZ0001 OO RUEHWEB DE RUEHRO #0433/01 1061348 ZNY SSSSS ZZH O 161348Z APR 09 FM AMEMBASSY ROME TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1935 INFO RUEHDJ/AMEMBASSY DJIBOUTI PRIORITY 0273 RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY S E C R E T ROME 000433 SIPDIS OSD FOR MAGGIE SADOWSKA EUR/RPM FOR CHRIS DAVY AND PETER CHISHOLM EUR/WE FOR CHRIS JESTER AND PAMELA SPRATLEN AF/RSA FOR MIKE BITTRICK AND JUN BANDO E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/17/2019 TAGS: MASS MARR EWWT KCRM PBTS PGOV PHSA PREL AORC SUBJECT: PIRACY: ITALY REQUESTS ASSISTANCE FOR ANTI-PIRACY OPERATION REF: WASLEY-JESTER-SADOWSKA EMAILS 4-15-09 Classified By: Charge d'Affaires a.i. Elizabeth Dibble for Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D) ¶1. (S) The Government of Italy sent U.S. Embassy Rome an unclassified Note Verbale on April 16 thanking the USG for assistance provided thus far in the deployment of Italian Special Forces to Djibouti for possible use in an anti-piracy mission and requesting continuing assistance as needed. The note, sent in unclassified channels to speed up the process, was generated in response to our requirement that any further USG assistance in support of the Italian anti-piracy mission be requested via Diplomatic Note. ¶2. (S) Background: The Italian-owned and flagged tugboat Buccaneer was taken by pirates in the Gulf of Aden on April ¶11. The ship has 16 crew members on board: 10 Italian, 5 Romanian, and 1 Croatian, and is currently about one nautical mile from the coast of Somalia. The Italian military has requested permission from the Government of Djibouti and Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) to use Camp Lemonier in Djibouti as a logistical staging area in preparation for a possible rescue mission. The GOI assures us that it has obtained all the necessary landing permits from the Government of Djibouti. It has already landed one aircraft in Djibouti with approximately 29 logistical support staff, currently housed at Camp Lemonier, to prepare for the staging. The mission, if it happens, will not/not be launched from Djiboutian soil, and the GOI is currently considering other options that do not entail a rescue mission. Italy may use its Frigate MAESTRALE, currently deployed to the region as part of EU operation ATALANTA, and which is currently shadowing the pirates, to launch the operation, or may make use of other vessels. Italy may request helicopter, intel, and other logistical support from the U.S. as the need arises, but currently its request is limited to logistical support to house units at Camp Lemonier. ¶3. (S) Post has stressed to the GOI the need to provide as many details as possible about the potential operation in a timely manner, as well as the need to coordinate fully with the Government of Djibouti. The Defense Attache is in contact with the Italian Military and Poloffs are in contact with the MFA Operations Center as the situation evolves, and will provide additional operational details as they become available. ¶4. (SBU) The translated text of the Note is as follows (Italian original will be emailed to EUR/WE): BEGIN TEXT "Ministry of Foreign Affairs Rome, 4/16/2009 Prot. 0129432 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Italy presents its compliments to the Embassy of the United States of America and, in consideration of our shared efforts in the fight against terrorism and piracy, has the honor to express its full appreciation for the assistance provided to the "Training Mission" sent to Djibouti. The sending of the mission, as well as the deployment of the Italian Frigate "MAESTRALE," forms part of the efforts undertaken by the Government of Italy in the struggle against piracy. While noting that the Authorities of Djibouti have provided the necessary visas and aircraft landing authorizations, the Italian Government is particularly grateful to the Government of the United States of America for having hosted this mission at Camp Lemonier. The Italian Government, in addition, is grateful to the Government of the United States of America henceforth for any further assistance that it might provide in the future. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in expressing its full gratitude for the collaboration, takes the opportunity to extend to the Embassy of the United States of America reassurances of its highest consideration." END TEXT DIBBLE